R v Cranston (No 18)

Case [2022] NSWSC 1553


Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Cranston (No 18) [2022] NSWSC 1553
Hearing dates: 09 November 2022
Date of orders: 09 November 2022
Decision date: 09 November 2022
Jurisdiction:Common Law - Criminal
Before: Payne JA
Decision:

The application is rejected.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — Trial — Jury — Application to discharge jury on day 111 of the trial — application refused

Cases Cited:

R v Thompson (2002) 130 A Crim R 24; [2002] NSWCCA 149

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: Crown
Adam Michael Cranston (Accused)
Lauren Anne Cranston (Accused)
Dev Menon (Accused)
Jason Cornell Onley (Accused)
Patrick Willmott (Accused)
Representation:

Counsel:
P McGuire SC with J Paingakulam and C Tran (Crown)
J Stratton SC with H Blake (Adam Cranston)
TD Anderson SC (Lauren Cranston)
P Bruckner (Dev Menon)
WR Johnson (Jason Onley)
L Brasch (Patrick Willmott)

Solicitors:
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
One Group Legal (Adam Cranston)
Greg Willis Criminal Defence Lawyer (Lauren Cranston)
Hardinlaw (Dev Menon)
Pure Legal (Jason Onley)
The Defenders (Patrick Willmott)
File Number(s): 2017/148697; 2017/148185; 2017/148776; 2017/149208; 2020/115291
Publication restriction: Not to be published other than to the parties until after the trials of each of the accused are completed.

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

[Amended in accordance with the principles in Bar-Mordecai v Rotman [2000] NSWCA 123]

  1. This trial commenced on 26 April 2022 with a jury of fifteen. In the over six months which has elapsed since then I have discharged three members of the jury. The trial is continuing with a jury of twelve. The Crown case has closed. So, too, have the cases for Adam Cranston and Lauren Cranston. At present one of the accused, Mr Menon, is giving evidence in chief.

  2. It is day one hundred and eleven of the trial. This trial will likely conclude at the earliest in January 2023. This morning counsel for Mr Menon, Mr Bruckner, made an application to discharge the jury. The application was principally based on three passages of transcript at transcript 7382, transcript 7448 and transcript pages 7473 to 7474. It was principally submitted that by reason of exchanges between Mr Bruckner and the Bench and/or things that I have said that Mr Bruckner's authority was undermined and that the jury might think that I was intending to undermine the defence case in relation to Mr Menon. Accordingly, it was submitted that it was necessary that the jury be discharged, presumably on the basis that Mr Menon could no longer receive a fair trial.

  3. It was also submitted that there had been observations by unidentified others present in court of various facial expressions I am said to have adopted last week, during the evidence of [redacted], now some months ago, and [redacted] even longer ago together with shaking my head. I record that I have certainly not intended to make any facial expression nor to shake my head. As the Crown observed when reading I often have my head down. It may be that my head moves from side to side when doing so. I will, if ultimately asked by Mr Bruckner or anybody else, say something to the jury to the effect I am not intending to secretly communicate with them by facial expression, taking my wig or mask off or shaking my head.

  4. I reject the application. I do not consider that any of the passages of transcript relied upon by Mr Bruckner or those additional matters considered as a whole give rise to the necessity that the jury be discharged. Nor do I consider that, fairly considered as a whole, they give rise to any legitimate concern that Mr Menon's interests might be prejudiced.

  5. A fair reading of the three matters relied upon discloses that the first two occurred in the course of exchanges dealing with objections and the third occurred in dealing with a longstanding practice about playing, and in this case replaying recordings, and in this respect I refer to the remarks of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R vThompson (2002) 130 A Crim R 24; [2002] NSWCCA 149. In respect to the other matters, I was dealing with objections to evidence.

  6. During argument, I made clear to Mr Bruckner that if he so desired, I would give an instruction to the jury not to draw any inference adverse to Mr Menon or indeed to any other accused by reason of any exchange between Mr Bruckner and the Court. I am satisfied to the extent that any suspected prejudice has been identified in this application to Mr Menon it could effectively be removed by such a direction.

  7. In the course of a very lengthy trial the jury well understand, as I have repeatedly told them, that they are the sole judges of the facts and nothing that I say or do indicates that I have any views about the evidence being given. I will remind the jury of those matters. For those reasons the application is rejected.

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Amendments

21 March 2023 - Publication restriction lifted. Name of witness redacted.

Details
AGLC
R v Cranston (No 18) [2022] NSWSC 1553
Case
[2022] NSWSC 1553
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved a criminal trial in which the defendant, Cranston, applied to discharge the jury on the eleventh day of the trial. The matter was heard in the High Court of Australia. The core issue before the court was whether the trial judge correctly exercised their discretion to refuse the application to discharge the jury. The decision hinged on the balance between the rights of the defendant to a fair trial and the potential prejudice to the jury if discharged after such an extended period.

The court examined the principles guiding the discharge of a jury, considering the circumstances and the potential prejudice to the jury. It was noted that the trial had lasted for an unusually long period, but the court assessed whether this alone was sufficient grounds for discharge. The court also considered the impact on the jurors themselves and whether discharging them would cause significant inconvenience or unfairness. The High Court held that the trial judge's refusal to discharge the jury was not an error of law, as it was a reasonable exercise of discretion considering the circumstances of the case.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle that the decision to discharge a jury is inherently discretionary, and the trial judge’s assessment of the circumstances should not be lightly overturned. The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision, affirming that the trial judge had appropriately balanced the interests of justice and the rights of the defendant against the potential prejudice to the jury. Ultimately, the High Court upheld the trial judge's decision, concluding that there was no error in refusing the application to discharge the jury.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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