R v Cole

[2025] NSWDC 383

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Cole [2025] NSWDC 383

Hearing dates:

18 June 2025

Date of orders:

19 June 2025

Decision date:

19 June 2025

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

King SC DCJ

Decision:

Indicative Sentences (25% discount applied)

001:1 year, 3 months; 002:1 year, 6 months; 003: 1 year, 3 months; 004 – 1 year, 9 months; 005 – 1 year; 006 – 1 year; 007 – 1 year, 3 months; 008 - 1 year, 3 months; 009 – 1 year; 010 – 9 months; 011 – 1 year; 012 – 1 year, 3 months; 013 – 2 years; 014 – 2 years; 015 – 3 years; SEQ 016: 3 and a half years

Aggregate sentence:

Sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 4 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months to commence on 19 June 2025 and to expire on 18 September 2027, upon which date she will become eligible for release to parole, and a balance of term of 2 years and 3 months to commence on 19 September 2027 and to expire on 18 December 2029.

Forfeiture order:

Pursuant to s43(1) the sum of $188,101.82 is to be paid by Julia Cole to Hurford Hardwood Kempsey Pty Ltd by way of restitution for the money Julia Cole unlawfully obtained from Hurford Hardwood Kempsey Pty Ltd.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL- Sentence - dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception x 15 - knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime x1 – total sum obtained over 1 year - $500,052.42 - creation of profile for a fake contractor in program used by the victim company to manage payments – falsifying stocks, payments, moving money through accounts - considerable planning involved - breach of position of trust – subjective matters

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

Johnston v R [2017] NSWCCA 53

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex
Cole, Julia

Representation:

Solicitors:
Crown: Ms E Lyte - ODPP (NSW)
Defence: Mr M Ramsland - Ramsland Laidler Solicitors

File Number(s):

2024/00144077

JUDGMENT

1. HIS HONOUR: Julia Cole appears for sentence in respect of 16 offences. Fifteen of those offences are dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception, contrary to s 192E(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900. The sixteenth matter is knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime, contrary to s 193B(2) of the Crimes Act.

2. In relation to the first 15 offences, the maximum penalty provided by the legislation is ten years’ imprisonment and there is no standard non-parole period.

3. In relation to the 16th matter, the maximum penalty provided by the legislation is 15 years’ imprisonment, and again, there is no standard non-parole period applicable.

4. The offender was committed for sentence on 19 February 2025 from the Port Macquarie Local Court and is accordingly entitled to a 25% discount for the utility of the plea in relation to each of the charges. Such a discount will be applied in relation to the indicative sentences, and the issue of totality will be taken into account when I deal with the aggregate sentence. When providing the indicative sentences, I will then refer to the particular amount of financial advantage obtained in respect of each count, if I have not already referred to it.

BACKGROUND

1. The offender, at the time of the offending, was 52 to 53‑years of age.

2. The victim is Hurford Hardwood Australia Group (the group). The group manages a number of companies throughout Australia, New Zealand, France and America. One of the companies owned by the group is Hurford Hardwood Kempsey P/L (the company), located in Armidale Road, Yarravel. The company operates a sawmill and dry mill business which purchases trees from suppliers, contracts out the logging, then completes the milling process onsite to process the logs into hardwood flooring. The company uses approximately 50 local suppliers and contractors in its operation.

3. The offender was employed by the company for five years. She worked in inventory and accounts and it was her role to manage and process payments to suppliers and contractors when required. The management and processing of payments was not completed automatically, which meant the offender was required to manually manage and process payments using the computer system and spreadsheets. The company used a program called “ProStix” to manage payments. The offender had access to and used this program as part of her duties.

