R v Dang

[2000] NSWSC 1257

CITATION:	R v Dang [2000] NSWSC 1257
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 70214/99
HEARING DATE(S):	01/12/00, 20/12/00
JUDGMENT DATE:	20 December 2000
PARTIES :	Regina v Hung Duc Dang
JUDGMENT OF:	James J at 1

COUNSEL :	R Hulme - Crown P Bodor QC - Prisoner
SOLICITORS:	SE O'Connor - Crown P Townsend - Prisoner
CATCHWORDS:	Criminal Law - sentencing - manslaughter - robbery in company - using an offensive weapon to prevent lawful apprehension -
DECISION:	Sentenced to imprisonment for seven years six months - Non parole period of 4 years commencing 25/10/01 and expiring on 24/10/2005

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
CRIMINAL DIVISION

JAMES J

WEDNESDAY 20 DECEMBER 2000

70214/99 - REGINA v HUNG DUC DANG

SENTENCE

1   HIS HONOUR: On 22 May 2000 Hung Duc Dang, whom I will refer to as Dang or the prisoner, was indicted before me on charges that:

1. On 25 April 1999 he murdered John Laurence Hammond.

2. On 25 April 1999 in the company of Nhat Thang Ton he robbed Monica Kaskardi of a lady’s handbag.

3. On 25 April 1999 he used a knife to prevent lawful apprehension (this was a charge of an offence under s33B of the Crimes Act )

2   Dang pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder and guilty to the other two charges.

3   On 4 February 2000 Nhat Thang Ton, whom I will refer to as Ton, had pleaded guilty to a charge of murdering Mr Hammond. On 3 November 2000 Adams J sentenced Ton for the murder of Mr Hammond to a term of imprisonment of 22 years, with a non-parole period of 14 years.

4 On 22 May 2000, after the prisoner had pleaded not guilty to the charge of murdering Mr Hammond, a jury was empanelled for the purpose of trying him on that charge. However, before the jury had heard any evidence, a voir dire was commenced for the purpose of determining the admissibility of parts of an interview of the prisoner conducted by police on 26 April 1999. One objection to the admissibility of these parts of the interview was that after the prisoner had been arrested on the night of 25 April 1999 contraventions of part 10A of the Crimes Act had occurred and, accordingly, evidence of answers given by the prisoner in the interview should not be admitted because it was evidence which had been obtained improperly or in contravention of Australian law and which, accordingly, should be excluded, in accordance with s 138 of the Evidence Act.

5   The voir dire enquiry lasted many days. After the first week I considered I had no option but to discharge the jury and I proceeded to discharge the jury. On 8 June 2000 I announced my decision that evidence of answers given by the prisoner in the interview on 26 April 1999, which had been objected to, was admissible. However, by 8 June 2000, the time allocated for the holding of the trial had almost expired and it was necessary to stand over the trial to a date to be fixed.

6   A fresh trial commenced on 16 October this year. In this trial evidence of answers given by the prisoner in the interview on 26 April 1999 was admitted. The trial was a short one. On 23 October the jury returned verdicts of not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

7   In the trial the Crown Prosecutor did not allege that the prisoner Dang had by his own act killed Mr Hammond. The Crown accepted that it was Ton who had killed Mr Hammond by stabbing him with a knife. The Crown case against the prisoner on both murder and manslaughter was that the prisoner was guilty under an application of the doctrine of common purpose.

8   The nature of the Crown case against the prisoner on the allegation of manslaughter can be seen from the written directions, which, with the concurrence of both counsel, I gave the jury. In outline, I directed the jury that, to establish that Dang was guilty of manslaughter, it was necessary for the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that:

9   (1) Dang and Ton entered into a joint criminal enterprise to rob Miss Kaskardi.

(2) Ton had committed at least the offence of manslaughter of Mr Hammond by stabbing Mr Hammond with a knife.
(3) Ton had committed this offence in the course of carrying out the joint criminal enterprise to rob Miss Kaskardi.
(4) at all material times Dang knew that Ton had the knife which Ton used to stab Mr Hammond.

10   (5) at all material times Dang knew that in the course of the carrying out of the joint enterprise to rob Miss Kaskardi Ton might do an unlawful and dangerous act with the knife by stabbing someone, otherwise than in self-defence but nevertheless Dang, having that contemplation, continued to participate in the joint criminal enterprise to rob Miss Kaskardi.

11   To prove some of these elements of manslaughter, and in particular elements (4) and (5), the Crown relied on what it said were admissions made by Dang in answers in the interview on 26 April 1999.

