R v Close - [2020] NSWSC 1026

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Close [2020] NSWSC 1026
Hearing dates: 13 – 23 July 2020
Decision date: 06 August 2020
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Button J
Decision:
Verdict of guilty of murder

Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – murder – trial by judge alone – plea of not guilty to murder but guilty of manslaughter – whether intention to kill or intention to inflict grievous bodily harm established beyond reasonable doubt – self-induced intoxication – expert evidence from three witnesses – consideration of large number of established circumstantial facts – rejection of alternative hypotheses – intention to inflict grievous bodily harm established to the criminal standard

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Regina (Crown)
Luke Jordan Close (Accused)
Representation:
Counsel:
K Ratcliffe (Crown)
M Austin (Accused)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Aboriginal Legal Service (Accused)

File Number(s): 2018/62445

Judgment

Introduction

On 13 July 2020, Mr Luke Jordan Close (the accused) was arraigned on an indictment before me in the Supreme Court at Nowra. No jury panel was present, because an order that the trial proceed by judge alone was extant.
The indictment contained a single count, averring that, on or about 23 February 2018 at Nowra, the accused did murder Mr Garry James Welsh (the deceased). The accused entered a plea of not guilty to murder but guilty of manslaughter; when he did so, he was represented by solicitor and counsel.
The Crown did not accept that plea in full satisfaction of the indictment, with the result that a trial by judge alone on the count of murder proceeded until 23 July 2020. The accused remained represented as described above throughout the entirety of his trial. On that latter occasion, I retired to consider my verdict, having made it clear that other judicial commitments would mean that its delivery would be delayed for a time.

Issues in the trial

In his opening as to the issues expected to arise in the trial, and subsequently, defence counsel explained the following.
First, in accordance with his plea, there would be no dispute about the fact that the accused had unlawfully killed the deceased in circumstances amounting to manslaughter, and I could be comfortably satisfied about that beyond reasonable doubt.
Secondly, the only disputed element with regard to murder would be the mental element; that is, whether the Crown could prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that, at the time of the homicide, the accused intended to cause at least grievous bodily harm (I shall subsequently refer to that as “really serious physical injury”).
Thirdly, a central component of the question of whether there is a reasonable doubt about that mental element would be close consideration of the intoxication of the accused at the time he performed the physical elements of the homicide.
Fourthly, no inherent psychiatric or intellectual condition suffered by the accused at the time would play any role in that assessment.
In light of those being identified as the real issues in the trial, these reasons for verdict will focus very much on the question: has the Crown proven to my satisfaction, beyond reasonable doubt, that, at the time the accused admittedly voluntarily did an act that caused the death of the deceased, he intended at the least to cause him really serious physical injury?