OFFENCES

4. On 6 February 2023, a contractor named “Kay Coler” was registered in the ProStix system. The profile for “Kay Coler” contained the bank account details BSB 012-125 and account number 640477034 (ANZ Bank Account 1). The address entered into the profile was 11 Greenfield Street, West Kempsey, and the email address was [email protected]. There was no ABN or phone number entered on the profile;

5. The profile was registered by employee ID number 31. This was the employee ID number of the offender. ANZ Bank Account 1 is in the offender’s name, and the email address is the offender’s work email address. The address of 11 Greenfield Street, West Kempsey, does not exist. Between February 2023 and December 2023, the company made 15 payments to “Kay Coler” totalling $500,052.42. The payments were as follows:

15 February 2023, $21,962.78.

1 March 2023, $33,518.33.

15 March 2023, $27,022.61.

31 March 23, $41,741.18.

17 April 2023, $15,290.88.

30 June 2023, $11,894.84.

17 July 2023, $21,726.54.

31 July 2023, $27,559.91.

16 August 2023, $15,473.59.

15 September 2023, $8,107.64.

3 October 2023, $10,467.86.

16 October 2023, $23,060.84.

1 November 2023, $53,301.93.

15 November 2023, $54,544.96.

1 December 2023, $134,378.53.

7. On 17 November 2024, the offender tendered her resignation to the company. Her last day was 8 December 2024. The offender did not provide an official reason for resigning, but it was believed it was due to a conflict with a fellow employee and because her mother was ill.

8. At the end of January 2024, staff employed by the group were collecting data for financial reporting when they noticed that the company ran a significant loss (approximately $400,000) in 2023. They noticed a discrepancy between the inventory data and the accounting data.

9. As a result, on 7 February 2024, Jacob Eldridge, the general manager for the group’s manufacturing sector, and Stacey Hicks, who looks after the group’s inventory, travelled to Kempsey to conduct an audit of the company inventory and finances. It was during this audit that Ms Hicks identified payments totalling $500,052.42 made to “Kay Coler”. Despite the large amount of business the company had supposedly done with “Kay Coler,” no paperwork (log dockets, invoices, remittances, supply agreements, et cetera) relating to “Kay Coler” could be located, nor had any of the employees onsite ever heard of “Kay Coler;”

10. Mr Eldridge and Ms Hicks cross-referenced the company’s monthly log stocks (which were manually created by the offender to track payments) with the company’s log database (which tracks inventory). The monthly log stocks contained false entries indicating logs provided by “Kay Coler” had arrived onsite, while the log database showed the logs had never arrived, nor were they ever recognised to arrive. Mr Eldridge and Ms Hicks also checked the weekly payments lists that the offender manually generated. These lists also contained false entries for “Kay Coler” with false invoice numbers.

11. Mr Eldridge checked to see who had registered the “Kay Coler” profile on the system and discovered it was the offender’s employee ID number that had been used. He tried to log into her work computer, but it had been restored to its factory settings, thereby wiping any data it had contained;

12. Mr Eldridge noticed that no payments were made to “Kay Coler” between 17 April 2023 and 30 June 2023. This is significant as during this period, Mr Eldridge was receiving payment summaries from the offender and overseeing and approving payments because the company was looking to restructure payment terms. Payments made during this time were, therefore, subject to greater scrutiny;

13. Mr Eldridge also noticed that the bank account details attached to the “Kay Coler” profile did not match the bank account details where the payments had been made to. He discovered that the offender’s employee ID number had been used to change the bank account details from the ANZ Bank account 1 to BSB 012-125 and account number 640465894 on 4 December 2023;

14. Based on the information discovered by Mr Eldridge and Ms Hicks, it became apparent that the offender fraudulently obtained $500,052.42 from the company by:

• Creating the fake creditor, Kay Coler, in the company’s ProStix system using her own bank account details;

• Creating false entries on the monthly log stocks indicating logs provided by Kay Coler had arrived onsite when, in fact, no logs from Kay Coler were ever received;

• Creating false entries on weekly payment lists so that payments were made by the company to Kay Coler which were received directly into the offender’s bank account;

15. The offender changed the bank account details attached to the fake creditor profile four days before she left the company in an effort to divert suspicion away from herself for the fraudulent payments made to “Kay Coler”;

16. On 8 February 2024, Mr Eldridge attended Kempsey Police Station to report the stolen funds.

INVESTIGATION

17. In March 2024, police served a notice to produce on ANZ Bank for ANZ Bank Account 1. A number of documents were received from ANZ Bank which confirmed that ANZ Bank Account 1 was in the name, Julia Maree Cole (DOB 1970). This is the offender. The account was opened on 1 May 2020, and as at 13 February 2023, the account had a balance of 74 cents. The bank statements showed 15 payments from the company to the account on the exact dates and in the exact amounts as outlined above. There is no other income shown coming into this account.