12   It is necessary to find the principal objective facts of the three offences for which I am sentencing the prisoner. In finding these facts I will apply, as far as applicable, the statements of principle set out by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Isaacs (1997) 90 A Crim R 587 at 591-2.

13   Many of the facts I am about to state were not disputed at the trial and a number of the other facts, although disputed at the trial, must be taken to have been established to the satisfaction of the jury beyond reasonable doubt, in order for the jury to have arrived at their verdict of guilty of manslaughter.

14   The prisoner and the co-offender Ton are young men who were aged 19 and 20 respectively as at 25 April 1999, who were of Vietnamese origin, who had migrated to Australia as children, who had attended the same school in western Sydney and who were acquainted with each other. On the evening of 25 April 1999 Dang and Ton travelled into the centre of Sydney in a car driven by Ton. Ton had two knives. On the trip into the centre of the city Ton gave Dang one of the knives. Dang knew that Ton was keeping one knife for himself. Ton parked the car in Pitt Street, near the corner of Campbell Street, and Dang and Ton walked to Castlereagh Street.

15   At about five to nine on the evening of 25 April 1999, Miss Monica Kaskardi, a 19 year old student, left her unit in Elizabeth Street to walk to a restaurant in George Street. She made a withdrawal of cash at an automatic teller machine at a branch of a bank between Bathurst and Liverpool Streets. After she had made the withdrawal, she put the cash in her wallet and put the wallet in her handbag, which she was carrying with its strap over her shoulder. She then started walking in a southerly direction down Castlereagh Street towards Liverpool Street. Ton and Dang decided to rob Miss Kaskardi of her handbag. They walked up behind her and Dang grabbed Miss Kaskardi's handbag. At the time Dang grabbed the handbag Ton was standing close to him. Miss Kaskardi felt her handbag being grabbed and she tried to retain hold of her handbag. The strap of the handbag broke and Dang ran off with the handbag. Ton ran off with Dang.

16   Initially, Dang and Ton ran together, being chased by Miss Kaskardi. However, Dang and Ton then separated. Dang turned right out of Castlereagh Street into Bathurst Street, ran in an easterly direction in Bathurst Street and then turned left into Elizabeth Street. After Dang and Ton separated, Miss Kaskardi chased Dang, who was the person who had her handbag.

17 A group of young men heard Miss Kaskardi screaming, saw Dang running holding the bag, saw Ms Kaskardi running in a distressed state and they ran after the prisoner. In Elizabeth Street they saw the prisoner hiding behind a pylon near a building. Two men in this group, Yakup Erkilic and Phillip Marino, cornered the prisoner and jumped on him; a scuffle ensued. During the scuffle the prisoner drew the knife he had earlier been given by Ton. Mr Marino sustained a cut from the knife to his wrist but fortunately was not seriously injured. The use by the prisoner of the knife with the intent of preventing his being apprehended by Mr Erkilic and Mr Marino led to the charge under s 33B of the Crimes Act.

18   Mr Erkilic and Mr Marino overpowered the prisoner and Mr Erkilic began frog-marching the prisoner in the direction of the police station near the Town Hall. On the way a police vehicle arrived and Mr Erkilic handed over the prisoner to one of the police officers. The prisoner was formally arrested by one of the police officers. He has remained in custody every since.

19   After the prisoner was arrested by the police, he was first taken to Sydney Hospital for medical attention for minor injuries he had received in the scuffle with Mr Erkilic and Mr Marino.

20   At about 3 o'clock in the morning of 26 April 1999 he was taken to the Sydney Central Police Station. The interview of the prisoner by the police commenced at about a quarter to six.

21   I have already noted that, after initially running together after robbing Miss Kaskarki of her handbag, the prisoner and Ton separated. After they had separated Mr Hammond, the victim of the offence of murder by Ton and manslaughter by the prisoner, endeavoured to apprehend Ton and took hold of Ton. The following statement of what subsequently happened is taken from Adams J's remarks on sentence in sentencing Ton, a copy of which was admitted into evidence in the present proceedings on sentence:

"Mr Hammond produced a cover for an official police notebook (which he had been given by a friend) and said he was a police officer. A struggle took place. The offender took a knife out of his pocket and stabbed Mr Hammond twice in the left side of his chest. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when he stabbed Mr Hammond, the offender mistakenly believed that he was a police officer. Mr Hammond let go and the offender fled. Some on-duty fire fighters nearby heard the commotion and emerged from the fire station to see the offender fleeing and Mr Hammond clutching his side and calling for help. First aid was immediately given and an ambulance called but, a little time after he was taken to hospital, Mr Hammond died."

