R v Chambers - [2005] VSCA 34

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 375 of 2003

THE QUEEN
	v.
LUTHANUEL ALEX JOSHUA CHAMBERS

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JUDGES:	WINNEKE, P., CHARLES and BUCHANAN, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	10 February 2005
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	28 February 2005
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2005] VSCA 34	1^st Revision – 1 March 2005

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentencing – Arson causing death – Appellant lighting fire in house causing two deaths – Relevant considerations – Borderline personality disorder – Personal and general deterrence – Manifest excess – Appeal allowed – Crimes Act 1958 (No. 6231) s.197A.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr J.D. McArdle, Q.C.	Mr S. Carisbrooke, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Appellant	Mr M.J. Croucher	Victoria Legal Aid

WINNEKE, P.:

Having had the benefit of reading the reasons stated by Charles, J.A., I agree with his Honour that the appeal should be allowed and the appellant re-sentenced as his Honour proposes.

CHARLES, J.A.:

On 10 September 2003 the appellant pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court at Melbourne to a presentment alleging two counts of arson causing death contrary to s.197A of the Crimes Act 1958. The applicable maximum penalty was 25 years’ imprisonment. During the plea a number of witnesses were called to give evidence on behalf of the appellant including a psychiatrist, Dr Lester Walton, and Estelle Louise Bromfield, Warren Kane Bowen, Julie Catherine Oldham and Ian Victor Seal. On 19 December 2004 the appellant was sentenced on both counts to eight years’ imprisonment and the judge directed that four years of the sentence imposed on count 2 be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed on count 1. The total effective sentence was thus 12 years’ imprisonment and his Honour fixed a non-parole period of eight years.

The appellant, who was granted leave to appeal under s.582 of the Crimes Act on 13 August 2004, now appeals on the grounds –

“1. The sentence is manifestly excessive;
2. The judge erred –
(a)in using manslaughter sentences as a guide in sentencing the appellant;
(b)in placing too much weight on the maximum penalty;
(c)in failing to accord sufficient weight to the fact that the appellant did not know or believe that the deceased were in the house at the relevant time and that neither death nor the slightest physical harm was a foreseen consequence of his actions;

(d)in failing to accord sufficient weight to the prosecution’s concession that ‘the present offence would constitute a lower level of moral culpability than, for example, a fire deliberately started on the edge of a State forest’;

3.The judge erred in failing to moderate the weight to be given to general deterrence on account of the appellant’s borderline personality disorder;
4.The individual sentences, the order for cumulation, the resulting total effective sentence and the non-parole period are manifestly excessive and infringe totality.”

The offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty occurred at Ballarat on 17 October 2002, and the property damaged was situated at 516A Armstrong Street,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Chambers

Details

AGLC: R v Chambers [2005] VSCA 34
Case: [2005] VSCA 34
Decision Date: 28 February 2005

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Chambers, the appellant was convicted of arson causing death under section 197A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). The appellant, Chambers, had ignited a fire in a house which resulted in the tragic deaths of two individuals. The primary dispute in this appeal was the appropriateness of the severity of the sentence imposed on the appellant by the trial judge, with the appellant contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The case was heard in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge erred in failing to adequately consider relevant mitigating factors, such as the appellant's borderline personality disorder, and whether the sentence imposed constituted a manifest excess of the judicial discretion afforded under the statutory provisions. The Court needed to determine if the sentence was appropriate in light of the principles of personal and general deterrence and whether it was proportionate to the offence committed.

The Court found that the trial judge had indeed failed to adequately consider the appellant's borderline personality disorder, which was a significant mitigating factor. The Court emphasised the importance of such considerations in the sentencing process. Additionally, the Court held that the sentence imposed was a manifest excess of the judicial discretion, as it did not sufficiently balance the principles of personal and general deterrence with the mitigating factors present in this case. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge for re-sentencing.

The final orders of the Court were that the appeal be allowed, the conviction be upheld, and the matter be remitted to the trial judge for re-sentencing. The Court directed the trial judge to consider all relevant mitigating factors, including the appellant's borderline personality disorder, and to impose a sentence that appropriately balances the principles of personal and general deterrence with those mitigating factors.

Orders