R v David John Stevens
[2014] NSWDC 167
•01 August 2014
District Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: R v David John STEVENS [2014] NSWDC 167 Decision date: 01 August 2014 Before: Yehia SC DCJ Decision: An aggregate sentence of 10 years is imposed with a non parole period of four years six months.
Catchwords: Sexual assault, rape, gang rape, aiding and abetting rape Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1990
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Parole of Prisoners Act 1966Cases Cited: AJB v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 51 (5 March 2007)
Catalan 1975 NSWCCA 226
Flaherty & Ors (1968) 89 NSW (as said) 141
Hili v R [2010] 520 CLR 537
Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50 (1 March 2013)
R v Flaherty & Ors (1968) 3 NSWLR
R v MJR [2010] NSWSC 653 (18 June 2010)
R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517Category: Sentence Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
David John StevensRepresentation: Mr Robinson for the Crown
Mr Greenhill for the Offender
File Number(s): 2013/91176
SENTENCE
HER HONOUR: The offender Mr Stevens pleaded not guilty to nine counts relating to sexual misconduct against the complainant.
On 15 May 2014 the trial commenced in relation to the nine counts on the indictment.
On 27 May 2014 the jury returned verdicts of guilty with respect to counts 1 to 8 inclusive and not guilty on count 9. It is appropriate to note at this early stage that counts 1 to 8 relate to events that all took place on one night between 1 September 1978 and 31 December 1978.
Count 9 related to a separate occasion between 1 February 1980 and 31 August 1980.
Mr Stevens maintained a denial that the events ever took place that night or indeed on any night. The jury's verdict on counts 1 to 8 is however consistent with the rejection of that denial and the acceptance of the complainant's evidence on those counts.
For the purpose of sentencing I make the following findings.
Mr Stevens attended a house-warming party in the south west of Sydney at the home of Julie Caldwell. He was about 19 years old. The victim was also at that party. She was 17 years old.
The offender and victim lived on the same street in Campbelltown, New South Wales, the offender having moved there with his mother and sister in early December 1978.
The offender had been driven to the party by his friend Rudolf Reichel in Mr Reichel's yellow Holden Sandman panel van. The offender and the victim were part of a group who walked outside Julie Caldwell's house at about the same time. Part of this group included Rudolf Reichel, Glen Partridge, Mark Johnson, Edward Lewockie, Susan Thomas and Vickie Chalker.
Julie Caldwell had also walked out of her house and down the driveway. Mr Reichel's Sandman was parked outside. Just after leaving Julie Caldwell's house the offender picked up the victim against her will and placed her into the back of the Sandman. The offender did this for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with her. These are the facts that give rise to count 1, the offence of forcible detention pursuant to s 89 of the Crimes Act 1990.
The Sandman was then driven away by Mr Reichel. There was dispute during the trial as to the configuration of seats in the Sandman as this was relevant to who got into the van at Julie Caldwell's residence and was present at all times when the other offences later occurred.
It was also relevant to the credibility of the complainant's account that essentially she was unable to climb into the front cabin of the car and make good her escape because of the bench seat. I accept that the configuration of the front seat was a bench seat. The back of the van was arranged for the mattress. The back door was divided into two panels with the top panel opening upwards.
The complainant was in the back of the van with the offender, Mark Johnson, Glen Partridge, Edward Lewockie. Rudolf Reichel was driving. Seated next to him was Susan Thomas with a friend, Vickie Chalker, occupying the far left front passenger seat.
Once the complainant was in the back of the van she was held down. Her underwear was taken off by the offender who passed it to Mark Johnson. Mr Johnson passed it to Rudolf Reichel who threw it out the window. They laughed.
The offender proceeded to push the complainant down and lay on top of her. The victim said that he was pushing his penis into her vagina and that it was hurting, so she tried to push him away.
The offender continued to push down and push his penis inside her vagina. The victim said she also felt Mark Johnson touching her leg and starting to stroke it. Those are the facts that I find which constitute count 2, the count of rape pursuant to the then s 63 of the Crimes Act 1990.