22   The present prisoner was not present when Ton stabbed Mr Hammond and he did not find out that Ton had stabbed Mr Hammond or that Mr Hammond had died, until some time after Mr Hammond's death. After stabbing Mr Hammond, Ton made good his escape. However, he was arrested by police a day or two later and charged with the murder of Mr Hammond.

23   Some of the more important objective facts of the three offences for which I am sentencing the prisoner can be summarised as follows. The robbery for which I am sentencing the prisoner was a robbery in company committed with Ton. The prisoner was the principal offender, in the sense that it was he who snatched the handbag and subsequently carried away the handbag. The offence was not planned in advance by the prisoner and Ton but they had reached a mutual understanding that, if the opportunity arose to snatch a handbag, they would take the opportunity. The prisoner, although carrying the knife Ton had given him, did not use the knife in robbing Miss Kaskardi of her handbag. There was no actual physical violence to Miss Kaskardi, over and above the snatching of the handbag. When the handbag was taken, Miss Kaskardi was seriously distressed.

24 The offence under s 33B of the Crimes Act was committed when the prisoner, having robbed the young woman of her handbag and having been chased by civilians, was cornered by his pursuers and, in those circumstances, drew a knife with the intent of preventing his being arrested. He was not charged with malicious wounding and the evidence does not permit a finding beyond reasonable doubt that he deliberately stabbed Mr Marino.

25   The prisoner is to be sentenced for the killing of Mr Hammond, on the basis that he has been convicted, not of murder, of which he has been found not guilty by the jury, but of the lesser offence of manslaughter. He is to be sentenced for manslaughter on the basis, not that he himself did the act of stabbing which caused Mr Hammond's death, but that he knew that Ton had a knife and he knew that in the carrying out of the joint enterprise to rob Miss Kaskardi Ton might do an act of stabbing with the knife which a reasonable person would realise carried an appreciable risk of causing serious injury. Consistently with the jury's verdict of not guilty of murder, he is to be sentenced on the basis that he did not contemplate that Ton might do an act of stabbing with the knife with the intention of killing or with the intention of causing really serious bodily injury. As I have already remarked, he was not present when Ton stabbed Mr Hammond; he did not encourage Ton to stab Mr Hammond; and he did not know Ton had stabbed Mr Hammond until some time later.

26   The facts of the three offences are objectively serious and the sentences to be imposed must take into account the objective seriousness of the offences.

27   I turn to the subjective circumstances of the prisoner.

28   The prisoner was born on 16 December 1979. He was accordingly 19 years old at the time the offences were committed and has now just turned 21. He has no previous criminal convictions.

29   The prisoner gave evidence in the proceedings on sentence. What he said was very similar to the family and social history he gave Associate Professor Susan Hayes of the Department of Behavioural Sciences in Medicine of the University of Sydney, who saw the prisoner on 17 November 2000 and furnished a report on 20 November 2000. The following extract is taken from Professor Hayes' report:

"At the time of the assessment Mr Dang was one month short of his 21st birthday. He was born in Vietnam and when he was about ten the family migrated from Vietnam to Australia. His family consists of his father, his mother and a sister who is two years older than Mr Dang. He also has a niece, the sister's daughter, who is aged three and who lives with the family. His father works at the Bankstown airport and his mother works in a shoe manufacturing business. Prior to arriving in Australia Mr Dang attended school in Vietnam. His father came to Australia before the rest of the family and then brought the family over. Mr Dang lived in Vietnam with his uncle and grandparents as well as his mother and sister, during the years that his father was absent in Australia. When he arrived in Australia he went into grade four at Chullora Primary School, then attended Birrong Primary School, followed by Birrong Boys High School. He said that he did the Higher School Certificate, but did not do well and so he started a matriculation course at the Ultimo TAFE. After the Easter break there was a big reduction in the number of people in the class and for some reason he changed to a course in bar-tending. He then looked for work. He was a process worker at Sefton for a while and then worked as a casual employee in a bistro at Yagoona. Prior to that whilst he was still at school he had work experience at Best and Less. He was also worked at Pizza Hut. His last job before being in prison was at the bistro, in about February 1999. Between February and April 1999 he did a hospitality course. During the time that he was undertaking study he received Austudy.
Mr Dang informed me that he previously smoked marihuana and took Ecstasy tablets. He denied any use of heroin. He says that he did not drink very much alcohol. He claims that he had not taken any substances on the day of the offence, although he indicated that he probably needed money for drugs on that day. He claims that he has not had any illicit substances since he has been in prison. He says that his drug use was on an irregular basis and was recreational.
Mr Dang lived with his family until early 1999 and then moved out of the house to live with his girlfriend and his sister. He had been having a relationship with his girlfriend for 18 months prior to his imprisonment. He says that his girlfriend, who is a receptionist, broke up with him about a month before the offence occurred. The relationship has resumed since she found out that he is in prison. The reason for the breakup, which was to some extent mutual, was because they were arguing over little things. He said that after the breakup and leading up to the time of the offences, he felt very sad and would just sit around, not wanting to do anything. He says that his sleeping pattern was not disturbed and his appetite was not affected and nor did he have suicidal ideation. It appears that he may have had some mild depression."

