R v CASSIDY

[2017] SASCFC 134

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v CASSIDY

[2017] SASCFC 134

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

13 October 2017

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE  - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE  - GENERALLY

Appeal against sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court. Application for permission to appeal sentence imposed in the District Court.

The appellant was first sentenced in the District Court to several sentences for 54 offences, predominantly serious criminal trespasses and associated thefts. The value of the thefts approximated $200,000 committed over a period of four months. The appellant has a ‘gruesome history’. Until that sentence was imposed the longest period of imprisonment the appellant served for offences of dishonesty was close to 21 months. The sentences imposed were partially concurrent and cumulative and totalled 16 years imprisonment with eight years non-parole fixed (the District Court sentence).

On 19 February 2014 the appellant was sentenced for a further 14 offences, predominantly serious criminal trespasses and associated thefts in a similar period. The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to a further four years imprisonment cumulative upon the District Court sentence. The non-parole period was extended to nine years.

The appellant was therefore sentenced to a head sentence of 20 years and a non-parole period of nine years commencing on 5 September 2012. The appellant appeals both sentences on the ground that each sentence and the totality is manifestly excess and that the Judge in the District Court ought to have considered the offending a continuous course of conduct.

Held per Kourakis CJ (Peek and Nicholson JJ agreeing), granting permission to appeal and allowing the appeal:

1.      The increase from a sentence of close to 21 months to a sentence of 16 years for the District Court offending was too high.

2.      The offending was committed while the appellant was overwhelmed by handicaps which had afflicted him since childhood.

3.      Cumulative sentences can increase the relative severity of the punishment imposed and decrease the requirement for personal deterrence.

4.      The appellant is resentenced with the effect, due to reductions and orders that sentences be served cumulatively, that the total head sentence for both the District Court and Magistrate sentences is 14 years and a non-parole period of seven years and three months is fixed commencing on 5 September 2012.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 134, s 170, referred to.
R v Copeland (No 2) (2010) 108 SASR 398, applied.
Flentjar v Daire (1983) 32 SASR 101; R v Delphin (2001) 79 SASR 429, discussed.

R v CASSIDY
[2017] SASCFC 134

Court of Criminal Appeal:   Kourakis CJ, Peek and Nicholson JJ

1. KOURAKIS CJ:   This is an appeal against a sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court, and an application for permission to appeal against a sentence imposed in the District Court, both of which have been referred to this Court. 

2. On 21 June 2013 the appellant was sentenced in the District Court for 54 offences, predominantly of serious criminal trespasses and associated thefts, to several sentences which totalled 16 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years.  The first of the cumulative series of sentences was ordered to commence on 5 September 2012 as was the non-parole period.  The offences were committed on 17 separate occasions, and are listed in Appendix 1 to this judgment which also records their salient features and the sentences imposed by the District Court Judge. 

3. On 19 February 2014 in the Magistrates Court the appellant was sentenced to four years imprisonment on 14 offences, again predominantly serious criminal trespasses and associated thefts.  The Magistrate imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment cumulative upon the 16 years imposed in the District Court and extended the non-parole period from eight to nine years.  The offences for which the appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court are set out in Appendix 2 to these reasons.

4. The appellant appeals against both the sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court and the sentence imposed in the District Court on the ground that each sentence individually, and in totality, is manifestly excessive.  The appellant also appeals against the sentence imposed in the District Court on the ground that the Judge erred in imposing cumulative sentences for groups of offences. The appellant refines that ground by saying the Judge did not take into account that the offences constituted a continuous course of conduct.

5. The total value of the property stolen approximates $200,000.  The appellant was aged 25 when he committed most of the offences over a period of less than six months.  The appellant had served sentences of imprisonment for theft offences in the past, but the longest term which had ever been imposed was just under 21 months.  The District Court Judge described the appellant’s upbringing as one of ‘abuse and deprivation’.  The Judge found that he was ‘under the grip of a hideous drug dependency’ and suffering multiple psychological disorders at the time of his offending. 

6. For the purposes of personal deterrence, the close temporal and circumstantial connection between the offences, the appellant’s youth and mental condition, and the relatively short terms of imprisonment the appellant had previously served, allowed for a much more graduated approach to increasing the severity of punishment than the steep increase in sentences imposed by the District Court Judge.

7. For the reasons appearing below, the sentences imposed in both Courts are manifestly excessive.  I would grant permission to appeal the District Court sentence and I would allow both appeals.  I would set aside the sentence of nine years imposed in the District Court for the offences numbered 14 to 37 grouped as D in Appendix 1.  For those offences I would impose instead a sentence of six years.  I would not interfere with the District Court sentences imposed on the offences grouped as A, B, and C on Appendix 1.  Nor would I interfere with the orders as to concurrency and accumulation as between those groups.  The total head sentence I would impose for the District Court offences is, therefore, 13 years.  I would fix a non-parole period of seven years.