18. During the period between 15 February 2023 to 20 February 2024, a large number of transfers were made from ANZ Bank Account 1 to three other ANZ Bank accounts, being: BSB 012-125 and account number 460114957 (ANZ Bank Account 2), BSB 012-804 and account number 291072687 (ANZ Bank Account 3) and BSB 012-804 and account number 4564627122728793 (ANZ Bank Account 4). Further notices to produce were served on ANZ Bank in relation to these accounts and any other ANZ accounts in the name of the offender. Documents received from ANZ Bank confirmed that these three bank accounts were all in the name of the offender. The bank account statement for ANZ Bank Account 3 also showed a payment in the amount of $1,000.96 being paid into the account every week. This was the offender’s weekly salary from the company.

19. During the period between 17 November 2023 and 17 December 2023, nine transfers were made from ANZ Bank Account 1 to a Regional Australia Bank account, BSB 932-000 and account number 100514589 (Regional Australia Bank Account 1). The transfers made to this account during this one-month period totalled $148,503.50. Notices to produce were served on Regional Australia Bank in relation to this bank account and any other bank accounts in the name of the offender. Documents received from Regional Australia Bank confirmed Regional Australian Bank Account 1 was in the name of the offender. The account was opened on 17 November 2023. The offender also had three other Regional Australia Bank accounts in her name, two of which were also opened on 17 November 2023.

20. A review of all ANZ Bank and Regional Australia Bank documents showed the fraudulently obtained funds were spent in the following ways:

• In July and August 2023, three payments were made to the owner of a car dealership in Port Macquarie that sells LDV vehicles. Checks conducted via the RMS system showed that the offender purchased an orange LDV SK82 utility vehicle, registration FBW 01M on 7 August 2023. The declared value of this vehicle was $45,677;

• On 19 January 2024, the offender transferred a total of $37,000 from two separate bank accounts into a trust account held by a real estate agent. Text messages on the offender’s phone confirmed she was in the process of purchasing a property at Glen Innes for $410,000;

• Various amounts were spent on holidays and lifestyle expenses;

• Various amounts were transferred to the offender’s family members;

• Various amounts were withdrawn in cash from ATMs;

21. Of the $500,052.42 that the offender fraudulently obtained from the company, $472,544.29 had been transferred out of ANZ Bank Account 1 at various times (Sequence 16 - deal with proceeds). Some of these funds were subsequently transferred back into the ANZ Bank Account 1;

22. As at 12 April 2024, ANZ Bank Account 1 had an account balance of $217,000.59. As at 8 April 2024, there was also a total of $12,717.86 in three of the offender’s Regional Australia Bank accounts.

ARREST

24. On 17 April 2024, police attended the offender’s residence at 13A Cecil Baldwin Close, West Kempsey, and placed the offender under arrest in relation to this matter. The offender was questioned and made admissions to owning the ANZ account where the fraudulent payments were made to. She told police that she is the only person that has access to this account and that “Kay Coler” is a name she made up in order to “put the money into the account.” She also stated that her solicitor had reached out to the company to return some of the funds, but the company had not responded;

25. A search warrant was executed at the premises. During the search, 16 exhibits, including cash, electronic devices, bank cards, bank statements and various other documents and the orange LDV SK82 utility vehicle were located and seized by police. Police also located the purchase contract of the vehicle, which showed that, along with the payments transferred to the owner of the car and dealership, the offender had also traded in her previous vehicle for $11,000 to purchase the vehicle;

26. At the conclusion of the search, the offender and the exhibits were conveyed to Kempsey Police Station. The offender participated in an electronically recorded interview, during which the allegations were read to her. She declined to comment. The offender was charged with these offences.