After the offender had finished the complainant said that she attempted to move away to the passenger side of the van in an attempt to get away from the offender and the other men in the van. I accept her evidence.
The complainant asked Mr Reichel to take her back to Julie's place where her bag and shoes were. Sue Thomas who was sitting in the front of the panel van next to the driver also heard the complainant ask Mr Reichel to take her back to Julie's place and heard her offer Mr Reichel money for petrol.
Ms Thomas also gave evidence that prior to that she saw the offender on top of the complainant in the back of the van and that other men were also in the back of the van.
The panel van then pulled up at Browning Street Hamilton and Vickie Chalker and Sue Thomas got out. Rudolf Reichel had gotten out of the front seat and the front driver's door was still open. The complainant tried to jump over the front seat in an attempt to get out. However the offender pulled her back towards the back of the van. The offender then proceeded to lay on top of her and have penile vaginal intercourse again.
The complainant said that she struggled. These are the facts that constitute count 3, again an offence of rape pursuant to the then s 63 of the Crimes Act 1990.
At this stage the other men that had been in the back of the van including Mr Reichel, had gotten out and were standing at the back of the van. The complainant could see them from where she was in the back of the van. When the offender had finished having intercourse with her Mark Johnson got into the van and had penile vaginal intercourse with the complainant.
The offender had gotten out and was standing at the back of the van during this time.
Consistent with the jury's verdict the offender was aiding and abetting Mark Johnson to rape the victim. The offender was standing there ready, willing and able to assist if need be. For example if the victim tried to escape. He did not however commit any physical act of assistance. These are the facts constituting count 4 aiding and abetting rape in contravention of the then s 63 of the Crimes Act 1990.
Once Mark Johnson had finished with the victim Edward Lewockie got on top of her. The complainant said that she did not have time to get up "or anything." Mr Lewockie also put his penis in the complainant's vagina without her consent. Again the offender was present outside the van in sight of the victim aiding and abetting Edward Lewockie to rape the victim.
The offender is liable on this basis in relation to count 5 and again the count of rape pursuant to the then s 63 of the Crimes Act 1990.
Count 6 is in contravention of s 76 of the Crimes Act 1990 and involves the indecent assault of the victim by Rudolf Reichel.
After Mr Lewockie raped the victim Mr Reichel got on top of the victim in the back of the van. The victim said that he didn't "really try and enter her", although he had his penis on her and was simulating sexual intercourse with her. At one stage Mr Reichel pulled out a cross that was hanging around his neck out from under his shirt and held it up in front of her face.
The offender was standing outside the van knowing what was taking place and ready and willing to assist if Mr Reichel needed it.
The offender then aided and abetted the attempted rape of the victim by Glen Partridge in contravention of s 65 of the Crimes Act 1990. Mr Partridge tried to get on top of the victim. He had his trousers down and was lying close to the victim with his head slightly above hers. He was close enough that she was able to bite him on the left shoulder. As soon as she did Mr Partridge backed off straight away.
The actions he performed up until that time constitute the attempted rape. The offender is liable as an aider and abettor of the attempted rape as again he was standing at the back of the van ready, willing and able to assist if Mr Partridge needed.
Following that, some of the men, it is unclear who, tried to tip the victim over. The victim said she struggled and they pulled her back down. The victim remembers the song "Working For The Man" came on. One of them asked her "Are you working for the men?" and laughed.
By then the victim says she was lying down and the offender had his legs straddled over her abdomen. He was facing towards her and grabbed her breasts. Her clothes were on the upper part of her body. He pushed her breasts together and thrust his penis between her breasts. These are the facts that constitute count 8, an indecent assault in contravention of s 76 of the Crimes Act 1990.
Some time after that and as the victim was pulling her skirt up Mark Johnson picked up a bottle and suggested using it on the victim. Rudolf Reichel replied "no she'd had enough".
The victim was then dropped off at a man called Simon's house. Simon's friend Rick was also staying there. Both were unknown to the victim, however the victim stayed there the night as she said she was unsure whether the offender was still outside and she did not want to risk leaving and running into him.