Undisputed facts

Evidence from more than 45 witnesses – the bulk of it in documentary form – undisputedly establishes the following facts and events. I interpolate that, sadly, many of the persons to whom I shall now refer have had their lives blighted by a vicious circle of deprivation, abuse of prohibited drugs and alcohol, and imprisonment.
The deceased was an older gentleman who had had problems with prohibited drugs, including heroin. As at the time of his death in early 2018, he was a heavy smoker of cannabis. He had lived at an address at 1/72 St Ann’s Street Nowra for many years. He lived in that small apartment alone, but often had visitors. Some purported friends and acquaintances were in truth persons –many of them burdened by their own problems with prohibited drugs or alcohol or both – who took advantage of him in various ways. Sometimes those visitors caused problems for the surrounding neighbours; an example is the neighbour Mr Tom McDonald, who forestalled a person from clambering into his backyard in early February 2018.
The deceased was in the habit of supplying small quantities of prohibited drugs, including cannabis, buprenorphine (“Bupe”), and crystal methylamphetamine (colloquially known in Australia as ice), but earned little from that illegal trade. At the time of his death, he was frail as a result of a number of medical conditions, the most serious of which was emphysema.
The accused, a much younger man, had had his own issues with substances and also with the criminal justice system. The two were known to each other, were on good terms, and there was no sign of previous trouble between them. On occasions, the accused would stay at the home of the deceased.
On the other hand, in the months leading up to the death of the deceased, some persons were frightened of, and avoided, the accused because of his propensity for angry outbursts. They included Mr Stephen Barker, a friend of the deceased, Mr Steve McCall, another of his friends, and Ms Terri Judge, an associate of both the deceased and the accused.
On Wednesday 14 February 2018, the accused arrived with a backpack full of clothes at the home of his sister, Ms Lola Close, in the western Sydney suburb of Old Guildford. He stayed with her family for a time, and was reporting on bail to Fairfield Police Station. He was leading a seemingly quiet life, and there was no sign of him using prohibited drugs.
In the evening of Saturday 17 February 2018, Ms Janelle Crump, the romantic partner of the accused, arrived by train from Nowra at the home in Old Guildford. She brought with her three children, at least one of whom was the child of the accused. She ended up staying there with the children for a number of days. Ms Lola Close noticed tension between the accused and Ms Crump. On occasions, his sister had seen the accused to have anxiety or panic attacks, and had seen that his neck was twitching.
During the stay of Ms Crump and the children in the household, an issue arose between the accused and Ms Crump about her possibly having had intimate contact with a Mr Ben Smith. The accused spoke of doing Mr Smith harm.
On Wednesday 21 February 2018, Ms Crump and the children returned to Nowra by train. Unexpectedly, the accused accompanied them. His sister was angry and disappointed that he had suddenly departed. The group arrived at Bomaderry train station to the north of Nowra at about 8:20 PM, and were picked up by a friend and neighbour, Ms Tammy Ford. They returned to the family home in Bomaderry.
Later that evening, after pizza had been obtained for dinner, Ms Crump noticed that the accused had smashed his own mobile phone. It seemed that he was angry about a woman called Kath, though precisely why is not entirely clear on the evidence. He stormed off in anger, but on his return later that evening was calm.
The following day, Thursday 22 February 2018, the accused slept in. At 2:19 PM, he used the phone of Ms Crump to call the deceased. The accused said to his partner that he was proposing to go to the home of the deceased for “bupe or something”. He departed the home on foot at about 2:30 PM, telling Ms Crump that he would first go to the Centrelink office in the centre of Nowra. At the time he left, Ms Crump saw that the accused was wearing a pair of shorts, a jumper with an Aboriginal motif on it, and “orange shoes”.
A little later, as she was driving, Ms Ford saw the accused walking through the streets of Bomaderry, and gave him a lift into town. During the car trip, she noted that the accused was very talkative, was gesticulating a lot, and that his legs were continuously tapping. His movements were so pronounced that her car was physically shaking as a result. The opinion of Ms Ford was that the accused was affected by prohibited drugs, based on her observations of him in the past.
At the Centrelink office, the accused ran into two friends, Mr Tauren Tarrant, and Ms Alinta Van de Maele. Mr Tarrant was carrying a bottle of alcohol with him. The three of them left the Centrelink office together at about 3:30 PM.
As it happened, the deceased attended the same office shortly before 4 PM. Due to his poor health, he was being ferried around town by a friend or friends, completing various chores.
The trio of the accused, Mr Tarrant, and Ms Van de Maele travelled to the home of Mr Richard James, where Mr Tarrant and Ms Van de Maele lived in an old bus that was permanently parked in the backyard. There they consumed a large quantity of alcohol. The accused, in truth not a heavy drinker, was spurred on in that activity by Mr Tarrant, a chronic alcoholic. They also smoked a small amount of cannabis at an early stage of their socialising.
Later, the accused and Mr Tarrant left the home on foot. They were heading to East Nowra, with the idea of purchasing some more cannabis. On the way, they came across a young woman, Ms Harmony Hubbard, who was riding a white BMX bike. She had obtained the bike through a convoluted process that, in all likelihood, involved the bike originally having been taken by another young woman without permission. The accused recognised the bike as his own, and confronted Ms Hubbard about it. He expressed his anger to her about what had happened. He was also, in the opinion of Ms Hubbard, affected by prohibited drugs.
The accused took possession of the pushbike, and thereafter rode it to premises associated with Mr Gary Knight. He did so because of what he had been told by Ms Hubbard about the provenance of the pushbike. The accused confronted Mr Knight about his pushbike having been taken without permission. Again, the accused was at the least annoyed, though he was mollified to some degree by the end of the interaction.
Having said that, as he was leaving the premises where he had spoken to Mr Knight, the accused ran into Ms Rebecca Ardler. As it happened, she was the person who had taken the bike without permission in the first place. She went to speak to the accused, but he said words to the effect of “[N]ot now sissy, I’ll talk to you later. I’m about to kill some cunt. I’m in the horrors.” The accused appeared to her very angry, and her assessment was that he was indeed “in the horrors”.
After that, the accused and Mr Tarrant travelled to the home of Mr Adam Bayliss. That was because the accused wished to retrieve some luggage that he had left there when he had previously departed Nowra. Mr Bayliss noticed that Mr Tarrant was “pretty much blind drunk”. He also noticed that the two men had with them a bottle of a reasonably potent alcoholic drink that seemed to have had something extra added to it.
The accused examined his belongings. He expressed the belief that someone had gone through his bags, and that it may have been the brother of Mr Bayliss, Mr Ben Smith. That was the man who the accused thought may also have had a romantic relationship with Ms Crump. The accused was at the least angry about the situation.
When he departed, the accused was no longer interested in taking possession of his bags.
At 6:27 PM meanwhile, Ms Crump sent the following text to the deceased: “Has Luke been there yet.” No response was recorded.
The two men returned to the home of Mr Tarrant, the accused presumably riding the BMX bike, and his companion on foot. There more socialising and drinking occurred with Ms Van de Maele. For a time they were in the backyard of the main house, drinking heavily. Later, the three of them decided to leave again. They invited Mr James to join them, but he declined. The accused reached through the window of the bus and slapped him to the face. Although Mr Tarrant apologised for the action of his friend, he assessed what had happened as something more or less playful rather than aggressive. Understandably, Mr James regarded the assault more seriously.
By the time the group departed, it was very approximately 8 PM or 9 PM, according to Mr James and Ms Van de Maele. The pushbike was left at the shared home of Mr James and Mr Tarrant. According to Mr Tarrant, the accused was close to falling down drunk: he was staggering, falling over his own feet, walking in circles, and when he tried to walk in a straight line he in fact walked in “figure eights”.
Meanwhile, various neighbours of the deceased living near his home began to retire to bed that evening.
The deceased himself had a visitor, Mr Adam Diebert, who arrived at about 10:30 PM on the Thursday but only stayed for 15 minutes or so. Mr Barker, as I have said, another friend of the deceased, was already present at the apartment. The three men discussed a possible fishing trip the following day. Mr Barker departed the home of the deceased shortly after 11:44 PM, the time at which he received a text from a female friend who was expecting him that evening asking him to bring food when he came. On the evidence, the deceased was home alone from shortly before midnight.
Meanwhile, the trio of the accused, Mr Tarrant, and Ms Van de Maele were out and about in Nowra. The evidence is unclear precisely where they were between perhaps 10 PM and 12 midnight. At the latter time, they were in the vicinity of the home of Mr Joseph Hucman, which was also located on St Ann’s Street, a short distance to the east of the home of the deceased, although one needs to cross the Princes Highway in order to get from one location to the other. Also present were two further members of the Hucman family, Mr Mark Hucman and Mr Nicolas Hucman.
According to Mr Mark Hucman, Mr Nicolas Hucman believed that there had been trouble between the accused and Mr Nicolas Hucman to do with insults on social media. The accused began to yell and scream and behave aggressively towards Mr Nicolas Hucman. A physical fight between the two men seemed imminent, but a young woman intervened. According to Mr Mark Hucman, the accused departed to the east on foot.
Later, at 12:10 AM on Friday 23 February 2018, Mr Mark Hucman attended at nearby Nowra Police Station, spoke of St Ann’s Street, and suggested to police that “you better get there”.
According to Mr Tarrant and Ms Van de Maele, it was after the trouble at the Hucman home that the accused left their company on foot.
Turning now to the undisputed evidence of neighbours of the deceased, some time after 12 midnight but before 1 AM, Mrs Carol Middleton, who lived directly to the east of the deceased on the same side of the road in a similar apartment and can therefore be thought of as his next-door neighbour, heard banging, screaming, and squealing. She believed that she heard the banging before the squealing. The noises were coming from a westerly direction. They seemed to move away from her. She went back to sleep.
Ms Jennifer Vaughan was woken from sleep at some stage after midnight. She heard someone yelling on View Street, which joins St Ann’s Street at a three-way intersection. Her partner awoke as well, because of the barking of their dog. She got out of bed, looked out of the window, and saw a man “walking down the street yelling abuse. He turned towards our house and yelled, ‘get that dog to shut the fuck up’.” The man was walking towards Marriott Park, that is, in a northerly direction. He also struck a car that was parked outside a block of flats very close to the intersection to which I have referred. There was no dispute before me that the man described by this witness and other neighbours was the accused. Later, Ms Vaughan went outside and saw three people on View Street “having an argument”.
Mr McDonald, at what he thought was about 1 AM, heard banging, and a male voice making a “yelling screech”. He saw a shirtless man about 10 metres away. He seemed to be holding a bat or some sort of wooden implement. The man was walking to the north on View Street. He was neither running nor walking fast. It looked and sounded as if the man was banging on cars with whatever it was he had in his hand.
At approximately 12:30 AM, Mr Erick Christiansen and Ms Brenda Christiansen, who also lived close to the intersection, were woken by the sound of a man yelling obscenities and repeating “People are dogs”. They saw a man walking in a northerly direction down View Street with no shirt on, away from the intersection with St Ann’s Street and towards the intersection of Cox Avenue. They noticed that the side mirror of the car of one of their children, which was parked outside, had been broken. They heard further sounds of glass breaking down the street. They called the police and went back inside their home.
(I interpolate now that I appreciate that the next chronological event in the Crown case is the alleged meeting between the accused and Mr Nathan Dalziel at Marriott Park, a short distance to the north. But because I understand that alleged interaction to be partly or wholly disputed by defence counsel, I do not discuss it here, but will deal with it later.)
A short time later, Mr and Mrs Christiansen heard the same voice. It was loud and high-pitched, and words were not decipherable. They heard the noise getting closer, and they went out the front of their home again. They saw the same man, this time heading south, and on the eastern side of View Street. Mr Christiansen said words to the effect of “Stay away from our car”. According to Mrs Christiansen, the man adopted a fighting stance and spat in the face of her husband. Mr Christiansen lunged at the other man, who kicked out at him in an effort to fend him off. A wrestle ensued. The other man was getting the better of Mr Christiansen, and the former told the latter that he was “an old man”.
When Mrs Christiansen said that the police were on their way, the accused said “That’s good because I want to die. They can run me over”.
Shortly thereafter, uniformed police arrived (in fact, they had been on the scene earlier, but had not been able to find any of the persons involved, although they had observed a broken umbrella lying on View Street somewhat to the north of the home of the deceased). They noted that the accused was sitting in the middle of the roadway, wearing only shorts. The accused was known to at least one of the police officers. He was not aggressive to police, but slumped back down to a prone position after they tried to place him in the rear of a secured vehicle. His arms and legs were “flailing”. He appeared to possess poor motor control.
Neither police officer could smell alcohol on the accused. Each was of the view that he was very significantly affected by some other substance.
When the two uniformed officers arrived, the accused had said to one of them “You’re all right”, but said to the other “You’re a fucking cunt”.
As he left with the police, the accused spoke of having just attacked Mr Christiansen, and apologised for it.
The two police officers and the accused arrived at nearby Nowra Police Station at about 1:20 AM. The accused was placed in the dock, a small fully enclosed Perspex area with a simple bench. He was asked whether he wanted a blanket, and replied in the affirmative.
Shortly after that, police became concerned by his state of consciousness that the accused may be experiencing a dangerous overdose by some form of depressant. An ambulance was called, and the accused was injected with a substance that immediately reverses the effects of opioids. He responded, and indeed went to the other extreme: he became agitated, aggressive, abusive, and seemingly obsessive. Although still confined to the dock, he was pacing back and forth, on occasions head-butting the Perspex, and verbally abusing police officers. The decision was made by the paramedics to sedate him. That was achieved by the intravenous administration of a sedative on two occasions. After a time, the accused became calmer, then sleepy, then unconscious. He was then removed from the dock, restrained, transferred to a nearby hospital, and ultimately “scheduled” for a number of hours in order to protect himself and others.

