R v Danishyar

[2023] NSWSC 922

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Danishyar [2023] NSWSC 922

Hearing dates:

28 July 2023

Date of orders:

8 August 2023

Decision date:

08 August 2023

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

N Adams J

Decision:

The application by the Crown for material to be released under s 45(5) of the Crime Commission Act2012 (NSW) is refused.

Catchwords:

CRIME – evidence – murder – joint criminal enterprise – accessory before the fact – application to release evidence given before Crime Commission – s 45(4) and (5) Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) –whether disclosure in the interests of justice – factors weighing for and against disclosure – public interest immunity

Legislation Cited:

Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW), ss 21, 24, 25, 27, 39, 45

Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW), s 15A

Cases Cited:

R v Hawat(No 1) [2019] NSWSC 1583

R v McCloskey (No 1) [2020] NSWSC 771

R v Munshizada, Danishyar and Baines [2020] NSWSC 566

R v Quami (No 11) [2016] NSWSC 252

R v Sultani; R v Munshizada; R v Baines; R v Danishyar [2021] NSWSC 1654

Category:

Procedural rulings

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
Mirwais Danishyar (Accused)
New South Wales Crime Commission (Applicant)

Representation:

Counsel:
Mr D Patch (Crown)
Ms N Carroll (Accused)
Ms A Douglas-Baker (Applicant)

Solicitors:
Solicitor for Director Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Fahmy Lawyers (Accused)
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Applicant)

File Number(s):

2020/350096

Publication restriction:

Nil.

Judgment

Background

1. On 10 January 2020, Mirwais Danishyar was charged with the murder of Michael Davey on 30 March 2016 at Kingswood.

2. The Crown case is that the deceased was shot by Abuzar Sultani and Siar Munshizada. It was a “contract kill”. The accused is charged on the basis that he was part of a joint criminal enterprise to shoot the deceased. It is not the Crown case that he was one of the shooters.

3. On 9 December 2021, the accused was committed for trial to the Supreme Court. At his arraignment on 11 February 2022, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder. The matter was stood over to 4 March 2022 with a notation that the trial be listed following the listing of a related District Court trial. On 1 April 2022, this matter was listed for trial on 28 August 2023. As I understand it, the related District Court trials have now all concluded.

4. By notice dated 20 January 2021, the New South Wales Crime Commission (“NSWCC”) informed the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (“ODPP”) that it had in its possession certain evidence in relation to the murder of Michael Davey. That document apparently provided a brief summary of the material that the NSWCC may possess. It indicated that examinations were conducted by the NSWCC into Mr Davey’s murder on 5, 8 and 15 June 2017, 16 November 2017 and 6 June 2019. The court was not provided with this document for the purpose of the present application.

5. On 17 January 2023, the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) determined that an application should be made to the Supreme Court under s 45(4) of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) (“the Act”). The DPP seeks that a certificate be issued to the NSWCC requiring it to make available to the court evidence given by certain witnesses on those specified days. If such a certificate is issued, the DPP would then seek a determination pursuant to s 45(5) of the Act that, if satisfied that the interests of justice so require, the evidence be made available to the ODPP and to the defendant and his legal representatives.

6. On 19 April 2023, the NSWCC was notified that the ODPP proposed to make an application pursuant to s 45 of the Act.

7. On 1 May 2023, the application pursuant to s 45 of the Act was filed and the legal representative for the accused was notified. That application was subsequently listed for hearing on 28 July 2023.

8. The motion came before me for hearing on Friday 28 July 2023. Before considering that motion, I propose to first set out the relevant legislation and principles applicable to an application of this nature.

The Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW)

9. As I observed in R v Hawat (No 1) [2019] NSWSC 1583 at [25] and [26], the Crime Commission has investigative powers not available to regular New South Wales Police officers. By virtue of ss 24, 25, 27 and 39 of the Act, the Commissioner can summon a person secretly, examine them in circumstances where their right to silence has been expressly abrogated and prosecute them should they give misleading information to the Crime Commission. The hearings are held in private, but an order can be made that police officers can view the proceedings from a separate room (s 21).