Maximum Penalties
For the now repealed offence of rape contrary to s 63 of the Crimes Act 1990, that is counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. For the offence of attempted rape contrary to s 65, count 6, the maximum penalty is 14 years imprisonment. For the offence of indecent assault contrary to s 76, counts 7 and 8, the maximum penalty is four years. For the offence of forcible detention with intent to carnally know, contrary to s 89 count 1 the maximum penalty is 14 years.
Objective Seriousness
Every offence of rape or sexual misconduct against another is a serious offence. I have heard the victim read out her victim impact statement today and I accept the emotional and psychological harm suffered by her is significant and ongoing. I have had regard to the substantial adverse impact upon her.
In assessing the objective seriousness of each offence I accept there is a continuum of seriousness for offences of this type. Some offences of sexual misconduct may be more serious than others. In some cases the degree of violence, the physical hurt inflicted, the circumstances of the forced intercourse or the humiliation may be greater in one case than another.
I must assess the objective seriousness of the offences before me. In doing so I note that the counts of rape upon which the offender has been found guilty are brought pursuant to s 63 of the Crimes Act 1990, now repealed. That offence involved the act of penile vaginal intercourse. The section did not include several categories of sexual penetration within the offence of rape. It did carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment thereby reflecting the seriousness with which it was considered and continues to be regarded.
The objective seriousness of each offence here is heightened by the fact that others were present at the time the offender or principal offender committed each offence.
Counts 1 and 2 were committed in the presence of the complainant's friends. All counts were committed in the presence of the offender's friends, all of whom were themselves a principal offender at some stage during the night. If they were not present in the van at the time the offence occurred they were standing outside the van in full view of the complainant.
I find that what essentially occurred was a gang rape. Aside from count 1 the offences were committed in the enclosed space of the van, limiting the options available to the complainant to remove herself from the situation.
She had tried unsuccessfully on at least one occasion. She could see that whilst she was being raped the rear door was blocked by four men or so. The victim would have been struck by fear and feelings of helplessness from the time she was thrown into the van by the offender to the time that she was dropped off at Mr Simon's house sometime later that night.
This fear would have been exacerbated and sustained by the fact that in accordance with evidence of the victim during the trial that she did not have a great degree of knowledge of her location from the time that Sue Thomas and Vickie Chalker were dropped off and had left the van. She did not know what the intentions of the offender were after she was left at Mr Simon's place and whether he would have seen her had she tried to make her way home.
However, I find that the offences were not planned or organised such as to enliven s 21A(2)(M). The offender's conduct was at first opportunistic. The offending conduct did however persist and demonstrated a completed disregard for the wellbeing of the victim.
Taking into account these considerations in relation to each particular offence I make the following findings:
The objective seriousness of the forcible detention of the complainant, count 5, was just below the middle of the range of objective seriousness. There were no accompanying threats of violence and any physical restraint of the victim by the offender was momentary. Although the victim initially described being thrown into the van she later said she was "placed" in the van.
Julie Caldwell who also witnessed the event gave evidence about what she saw. She said that she saw Michelle picked up by one of the boys underneath her legs and back and that they took her to the back of the car and threw her in.
She was however picked up and placed in the van against her will at a time when a number of men were in the back of the van. Although two of her girlfriends were in the front passenger seat I accept that she must have been fearful about what was going to happen.
The acts constituting the four counts of rape fall into two categories in my view. In Counts 2 and 3 the offender was the principal offender. He perpetrated the rape himself. Counts 4 and 5 involve liability as an aider and abettor of the rapes.
In a case of Catalan 1975 NSWCCA 226 his Honour CJ Street pointed out that rape has been many times categorised as one of the most serious crimes of violence. At that time rape was restricted to the act of penile vaginal intercourse.
In the present case the rapes were not accompanied by violence, although I accept that the offender and principal offenders had to apply pressure on the victim overbearing her to ensure that she remained where she was. The victim at the time was a petite girl of 17 years or thereabouts.
I find that the criminality involved in these four counts of rape is in the middle of the range of objective seriousness. Although the offender himself did not have intercourse with the complainant in counts 4 and 5 the verdicts reflect the jury's findings that at the relevant time he was present, knowing what was taking place and with the intention of assisting or encouraging of the crime.