At 6 AM the next morning, the neighbour of the deceased, Mrs Middleton, woke up. At 7:45 AM, she took her granddaughter to work. She noticed that, although the front door of the apartment of the deceased was closed, the screen door, unusually, was open. She also noticed pieces of coloured plastic outside his doorway.
Later, at about 10 AM on the Friday, Mrs Middleton found a knife in the driveway between her home and the home of the deceased. She used a plastic bag to pick it up, and retained it in her own apartment. From the driveway, she attempted to rouse the deceased in his apartment, but without success. Eventually, the police were alerted.
Shortly before midday on the Friday, the accused was sufficiently well to be discharged from hospital. Uniformed police attended, and offered him a lift home. He identified his home as the address of the deceased. There was no dispute between the parties about the fact that, at that time and subsequent stages, the accused was and is amnesic with regard to the events of the evening in question.
On arrival at the home of the deceased with the accused, police were told of the discovery of the knife in the driveway. The police entered the home, and, tragically, saw Mr Welsh, deceased, in his bedroom. On their return to the street, the accused asked “How is Garry? Is he okay?” He was informed that his friend was dead. When asked whether he had been at the home of the deceased the previous evening, the accused replied “I don’t know”; a little later, he said “If I was on View Street last night, I would’ve been going to Garry’s house.”
Later, whilst attending Nowra Police Station voluntarily, the accused gave a statement to the effect that after having a few drinks at Mr Tarrant’s place on Thursday 22 February and subsequently visiting Mr Bayliss at some point during the day, he had no recollection of events that occurred later that afternoon and evening.
Later again, at about 5:50 PM on Friday 23 February 2018, the accused engaged in a short recorded interview with detectives to similar effect. That interview had to be interrupted for a time, and ambulance personnel called, when the accused began to hyperventilate, seemingly as a result of anxiety or panic. In a nutshell, his position in the interview was that he had no memory of the events of the previous afternoon and evening after leaving Mr Tarrant and heading towards the home of Mr Bayliss, and had no memory of harming the deceased.
Two days later, on Sunday 25 February 2018, the accused was offered a further recorded interview, but on legal advice he exercised his right to silence.
As one would expect, a great many investigations were undertaken by specialist police. Blood patterns suggestive of the use of significant force were identified in the home of the deceased. DNA consistent with that of the accused and the deceased was identified that closely connected them with each other and with the knife that had been found on the driveway. In the bedroom of the deceased where his body had been found, a bedside drawer was located some distance from the bedside table from which it had come. The draw was upended, and its seeming contents were scattered over the floor of the bedroom. Some of those contents could be described as drug paraphernalia. The rest of the bedroom, and the rest of the apartment, was tidy. Also located in the home of the deceased was a pair of black and orange running shoes.
On 27 February 2018, a post-mortem examination was conducted by a specialist forensic pathologist upon the body of the deceased. In short, it revealed that the deceased had been stabbed over 50 times with a sharp implement that could have been the knife located on the driveway. There were clusters of stab wounds located near the shoulder, back, neck, and chest areas. It was noted that three wounds on the front chest breached the chest wall, and two of those were deep enough to cause substantial wounds to the left chamber of the heart. Some other stab wounds were located, including to the thighs and ears, of varying severity. There was also significant blunt force trauma to the head and neck, the torso, the hands, and to the right big toe.
On examination of the deceased’s blood, there was found a modest amount of alcohol, which could have well been generated after death, a very large amount of methylamphetamine, a non-toxic range of an anti-anxiety medication, an amount of methadone, and an amount of an anti-psychotic medication.
As I have said, the deceased suffered from a number of chronic conditions, which were detailed in the post-mortem report. Having said that, there is not the slightest question that the cause of death was the infliction of multiple stab wounds to his person.
That concludes my overview of the undisputed direct evidence that was placed before me. I shall now outline the direct evidence that was disputed.