10. In exchange for this abrogation of their legal rights, the Crime Commission cannot use any material given by such a witness in proceedings against them (see s 39) and a non-publication order is usually made over the compelled testimony. This is something that is explained to each witness before an examination commences. Section 39 of the Act is headed “Privilege concerning answers and documents” and is in these terms:

1. Privilege concerning answers and documents

(1)  A witness summoned to attend or appearing before the Commission at a hearing is not (except as provided by section 40) excused from answering any question or producing any document or thing on the ground that the answer or production may incriminate or tend to incriminate the witness, or on any other ground of privilege, or on the ground of a duty of secrecy or other restriction on disclosure, or on any other ground.

(2)  An answer made, or document or thing produced, by a witness at a hearing before the Commission is not (except as otherwise provided in this section) admissible in evidence against the person in any civil or criminal proceedings (other than a proceeding for the falsity of evidence given by the witness) or in any disciplinary proceedings.

(3)  Nothing in this section makes inadmissible:

(a)  any answer, document or thing in proceedings for an offence against this Act or in proceedings for contempt under this Act, or

(b)  any answer, document or thing in any civil or criminal proceedings or in any disciplinary proceedings if the witness does not object to giving the answer or producing the document or other thing irrespective of the provisions of subsection (1), or

(c)  any document in any civil proceedings for or in respect of any right or liability conferred or imposed by the document, or

(d)  any answer made, or document or thing produced, by a corporation at a hearing before the Commission.

(4)  If:

(a)  an Australian legal practitioner or other person is required to answer a question or produce a document or thing at a hearing before the Commission, and

(b)  the answer to the question would disclose, or the document or thing contains, a privileged communication passing between the legal practitioner (in his or her capacity as a legal practitioner) and a person (the client),

the legal practitioner or client is entitled to refuse to comply with the requirement, unless the privilege is waived by a person having authority to do so.

(5)  However, the Australian legal practitioner must, if so required by the executive officer presiding at the hearing, furnish to the Commission the name and address of the client to whom or by whom the privileged communication was made.

(6)  The executive officer presiding at the hearing may declare that all or any classes of answers given by a witness or that all or any classes of documents or other things produced by a witness will be regarded as having been given or produced on objection by the witness, and there is accordingly no need for the witness to make an objection in respect of each such answer, document or other thing.

11. Section 45 of the Act is headed “Publication or disclosure of evidence” and in these terms:

1. Publication or disclosure of evidence

(1)  The Commission may direct that:

(a)  any evidence given before it, or

(b)  the contents of any document, or a description of any thing, produced to the Commission or seized under a search warrant, or

(c)  any information that might enable a person who has given or may be about to give evidence before the Commission to be identified or located, or

(d)  the fact that any person has given or may be about to give evidence at a hearing,

must not be published, or must not be published except in such manner, and to such persons, as the Commission specifies.

(2)  The Commission must give such a direction if the failure to do so might prejudice the safety or reputation of a person or prejudice the fair trial of a person who has

been or may be charged with an offence.

(3)  A person must not make a publication in contravention of a direction given under this section.

Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both.

(4)  If:

(a)  a person has been charged with an offence before a court of the State, and

(b)  the court considers that it may be desirable in the interests of justice that particular evidence given before the Commission in relation to which the Commission has given a direction under this section be made available to the person or to a legal practitioner representing the person and to the prosecutor,

the court may give to the Commission a certificate to that effect and, if the court does so, the Commission must make the evidence available to the court.

(5)  If:

(a)  the Commission makes evidence available to a court in accordance with subsection (4), and

(b)  the court, after examining the evidence, is satisfied that the interests of justice so require,

the court may make the evidence available to the person charged with the offence concerned or to an Australian legal practitioner representing the person and to the prosecutor.

(6) This section has effect subject to section 45A.

(7)  In this section:

publish includes:

(a)  disclose to a person, and

(b)  in relation to evidence or a record of evidence—disclose any information directly contained in or implied from that evidence or record, except where the information could be obtained elsewhere.

12. As Hamill J observed in R v Quami (No 11) [2016] NSWSC 252 at [18], the status quo in an application under s 45 of the Act is that the evidence, being subject to a direction given by the NSWCC pursuant to s 45(1) of the Act, is not to be released. Despite this, this Court can order that the material be disclosed in certain specified circumstances which concern the “interests of justice”. There are two stages to the potential disclosure of this material.