I find that the objective seriousness of the attempted rape, count 7, is also at the middle of the range of objective seriousness. Whilst no act of intercourse actually took place the attempt was made after a number of other men had either raped or indecently assaulted the victim. It was only the victim's act of biting the perpetrator that caused him to stop his actions. The offender here was also aiding and abetting.
I find that the objective seriousness of the indecent assault of the victim by the offender, count 8, was low. I make this finding in light of the wider range of criminality that was encompassed within s 76 of the Crimes Act 1990 in the year 1978. At the time the offence included acts that now fall within the current definition of sexual intercourse. For example, acts of fellatio, cunnilingus and certain acts of penetration.
The inclusion of several categories of conduct within an offence carries no implication that each category is as heinous as another. Seriousness in that instance depends on the facts of the case. The type of penetration or indecent assault is only one factor and by itself does not indicate how serious the offence is.
Similarly the indecent assault of the victim by Rudolf Reichel, count 6, I find to be at the bottom range of objective seriousness. The acts of Mr Reichel were not accompanied by any threatening behaviour. To the contrary the evidence of the victim suggests that he felt uncomfortable committing those acts upon her. He was still clothed and while it does not diminish what Mr Reichel did, the victim's evidence suggests an element of peer pressure. The offender again is equally liable for this offence as an aider and abettor.
In making these findings with respect to the individual offences I do not intend to convey that the totality of the criminality has not been taken into account. My analysis of the objective seriousness has been conducted taking into account all of the relevant circumstances and the criminality encompassed by the offences as they were at the relevant time.
In imposing sentence I have taken into account the totality of the criminality involved. A consideration of the maximum penalty together with the range of conduct encompassed within a particular offence at the time is an easily ascertainable objective reference point in determining where the offender's conduct falls within the gravity of an offence.
These offences were what are commonly referred to as historical offences. Aside from three complaints to her friends in the days following the offences, the victim did not contact police until some time in 2012, some 32 years after the offences occurred. The offender faced trial and is now being sentenced almost 36 years later.
It is widely accepted, and not in dispute in this case, that sentencing for historical offences should be in accordance with the sentencing patterns in place at the time the offences occurred, see the decisions of Magnuson [2013] NSWCCA 50 (1 March 2013) and MJR[2010] NSWSC 653 (18 June 2010).
Given the length of time that has passed, some precision is required in identifying, if possible, the correct sentencing approach to be applied in this instance to this offender. I have had particular regard to the principles enumerated by Button J in Magnuson. Button J noted a number of relevant factors in discerning a sentencing pattern with regard to sexual offences against children in the 1970s and 80s. This pattern was based upon five factors: statistics, summaries of cases, a recognition of a general increase in sentencing over the last quarter of a century, the increase in maximum penalties and the fifth being judicial memory.
I accept the following principles as applicable to this sentencing exercise: sentences for the offence of indecent assault were more lenient in the late 1970s; lengthy head sentences were imposed for the offence of rape in the late 1970s; while head sentences were not shorter than an analogous offence today, statistics provide some support for the proposition that non-parole periods at the relevant time for the offence of rape were shorter than they would be for an analogous offence today. There has been a steady increase in sentences for serious offences, including sexual offences, since the late 1970s for the reasons expounded in Magnuson.
I also note that standard non-parole periods for sexual assaults are now relevant and were not in the 1970s. The statutory ratio between the parole and non-parole period was governed by Parole of Prisoners Act 1966. It has often been repeated that a sentencing practice in the 1970s and 80s of a non-parole period of one-third to one-half of the term of the sentence was common. Sentencing should be in accordance with the fact that no statutory ratio existed at the time the offences were committed. This is a factor I can have regard to when considering special circumstances.
The Parole of Prisoners Act1966 also implemented a system of remissions which was operative in the 1970s. The application of the system of remissions in relation to sentencing for historical offences was considered in the case of AJB v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 51 (5 March 2007), in particular paras 31 to 33, where it was considered that it was inappropriate for a latter court to try to replicate the executive practice of the treatment of prisoners. Accordingly, I have not taken into account any potential remissions available in the late 1970s in this sentencing exercise.