Disputed matters

As I have said, my understanding is that none of the above evidence given in the Crown case was disputed by defence counsel. He made clear in his final submissions, however, that two matters of fact were in dispute. I shall state them briefly now, but resolve them later.
It was said in written submissions that neither Mr Dalziel nor Mr Bayliss could be relied upon in relation to any issue.
Expanding on the evidence of those two men, I have already recounted the evidence of the meeting between Mr Tarrant, Mr Bayliss, and the accused on the Thursday afternoon, when the question of the luggage of the accused was raised. I did not understand the version of those events of Mr Tarrant to be impugned: his evidence was placed before me in documentary form, he gave no oral evidence, and he was not cross-examined.
My understanding accordingly was that defence counsel did not dispute that the three men met on that afternoon of 22 February 2018; that there was some discussion about the bags of the accused; that the accused was at the least annoyed; but that he ultimately calmed down and departed without incident.
My understanding of the submission was that the portions of the evidence of Mr Bayliss that I would not be prepared to act upon included: the oral evidence that he saw the accused with some sort of implement, perhaps a weapon, in light of the fact that no mention was made of such an item in his statement to police of many months ago; the evidence that the accused may well have been in fear of death from Mr Ben Smith; and the oral evidence that, far beyond being merely annoyed or even angry, the accused was “having virtually, a big, massive breakdown”, and was “that angry that he couldn’t do anything but cry”. Again, I understood the point of defence counsel to be that Mr Bayliss had not spoken of such an extreme emotional state on the part of the accused in his own statement.
The other witness, Mr Dalziel, gave the following evidence. At what he thought was about 2 AM on (what on the Crown case was) Friday 23 February 2018, he was sitting in the rotunda of Marriott Park with his then-romantic partner, Ms Vicki Le Brocq. They were waiting for some government funds to be placed into a bank account, so that they could immediately purchase food and prohibited drugs.
He observed the accused approaching him on foot from the south (that is, in the general direction of the intersection of St Ann’s Street and View Street). The two men were well known to each other. The accused was wearing a pair of shorts. He was distressed. He approached the witness and referred to him as “My brother”. The accused fell to his knees, and dropped a knife on the ground. The accused apologised repeatedly to the witness, spoke of the danger that the witness might be shot, and also said words to the effect that he thought that he, the accused, might have killed someone. Thereafter the accused walked away in the direction from which he had come; that is, back to the south.
Ms Le Brocq spoke of having been with Mr Dalziel in the rotunda late one night at around that time, though she could not be specific about dates. She gave evidence of having seen a man of the general description of the accused on that evening, and of him having interacted with her then-romantic partner. She said nothing, however, about having seen a knife, or having heard words spoken by the man who walked into and out of Marriott Park.
Some weeks later, Mr Dalziel was in touch with a detective attached to Nowra Police Station. He sent her at least one text about trying to locate the knife that he claimed to have seen. He referred to her as “Auntie Sue”. There was no evidence in the trial that the knife purportedly seen by Mr Dalziel as having been dropped by the accused in the park that evening had ever been seized. (Although this latter aspect of the evidence was undisputed, because of its connection to the evidence of Mr Dalziel, I nevertheless recount it here for convenience.)

