R v Cosseddo - [2000] NSWSC 446

CITATION: R v Cosseddo [2000] NSWSC 446 revised - 25/05/2000

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 70012/97

HEARING DATE(S): 1 May 2000-23 May 2000, 25 May 2000

JUDGMENT DATE: 25 May 2000

PARTIES :

Regina
Francesco Cosseddo

JUDGMENT OF: Studdert J

COUNSEL : P.S. Dare (Crown)
P.F. Joseph (Offender)

SOLICITORS: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Thorneycroft Appleton Solicitors (Offender)

CATCHWORDS: Special hearing - finding on limited evidence available that offender committed crime of murder - nomination of "limiting term" - principles applicable - Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act, ss 23,24

LEGISLATION CITED: Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act
Sentencing Act
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
Mental Health Act
Coroner's Act
Criminal Procedure Act

CASES CITED: R v Mitchell [1999] NSWCCA 120
R v Holyoak (1985) 82 A Crim R 502

DECISION: See paras 37-38

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
CRIMINAL DIVISION
STUDDERT J
Thursday 25 May 2000

70012/97 REGINA v FRANCESCO COSSEDDO
JUDGMENT
1   HIS HONOUR: In stating these reasons, I will refer to Francesco Cosseddo as the offender, using the language of the new sentencing regime.
2   Following a special hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act, 1990, the jury on Tuesday last, 23 May 2000, found on the limited evidence available that the offender, Francesco Cosseddo, committed the crime of murder. The victim was the wife of the offender, Maria Cosseddo.
3 The finding of the jury enlivens the application of s 23 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act. Under s 23(1) the Court:

“(a) must indicate whether, if the special hearing had been a normal trial of criminal proceedings against a person who was fit to be tried for the offence which the person is found to have committed, it would have imposed a sentence of imprisonment; and

(b) where the Court would have imposed such a sentence, must nominate a term, in this section referred to as ‘a limiting term’, in respect of that offence, being the best estimate of the sentence the Court would have considered appropriate if the special hearing had been a normal trial of criminal proceedings against a person who was fit to be tried for that offence and the person had been found guilty of that offence.”

4 Had this special hearing been a normal trial of criminal proceedings against a person fit to be tried for the offence the jury has found the offender committed, I would have imposed a sentence of imprisonment upon the offender. I am therefore required by s 23(1)(b) to nominate a “limiting term” under that sub-section. My task is to make the best estimate of the sentence I would have considered appropriate if the special hearing had been a normal trial of a person fit to be tried who had been found guilty of murder.
5   Following the verdict of the jury, the offender was taken into custody, to be detained at the hospital attached to the prison at Long Bay. However, until then…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Cosseddo

Details

AGLC: R v Cosseddo [2000] NSWSC 446
Case: [2000] NSWSC 446
Decision Date: 25 May 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Cosseddo, the High Court was presented with an appeal by the accused against a finding of guilt for the crime of murder. The case centred around the defendant's mental state at the time of the offence, and the extent to which this impacted his culpability. The accused argued that he was not criminally responsible for his actions due to a mental disorder, and the Court was required to determine the appropriate legal framework for assessing this claim. The court was tasked with interpreting and applying the provisions of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act, specifically sections 23 and 24, in relation to the defendant's mental state and the principles applicable to determining culpability in cases involving limited evidence.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the available evidence was sufficient to establish that the accused committed the crime of murder, despite his plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness. The court needed to assess whether the principles outlined in the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act allowed for a conviction of murder in cases where the evidence was limited due to the accused's mental state. Furthermore, the court had to consider the appropriate "limiting term" to be applied to the offence in light of the accused's mental disorder. The court was required to balance the need to protect society from dangerous offenders with the protection of individual rights and the principles of justice.

The court found that, in light of the limited evidence available, it was possible to make a finding on the limited evidence that the accused had indeed committed the crime of murder. The court held that the principles outlined in the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act allowed for such a finding, as long as the evidence was sufficient to establish the facts of the case beyond reasonable doubt. The court also determined that the appropriate "limiting term" should be applied to the offence in consideration of the accused's mental state, which would take into account the impact of his mental disorder on his culpability. Ultimately, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to establish the accused's guilt, and that the appropriate "limiting term" should be applied to the offence in light of his mental state.

Orders