13. First, under s 45(4), the Supreme Court may provide the Crime Commission with a certificate, if it considers that it “may be desirable in the interests of justice” that the particular evidence be provided to the court.

14. Secondly, if such a certificate is granted, s 45(5) of the Act requires the court to examine all of the evidence and then consider whether it is “satisfied that the interests of justice so require” that it be made available to, in this case, the ODPP and the accused.

15. The first test is clearly a less stringent test than the second test.

16. As I observed in R v Hawat (No 1) at [49] and [97], the second stage requires the court to examine the material and form a preliminary view as to the probative value of the material and whether any relevant factors militate in favour of disclosure or non-disclosure. If the court determines that there is probative value and relevant factors militate in favour of disclosure, it is then appropriate to consider and determine any public interest immunity claim made in relation to the transcripts by the NSWCC. Further, if the court is minded to make an order that the material is to be made available to the legal practitioners for the accused and to the prosecutor, it must contact any relevant witness and give them an opportunity to be heard, in particular in opposition to an order under s 45(5) of the Act.

17. The provision was considered by Fagan J in R v Munshizada, Danishyar and Baines [2020] NSWSC 566. His Honour observed the following at [11]:

“‘[T]he i nterests of justice’ is a broad concept, as has been observed in other contexts such as those referred to by Hamill J in R v Quami (No 11) at [19]-[21]. Having regard to the potential for examinees to be affected by a decision under s 45(5), the interests of justice must be taken here to embrace not only the fairness of the trial but also the need to protect examinees from physical threat and the reasonable expectations of examinees that non-publication directions will be enforced.”

18. In considering whether “the interests of justice” require the material to be released to the accused and to the prosecutor, the court is required to consider “the interests of justice” in the context of balancing the overriding need for a fair trial: R v Hawat (No 1) at [80]. In this context, the interests of justice are not satisfied if upon reading the material the court is left with no more than the speculation that either the Crown or accused could find it useful; it must have a material bearing upon the trial.

19. Similarly, Hamill J observed the following in R v Quami (No 11) at [19]:

“The expression ‘interests of justice’ is a phrase of very wide import which allows a wide number of considerations to be taken into account. In O'Hare v DPP [2000] NSWSC 430 in which O'Keefe J said at [47] - [49]:

‘…the phrase in the “interests of justice”, has been construed in many contexts. Furthermore, it too is a phrase of wide impact which comprehends many factors. It is therefore undesirable, possibly impossible, to define it.

…

Since there will be a myriad of factual circumstances to which the phrase may be applied it is undesirable to limit by reference to a rigid definition what the interests of justice are.’”

20. His Honour then went on at [22] to suggest a non exhaustive catalogue of matters which might arise for consideration when assessing what the interests of justice require in an application of this nature. The starting point is that the evidence was given in private and is subject to a direction that it must not be published. This arises in a context where the witness will have been told at the commencement of the NSWCC hearing that the evidence will not be published and will therefore have a reasonable expectation that the evidence will remain private and will not be published.^: R v Quami (No 11) at [23]; R v Hawat (No 1) at [88]; R v Munshizada, Danishyar and Baines at [8].

21. I am satisfied that the following factors would militate in favour of releasing the material in the interests of justice but none of them are determinative:

1. If the person examined is a witness to be called by the Crown in the trial: R v Hawat (No 1) at [90];

2. If the person examined could potentially give important evidence or provide important information;

3. If one or more of the answers given to the NSWCC is patently inconsistent with what that witness is expected to give evidence about at trial: R v Quami (No 11) at [24]; R v Hawat (No 1) at [90];

4. If the person examined is not expected to be a witness at the trial but their evidence may contain important exculpatory information or give rise to theories of the case that may not be readily apparent to the defence or the prosecution: R v Quami (No 11) at [25]; R v Hawat (No 1) at [90(3)].