Summary of expert evidence

I have concluded my outlines of undisputed and disputed direct evidence. I now turn to the evidence of three expert witnesses that was placed before me: Dr Eagle, forensic psychiatrist, for the Crown, Dr Farrar, forensic pharmacologist, also for the Crown, and Professor Christie, toxicologist, for the defence. Each of them expressed opinions about the effect that intoxication with various substances would or could have had upon the capacity of the accused to form an intention to cause really serious physical injury to the deceased, very late in the evening of Thursday 22 February and very early in the morning of Friday 23 February 2018.
In a nutshell, Dr Eagle is a distinguished and experienced forensic psychiatrist. She has had clinical experience of persons affected by prohibited drugs and alcohol. She engaged in a very detailed review of the evidence that was expected to be, and was, placed before me.
Dr Eagle diagnosed the accused as having been suffering from “severe substance intoxication delirium” at the time of the offence. Although she did not believe that there were clear signs of “frank psychosis”, she certainly noted his bizarre behaviour after the offence, both in public places and in custody. She felt it “difficult to firmly conclude” that the mental state of the accused was so compromised that he was suffering from delusions and hallucinations. She stated that the “thinking and behaviour [of the accused] was significant[ly] effected and impaired by acute intoxication.” Those impairments included displaying “substantial deficits in his emotional control, overall judgment (including his capacity to reason, plan and consider the consequences of his actions), and impulse control.” She also spoke of fluctuation in his mental state and level of consciousness, consistent with “an intoxication delirium”. The psychiatrist was of the view that the accused “likely lacked the capacity to weigh up the consequences of his actions or to reason with any composure as to his actions at the time.”
Having said all that, the ultimate opinion of Dr Eagle said to be supportive of the Crown case was the following: “[T]here does not appear to be clear information to suggest that, due to his level of intoxication or delirium, he was incapable of forming an intention at the time of the Index Offence to stab Mr Welsh knowing that it would potentially cause grievous bodily harm or death” (underlining in original removed by me).
In cross-examination by learned defence counsel, Dr Eagle accepted that one way to describe her “function” was as a doctor who diagnosed and treated diseases of the mind (as opposed, as I understood the contention, to being a toxicologist).
The attention of the expert witness was invited to some differences between the evidence of Mr Dalziel foreshadowed in his statement to police, and the oral evidence that he had actually given in the trial.
She confirmed that she remained of the ultimate opinion that I have quoted above.
Dr Farrar, consultant forensic pharmacologist, provided two reports; as the trial unfolded, one was tendered by the Crown and one by the defence, but nothing turns on that.
Turning to his first report, again, he is a highly qualified and experienced pharmacologist, particularly with regard to the effects of alcohol and other drugs on human beings.
He engaged in a very detailed review of the expected evidence, little or none of which was superseded by the evidence as actually given.
He explained in detail the effects of the many substances that were found to be in the bloodstream of the deceased on post-mortem, and the many substances by which the accused may well have been intoxicated.
As for the latter, he felt that the amount of alcohol ingested by the accused would have caused “substantial intoxication with profound deficits in cognition, impaired fine and gross psychomotor function and impaired judgement and decision-making capacity.”
As for the effect of the reversing agent, he confirmed that it demonstrated that the accused had indeed ingested an opioid. The effects of an opioid combined with alcohol would have been, in his opinion, cumulative.
Dr Farrar did not regard the aggression of the accused after the administration of the reversing agent as conclusively demonstrating that he had also ingested a stimulant.
Dr Farrar did not regard cannabis as having played a significant role at the time of the alleged offence.
Importantly, in the first report, Dr Farrar said “[I]n my opinion, on the balance of probabilities, the consumption of alcohol and opiate or opioid drugs rendered Mr Close incapable of the level of executive function required to form an intention to kill Mr Welsh.” A footnote to that paragraph is as follows: “[T]he degree of intent required for Mr Close to find his way home prior to the alleged offence cannot be directly compared to the relatively complex intent required to kill. The former was a task undertaken by Mr Close on a routine basis; whereas the latter is a novel task requiring planning.”
In his second report, Dr Farrar repeated his document review. He spoke again of the effects of many different substances. He recounted the interactions of the accused with other persons after the offence. He spoke of the demeanour of the accused in the dock at the police station, and the need for the administration of the reversing agent and the two doses of the sedative. He repeated his opinion that the success of the reversing agent demonstrated the presence of an opioid. He also repeated his opinions that the aggression of the accused thereafter does not conclusively demonstrate the presence of a stimulant, and that cannabis probably played little role.
As for the interaction between the accused and Mr Christiansen, Dr Farrar said that it “does not contribute further information of a specific nature as to Mr Close’s sobriety status at the time. Mr Close was verbally and physically aggressive, he exhibited some degree of cognition, and he was apologetic. These interactions do not require long-term memory and are entirely consistent with alcohol intoxication.”
As for the offence itself, Dr Farrar expressed the view that “some degree of planning” would have been required to “obtain the knife”. Further planning would have been required if two knives had indeed been used.
A little later, Dr Farrar repeated the point previously made that the degree of planning with regard to the “novel task” of homicide was well beyond that required simply to find one’s way home. I understood the point to be that one can do the latter routinely, whereas homicide requires planning “at executive level”.
The pertinent opinion of Dr Farrar concluded with the proposition that the accused “was impaired by alcohol and an opiate or opioid drug to the extent that his ability to make decisions at executive level was substantially impaired”.
Dr Farrar did not give oral evidence, and was not cross-examined.
Finally, Professor Christie is an eminent pharmacologist. He has had a very long and distinguished career to do with all aspects of the effects of substances upon human beings; in particular, commonly abused prohibited drugs. Yet again, there can be no doubt about his qualification to express an opinion in this matter.
Professor Christie took the view that “the most plausible explanation of [the accused’s] behaviour prior to and after arrest is that the combined, severe effects of the drugs he used produced a drug-induced delirium and/or stimulant-induced psychosis”.
Professor Christie had no doubt that the accused was “severely affected” by drugs, and in all likelihood by more than one, at the time of the offence.
Professor Christie spoke of the well-known effects of substantial alcohol intoxication. He also spoke of the possibility of a very negative cumulative effect between methylamphetamine and cannabis; in particular, in the precipitation of psychosis.
He separately spoke of the possibility of psychostimulants combined with alcohol increasing the risk “of violent and aggressive behaviour”.
Professor Christie took the view that the evidence of the behaviour of the accused strongly suggested that his delirium or psychosis had been precipitated “by injection of methylamphetamine while in the presence of the deceased”.
As for the question of formation of intent, the conclusion of the professor was as follows: “It is not possible to state conclusively whether or not the expected severe impairment of brain processes described above for opioids, methylamphetamine, alcohol and cannabis, in the absence of a delirium/psychotic episode would have affected Mr Close’s mental processes to the extent that he had no ability to form an intention to kill Mr Welsh. However, his ability to think clearly, make rational decisions and be aware of the consequences of his actions would have been severely impaired. However, the emergence of a poly drug-induced toxic delirium and/or psychostimulant–stimulant psychosis appears to be the only plausible explanation of your client’s behaviour around the time of his arrest and subsequent treatment by ambulance officers, including his response to medications. It is thus unlikely that he was able to form the necessary intent to prove the charge of murder.”
In cross-examination by the learned Crown prosecutor, Dr Christie accepted that different individuals can respond differently to different drugs. He agreed that psychosis is not an absolutely necessary outcome of intoxication with methylamphetamine in all individuals.
He agreed that he did not engage in clinical assessments of patients.
He agreed that there was no direct evidence of consumption of a stimulant prior to the offence, but that that was his inference.
The alternative thesis that the agitation of the accused was caused not by methylamphetamine intoxication but rather withdrawal from it was explored.
The witness explained that his ultimate opinion was based on a number of factors, including very substantial intoxication by alcohol, the likely presence of methylamphetamine, the onset of a significant amount of opioids, the behaviour of the accused described by police and observed by ambulance officers, and his bizarre behaviour after the administration of the reversing agent, necessitating two doses of a sedative.
The asserted simplicity of the physical act of repeatedly stabbing someone with a knife was raised with the witness. As for the demand made by the accused about silencing the dog, the witness accepted that, at that time, the accused was “conscious” of the animal, and possessed “an awareness of that aspect of his environment”.
Finally, the interactions with Mr and Mrs Christiansen and the police first on the scene were explored, and the witness expressed the opinion that “delirium or loss of contact with reality” can very often be “episodic”.

