R v Chambour; R v Khallouf (No 2)

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District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Chambour; R v Khallouf (No 2) [2016] NSWDC 245
Hearing dates:27 September 2016
Date of orders: 27 September 2016
Decision date: 27 September 2016
Jurisdiction:Criminal
Before: Neilson DCJ
Decision:

Grant leave to each of the accused under s 132A to make an application for trial by a judge alone but pursuant to s 132 those applications are dismissed

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – Application for trial by judge alone – Trial involving matters normally entrusted to juries – Desire by accused for reasons for judgment not sufficient in itself to justify trial by judge alone
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Cases Cited: R v Belghar [2012] NSWCCA 86; (2012) 217 A Crim R 1
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
George Chambour (Accused)
Youssef Khallouf (Accused)
Representation:

Counsel:
Ms R Rodger (Crown)
Mr B Vasic (Accused Chambour)
Ms A Francis (Accused Khallouf)

  Solicitors:
Solicitor for the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Elie Rahme & Associates (Accused Chambour)
Barakat Lawyers (Accused Khallouf)
File Number(s):2013/271652; 2013/271657
Publication restriction:No

ruling on application for trial by judge alone

  1. HIS HONOUR: This is an application for leave under s 132A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 to make an application out of time for trial of the current proceedings by judge alone. I have permitted the application for leave to run in tandem with the substantive application under s 132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.

  2. This is the second interlocutory ruling that I must make in these proceedings. I spent some time yesterday on the first interlocutory ruling, setting out the background of the matter. Two things have changed in substance since that time. This morning the Crown sought leave and was granted leave to file a fresh indictment. That indictment contains only six counts, whereas the previous indictment contained seven counts.

  3. The indictment dated this day has had removed from it what was previously count 1 which was a charge of affray, to which the accused George Chambour pleaded guilty. The fresh indictment dated this day contains those charges to which pleas of not guilty have been entered. The only other difference is that the pleading of various counts under s 35(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 has been expanded such that, for example, the current count 3, previously count 4, is now worded in this fashion:

"On the 8th day of January 2013 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales, while in company, did wound Chris Pattison and was reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to Chris Pattison or any other person."

  1. The Crown has also announced this morning that it is not relying upon the extended definition of "recklessness" contained in s 4A of the Crimes Act 1900, and does not seek to establish proof of any count alleging recklessness by proving a requisite intention.

  2. The Crown case is now narrowed…

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Details
Case
[2016] NSWDC 245
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Chambour and R v Khallouf, the applicants sought a trial by a judge alone instead of a jury. The court was tasked with determining whether the applications for a trial by judge alone should be granted. The legal issues before the court centred on whether the desire for reasons for judgment by the accused was sufficient to warrant a trial by judge alone, considering the complexity and nature of the charges against the applicants.

The court considered the legislative provisions that allow for a trial by a judge alone in circumstances where the accused person requests it. However, the court also noted that the discretion to grant such a request must be exercised with caution, particularly when the trial involves matters traditionally entrusted to juries. The court examined the specific circumstances of each case, including the nature of the charges and the potential impact on the administration of justice if a judge alone were to hear the matter.

The court found that while the applicants had a legitimate interest in receiving reasons for judgment, this desire alone was not sufficient to justify a trial by judge alone. The court determined that the applications should be dismissed, as the nature of the charges and the complexity of the issues at hand warranted a trial by jury to ensure a fair and impartial hearing. The court concluded that the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the jury system outweighed the applicants' individual preferences in this instance.

Consequently, the court granted leave to each of the applicants to make an application for trial by a judge alone under section 132A, but pursuant to section 132, those applications were dismissed. The matter would proceed to trial before a judge and jury as per the usual procedure.

Orders

Orders of the court

Grant leave to each of the accused under s 132A to make an application for trial by a judge alone but pursuant to s 132 those applications are dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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