8. I would not interfere with the term of the sentences imposed in the Magistrates Court, but I would order that it be concurrent, save as to one year, with the District Court sentence.  The total head sentence I would impose is therefore 14 years.  I would extend the non-parole period of seven years fixed for the District Court offences by three months such that a total non-parole period of seven years and three months be fixed.

   The offences

9. The appellant was also sentenced in the District Court for some miscellaneous offences other than serious criminal trespass but those sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed on the offences of serious criminal trespass and theft.  The miscellaneous offences included offences of breaching restraining orders, property damage, failing to comply with bail agreements, shop lifting, as well as various street and unlawful possession offences.  Many of them were committed in 2010. 

10. The main offences of serious criminal trespass and theft for which the appellant was convicted were committed in a six month period between May and October 2012.  Some of the stolen property was recovered but much of it, including many items of personal and sentimental value, were lost.  The Judge described the offence of serious criminal trespass which was committed on 30 May 2012 as particularly ‘distressing’.  It is likely that the Judge meant to refer to the aggravated serious criminal trespass in Tusmore on 11 July 2012 in which offence the appellant took goods to the value of $16,475.00 and stole a car to effect a get-away.  The occupier’s son was asleep in the house at the time.   

11. The occupier’s victim impact statement described her reaction to the offence as follows:

    I felt violated, sick to the stomach knowing that someone had been through our belongings and then discovering that this took place while our son was asleep in his room distressed me further.  At the time I felt worried and scared knowing what could have happened had our son woken up.  This has impacted on my children’s ability to stay home alone – they feel unsafe and will call us more than usual.

    The materials do not disclose what signs should have alerted the appellant to the son’s presence, and it is therefore not possible to evaluate precisely the seriousness of that aspect of the offence. 

12. The 14 offences on which the appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court were also committed in August 2012 and September 2012.  The value of the property taken in one of the offences was $20,000.  The Magistrate summarised the offending as follows:

    Each of the breaks or non-aggravated serious criminal trespasses involves invasion of property, ransacking of houses, stealing of items that are of sentimental an actual value, and the intrusion on sense of privacy.

13. The Magistrate referred to the victim impact statements received by him in which the occupiers described their shock and distress on finding that their homes had been broken into and that a thief had rifled through their household effects.  The sentiments expressed included:

    ·horrifying and gut-wrenching;

    ·ransacked my bedroom;

    ·I am still afraid that when I open the door I will find my house ransacked again;

    ·feeling safe in your own home should be a right, a given, but you have robbed me of this;

    ·the worst day of my life;

    ·felt physically sick;  and

    ·completely unfair.

    The appellant

14. The appellant was born on 16 February 1987.  He has a long history of offending primarily for offences of dishonesty commencing in February 2001 when he was just 13 years of age.  He appeared in the Adelaide Children’s Court for multiple offences in 2001 and 2002 which were largely dealt with by orders convicting the appellant but dismissing the charges without penalty. On 7 August 2002 he was sentenced to a suspended period of three months detention for two charges of assaulting a person other than a family member and using a motor vehicle without consent.  In March 2004 he was sentenced to eight months detention for, among other offences, threatening to cause harm and offences of dishonesty. 

15. The appellant first appeared as an adult for offences of dishonesty in the Port Adelaide Magistrates Court on 20 October 2006.  He was sentenced to a suspended sentence of 15 months imprisonment on entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for 18 months.  That bond was revoked on 25 September 2007 and the appellant was ordered to serve the period of 15 months imprisonment in addition to a period of close to six months imprisonment for other offences of assault and dishonesty.  The total head sentence was 20 months and 23 days imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight months. 

16. Very soon after his release the appellant breached his parole by a further offence of dishonesty and was sentenced to 12 months and 17 days imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven months and five days.  On his release he travelled to Queensland. He later travelled to New South Wales where he was convicted of offences of dishonesty and was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months at the Coffs Harbour Local Court on 14 April 2011. 

17. The Judge summarised the appellant’s personal antecedents as follows:

    You are a 26-year-old man coming before the court with what your counsel have described as ‘a gruesome history’. There is a moving background of abuse and deprivation. You committed these offences under the grip of a hideous drug dependency. The common denominator in the counts of trespass is almost always entering premises in the daytime, expecting that people will not be home and stealing property most readily converted into cash, particularly jewellery and electrical items. In most instances you left your fingerprints and in a few cases your DNA behind. The combined total of the property involved was quite high. As a result of these offences you have lost everything, your home, your partner and access to your child.