30   Professor Hayes' conclusions in her report, which I accept, were as follows:

"At the time of the assessment Mr Dang was nearly 21 years of age, a quiet, solemn man who appeared to co-operate well with the assessment, although his answers were very brief. Mr Dang is of average intelligence, although he has low average psycholinguistic abilities. Nevertheless, these areas of functioning are in the low average category and do not indicate any severe impairment or disability.
Mr Dang did not report any symptoms which are consistent with psychiatric illness now or at the time of the offences in April 1999. He reported some involvement with marihuana and Ecstasy in the period leading up to the offences. According to his report, the idea to snatch the bag was impulsive and unplanned. He had little insight into his motivation as to why he was carrying a knife at the time.
Mr Dang reports that since he has been in prison he has been 'stressed out' and has suffered from racing thoughts and nervousness. He tries to pass the time by doing exercise. He says that because he is still on remand, he has not enrolled in any courses. When he was at Goulburn he worked in the sewing room.
Mr Dang expresses remorse at the consequences of his actions and says that he wishes he could say sorry to the victims and their families.
Mr Dang appeared to have difficulties in understanding his own motivations on the day of the offences, particularly his motivation in participating in the bag snatch and carrying a knife. In part, the difficulty that he has with insight into his own actions may be related to his low average level of verbal reasoning. It could also be related to cultural differences in admitting to and acknowledging personal motivations in a situation such as this. Nevertheless, I consider that it is important for Mr Dang to be able to articulate and understand his own feelings and emotions and gain some insight into how these influence his behaviour. I recommended that he participate in counselling. Because there seems to be some indirect drug involvement in the offences, he should also undertake drug and alcohol counselling and be supervised to ensure that he does not revert to substance abuse after he is released from prison.
Mr Dang said that after he is released from prison he intends to live with his parents and do a TAFE course in marketing management. He says that he does not intend to return to illicit substance use.
As noted above, Mr Dang does not appear to have any psychiatric symptoms which would have been relevant to the offence or which would render him dangerous in future."

31   In his evidence the prisoner stated that since he has been in custody he has been on protection, ie subject to more than usually onerous conditions of imprisonment. I am prepared to infer he is likely to remain on protection while serving the sentence I impose.

32   In his evidence he expressed regret for what he had done and apologised for the death of Mr Hammond. He said in evidence he intends after he is sentenced to undertake a course of study in prison. He has not been able to undertake a course of study pending his being sentenced.

33   I have received and read victim impact statements by Mrs Marion Hammond, Mr Hammond's widow, on behalf of herself and her young daughter, and Mrs Dorothy Hammond, Mr Hammond's mother.

34   As I have already noted, a copy of the remarks on sentence of Adams J in sentencing Ton was admitted into evidence in the present proceedings on sentence. Adams J sentenced Ton only for the offence of murdering Mr Hammond. The Crown had accepted the plea of guilty by Ton to the charge of murder in full discharge of the other charges against Ton, including a charge of robbery in company of Miss Kaskardi committed with Dang. Adams J, of course, sentenced Ton for the offence of murder and not the offence of manslaughter and as being the person who had himself done the act causing the death of Mr Hammond. Ton had in fact stabbed Mr Hammond twice with the knife. Adams J found that Ton had stabbed Mr Hammond as impetuous, impulsive responses to his being apprehended. His Honour noted it was common ground between the Crown and Ton's defence lawyers that in stabbing Mr Hammond Ton had not had the intention of killing Mr Hammond but had had the intention of causing him grievous bodily harm, that is, really serious bodily injury.

35   Adams J found as a circumstance of aggravation that Ton at the time of stabbing Mr Hammond believed that the person he was stabbing was a police officer.