Submissions of parties

I turn now to set out briefly the competing submissions of the parties.

In her final address, the Crown prosecutor first pointed to the backdrop of the accused’s life at the time of the homicide. This was marked by heavy use of prohibited drugs and his withdrawal from a very addictive one, which was said to be characterised by aggression and agitation.
Furthermore, the Crown emphasised the accused’s state of anger and generally heightened emotional state, which was affected by the belief that his partner was being or had been intimate with another person, his negative interaction with Nicolas Hucman, and the belief that some of his property had been stolen.
The Crown also asserted that the accused’s observed behaviour and apparent state of mind after the homicide indicated a level of insight and awareness of his surroundings. Particular attention was drawn to the accused silencing the dog of Ms Vaughan, his physical altercation with Mr Christiansen, including verbally insulting Mr Christiansen by reference to his age, and his subsequent interaction with the police officers.
The Crown also pointed to inferences of guilt said to be able to be drawn from the state of the deceased’s bedroom, and from the evidence of Mr Dalziel.
Furthermore, it was contended that the evidence of the disturbed state of the deceased’s bedroom was unlikely to have been caused by the deceased himself. Rather, on one thesis, it was the consequence of the accused desperately trying to satisfy his drug cravings, and in doing so, stabbing the deceased to death in a state of anger.
Ultimately, it was submitted that the accused, although intoxicated, certainly performed the acts which caused the death of the deceased, and did so with the intention of causing the deceased, at the least, grievous bodily harm.
In final address, both in writing and orally, defence counsel submitted that all experts that gave evidence in the trial were of the view that the accused was significantly intoxicated at the time of the offence, and that that level of intoxication meant that the accused could not have formed the relevant intent for murder.
It was asserted that the nature and number of the injuries inflicted by the accused do not of themselves produce an inference that would indicate an intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm.
It was said that, even reflecting upon the opinion of the Crown expert, Dr Eagle, she could not form an unequivocal opinion about whether the accused was incapable of forming a requisite intention for murder.
He also submitted that the opinion expressed by Dr Farrah in his first report that, on balance, the accused was rendered incapable of the degree of executive function necessary to form an intention to kill, should surely also be understood as encompassing the intention to cause really serious physical injury. In other words, it was said that the two possible relevant mental elements for murder should not in any sense be “divided up” with regard to that expert opinion.
Ultimately, counsel for the accused placed reliance upon the opinion of Professor Christie, suggesting that if I were to accept the expert opinion of the professor, then that would lead to the acquittal of the accused on the count of murder.
It was submitted that, while there is difficulty in conclusively establishing the precise drugs that the accused may have ingested prior to the offence, it is evident from the reaction to the reversing agent and the subsequent injections of a sedative that the accused had taken, and was affected by, a stimulant at the time of the homicide.
In any event, it was suggested that, even if there is some doubt with respect to precisely which substances had been ingested, the important aspect was that the accused was nonetheless substantially intoxicated.
Defence counsel also impugned the credibility of Mr Dalziel and Mr Bayliss, and suggested that they should not be relied upon in my determination.
It was further submitted that an inference should not be drawn, consistent with the guilt of the accused, from the evidence that there was a displaced drawer and some disturbance to the room of the deceased, on the basis that what happened in the home of the deceased was simply unclear.
While counsel for the accused conceded that the prosecution did not need to prove motive in this matter, it was put before me that there was, in fact, no proof of any motive for the homicide.
Finally, with respect to the behaviour and appearance of the accused after the homicide, but prior to the accused being placed into police custody, it was submitted that caution should be exercised in drawing inferences about subsequent behaviour, without direct evidence of the behaviour and state of mind of the accused at the time of the homicide. It was emphasised that there are in fact no observations at all available from that specific time, which should lead to great care being exercised when reflecting upon any observations of the accused subsequent to the homicide.

Legal principles

In coming to my verdict, I have applied the following legal principles, in general accordance with the written and oral submissions of the parties.
First, in order for me to return a verdict of guilty of murder, I would need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily did an act, which caused the death of the deceased, and, at that time, the accused intended to cause at least really serious physical injury.
Secondly, in order for me to return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, I would need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily did an act, which caused the death of the deceased, and that act was unlawful, and that act was dangerous, in the sense that a reasonable person, in the position of the accused, would have realised that, by that act, the deceased was being exposed to an appreciable risk of serious injury.
Thirdly, the fact that the accused exercised his right to silence when offered a second recorded interview is not to be held against him in the slightest, does nothing to assist the Crown case against him, and proves nothing. The same approach is to be taken to the fact that he did not give evidence in the trial.
In similar vein, the various references scattered throughout the evidence to the accused having had previous interactions with the criminal justice system are not to be held against him by me in the slightest.
Fourthly, it is incumbent upon me to consider the opinion evidence of three highly qualified experts. I should reflect upon the nature and degree of expertise of each, and whether his or her opinion falls within that area of expertise. I should also, as the tribunal of fact, make an assessment of the cogency of the thesis at which each of the experts has ultimately arrived, and the reasoning underlying that thesis.
Having recounted those legal principles about my approach to expert evidence, as the tribunal of fact, it is my task to consider all of the evidence placed before me, and not just the evidence of the experts, whether that be with regard to the disputed mental element of murder or indeed any other topic.
Fifthly, although I am entitled as the tribunal of fact to draw inferences generally about matters that are not directly proven, on the basis of the combined force of other established facts, I should exercise a degree of caution in doing so, and reflect on alternative hypotheses.
Sixthly, there is no direct evidence that the accused committed the homicide of the deceased. Accordingly, although the proposition is undisputed, I should nevertheless reflect upon whether there exists a combination of established circumstantial facts that demonstrates the proposition; whether, in my opinion, they prove it beyond reasonable doubt; and, as an important part of the latter question, whether there is any alternative rational hypothesis to the contrary.
Seventhly, the same may be said about proof of intention to cause really serious physical injury: the Crown case is circumstantial, and I must approach it in the identical, highly cautious way.
Eighthly, the state of self-induced intoxication of the accused is relevant to, and otherwise admissible with regard to, the question of whether he possessed the necessary mental element for murder. Furthermore, it is evidence capable of both detracting from and bolstering that proposition.
Ninthly and finally, although each of the experts focused on the question of the capacity of the accused to form the necessary intention, that is not the ultimate question that I must answer. If I were to focus merely on demonstration of capacity to form the intention, that would be to ask myself the wrong question. I need to go further, and consider whether, if I am satisfied that the capacity existed, I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the intention was actually in the mind of the accused at the time that he allegedly performed the physical elements of the offence.