    You are diagnosed with polysubstance dependence, a complex post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder, a schizophrenic disorder and of having a mixed antisocial borderline personality. You are also described as pathological gambler. A psychological assessment before the court places your problem solving skills as equivalent to those of an average 9-year-old child. There have been admissions to the Royal Adelaide Hospital in 2010 and Glenside Hospital in 2012 for paranoid psychosis.

    You have expressed a desire to change and to reform. You have more optimistic plans for the future. You may yet have the willpower to do so because for three years you were drug-free but you resumed taking drugs for reasons you cannot explain. There are recommendations for treatment and rehabilitation which are now matters for the Parole Board to consider.

18. The appellant was born to parents who were both alcoholics and who separated when he was still a baby.  The appellant was raised by his father but described his relationship with him as ‘rocky’.  He has not seen his father since becoming an adult and has no happy memories of his childhood.  The appellant was placed in foster care between the ages of 10 and 15.  He was sexually abused by a foster carer over a period of four months when he was about 13, the year in which his offending started.  The appellant completed his primary schooling but has not had the benefit of any secondary education.  He has been asthmatic from birth, is of low average intelligence, and has experienced auditory hallucinations from 2010.  On two occasions the appellant has been detained at Glenside Hospital.

19. The appellant’s drug abuse has included taking marijuana (from age 11), methylamphetamine (from age 13), ecstasy, hallucinogenic drugs and heroin (from age 15).  The appellant was significantly addicted to gambling (particularly Keno and poker machines) from age 16. 

    The sentences

20. The Judge grouped the multiplicity of offences for the purposes of imposing sentence as follows:

A	Offences 1-4 listed in Appendix 1, being offences of serious criminal trespass in which goods of substantial value were taken in early September 2012	Three years imprisonment reduced from four years on account of the appellant’s guilty pleas
B	Offences 5-7 listed in Appendix 1, being the trespass on, and theft from a workshop in Glenelg in May 2012 and a later offence of being unlawfully on premises at the same workshop in August 2012	18 months imprisonment reduced from 24 months for the appellant’s guilty pleas to be served concurrently with the sentences in group A.
C	Offences 8-13 listed in Appendix 1, being three offences of serious criminal trespass one of which was aggravated and associated thefts (including the unlawful use of a motor vehicle) between May and July 2012 in which goods of substantial value were taken	Four years imprisonment reduced from five years for the appellant’s pleas of guilty, cumulative upon the sentences imposed for group A.
D	Offences 14-37 listed in Appendix 1, being 11 offences of serious criminal trespass, one of which was aggravated, having been committed in September and October 2012	Nine years reduced from 12 years for the appellant’s pleas of guilty, cumulative upon the sentences imposed for the offence in groups A and C.

Applicable principles

1. In R v Delphin,[1] (Delphin) this Court held that in the ordinary case of a single serious criminal trespass in a residence, in which the intention upon entry is larceny, a penalty for a first offence should generally be in the order of 20 to 24 months if there has been a plea of guilty.  The decision in Delphin pre-dated the current statutory guilty plea reduction scheme and therefore there can be no precision about the percentage reduction which might be allowed for.

   [1] (2001) 79 SASR 429.

2. It follows that the individual sentences imposed by the Judge were consistent with that sentencing standard.  As a general proposition, continued and repetitive offending will generally attract cumulative penalties.  The Judge moderated that approach by providing for a substantial degree of concurrency but, as I have foreshadowed, more was required.

3. There are necessarily limits to on the extent to which sentences can be imposed cumulatively.  First, as penalties are accumulated the requirement for personal deterrence, and the weight attached to it, is relatively reduced and the relative severity of the punishment increased by the circumstance that an offender only commences to serve each cumulative term after first serving each preceding term is served and after long periods of earlier imprisonment.  I explained this limit in the R v Copeland (No 2):[2]

   [2] (2010) 108 SASR 398 at 425-426, [102]-[107].

   [102]It is difficult, but I think useful, to attempt to identify why it is that very similar and proximate offences committed in furtherance of a single criminal plan warrant, at least to some extent, concurrent sentences.

   [103]First, there is the consideration, which applies in all cases when sentences of imprisonment are made cumulative, that the deprivations of a sentence of a particular length will be suffered all the more deeply if it is served after the completion of one or more earlier terms. In Jarvis v The Queen Ipp J explained this consideration in the following way:

   What then is the explanation for the phenomenon that it is not unusual for an overall term of imprisonment to be reduced even though the individual sentences are proportionate to the gravity of the particular crimes for which they were imposed? In my opinion the reason for such a reduction is that the severity of a term of imprisonment increases exponentially as it increases in length. Thus, for example, whereas a sentence of seven years may be appropriate for one set of crimes and a sentence of eight years may be appropriate for another set of crimes, a sentence of 15 years for both sets may be out of proportion to the degree of criminality involved simply, because of the additional severity brought about by the significantly longer period the defendant will be required to spend in prison.