I have reviewed a large number of cases concerning sexual and indecent assault, and similarly a large number concerning representative accounts for patterns of conduct spanning over months or years. This is not the case here. The offender and the victim were, relatively speaking, of a similar age. The victim was just over 17 and the offender 19. They moved, it would appear, in the same social circles. The offences occurred on one night and are not representative.
The Crown provided me with a copy of an interim report entitled Sentencing Sex Offenders in New South Wales. It included appendix B, a schedule of cases and sentences imposed. The schedule sets out the facts in very brief form, very little is indicated about the offenders' subjective cases in those cases.
The Crown has referred me in particular to the case of R v Flaherty & Ors (1968) 3 NSWLR. That case involved a number of sexual assaults upon the victim perpetrated by ten offenders. The man Flaherty was found to be the leader of the group and the instigator of the offending behaviour. He not only raped the victim himself but went to some effort to enlist at least two of the other offenders to attend the location to further sexually assault the victim.
Although sentenced with respect to one count, the total criminality involved in the incident was taken into account when imposing a sentence of ten years with a non-parole period of six.
I find that the case of Flaherty & Ors more objectively serious than the present case. It involved ten offenders, the victim was younger than the present victim. Most significantly in my view Flaherty, after raping his victim and aware of the fact that she was subsequently being raped by others at the scene, left the scene with his co-offender, returned to Cabramatta, met two of his co-offenders and suggested to them that they should go to the scene to have intercourse with the victim. However, I must have regard to the fact that in the present case I must sentence this offender not on one count but on eight counts relating to sexual misconduct.
I have reviewed the statistics of higher criminal courts for 1977, 78, 79 and 1980. However, I am cognisant of the fact that statistics should be examined with care.
I have had regard to what the High Court has said in the decision of Hili v R [2010] 520 CLR 537 at para 54. It said:
"Sentencing patterns are, of course, of considerable significance in that they result from the application of the accumulated experience and wisdom of first instance judges and of appellate courts."
It was also said in Hili that:
"Past sentences are no more than historical statements of what has happened in the past. They can, and should, provide a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence."
With respect to delay, this is not a case where there has been extraordinary delay between charging and sentencing. It is not a case, for instance, where the offender has been left in a state of uncertain suspense. However, it seems to me that in the case of Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 the then Chief Justice, Street CJ, said:
"Moreover, where there has been a lengthy postponement, whether due to an interstate sentence or otherwise, fairness to the prisoner requires weight to be given to the progress of his rehabilitation during the term of his earlier sentence, to the circumstances that he has been left in a state of uncertain suspense as to what will happen to him when in due course he comes up for sentence on the subsequent occasion, and to the fact that sentencing for a stale crime, long after the committing of the offences, calls for a considerable measure of understand and flexibility of approach - passage of time between offence and sentence, when lengthy, will often lead to considerations of fairness to the prisoner in his present situation playing a dominant role in the determination of what should be done in the matter; at times this can require what might otherwise be a quite undue degree of leniency being extended to the prisoner".
I am prepared to take into account the long delay of 36 years when sentencing the offender, I take it into account with respect to those considerations of fairness referred to in the case of Todd. A term of imprisonment at this stage of his life will be particularly difficult and disruptive for him. That said, any mitigation afforded to the offender by virtue of delay is slight as I have already taken into account his rehabilitation in the interim. I do not take it into account additionally here.
Mr Stevens' prospects of rehabilitation, character and other subjective features in 1978 would have been an important consideration if sentencing occurred at that time and I considered what they would likely be. Equally, the offender's conduct in the intervening period of some 36 years is also a factor I can, and have, had regard to.
At the time of his offending behaviour, Mr Stevens had a record for driving matters. He was also on a s 588 recognisance for an offence of steal motor vehicle. The fact that he was on conditional liberty is an aggravating factor and I take it into account in that regard.
Since then the offender has had a number of convictions, however was not dealt with by way of a term of imprisonment. He has had no convictions since 2002. I find that the offender does not have a significant record of previous convictions.
