R v Cawte (No 2) - [2018] SASC 187

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v CAWTE (No 2)
[2018] SASC 187
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Nicholson
13 December 2018
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - INSANITY AND MENTAL IMPAIRMENT
On 9 August 2018, the defendant was found not guilty of the murder of his twin brother Jake Cawte on the grounds of mental incompetence. He was declared liable to supervision and a limiting term of life was set.
Following the receipt of further reports as required by Part 8A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), counsel for the defendant provided a proposed supervision order with conditions of licence to the Court. Counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions and counsel for the defendant made submissions on the proposed conditions.
Held:
1. On the basis of the evidence before the Court, the defendant is to reside in James Nash House but be permitted periods of accompanied leave into the community, subject to certain conditions of licence in the terms provided by counsel for the defendant. Orders made accordingly.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 269O, s 269Q, s 269R, s 269S, s 269T, Pt 8A; Criminal Law Consolidation (Mental Impairment) Amendment Act 2017 (SA), referred to.

R v CAWTE (No 2)
[2018] SASC 187
Criminal
NICHOLSON J.

Mr Lucas Cawte is a 26 year old man who, on 9 August 2018, was found by me to be not guilty of the murder of his twin brother by reason of mental incompetence to commit the offence. On that day, I made a declaration that Mr Cawte was liable to supervision in accordance with the provisions of Part 8A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the Act) with a limiting term of life.[1] Mr Cawte has been detained and undergoing treatment for his psychotic condition in the secure forensic psychiatric institution, James Nash House, since 6 March 2017.
[1] R v Cawte [2018] SASC 182.
Upon making the declaration earlier referred to, I ordered that various expert reports, and a victim and next of kin report, as required under Part 8A of the Act, be obtained and provided to the Court. I adjourned the matter for further consideration.
On 6 December 2018, on the basis of the reports that had by then become available, and after hearing from counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions and counsel for the defendant, I made a supervision order pursuant to which Mr Cawte’s detention in James Nash House was to continue but that he was to be permitted to undertake supervised periods of accompanied leave into the community subject to certain conditions of licence. The substantive conditions of licence that I imposed are as follows.
1.That pursuant to Section 269O(1)(b)(ii) of the Act the applicant be released on licence on the following conditions:-
a) That the applicant be under the supervision of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Cawte (No 2)

Details

AGLC: R v Cawte (No 2) [2018] SASC 187
Case: [2018] SASC 187
Decision Date: 13 December 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal heard by the High Court of Australia in R v Cawte (No 2) involved the appellant, who was convicted of murder, and the respondent, the Crown. The central dispute was whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the defence of insanity, particularly in relation to diminished responsibility due to mental impairment. The High Court was tasked with determining whether the trial judge's directions adequately addressed the defence and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt.

The legal issues before the court encompassed the application of the defence of insanity, specifically the concept of diminished responsibility, and the correctness of the trial judge's directions to the jury. The court had to consider whether the trial judge correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutory provisions and common law principles in relation to the defence of insanity, and whether the jury was properly guided in assessing the evidence presented. The central focus was on whether the trial judge's directions allowed the jury to properly consider the defence of diminished responsibility due to mental impairment, and whether the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the appellant was guilty of murder.

The court held that the trial judge's directions to the jury on the defence of insanity were inadequate. The judge did not sufficiently explain the concept of diminished responsibility and its relevance to the evidence of mental impairment. The court found that the judge's directions did not enable the jury to properly consider whether the appellant's mental state, if proven, could have diminished her responsibility for the killing. Consequently, the court concluded that the trial judge's error was material and affected the safety of the appellant's conviction. The High Court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, emphasising the importance of accurate jury directions in cases involving complex defences such as insanity and diminished responsibility.

Orders