Resolution of surrounding factual issues

I turn now from legal principle to the resolution of ancillary factual issues, as follows.
First, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence of homicide; in other words, that he is at the least guilty of manslaughter.
In my opinion, the circumstantial case to that effect is overwhelming: the DNA evidence showing a close connection between the accused and the deceased; the similar scientific connection between both men and the knife that one can infer without difficulty was used in the homicide; the preceding social contact between the two of them in the apartment of the deceased; the plan that the accused would attend the home of the deceased that evening; the finding of shoes in the home of the deceased consistent with those that the accused was seen to have been wearing earlier in the day; the presence of the accused before and after the homicide in close proximity to its location; the evidence that the deceased was alone before the crucial time; and the profoundly emotional state of the accused immediately after the time at which (one can readily infer from the noises heard by neighbours) the fatal violence was inflicted.
In my opinion, all of that evidence means that one can very comfortably be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt about the proposition that the accused unlawfully killed the deceased. As part of that, one can conclusively rule out to the criminal standard any alternative rational hypothesis of the assailant having been any other person.
Finally on this point, despite his amnesia, I believe that the plea of guilty to manslaughter entered by the accused, solemnly and publicly and whilst represented by solicitor and barrister expert in criminal law, has a role to play in bolstering the proposition.
In other words, if I were not satisfied of the guilt of the accused of murder, I would most certainly return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. There is no question of a complete acquittal of homicide in this case.
Secondly, there can be no doubt that the accused had ingested an opioid on the evening in question, and was seriously affected by it when he was at the police station after about 1.30 on the Friday morning. That is conclusively demonstrated by the effectiveness of the reversing agent administered by the paramedics.
I also consider that it was ingested by the accused either late on the Thursday evening or very early on the Friday morning; in other words, close to midnight. I say that because its effects were increasing as the morning wore on, to the extent that the police feared that his well-being was in danger.
Exploring that a little further, although I think it possible that the accused ingested the opioid in the home of the deceased, I do not regard that proposition as established. I say that because there is a reasonably possible temporal gap between the interaction with the Hucman family and the departure of the accused from the company of Mr Tarrant and Ms Van de Maele, and his arrival at the home of the deceased, during which the accused may somehow and somewhere have ingested the drug.
Thirdly, I accept that the accused was not a heavy drinker at the time, but was grossly intoxicated with alcohol as a result of the extended drinking session with an alcohol addict, Mr Tarrant.
Fourthly, I think that the admittedly small amount of cannabis ingested earlier in the day was probably still affecting the consciousness of the accused to some degree late on the Thursday evening and very early on the Friday morning.
Fifthly, the level of extreme agitation displayed by the accused after the reversing agent was administered and before the sedatives were effective, as shown in the CCTV footage from Nowra Police Station, strongly suggests to me that he was under the influence of a stimulant. Although one cannot be absolutely conclusive about it, I think that the evidence of Professor Christie is to be preferred on this point.
In other words, I am satisfied that, at the time of the homicide, the accused was affected by: alcohol, cannabis, an opioid, and, on balance, some form of stimulant.
Sixthly, as for the evidence of Mr Bayliss, I accept that the two men met on the Thursday afternoon, and that the accused was annoyed and upset about someone having rifled through his bags. But I do not go further: I do not accept that the emotional state of the accused was as extreme as that portrayed by Mr Bayliss in his oral evidence. I also put to one side the evidence of Mr Bayliss about having seen some sort of implement or other in the possession of the accused, chiefly because it was not mentioned many months ago when he gave a reasonably detailed statement to police.
Seventhly, and in similar vein, I accept that Mr Dalziel and the accused met in the park to the north of the scene in the early hours of the Friday morning. That is not only because that proposition is entirely consistent with the journey of the accused from and to the intersection observed by the neighbours of the deceased. It is also because Ms Le Brocq gave evidence confirmatory of the proposition.
I also accept that the two men were known to each other, that they recognised each other, and that they spoke to each other for a short period, for the same general reasons.
However, in light of the changes of position of Mr Dalziel between his statement and his oral evidence, and more importantly the unclear and seemingly equivocal role that he has played in the background of this matter, I do not go further: I put to one side the propositions that the accused spoke of the possibility of having killed someone, that the accused was very distressed, that the accused apologised to the witness, and in particular that the accused dropped a knife in the park that has never been found, let alone tendered in evidence.