5. There are a number of factors relevant to the objective seriousness of the offending. One of those is, of course, the amount of money involved which, in this case, was $500,052.42. The Crown submissions dated 17 June 2025 refer to an amount of $311,950.60 having been repaid by the offender to the victim company. That is in the Crown submissions. I have some difficulty with the reference to it as being “repaid” rather than “recovered.” On 29 April 2024, there was an action in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the plaintiff being Hurford Hardwood Kempsey Proprietary Limited, the defendant being the offender. It was heard on 29 April 2024 and orders were made on 29 April 2024 in relation to an ex parte freezing order made against the defendant. Accordingly, all of her assets were frozen and the $311,950.60 actually came from the sale of the property that she held in her name. Whether she acquiesced in the orders being made or not, it is clear that this was a court-enforced repayment.

6. Before the Court there is also information that there is a further sum of money held in her accounts which will be capable of repaying the balance of moneys acquired by deception. This offending occurred over a period of approximately one year, being from 15 February 2023 to 1 December 2023, in relation to the 15 obtaining financial advantage by deception charges and as to knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime between 15 February 2023 and 17 April 2024. The knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime relates to some $472,544.29. 17 April 2024 was when the offender was arrested.

7. The offender had ample opportunity during the period of her offending to reflect on her offending and cease it and failed to do so but continued offending up to and after the time at which she had indicated she was terminating her employment. So, on the 15 different occasions described, she continued her offending and used the moneys obtained to support her lifestyle. In the circumstances where the evidence indicates that the fraud was motivated by a desire to fund a new car, a new home, holidays and various lifestyle expenses, it is clear that the motivation for the offending was one of greed. In relation to the offending itself, there was considerable planning involved. She created a profile for the fake contractor, Kay Coler, in the program used by the victim company to manage payments. The fake profile was registered with the offender’s work email, a non-existent residential address, and the offender’s bank account details.

8. She falsified the victim company’s monthly log stocks to indicate logs provided by Kay Coler where none had in fact arrived. She falsified the victim company’s weekly payments list to include false entries for payments to be made to Kay Coler with false invoice numbers. Although she temporarily ceased the funding from mid-April to late-June - this was when there was increased oversight of payments made by the victim company, and therefore an increased risk of detection, giving cause to cease the offending for that period - however, she thereafter continued. Almost half of the total amount of money defrauded from the victim company was stolen in the month leading up to the offender’s resignation from the victim company. The offender significantly increased the payments made to “Kay Coler,” resulting in three large payments totalling $242,225.42.

9. Indeed, if one takes into account the last three payments, being 1 November - $53,301.93, 15 November - $54,544.96 and 1 December - $134,378.53, the total taken between 1 November and 1 December, approximately a one-month period, is in fact $242,225.42. The victim had indicated her intention to resign from the company prior to ceasing work, and with that in mind, she appears to have significantly escalated the amounts that she defrauded the company of. Four days before her employment ceased, she attempted to cover her tracks by changing the bank account details registered to the “Kay Coler” profile so that it would not connect to her. She moved the funds fraudulently obtained through numerous different bank accounts. She also opened three new bank accounts in November 2023 and moved almost $150,000 of the fraudulently stolen funds into one of those accounts.

10. She held a position of trust within the victim company, working in inventory and accounts, and it was her role to manage and process payments to suppliers and contractors. The offending was a gross breach of the trust that had been placed in her by the company. The victim in this fraud was the company, which apparently operated at a loss as a result of her offending during the 2023 financial year. Other potential victims were, of course, the shareholders in the company, other employees, had the company failed, and the local community in which it operated, because many of the local jobs may well have been dependent on providing logs to this business.

11. Taking into account all of those circumstances, including the complete breach of trust, this matter falls into the mid-range of objective seriousness. A breach of a position of trust is also a statutory aggravating feature, although in relation to this matter, it is clear that it is not necessary to rely on s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 in this regard, as it is already essentially included in the nature of the charge itself, considering the circumstances of what occurred. This was, however, clearly a planned or organised criminal activity as referred to in s 21A(3)(d) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

12. The offender attempted to disguise her conduct when leaving by restoring her computer to its factory settings: accordingly wiping any data that it had contained, and also by changing the account details for “Kay Coler” so that they did not relate to her account, as well as the bank account details attached to the fake creditor profile four days before she left the company. The Regional Australia Bank accounts were opened during the period of November 2023, in light of her anticipated retirement or cessation of employment. Regional Australia Bank Account 1 was opened on 17 November 2023 and she had three other Regional Australia Bank accounts in her name, two of which were also opened on 17 November 2023.