I find that the lengthy period that has elapsed without further offences being committed of serious violent type allows for a finding that the offender has rehabilitated. In making that finding I have also has regard to the fact that for a substantial period of time he has not offended at all. I also find that the offender is unlikely to re-offend.
I have placed minimal weight on specific deterrence due to the very lengthy period that has transpired between the offences and the sentencing and the fact that he has, in my view, rehabilitated during that period. I note that he maintained throughout the trial, as was his right, a denial that he was ever present in or at any of the incidents where other men were present in the back of the van and where the victim may have been sexually assaulted. The jury, clearly, did not accept this evidence.
There is no indication that the offender has since acknowledged responsibility for the offences for which he has been convicted. I have no evidence, therefore, from which I can find that the offender is remorseful.
A number of references have been tendered on behalf of the offender. They are written by co-workers, neighbours and other members of the community and friends and by his current partner. It is evident from those references that the offender is a well-respected and supportive member of the community with a generous and caring nature. It appears that many families have enjoyed the use of his property over the years.
The references of Martin Irvin and Rhonda Swadling give specific example of the offender caring for members of the community who are experiencing hardship. The references also speak of his good work ethic. I accept the truth of those statements. In particular the references are singular in expressing the close nature of the offender's relationship with his daughter Lily who is nine years old. He is, I accept, a devoted father.
Also in evidence before me is exhibit 4 which is a schedule of the number of days the offender has spent with his daughter over the past three years. Although not in his custody, he has spent an extensive period of time with her and has been dedicated to her. Those references also highlight the expected difficulty that the offender's daughter Lily will experience as a result of any likely period of separation from her father. The references seem to indicate that the young child's mother is, at times, unreliable and that the separation of the child from her father will be particularly hard.
Mr Irvin describes the offender as "an excellent neighbour, supportive of the members of the small Braefield community in which we live, he is devoted to Lily and committed to her wellbeing". Mr Irvin also describes the attention and assistance the offender has given with Mr Irvin's own disabled daughter. Mr Irvin states that "the offender is well regarded and respected, he has always been willing to help people out". He also states that the offender is totally devoted to his daughter Lily and describes the offender as "a selfless sort of bloke".
Patricia Bartley, who was a partner of the offender's between 2006 and 2009, also deals with the close relationship between the offender and his daughter.
Rhonda Swadling describes the very caring nature of the offender. She states, in part:
"At holiday times David would bring Lily's play equipment down to the river for the children to play on and I watched him spend time making sandpits for the children to use. David appeared to be very aware of where the children were so they would not come to any danger."
She also states that he is very dedicated to his daughter and that he treated everybody with respect, and finally she states that "he is supporting, nothing was too much trouble and he seemed constantly concerned for the care of everybody around him".
There is also a reference from Richard Dreyer, who is a retired police officer, who has known the offender for approximately 20 years and describes him as a hard worker and a competent tradesman. Mr Dreyer states that "often there would be several members of the police force camping on David's property with their children at the same time". Mr Dreyer states that he was shocked when he heard of the convictions, that the offender had always seemed very polite and got on well with women who visited the property. Mr Dreyer considered the offender as honest and very close to his daughter.
The rest of the references speak highly of the offender and in particular they emphasise the close relationship he has with his daughter.
His current partner, Cassandra Ernshaw, has remained supportive of him, indeed she is in court today together with some other members of the community where he lives. Ms Ernshaw has also provided a letter to the Court and describes how the offender and herself together with Lily, his child, and Mia, her child, have become a family. I have no doubt that Ms Ernshaw will remain supportive of the offender during the period that he has to spend in custody.
I also have no doubt that the offender is a devoted father. I witnessed that concern at the conclusion of the trial in May. I have no doubt that Lily will struggle, albeit as any child would, with any prolonged separation from her father to whom she is so attached particularly at this young age. Hardship to the dependants and family members of offenders is, unfortunately, an unavoidable consequence any custodial sentence.
