R v Chris Stilliaras

[2007] NSWDC 291

CITATION:	R v Chris Stilliaras [2007] NSWDC 291
JUDGMENT DATE:	30 November 2007
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE:	22 May 2008
JURISDICTION:	Criminal
JUDGMENT OF:	Nicholson SC DCJ
DECISION:	Conditional s.11 C(SP)A bail granted for 6 month period.
CATCHWORDS:	Criminal Law - Severity appeal from Local Court - Malicious Damage - Domestic violence offence - sustained and enduring anger motivating intimidating and harassing behaviour
PARTIES:	Regina Chris Stilliaras
FILE NUMBER(S):	07/22/0673
SOLICITORS:	Crown: Mr L. Crepaldi, Office of the DPP, Parramatta. Defence: Ms T. Johnson

JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: Between 1995 and 2002, Chris Stiliaras clearly had an anger management problem. In his evidence before me today, he indicated that all of his offending as an adult had as an ingredient of it, his anger. There does not appear to be any offending between 2002 and 2007.

2 The bringing of a drug into a complex is, though in fairness to him, an example of offending that probably was not motivated by anger. Unfortunately in 2007 the issue of anger arose in a fairly substantial way. His counsel sought to suggest to me that the objective facts of this offending were not very serious. My own view is significantly different.

3 Belinda Robinson was the former de facto of the appellant. She had been his de facto for some fourteen years. They had four children - Luke eleven, Tina six, Panagiotis(?) three, and Georgia one.

4 On 18 March 2007 they separated, but would appear to have been on good terms, with the appellant visiting the children regularly.

5 The appellant says he had nowhere to stay and it would appear that he had been staying at least over the weekend at the home of his former de facto.

6 On 20 May which was a Sunday, he was at her unit in Doonside. They had a heated argument, which apparently was in some way connected with the complainant’s niece. She asked him to leave the premises. He left but slept outside in his vehicle. At about 7:45am she left the house and saw the appellant apparently waiting in his vehicle outside. He reversed his vehicle down the driveway blocking her vehicle from leaving. I say the vehicle is hers because it is registered in her name but apparently jointly owned by the complainant and appellant.

7 The driving of his vehicle and blocking the driveway appears to me to have been a spiteful act motivated by anger he had felt from the previous night. He moved his car and she drove away. She headed to her mother’s house at Blacktown. By the time she arrived he was already there and had parked his vehicle nose first into the visitors’ parking.

8 The complainant parked her vehicle behind the appellant’s. The driver’s side door was adjacent to the rear of the appellant’s vehicle. She was standing out of her car between her driver’s door and the car seats. The appellant abused her saying to her, “You fucking slut, you are just like your niece”.

9 In the witness box he had said that the argument had been motivated by the niece but clearly that comment is a comment addressed to her in anger, and again indicates a brooding resentment not satisfied by his acts thus far.

10 He then reversed his vehicle in the direction of the complainant. She was able to move out of the way because he was driving his vehicle slowly. Nonetheless the rear of his vehicle collided with the door of hers with enough force that had she not moved, she would have been seriously injured.

11 Again, it seems to me this act was done in spite quite possibly with intent to cause fear in the complainant, and because whatever else had happened, he still had unsatisfied anger with her. He drove off. She, too, left with her older son. They returned to the Blacktown address at about 12.30.

12 The appellant was still waiting in his vehicle on the road outside the units. He commenced walking up the driveway towards her. She came towards the accused and met him halfway on the drive. The appellant said, “I’m going to kill the fucking lot of youse”.

13 Again, this comment demonstrates to me that there were still anger issues residual from the previous night, motivating the appellant to behave in a threatening way.

14 The complainant asked the appellant to leave. He walked to the rear of her vehicle, kicked the rear panel twice causing two large dents in the body of the vehicle.

15 Those kicks were again administered in a spiteful way by a man angry, whose anger was still lingering from the previous night’s encounter. He punched the Colorbond fence a number of times again, no doubt in anger. The complainant became fearful of her safety and of the safety of the children.

16 The young three-year-old, Panagiotis was walking near him. The appellant picked up the youngster and ran off down the driveway. That action can only have been motivated by spite because his wife immediately interpreted it and ran off chasing him.

17 The appellant let the youngster sit on a brick wall. When the complainant came closer, the appellant picked up the child and swung him under his arm. Panagiotis commenced crying and to his credit, the appellant placed him down. It again was perhaps an unintended but certainly not unforeseen consequence.

18 Anger between parents can be the most distressing thing for children particularly when they are made to play such an important role in it; when they are the bargaining chip. The child was put down and both complainant and child ran inside. The police were called.

19 Police arrived shortly thereafter and placed the appellant under arrest. His vehicle was searched. There was a fishing knife located in the car. It is not made clear whether the fishing knife was part of other fishing gear in the car, or whether it was there on its own. As I said to him during the course of his evidence, from a judge’s point of view, the very presence of a knife within easy access in respect of a man who cannot let go of his anger over such a long period, is a scary feature of this case.

20 Viewed in that way, it seems to me the objective features of this case are serious. The appellant would appear to be contrite in respect of his conduct. In domestic violence situations, that is not as significant a factor as it can be in others, because contrition does not always mean rehabilitation or a strengthening desire not to re-offend.

21 Learned magistrate in dealing with the malicious damage charge and the circumstances of it, particularly given the history of past imprisonment for domestic violence, took in my view a relatively lenient view. Eight months periodic detention with a non-parole of six, I would have thought was, from the appellant’s point of view, not a bad result.

22 He says, and I accept what he says, that his older son is probably ashamed that his father is now to be going to prison. He says that - I cannot quite remember the phrase, but that he wants to become a father that the children can look up to. I am prepared to give him one opportunity so to do.

23 What I propose to do is to adjourn this matter for six months from today, and grant to the appellant bail for the purposes of demonstrating to me that he can rehabilitate. The bail will be for a period of six months with the following conditions.

• That he be of good behaviour, that he not consume any illicit or unprescribed drugs;
• That he accepts supervision of Probation and Parole.
• That he attend the Blacktown Probation and Parole office on or by 5pm on Monday 3 December next. That he comply with all reasonable directions of the Probation and Parole Service including counselling, and my recommendation to Probation and Parole is that he receive counselling in four particular categories and any other such categories as they deem appropriate. (1) Relationships (2) Anger management (3) Parenting skills and (4) Drug and alcohol abuse.
• That he attend upon a Commonwealth Employment Agency such as Centrelink, or the Parramatta Mission, I think Wesley Church has got one too, the Uniting Church might have one, and enrol in their personal support programme for the purposes of dealing with issues that may be obstructing his pathway to employment.
• That he attend, at the direction of his case manager with Probation and Parole, for random urine analysis no more than four times monthly for the purposes of detecting the presence of illicit drugs.
• Any failure to supply urine is deemed a breach of this bail. The presence of any illicit drug is deemed a breach of the bail. Any breach of the bail is to be notified to me by Probation and Parole within forty-eight hours.

24 I will stand this over to 6 June next. I think that is six months and six days, for finalisation at Parramatta. There will be a review for progress reports when the appellant will bring to me evidence of progress he has made, on 1 February here in Parramatta.

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