36   Ton, like Dang, was of Vietnamese origin and had come to Australia as a child, although he had arrived in Australia when he was younger than Dang. Adams J found that as at 25 April 1999 Ton was a heroin addict who was withdrawing from heroin and he may not have reacted as he did to Mr Hammond’s intervention, if he had been unaffected by drugs. Ton had, of course, pleaded guilty and Adams J said he was reducing the sentence he would otherwise have imposed by 20 per cent by reason of the plea of guilty.

37 Adams J found special circumstances within s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, in Ton's youth, the nature of the offence and its context including his drug addiction and the need for a longer than usual period of supervision on parole.

38   In the proceedings on sentence the Crown made inter alia the following submissions. As regards the offence of robbery in company, the Crown Prosecutor referred to the statement of Gleeson CJ (as he then was) in R v Ranse, unreported Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 August 1994, in which his Honour said:

"One primary purpose of criminal justice is to keep the peace and that includes the freedom of ordinary citizens to walk the streets and go about their daily affairs without fear of physical violence and with respect being accorded to their property rights."

39   While acknowledging the present offence is an offence of robbery in company and not armed robbery, the Crown submitted that the offence of robbery in company committed by Dang exhibited many of the features of the paradigm case described by Spigelman CJ at paragraph (162) of his Honour's judgment in R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, the guidelines judgment on sentences for armed robbery, in that Dang is a young offender with no criminal history, that, while not using the knife to rob Miss Kaskardi, he was carrying a knife, that there was only a limited degree of planning and that there was little, if any, actual violence, that Miss Kaskardi was a young woman who at an ATM in a street at night was in a vulnerable position, that only a small amount of money was taken and that there had been a plea of guilty in a case in which the Crown case was very strong. In R v Henry, Spigelman CJ said that sentences for an offence of armed robbery having the characteristics described in the paradigm case, should fall between four and five years for the full term. I accept that what Spigelman CJ said in R v Henry, while not directly applicable, affords some measure of guidance to sentencing Dang for the offence of robbery in company.

40   As regards the offence of manslaughter, the Crown submitted it should make little difference that the victim, Mr Hammond, was not a police officer. The Crown stressed the need for condign sentences for offences in which knives are carried or used.

41 In the proceedings on sentence counsel for the prisoner made inter alia the following submissions. The robbery in company committed by Dang was a simple, foolish, impulsive crime and neither offender had used or even drawn his knife in effecting the robbery. It was submitted that the offence under s 33B of the Crimes Act had been committed when the prisoner perceived himself as being cornered by two or more men and in danger of being subjected to physical violence and the prisoner had pulled out the knife he had been given by Ton in what he perceived to be a means of defending himself. It was conceded by counsel that no legal defence of self-defence was available to the prisoner. The prisoner had pleaded guilty to both the offence of robbery in company and the offence under s 33B of the Crimes Act and should receive some credit for pleading guilty. He had not pleaded guilty to any charge of homicide, because he could not understand how he could be responsible for the death of Mr Hammond and, in any event, the charge which the Crown had continued to press was a charge of murder, of which the jury acquitted him. Any lack of acceptance of the jury's verdict of guilty of manslaughter exhibited in the prisoner's evidence in the proceedings on sentence was to be attributed, not to defiance of the Court or to a lack of contrition, but to the prisoner's continuing lack of understanding of his legal responsibility for Mr Hammond's death under the doctrine of common purpose.

42   It was submitted that Adams J in sentencing Ton had regarded it as an act of aggravation that Ton believed that the person he was stabbing was a police officer. Dang, of course, had no knowledge of who Ton was stabbing or of any belief Ton might have had about who it was he was stabbing.

43   I am sentencing the prisoner for three offences, manslaughter, robbery in company and using a knife with intent to prevent lawful apprehension. I am required to apply what McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ said in their joint judgment in Pearce v R (1998) 72 ALJR 416 at paragraph 45, namely:

"The judge sentencing must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of accumulation or concurrence as well as, of course, questions of totality."

44   It is not legitimate to have regard only to the total effective sentence which should be imposed on the prisoner, although the principle of totality has an important part to play.