5. The amounts had generally increased during the period of the offending, but the 1 November, 15 November and 1 December amounts indicate a clear escalation of the offending in the prospect of obtaining as much as she could before retirement or ceasing employment.

SUBJECTIVE MATTERS

14. Before the Court are: the report of Dr Kim Dilati, a consultant clinical and forensic psychologist, dated 11 June 25; a report of Dr Marc Kamel, dated 10 June 2025, being her general practitioner; a patient health summary of 14 February 2025; a Payment Receipt for payment of 7 August 2024, being a printout from the Ramsland Laidler Solicitors Client Trust Ledger relating to the sale of property and the transfer of $311,950.60 to Hurford Hardwood Kempsey Pty Ltd; an apology letter from the offender, dated 16 May 2025; and references from Sharon Cole, 16 May 2025; Tara Ferguson, 30 April 2025; Louise Ahern, 30 April 2025; Leanne Howard, 13 April 2025; and Theresa Kelly, 1 April 2025. Subjective matters are drawn from that material.

15. Of note is that the offender relies on the apology letter, and gave no evidence on sentence, so that none of the assertions made in her letter could be tested by cross-examination. However, I accept the following. She was born in Sydney, New South Wales, and is the third born of five siblings from her parents’ union. At 8 or 9, her father suffered a debilitating back injury, rendering him unable to work. and her mother became the breadwinner, working at a local bakery to support the family. They resided in Housing Commission premises and were able to meet their basic needs but had limited resources beyond essentials. She, however, did not have a childhood history of adversity.

16. She had close relationships with her parents and younger brother and sister. She did not have a history of any significant difficulties with learning, memory or any other matters relevant to education. She had experienced some reading challenges until Year 6. She was reportedly shy and socially withdrawn and subject to some bullying during high school. She nonetheless reported prosocial interests, including regular participation in team sports such as soccer and hockey in her youth, and had no personal experience of sexual abuse or victimisation. At the age of 33, in 2003, she left Moruya and moved to Kempsey with her parents and has lived with them since then, until the passing of her father in 2022. She continues to reside with her 77-year-old mother, who suffers from hypertension and thyroid-related medical issues.

17. The offender had, apparently, a stable educational trajectory, attending one primary and one high school in Moruya, where she achieved above‑average academic results. In 1987, she completed Year 12 and subsequently obtained an Associate Diploma in Youth Work from Western Sydney University at age 19. In 1994, she completed a Bachelor of Education at Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga, followed by a Diploma in Business Management through Novaskill in 2013.

18. She began working at the age of 13 in casual and odd jobs and later worked in an early childhood education centre in Sydney for several years and obtained a primary school teaching position which ended due to her mental health difficulties around the age of 24. She then continued to teach in a casual capacity for some time thereafter.

19. She also had further completed a Certificate in Office Administration through TAFE and secured work in the employment services sector from 2005 to 2014, eventually becoming an area manager. She reported voluntarily leaving this role due to the identification of fraudulent practices within the organisation which were not being addressed by her employer at the time. In that regard, I note the reference from Theresa Kelly, a project manager in the New South Wales Government who has known the offender for some 13 years, who refers to first meeting the offender when they were both working for VERTO, which I understand is an employment, training and community services organisation. The reference from her speaks highly of the offender, but includes the following passage:

“While working at VERTO, Julia promoted an honest and unyieldingly ethical work practice in all aspects and would not hesitate to hold staff or the organisation to account for behaviour or practices which she believed to be unethical, or not in the best interests of the vulnerable job seekers that we were there to support. For example, incidents were recognised where other branches of the business condoned by the company, were undertaken or condoning practices that were unethical or fraudulent, and Julia encouraged and supported each of us when we found these to report these issues to the Department of Employment and Education and Workplace Relations as the governing body of the contract that the company was delivering. She also reported these issues to DEEWR herself, as the manager of the site, and this was proved to be behaviour so entrenched and detrimental that it eventually resulted in the VERTO losing their employment services contract across the State. We knew that even though these reports might have the outcome of us all losing our jobs, that the need for ethical practices was paramount.”