Resolution of central issue

Having resolved what I believe to be all ancillary questions of fact requiring determination in these reasons, I turn to the central question.
As I respectfully suggested to counsel in the course of the trial, the opinion evidence of the experts is undoubtedly important. But the direct evidence from which one might infer the level of cognition of the accused in the period before and after the homicide plays, in my opinion, an even more important role in assessing his level of “mental engagement” with his own fatal acts at the time he committed them. And I say that not forgetting the evidence of at least one expert that the delirium experienced by the accused could well have featured a fluctuating level of consciousness.
The other important aspects of the expert evidence are, in my opinion, the following. First, no expert expressed himself or herself dogmatically. Instead, each ultimately put forward a thesis based on likelihood. Secondly, each was undoubtedly well-qualified and well-experienced, though each had different emphases of expertise. Thirdly, the shades of meaning and opinion between them were, as I have shown, not pronounced.
For all of those reasons, I do not believe that it is incumbent upon me to state categorically that one expert is right, and another is wrong, or even that I firmly prefer the evidence of one over another. Instead, as these reasons show, to the extent that a choice is sometimes made by me, I prefer the approaches of different experts at different times.
Fourthly and finally, to reiterate my approach: although I have reflected on all of the expert opinion evidence, my verdict is more substantially based upon the inferences that are and are not to be drawn from the direct evidence surrounding the fatal offence.
By way of background, I think it well-established that the accused was agitated and angry on the Thursday. There were a number of reasons for and signs of that, all of them derived from his deprived and chaotic lifestyle: the recent disruptive departure from Old Guilford and return to Nowra; the possibility weighing on his mind that his romantic partner had been intimate with another man in his absence; the interaction with more than one person about the stealing of his BMX bike; the interaction about the luggage, again featuring the possibility that someone had stolen from him; and the interaction with Mr Nicolas Hucman, the gentleman with whom the accused almost came to blows about things said on social media.
Whilst it is true that the accused had no reason to possess ill feeling against the deceased, and that they were, if anything, friends, I think that the accused was very on edge and easily upset by the time he arrived at the home of the deceased.
And that characteristic, I think, was exacerbated by the drugs by which he was affected; in particular, alcohol is a notoriously disinhibiting drug, and a drug that makes some people more prone to anger and the use of force than they would otherwise be. Speaking generally, that may also be a reaction to stimulants, especially amphetamines, and doubly especially ice. In other words, the evidence of Professor Christie plays an important role here.
Furthermore, the number and location of the wounds to the person of the deceased supports, I think, an intention at the least to cause really serious physical injury on the part of the assailant. I appreciate that the former can point both ways: in a sense, the infliction of over 50 stab wounds could suggest a frenzy in which the mind of the assailant is not fully engaged. Even so, I think that the very high number of wounds inflicted supports, to some degree, the inference that, unless in a state of very severely reduced cognition, the assailant must have, at some stage during that process, formed an intention to cause really serious physical injury.
The same may be said of the location of the injuries, not only the stab wounds and incised wounds, but also the blunt force injuries: a significant majority of them are grouped upon the head, shoulders, and chest. That is suggestive of appreciation of the most vulnerable and important parts of the human body. To express this thought in another way: it is not as if the assailant, utterly irrationally, stabbed the deceased a large number of times in his right foot. The location of the majority of the wounds themselves is suggestive, in my opinion, of an engaged mind behind them.
In similar vein, I am well satisfied that the bedside drawer was forcibly removed from the bedside table by the accused, and that it ended up flung across the room. An act of that forcefulness is not to be attributed, in my opinion, to the deceased in his frailty. Again, it is suggestive of an engaged mind of a person who was looking for something, thought to be concealed within that drawer.
As for the behaviour of the accused immediately after the killing, there is force, with respect, in what defence counsel has submitted: it is bizarre indeed for the accused to have drawn attention to himself by screeching, damaging cars, and proceeding up and down View Street, if it be the case that he had just intentionally inflicted at the least really serious physical injury upon a fellow human being.

It is also important that he was sincerely amnesic later; I accept that, in all honesty, he had and has no knowledge whatsoever of what he had done.
Even so, in my opinion, there are many signs of the engagement of the mind of the accused with the world around him, very shortly after the homicide. To examine one such interaction in detail, when demanding that Ms Vaughan silence her dog, the accused implicitly recognised the following: that a sound was aggravating him; that the sound was barking, which emanated from a dog; that the person of whom he had caught sight was to be seen in the general vicinity of the sound of the barking; that the person could well be associated with the animal; that the person may be able to quieten it; and that, if the accused used forceful language, the other person may be more likely to comply.
That was the first interaction of the accused with another person after the homicide, and in my opinion it is suggestive of an engaged mind.
Other examples do not require the same degree of granular, step-by-step analysis. But they are to similar effect: the response of spitting in the face of Mr Christiansen after he had confronted the accused; the physical ability to engage successfully in a fight with Mr Christiansen, including landing punches to his person; the reference to the latter as an “old man” when the accused was getting the better of him; the appreciation of the accused that, if he sat on the roadway, he may succeed in killing himself if he were run over by the summonsed police vehicle; the apology to Mr Christiansen; the recognition and recollection at that time that he had attacked that gentleman; the differentiation between the two police officers, one of whom the accused approved and one of whom he did not; and, finally, the later appreciation that a blanket would be welcome and keep him warm in the starkness of the dock.
And all of that evidence is to be reflected upon in the context of the last observed human interaction of the accused before the homicide: aggression towards Mr Nicolas Hucman, a person with whom the accused had good reason to be upset – the prior social media contretemps – as opposed to some irrational or thoughtless threatened use of force.
In short, before his arrival at the apartment of the deceased, during his presence there, and immediately afterwards, in my opinion the accused demonstrated by his actions and words that his mind was reasonably well engaged with the world around him.
I accept that the accused was grossly intoxicated with multiple substances before, during and after the homicide; that the fatal acts have a flavour of frenzy to them; that the accused afterwards showed signs of emotional regression and irrationality; and that he is sincerely amnesic with regard to the whole tragic event.
Even so, I am compelled to the firm opinion that his mind was engaged with what he was doing: repeatedly and forcefully inserting a knife or knives, which he was holding in his hand or hands, into the person of a frail old man, who must have been bleeding copiously as a result, and also inflicting many other injuries by violence as well. I have reflected on alternative rational hypotheses, but have come to reject them to the criminal standard. In my opinion, the mental element of an intention to cause, at the least, really serious physical injury has been established beyond reasonable doubt. For that reason, I return the following verdict.

Verdict

On the indictment averring that on or about 23 February 2018, at Nowra in the State of New South Wales, the accused Luke Jordan Close did murder Garry James Welsh, I return the verdict: guilty of murder.

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Decision last updated: 06 August 2020

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Close [2020] NSWSC 1026
Hearing dates:	13 – 23 July 2020
Decision date:	06 August 2020
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Button J
Decision:	Verdict of guilty of murder
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – murder – trial by judge alone – plea of not guilty to murder but guilty of manslaughter – whether intention to kill or intention to inflict grievous bodily harm established beyond reasonable doubt – self-induced intoxication – expert evidence from three witnesses – consideration of large number of established circumstantial facts – rejection of alternative hypotheses – intention to inflict grievous bodily harm established to the criminal standard
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Regina (Crown) Luke Jordan Close (Accused)
Representation:	Counsel: K Ratcliffe (Crown) M Austin (Accused) Solicitors: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Aboriginal Legal Service (Accused)
File Number(s):	2018/62445