45   I have decided that I should impose sentences for the three offences in the following manner, which I outlined to counsel in the proceedings on sentence and to which neither counsel raised any objection. The sentence for the offence of manslaughter should be the heaviest sentence and that should be served cumulatively upon the sentence for the other two offences. The sentences for the offences of robbery in company and using a knife with intent to prevent lawful apprehension should be lesser sentences, should be served concurrently with each other and should be the first sentences to be served. The sentences for those two offences should be served concurrently, because the two offences are closely connected, the offence of using a knife with intent to prevent lawful apprehension being committed by the prisoner to prevent his apprehension for the offence of robbery. The sentence for those two offences will be fixed terms of imprisonment, because if I were to set a non-parole period and a parole period, any parole period would be subsumed in the non-parole period for the offence of manslaughter. The sentence for the offence of manslaughter should contain a proportionally longer than usual parole period, because the first two sentences will not contain any parole period and the sentence for manslaughter should contain a parole period which bears an appropriate relationship to the total of the sentences.

46 As I indicate later in these remarks, there are circumstances which are special circumstances within s 44 of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act. As stated in the passage in the joint judgment in Pearce quoted by me, because I am setting two sentences to be served concurrently or partly concurrently and then a sentence to be served cumulatively on the first two sentences, it is necessary to have regard to the sentencing principle of totality. This principle will require some adjustment downward of the sentences which would have been imposed, if each had been the only sentence being imposed, in order to achieve an appropriate relationship between the totality of the criminality and the totality of the sentences.

47   It was accepted by both the Crown Prosecutor and defence counsel in the proceedings on sentence that there should be some degree of proportionality, but not parity, between the sentence to be imposed on the prisoner for the offence of manslaughter and the sentence which was imposed by Adams J on the co-offender Ton in relation to the offence of murder. However, the very considerable differences between Dang and Ton, including the different offences of murder and manslaughter of which they have been convicted, their very different roles in the death of Mr Hammond, their very different criminal mental states and the application in Dang's case of sentencing principles of totality because I am sentencing him for other offences as well, will produce the consequence that the sentence to be imposed on Dang for the offence of manslaughter will he less, and substantially less, than the sentence imposed on Ton for the offence of murder.

48   The prisoner pleaded guilty to the offences of robbery in company and using an offensive weapon and I will allow some credit for the utilitarian value of his pleas of guilty to those offences. However, the amount of the credit I allow is only slight. After robbing Miss Kaskardi, the prisoner was chased and apprehended and the Crown case against him for those offences was overwhelmingly strong.

49   I have already stated the objective facts and have noted some of the more important of those objective facts. I take into account the prisoner’s subjective circumstances, including inter alia his youth, his lack of any previous criminal convictions, the fact that he will serve the sentence on protection and what I find to be some prospect of rehabilitation. I accept that he experiences some contrition but only to a limited extent. At the time of the interview on 26 April 1999 he thought the taking of Miss Kaskardi’s handbag was a “small” thing and it appears to me that he still regards this offence as minor. In the proceedings on sentence he still claimed he had been carrying the knife for self-defence. I accept that, so far as the offence of manslaughter is concerned, it is still difficult for him to understand how he could be legally responsible for the death of Mr Hammond. In the proceedings on sentence he expressed sorrow for the death of Mr Hammond and apologised to his relatives and I am prepared to accept he experiences some contrition.

50   I have already stated that the non-parole period in regard to the sentence for manslaughter should be less than three quarters of that sentence, because the period during which the prisoner is eligible for release on parole should bear an appropriate relationship to the totality of the sentences I will be imposing and not merely to the sentence for manslaughter. In addition, it was submitted on behalf of the prisoner and accepted by the Crown, that I should find special circumstances in the prisoner's youth, the fact the prisoner would be serving his first sentence of imprisonment and he would be serving that sentence on protection and in any event, the prisoner as a youthful first offender on protection, is likely to find imprisonment more than usually difficult and is in need of a proportionally longer than usual period on parole in which an attempt could be made to address some of the matters referred to in Professor Hayes' report. The sentence will commence on 25 April 1999, the date on which the prisoner first came into custody.

51   Hung Duc Dang, for the offence of robbery in company I sentence you to a fixed term of imprisonment of two and a half years commencing on 25 April 1999 and expiring on 24 October 2001. For the offence of using a knife as an offensive weapon with intent to prevent lawful apprehension I sentence you to a fixed term of imprisonment of two years commencing on 25 April 1999 and expiring on 24 April 2001 to be served concurrently with the sentence for robbery in company. For the offence of manslaughter I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of seven and a half years commencing on 25 October 2001. I set a non-parole period of four years commencing on 25 October 2001 and expiring on 24 October 2005. The earliest date on which you will be eligible to be released on parole will be 25 October 2005.

**********

Last Modified: 11/15/2001