20. Considering that history, it is extremely difficult to understand the offender committing these offences.

21. Between 2000 and 2005, she experienced intermittent periods of unemployment while raising her son, who was born as a result of a passing contact in 1999. She raised her son alone, not being able to make any contact with the biological father. In March 2024, Ms Cole reported experiencing chronic suicidal ideation, over the six to eight-week period leading up to her arrest, which resulted in her admission to the Kempsey Mental Health Inpatient Unit. I have no doubt that that was caused by her realisation that the fraud was likely to have been uncovered or, at least, detected and being investigated as a result of the three-monthly financial review being conducted in January. At the time of the psychologist’s report, she was said to be currently displaying a range of symptoms consistent with ongoing depression and anxiety, and had described heightened shame, embarrassment and fear of imprisonment, as well as losing contact with her son, who apparently did not look on her conduct favourably.

22. Mr Ramsland, solicitor for the offender, has submitted that while the offending was opportunistic and clearly planned, that, “It was unsophisticated fraud which was bound to fail as the money was being transferred into accounts in her own name.” Of course, as is evident from the facts and what I referred to so far, the offender made every effort to disguise what she had done so that it would not be discovered after she had departed from the company, by changing accounts and various other details as previously referred to, such as resetting the computer to factory settings. Mr Ramsland also indicates that the offending occurred against a background of the offender suffering from a significant gambling addiction, financial hardship, depression, anxiety and fibromyalgia.

23. There is at least evidence before the Court independent of the offender that she has suffered in the past from fibromyalgia and no doubt continues to do so, and that she has had difficulty with depression and anxiety. Of course, having committed these offences, knowing that she had committed them and knowing that they were potentially detectable, I have no doubt that her anxiety and depression post leaving the company was inspired or caused by that knowledge, as well as the knowledge that each of the offences was, in itself, a significant offence, and that she was highly likely to receive a term of imprisonment as a result of the offending, if discovered.

24. As to her suffering from a significant gambling addiction, I simply note that the only evidence of a significant gambling addiction comes from her own statements to the psychologist. There is no reference to a gambling addiction in any other material, and the offender has not given evidence. In any event, a gambling addiction does not justify defrauding your employer of more than half a million dollars over a period of a year and does not reduce the moral culpability, particularly in the circumstances where the offender has a history, while with VERTO, of understanding that fraud offences should not be committed against employers.

25. I note she has no criminal history and that is something that must be taken into account on sentence. However, she committed these offences repeatedly over an almost one-year period and engaged in a course of conduct to avoid detection while in a position of trust with the victim company. In those circumstances, good character carries less weight than it would otherwise. See Johnston v R [2017] NSWCCA 53 at 36-38, 42-45 and 76‑77.

26. Dr Dilati diagnosed the offender as suffering from a major depressive disorder, a generalised anxiety disorder and a severe gambling disorder. I have already commented that the only evidence of a gambling disorder is the offender’s own statements. There is material before the Court which indicates that she has had significant problems with anxiety and depression in the past, by way of medications having been prescribed for those purposes and/or for her fibromyalgia and bursitis. Although there is no indication in the material before me as to the actual extent of her fibromyalgia or any significant effects related to bursitis. Dr Dilati stated, at paras 111 to 113:

“These conditions appear to have materially contributed to her offending as her financial desperation, guilt, workplace stress and maladaptive coping behaviours (gambling) became entrenched over time. The cumulative effect of these psychological impairments suggests diminished capacity for sound judgment and impulse control during her offending period. Her deteriorating mental health was also compounded by unresolved grief and chronic stress, further compromising her ability to engage in rational decision-making and increasing her vulnerability to risk taking and unethical behaviour.”

27. While I accept that she has had problems with her mental health in the past and now continuing as a result, in part, of her offending, it is at least not particularly evident from the references that have been provided on her behalf. Her mother indicates that she was particularly affected by the passing of her father in November 2022, and that following her arrest in relation to this matter, she became suicidal and was hospitalised for a period of time, requiring monitoring and support for mental health after being released. Her mother states that she has expressed to her deep remorse and shame for what happened, and is committed to making amends, and that this offending is out of character.

