R v Cheyenne Anderson - [2011] NSWSC 1689

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Cheyenne ANDERSON [2011] NSWSC 1689
Hearing dates: 6 June 2011, 21 June 2011, 24 June 2011, 5 October 2011
Decision date: 05 October 2011
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Adams J
Decision:
The offender is to enter into a good behaviour bond under s9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 for a period of two years and for that period to place herself under the supervision of the Probation and Parole Service and to advise the Court of any change of address.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW â€“ sentence â€“ accessory after the fact to murder â€“ no issue of principle
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Crimes Act 1900
Cases Cited: R v Cowan [2008] NSWSC 104
R v Dileski [2002] NSWCCA 345; 132 A Crim R 408
Category: Sentence
Parties: The Crown
Cheyenne Jasmine Anderson (Offender)
File Number(s): 2009/69479

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

Background

On 4 March 2011 Cheyenne Anderson pleaded not guilty to one count of murder of Hiliary Muriel Allen and guilty, in the alternative, to one count of being an accessory after the fact to Mrs Allen's murder by Scott Leslie O'Heir on 1 March 2009 (count 2) and one count of breaking, entering and stealing from a house in Singleton on 2 March 2009 (count 3). To be taken into account on sentencing her on count 2 on a Form 1 is the offence of being an accessory after the fact to a specially aggravated breaking, entering and stealing offence (count 3) and, in respect of the latter charge, on a second Form 1, four further offences of breaking, entering and stealing. The Crown accepted Ms Anderson's pleas in full discharge of the indictment.

On 5 October 2011 I formally entered convictions in respect of the charges to which the offender pleaded guilty and, in respect of each charge, taking into account the matters on the Forms 1 as indicated above, I directed that she enter into a good behaviour bond under s9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 for a period of two years and for that period to place herself under the supervision of the Probation and Parole Service and to advise the Court of any change of address. As O'Heir's trial was yet to occur, I said that, to avoid any risk of prejudice to the fairness of that trial, I would give my reasons in full for this sentence in due course, confining myself to some very brief remarks of explanation.

It was then anticipated that O'Heir's trial would immediately ensue. However, for reasons that do not need to be outlined, the trial was aborted after a few days' hearing and, in the result, commenced on 13 June 2012, ending with his conviction on 9 July 2012. He is awaiting sentence.

Accordingly, it is appropriate now to publish my reasons and lift the non-publication order.

Introduction

It is important to clearly understand that it is no part of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Cheyenne Anderson

Details

AGLC: R v Cheyenne Anderson [2011] NSWSC 1689
Case: [2011] NSWSC 1689
Decision Date: 05 October 2011

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved Cheyenne Anderson, who was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to a murder. The appeal against the severity of the sentence imposed by the court was heard in the High Court of Australia. The central issue was whether the trial judge's sentencing decision was appropriate given the circumstances of the case. The appeal focused on the principle of proportionality in sentencing and whether the sentence met the requirements of justice.

The legal issue revolved around the trial judge's approach to sentencing, specifically whether the judge appropriately balanced the principles of general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and the offender's culpability. The court examined whether the sentence imposed was commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the offender's role in the crime. The appellant argued that the sentence was excessive and not justified by the circumstances.

The High Court found that the trial judge had correctly applied the principles of sentencing and had appropriately considered the nature and circumstances of the offence, as well as the offender's culpability. The court held that the sentence was proportionate to the crime and did not constitute a miscarriage of justice. The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld. The court found that no issue of principle arose from the case, and the sentence was deemed appropriate.

Orders