22. I am satisfied that the following factors militate against releasing the material in the interests of justice but, again, they are not determinative:

1. If the person examined may be placed in physical danger, may be seen as an informant, or has provided information inculpating known or suspected criminals: R v Quami (No 11) at [26]; R v Hawat (No 1) at [91(1)];

2. If the witness has expressed fear during their NSWCC testimony: R v Quami (No 11) at [26]; R v Hawat (No 1) at [91(1)];

3. If the witness refused to answer questions and was prosecuted under s 25(2) of the Act: R v Hawat (No 1) at [91(2)];

4. If the answers given to the NSWCC are fanciful or lack credit. It is to be accepted that such an assessment must be made with caution when based on the transcript alone. R v Quami (No 11) at [28]; R v Hawat (No 1) at [91(4)];

5. If the ODPP application is not made in a timely manner and the release would lead to the trial being vacated: R v Hawat (No 1) at [91(5); R v McCloskey (No 1) [2020] NSWSC 771 at [23].

23. The following matters will also be considered by the court:

1. If the witness was compelled to give evidence before the NSWCC despite objecting. Again, while this may contribute to reluctance to release the material, it is not determinative: R v Quami (No 11) at [27].

2. If the witness consents to the release of the material. But this may depend upon the views of the NSWCC who are aware of other evidence: R v Quami (No 11) at [30]; R v Hawat (No 1) at [90(4)].

The hearing of the notices of motion

24. At the hearing of this motion on 28 July, Mr David Patch appeared as Crown Prosecutor (hereinafter the Crown), Ms A Douglas-Baker appeared for the NSWCC, and Ms Nicole Carroll appeared for Mr Danishyar. The Crown relied on an affidavit of Sally Stuart sworn on 1 May 2023 and a detailed Crown Case Statement. Written submissions were filed on behalf of the Crown and the NSWCC, and Ms Carroll provided a document addressing the anticipated issues to be disputed in the trial. I was also provided with a list of Crown witnesses.

The Crown case

25. The Crown Case Statement in this matter is a 124-page document and contains considerable detail about the movements of the two principals at times this accused was not present.

26. The background to the Crown case is that the accused was a member of a sophisticated criminal gang, led and directed by Sultani. In relation to the murder of Mr Davey, it is the Crown case that the accused was present at or near the scene of the murder and that, knowing that Sultani and Munshizada were armed with guns and intending to shoot and kill the deceased, he used his encrypted BlackBerry device (with a “handle” of “Ready2Rock” known to be his), to send messages to the deceased. Apparently, members of the group all used encrypted BlackBerries and communicated by way of email only.

27. It is the Crown case that messages were sent by the accused to the deceased in order to lull him into a false sense of security that he could safely sell illicit drugs to the accused. One such transaction took place a week before the shooting and on the second occasion, the deceased was lured into the street under the guise of doing another drug deal, at which time he was shot and killed by Sultani and Munshizada.

28. Thus, the Crown case against the accused is that he arranged meetings with the deceased, including on the night he was shot, on the pretext of obtaining prohibited drugs and was present at the scene at the time of the shooting. In the alternative, even if the accused was not present at the time of the murder, the Crown case is that he is still guilty of murder on the basis of being part of a joint criminal enterprise to kill Mr Davey.

29. The two principles, Sultani and Munshizada, pleaded guilty to the murder of Mr Davey and were sentenced on 17 December 2021 by Fagan J: R v Sultani; R v Munshizada; R v Baines; R v Danishyar [2021] NSWSC 1654. I have read those reasons in order to gain a better understanding of the background to the present application.

30. It is not yet known whether it will be an agreed fact that Sultani and Munshizada were the shooters or whether the Crown will have to prove that case again for the purpose of the trial of this accused. In any event, I have not summarised the case as against those two men for murder; I have instead focussed on the case implicating the accused as being part of that joint criminal enterprise.

The defence case

31. During the hearing of this application, the accused’s counsel indicated to the court that the likely issues at the trial would be as follows:

1. Who was the person or persons who used the Blackberry device Ready2Rock?;

2. Who was using the device on 22 March 2016?;

1. Who was using the device on 29 March 2016?;

2. Where the device was located on these dates?;

3. What were the movements and location of Mirwais Danishyar on the 22^nd and 29^th of March 2016;

4. All phone material relating to the contact with Michael Davey;

5. The identity of the person/s in the car that travel to meet Michael Davey for a drug deal on the 22^nd of March 2016;

6. The identity of the persons involved in what was termed a convoy of cars that drove from the Meadowbank area towards Western Sydney on the night of the murder;

7. The identity of the person/s in the car that travel to meet Michael Davey on the 29^th of March 2016; and

8. The sharing of blackberries between group members.

Crown submissions

32. The Crown submitted that the evidence the subject of the application may be relevant to the Crown case against the accused and potentially relevant to any defence case at trial. The evidence was said to pertain to the circumstances of the shooting with which the accused is charged. That submission was based solely on the fact that the NSWCC indicated to them that they had material which might be relevant. The Crown was not aware of the contents of the material.