Courts are frequently faced with such circumstances. However, the law provides that it is not a mitigating factor on the sentence of an offender unless that hardship is wholly, highly or truly exceptional. While any such separation is a matter for concern, it is not of the exceptional nature described in the authorities. That being said, I have taken into account the expected hardship of the offender's daughter and the impact upon him as part of the synthesis of the offender's subjective case.
With respect to special circumstances, I do find special circumstances. This is the first time the offender is subject to a term of imprisonment. He will require a longer than usual period of supervision to assist him in his reintegration back into the community both psychologically and practically. Special circumstances may also be found in the fact that there was a different sentencing practice in relation to fixing of the non-parole period at the time of these offences which did not require a finding of special circumstance in order to avoid a statutory relationship between a non-parole period and the balance of the term.
Not withstanding the subjective circumstances of the offender, general deterrence, remains a relevant matter in this case. The sentence needs to reflect the nature of the offending and to be proportional to the criminality involved in the offences committed.
During the course of submissions I referred to the decision of AJB and in particular with reference to the statement made there that general deterrence was not a significant matter in the applicant's case because, in light of the very lengthy period that had transpired between the offences and the passing of the sentence and his reform, it was not appropriate to make an example of him to deter others from similar conduct.
I cannot fully agree with that statement. Notwithstanding the fact that it has been some 36 years, I find that general deterrence is a factor that I should take into account in light of the nature of the offending behaviour.
In imposing sentence I have had regard to the purposes of sentencing which are set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. I have particularly had regard to general deterrence, recognition of the harm done to the victim, punishment and denunciation.
That said, in a case such as this where there has been such a lengthy delay between the offence and sentence and where the offender is rehabilitated, it seems to me that it is the fact of imprisonment as well as the length of the sentence which will be of great significance to punish the offender and denounce his conduct. The weight to be given to general deterrence in this case is moderated by virtue of the fact that there has been a very lengthy period that has transpired between the offences and the passing of sentence and his reform. However, as I have said, general deterrence remains a relevant purpose of sentencing and must be given significant weight.
After considering the purposes of sentencing and other matters which I have set out, I am satisfied pursuant to s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 that no penalty other than full-time imprisonment is appropriate, and indeed there has been no dispute about that.
Each offence was substantially contemporaneous and in a sense connected, however the sentence for one offence cannot completely, in my view, comprehend the criminality of any of the other offences. Each offence was characterised by separate serious acts of criminality with four different principal offenders. Accordingly, the sentence for each will be partially accumulated. However, I do intend to impose an aggregate sentence in this matter. Before I do so, I am obliged to set out indicative sentences with respect to each of the offences.
With respect to count 1, that is contrary to s 89 of the Crimes Act 1900, the indicative sentence is one of three years.
With respect to count 2, that is the count that this offender raped the complainant, the indicative sentence is seven years.
With respect to count 3, again a count of rape involving this offender as the principal offender, the indicative sentence is seven years.
With respect to count 4, that is a count of rape where the offender aided and abetted Mark Johnson, the indicative sentence is five years.
With respect to count 5, again a count of rape where the offender aided and abetted Edward Lewockie, the indicative sentence is five years.
With respect to count 6, that being the indecent assault perpetrated by Rudolf Reichel, the indicative sentence is one of nine months.
With respect to the attempted rape where this offender's liability is one as aider and abetter the indicating sentence, that is on count 7, is four years.
With respect to the indecent assault perpetrated by this offender, that is count 8, the indicative sentence is 18 months.
In terms of the aggregate sentence, Mr Stevens, you are convicted. Taking into account special circumstances, I impose an aggregate sentence of ten years imprisonment to commence from today, 1 August 2014, and expiring on 31 July 2024 with a non-parole period of four years six months commencing from today, 1 August 2014, and expiring on 31 January 2019. In imposing that sentence I have taken into account the one day you spent in custody. On 31 January 2019 you will be eligible for release to parole.
The exhibits will be returned forthwith.
HER HONOUR: Any other orders sought?
SPEAKER: Would your Honour consider making a direction that your remarks on sentence be taken out and placed on the court file.
HER HONOUR: Yes, and I'll also have the statistics together with the tables relating to those statistics placed on the court file and attached to my reasons.
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Decision last updated: 17 October 2014
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