R v Crafter

The appeal concerned a conviction for rape, brought by the appellant against the Crown. The central dispute revolved around alleged misdirections by the trial judge to the jury concerning the complainant's intoxication, the admission of her evidence of non-consent, and the application of provisions within the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA) relating to complaints and propensity evidence. The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The legal issues before the court included whether the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury in accordance with section 34M(4) of the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA) regarding the complainant's complaint, and whether the judge misdirected the jury concerning sections 34R and 34P of the same Act in relation to evidence of uncharged acts. Further issues were whether the complainant's evidence of lack of consent was wrongly admitted, whether the judge misdirected the jury on the effect of the complainant's intoxication on her conduct and credibility, and whether the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory due to alleged uncertainty in how it was reached or a miscarriage of justice caused by the judge undermining the defence case or misdirecting on the right to silence.

The court dismissed the appeal. Regarding the admission of the complainant's evidence of non-consent, the court found it was proper to elicit this evidence as the prosecution was required to exclude any reasonable possibility of consent, and the complainant was conscious at various stages. On the issue of intoxication, the court found the trial judge's directions were extensive and adequately addressed the impact of intoxication on the complainant's reliability and conduct, including the possibility of reduced inhibitions. The court also considered that the evidence of a petting incident was contextual to the act of intercourse and not a separate uncharged act for the purposes of section 34P, and that the directions given regarding the complainant's complaint under section 34M(4) were appropriate given the specific circumstances of the case, where delay in complaining was not the central issue.

Ultimately, the court concluded that no error of fact or law had been identified that warranted intervention, and after an independent assessment of the evidence, was satisfied that the conviction was open to the jury. The appeal was therefore dismissed.