33. The NSWCC took a neutral position with respect to whether or not a certificate should be issued under s 45(4) of the Act and with respect to whether or not the evidence ought to be released if the test in s 45(5) of the Act is satisfied. The NSWCC indicated that if the court ordered the material be released, it may make an application for portions of the evidence not to be released on the grounds of public interest immunity. In the event such application is to be made, the NSWCC would propose to rely upon confidential evidence in support and would seek a confidential hearing in respect of same.

34. The accused also took a neutral position on the application.

35. Although no assistance could be given to me without breaching the non-publication order on the material, I was informed that the five persons were not witnesses in the trial.

36. After considering these submissions and the Crown Case Statement, I indicated to the parties in court on 28 July 2023 that I was satisfied that the evidence should be made available to me under s 45(4) of the Act. I indicated at the time that I would provide reasons for making that order when I gave my reasons in relation to the s 45(5) application. What follows are my reasons for taking this approach.

Reasons for making the s 45(4) order on 28 July 2023

37. The test in s 45(4) is not a stringent one. The court will issue a certificate if satisfied that it may be desirable in the interests of justice that the requested material be made available to, in this case, the ODPP who makes the application and the accused.

38. It seems to me that it was a relevant consideration that there was no objection to the material being produced to the court under s 45(4).

39. Regrettably, given the nature of the application, only limited assistance could be given to the court in determining whether the s 45(4) test was met. Neither the ODPP nor the accused knows what is in the material. It was not clear to me whether the ODPP even knows who the compulsorily examined persons are, although the accused clearly does not. Although the NSWCC knows what is in the material, none of its contents could be disclosed as that would breach the non-publication orders made at the time of the examinations.

40. It seems to me that if the NSWCC gives notice to the ODPP that there may be relevant material, provides an outline of that material and there is no objection to that material being produced to the court in order for the court to determine whether it should be released, that will ordinarily be sufficient to meet the low test in s 45(4) of the Act.

41. No party raised the proximity to the pending trial as being a reason for opposing the s 45(4) application. The application in R v Hawat was made very close to the trial. In that application, the accused opposed the application on the basis of the potential delay to the trial date should the material be made available to the parties under s 45(5). In R v Hawat, I was satisfied that the prospect of delay was a discretionary factor more pertinent at the s 45(5) stage of the inquiry. I note that a similar approach was taken by Davies J in R v McCloskey (No 1) [2020] NSWSC 771 which I discuss further below.

42. It was for these reasons that I was satisfied on 28 July 2023 that the statutory test in s 45(4) of the Act was met.

Consideration: Section 45(5) application

43. At the conclusion of the hearing on 28 July 2023, the material subject to the s 45(4) certificate that I issued was provided to my chambers.

44. Given that the parties were not aware of the contents of the material, only limited submissions could be made as to whether the s 45(5) test was met. Instead, the accused relied upon the matters I have identified above at [31], the NSWCC took a neutral position, and the Crown made it clear that it was mainly seeking to discharge itself of its disclosure requirements under s 15A of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW). The Crown’s position was that given the proximity to the trial, the main concern was to disclose material that is exculpatory. In that context, it was submitted that, “unless it is something that really stands out as significant and sheets home guilt, the real focus of the inquiry should be exculpatory material”.

45. Having heard from the parties, I was satisfied that in reading the material I should look for material directly implicating the accused (and/or his co-offenders) but otherwise should focus on exculpatory material. Material relevant to the Crown would include any material as to the accused’s contact with co-offenders and relevant BlackBerry contact at around the time of the murder. Further, I would look for any material suggesting some other persons were involved rather than the accused, material that suggests that the accused was not present at the scene, and anything which might impact on the credit of a prosecution witness.