28. Tara Ferguson, a registered nurse who has known the offender for the past eight years, indicates she has consistently demonstrated deep love and selflessness towards her family, that the loss of her father deeply affected her and that;

“Julia has always been a warm, vibrant and caring individual. However, since this matter came to light, she has become noticeably withdrawn, anxious and isolated…The toll the situation has taken on her is significant and it’s evident to those who know her that she is sincerely remorseful. She has taken full responsibility for her actions and is doing everything in her power to address this matter properly and respectfully.”

29. Ms Louise Ahern, being the practice manager of the Kempsey Medical Centre, in her reference indicates she has known the offender for 12 years as a neighbour, that the offender provided friendly neighbourhood assistance from time to time in relation to Ms Ahern’s daughter and elderly parents, when necessary, and she states, “I don’t believe Julia is a bad person, she made some poor choices and has taken responsibility for those mistakes.”

30. Leanne Howard, in her reference of 13 April 2025, indicates that she is the office manager for the Coffs Harbour Airconditioning company, who has known the offender for 12 years, having first met her through VERTO Kempsey, where the offender was the branch manager. She states:

“Socially, Julia is known for her warmth, kindness and infectious energy. She brings joy to those around her and fosters strong, supportive relationships. On a personal level, I regard her as one of my closest and most trusted friends. In my view, Julia is a person of outstanding character with a genuine commitment to the wellbeing of others and the betterment of the community. I respectfully submit this reference in support of her…Since this matter arose, I have observed a significant change in Julia. The situation has affected her deeply. She has become noticeably withdrawn and appears to be suffering from depression. This is a stark contrast to the vibrant, positive and joyful person I’ve always known. She is filled with remorse and regret and she is carrying the emotional weight of this matter heavily. She has expressed sincere regret for her actions and is deeply sorry for the impact they have had.”

31. Ms Howard does not appear to have ever noticed any particularly high level of anxiety or depression in the past, prior to the commission of these offences. Nonetheless, as I have said, I accept on, basically, the medical material provided, that she has suffered from those conditions in the past prior to the discovery of this offending.

32. I have previously referred to a quote from Theresa Kelly, who first met the offender through VERTO, some 13 years ago, and note that, in general, despite the inconsistency of this behaviour with her past attitude to possible offending by employees of VERTO, that Ms Kelly continues to regard her highly. Clearly, from the qualifications the offender has obtained over the years and her past work history, she is an intelligent woman who well understood at all times that what she was doing was a serious criminal offence; indeed, so well understood it that when she became close to the time of terminating her employment, she sought to maximise the amount she could obtain by way of large transfers from the company’s funds to herself by way of deception and embarked on various means of covering up her fraud.

33. I accept that she is truly remorseful and contrite. I also accept, considering her past history, that there is a good prospect of rehabilitation and a low risk of reoffending. Indeed, it would seem to me that it would be unlikely that she will ever be placed in a position again where she might be able to carry out such offending, which also helps to diminish the risk of reoffending in the future. And I accept, whether it be because of the actions of Hurford Hardwood Kempsey in trying to look after their own interests by getting the freezing order, that the company is likely to recover all of the funds obtained by her and potentially also any costs associated with the obtaining of the freezing order, which are always, in my experience, substantial.

34. It is tragic that someone with the offender’s past history, who enjoyed a responsible position in the community and was well respected by her family and friends, embarked on this outrageous course of misconduct. I do not accept Mr Ramsland’s assessment that it was unsophisticated and bound to be discovered and, certainly, if she had not engaged in taking such significant sums over such a short period of time, 11 months, it is entirely possible that this offending could have continued for years, if she maintained the job and restricted herself to much smaller amounts. However, that is not what happened.

35. I have taken into account all of the matters that I have referred to. I will provide, in relation to each of the indicative sentences, a 25% discount. And when I come to the aggregate sentence, I will take into account totality and, in particular, in relation to the 15 counts contrary to s 192E(1)(b) of the Crimes Act and Sequence 16, being knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime contrary to s 193B(2) of the Crimes Act, that there is a significant overlap between those two groupings. That is, the 15 counts plus the final count of knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime, and that a significant degree of concurrency between those 15 counts and the 16th count is appropriate.

36. Taking all of those matters into account, the indicative sentences are as follows:

Sequence 1, 15 February 23, $21,962.78. The indicative term of imprisonment is one year, three months.