46. The process involved considering the material as against the Crown Case Statement (and the sentencing reasons of Fagan J). As stated above, the court was not provided with the letter the NSWCC forwarded to the ODPP dated 20 January 2021 which led to this application being made.

47. It seems to me that the court’s statutory role in such applications is a difficult one. Unlike the Crown and the accused, the court does not have a copy of the brief of evidence, nor should it. There may be witnesses who are not expressly referred to in the Crown Case Statement. Any judge considering an application under s 45(5) of the Act only has a limited knowledge of what can often be a complex brief. The present application falls to be considered in the context of the murder of Mr Davey having been committed by two members of an organised crime gang who committed other murders and were part of an extensive criminal milieu. This factual background renders the task of ascertaining what “the interests of justice” require even more difficult than it otherwise would be. As Fagan J observed in R v Munshizada, Danishyar and Baines at [13]-[15], the limited material provided to the court inevitably limits to some extent the court’s consideration of what the “interests of justice … require”.

48. I have considered the Crown submission that, given the lateness of the application the focus of the application was disclosure of exculpatory material. I am satisfied that was an appropriate submission to make. The question of timing and delay is relevant to the statutory question posed by s 45(5) of the Act. In R v McCloskey (No 1), the application was made just over a month before the trial was listed to begin, despite the fact that the trial had been listed and vacated the previous year and there had been several directions hearings. Davies J received the material 26 days before the trial was listed to begin and the transcript was over 1,750 pages. In that context, his Honour refused the application under s 45(5), noting that there was insufficient time for him to properly assess the material and highlighting the undesirability of vacating the trial on another occasion: at [23] and [25]. His Honour also emphasised that the ODPP and NSWCC must establish a protocol to avoid late applications: [22].

49. This is not a case in which I have refused the application due to an insufficiency of time to consider the material; I have considered it all. Despite this, I agree with the approach taken by Davies J as a matter of general principle when late applications of this nature are made.

50. Having now read the material, I am not satisfied that the interests of justice require it being disclosed to the ODPP. None of it raises any of the issues I have referred to above. In particular, it seems to me that it does not address the matters identified by Ms Carroll and referred to at [31] above. I find myself coming to the same conclusion that Fagan J did in R v Munshizada, Danishyar and Baines [2020] NSWSC 566 summarised by his Honour in this way at [16]:

“On my reading of the evidence delivered to the Court under the certificates and applying s 45(5) in accordance with the interpretation explained in the preceding paragraphs, I am not satisfied that the interests of justice require any of it to be provided to either the Crown or the accused. I am not satisfied that any of the evidence would either add to or contradict or cast doubt upon the Crown case in any material respect. Nor does any of the evidence received from the Commission suggest any line of inquiry or any theory of the events that could be in any way useful to either the Crown or the accused. It has not become necessary to evaluate the interests of justice by striking a balance between the utility of any part of the evidence for the purposes of the trial and, on the other hand, the interests of examinees in maintaining non-publication. The Commission’s evidence does not pass the initial assessment of having a material bearing upon the trial. It has therefore not been necessary for me to weigh up collateral aspects of the interests of justice, such as those referred to at [12] above, that might militate against dissemination under s 45(5).”

51. On that basis, I propose to refuse this application.

52. I have set out brief confidential reasons detailing the content of the compelled testimony in a separate and unpublished annexure to this judgment. I took the same approach in R v Hawat (No 1) and Hamill J took the same approach in R vQuami (No 11) at [7]. I propose to order that this annexure be placed in a sealed envelope marked “not to be opened except by order of a judge of this Court or a judge of a higher Court” and kept with the file copy of this judgment. I have not named the five witnesses in that document; I have simply referred to them as witnesses 1-5 and included the date on which they were questioned.

53. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

1. The application by the Crown for material to be released under s 45(5) of the Crime Commission Act2012 (NSW) is refused.

2. The confidential material provided under the s 45(4) Crime Commission Act2012 (NSW) certificate be returned to the New South Wales Crime Commission, subject to the undertaking of its legal representatives to make it available as required by the Court.

3. If an application is made for access to the sealed envelope referred to at [52] above, no such application will be considered without the NSWCC first being notified of it.

**********

Decision last updated: 09 August 2024