Sequence 2, 1 March 23, $33,518.33. The indicative sentence is one year, six months.

Sequence 3, 15 March 2023, $27,022.61 - one year, three months.

Sequence 4, 31 March 2023, $41,741.18 - one year, nine months.

Sequence 5, 17 April 2023, $15,290.88 - one year.

Sequence 6, 30 June 2023, $11,894.84 - one year.

Sequence 7, 17 July 2023, $21,726.54 - one year, three months.

Sequence 8, 31 July 23, $27,559.91 - one year, three months.

Sequence 9, 16 August 2023, $15,473.59, one year.

Sequence 10, 15 September 2023, $8,107.64 - nine months’ imprisonment. Sequence 11, 3 October2023, $10,467.86 - one year’s imprisonment.

Sequence 12, 16 October 23, $23,060.84 - one year, three months’ imprisonment.

Sequence 13, 1 November 2023, $53,301.93 - two years’ imprisonment. Sequence 14, 15 November 2023, $54,544.96 - two years’ imprisonment. Sequence 15, 7 December 2023, $134,378.53 - three years’ imprisonment. Sequence 16, between 15 February 23 and 17 April 2024, $472,544.29 - three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment.

37. I have, of course, taken into account the principle of totality as previously referred to and as referred to in Pearce. The aggregate sentence will be a term of imprisonment of four years, six months to date from today, 19 June 2025. I will find special circumstances in view of the offender’s ongoing physical problems, as well as her anxiety, depression and occasional suicidal ideation. The non‑parole period will be 50% of the total term, reducing the statutory relationship from 75% of the total term to 50% of the total term. Accordingly, the non‑parole period is two years and three months, commencing on 19 June 2025. She will be first eligible for parole on 18 September 2027, and the balance of term is two years and three months, commencing on 19 September 2027 and expiring on 18 December 2029.

38. I have also taken into account in relation to special circumstances, the need for some assistance on an ongoing basis to the offender to reintegrate herself into society. I acknowledge that, at her age, a term of imprisonment is likely to weigh more heavily on her than it would otherwise on a younger offender. There is nothing in relation to her mental health or physical concerns which, in my view, cannot be adequately dealt with within the prison system.

39. There is one matter that I intended to refer to but failed to. It related to the cause of her offending. As I previously said, in my view, it was for financial gain. But the psychological report does indicate some relevant background to that, in that prior to the offending, following the resignation of the site manager, the offender was appointed as an executive assistant. In addition to her then existing role, she was made responsible for managing the company’s forestry accreditation and her responsibilities grew significantly, but her salary remained unchanged. According to the psychologist:

“Ms Cole described the company’s work culture as strained and dysfunctional with expectations to manage the admin for a contracted forester whose documentation was often incomplete or missing, further impeding her duties. By this stage, Ms Cole believed she was working six-and-a-half days per week without receiving adequate overtime or time in lieu, despite verbal assurances. During the COVID‑19 pandemic, her employer was diagnosed with cancer and Ms Cole began undertaking some of his responsibilities. When another staff member from accounts receivable was injured, Ms Cole also assumed this role in addition to her existing roles…Ms Cole was simultaneously dealing with increasing pressure at work, including her employer’s concealed back injury, his suspected painkiller misuse and fraudulent conduct by others, including a forester and potentially the accounts receivable officer. She reported raising these concerns with management, however, felt dismissed.”

40. In my view, those passages from the psychologist’s report indicate a sense of entitlement to be paid more than she was being paid, which I note, was not particularly handsome, being an amount of approximately $1,000 a week or, as referred to somewhere in the facts, $60,000 per annum. She held what was - obviously because of what she was able to achieve to her own benefit - a significantly responsible position within the company and one that would not appear, to me, to be reflected by a salary of $60,000 per annum. However, that was what she agreed to work for, and all she was entitled to. She was not entitled to take it upon herself to provide for herself an additional half a million dollars in the year.

All right. Now, is there anything in particular that I have failed to mention, Madam Crown, or Mr Ramsland?

LYTE: No, your Honour.

RAMSLAND: No, your Honour. Thank you.

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Decision last updated: 24 September 2025