   (Emphasis added.)

   [104]Secondly, in my view, the length of imprisonment necessary to achieve specific and general deterrence in the case of sentences imposed for a single course of conduct will generally be less than the result of the multiplication, by the number of offences committed, of the sentence which would have been imposed for a single offence.

   [105]Thirdly, where the offences are committed within a very short space of time it may be that the limited time and capacity which the offender had to reflect on whether or not to commit the subsequent offences mitigates his or her moral culpability.

   [106]There can be no hard and fast rules, but considerations like the ones to which I have referred will inform the characterisation of offences as one or more courses of conduct and the extent, if any, to which the sentences imposed for them should be concurrent. I hasten to add that too much emphasis should not be placed on the characterisation of multiple offences as a single course, or a number of courses, of conduct. Even where the connections are insufficient to characterise the offences as a single course of conduct it may be that there is sufficient reason to make the sentences at least partially concurrent.

   [107]The considerations which govern the question of concurrency, together with a consideration of the offender's prospects for rehabilitation, are, I think, the same matters which inform the reductions which are sometimes made for totality. Where, for example, a sentencing judge commences with a notional sentence which is calculated by simply multiplying the sentence which would have been imposed on one of a series of offences, by the number of offences committed in that series, there will almost always need to be a substantial reduction for totality. However, if the notional head sentence is arrived at after making proper allowance for the appropriate degree of concurrency, the artificiality commented on by Bleby J in R v Nylander will seldom arise. In such a case the notional sentence may only need to be adjusted, if at all, to allow some scope for rehabilitation in the circumstances of the particular offender.

   (citations omitted)

1. The abovementioned considerations militate against a linear arithmetic accumulation of sentences.  Instead as more sentences are imposed they will have a relatively smaller effect on the total head sentence and will follow what might be described as a logarithmic function. 

2. There is a further limit on a linear accumulation.  For offences falling in the lower end of the criminal calendar which individually would not warrant long sentences, it is both possible and desirable to take a graduated approach to personal deterrence.  Sentences of imprisonment may be increased incrementally having regard to the length of sentences previously imposed. Of course, ultimately, if an offender persists in recidivistic offending, the total head sentence for multiple offending may be as severe as sentences imposed for much more serious offences.  However, there is some scope to postpone visiting the full consequences of the offending on a young offender. In R v Flentjar v Daire Zelling J explained: [3]

   Mr Tilmouth’s last point was that the sentences, looked at in their totality as five years’ imprisonment, were in any event manifestly excessive. Mr. Tilmouth said that a head sentence of five years’ imprisonment approaches those given for rape and for the lower categories of robbery. I do not think that this matters where one is dealing with cumulative sentences. If a man commits a series of offences of such a kind that they should be dealt with cumulatively, then the fact that the cumulative sentence takes the totality of the sentence above what is normally awarded for that type of offence is simply a result of his criminal behaviour. This appellant had a series of convictions for dishonesty going back to appearances in the Juvenile Court in 1973. Various courts have tried fines, bonds, probation, suspended sentences, and straight out imprisonment and none of these have caused the appellant to change his way of life. Under these circumstances it seems to me that the Magistrate had to deal with the matter seriously. However, I think the jump to five years imprisonment was too high taken in totality. This man’s previous highest sentences have been the ones of fifteen months and twelve months to which I have already referred, and I think that a total sentence of four years’ imprisonment for these offences would have been sufficient. Giving effect to the fact that he had already spent three months in gaol prior to being sentenced that means that the sentence for housebreaking relating to Parkin should be reduced to one of two years and three calendar months with hard labour and that the overall head sentence should be three years and nine calendar months, giving credit for the time served prior to sentence. The Magistrate, after considering the matter carefully, fixed an overall non-parole period of eighteen calendar months and although I have reduced the sentence I see no reason to alter the non-parole period which will bring home to the appellant, if anything will, the fact that a life of crime simply is not worthwhile.

   [3] (1983) 32 SASR 101 at 105.

   Conclusion

3. The jump in this case from a previously highest sentence of close to 21 months to 20 years was too high.  Indeed, the jump to a head sentence of 16 years in the District Court was in itself too high.  The fixing by the Judge of a relatively low non-parole period, of eight years for the head sentence of 16 years for an offender who does not have good prospects of rehabilitation is an indication that the head sentence is too high.  The small extension of one year effected by the Magistrate when he had increased the head sentence by four years similarly indicates that the term of the cumulative sentence he imposed was too high.

4. I pause here to observe that the imposition of a high head sentence with a relatively low non-parole period has the attraction of effectively, on the face of the sentence, a significant measure of general and personal deterrence, whilst at the same time allowing an early release from prison.  Of course, the early release necessarily detracts from the deterrent effect of the sentence.  However, more importantly, the prospect of parole breach must be realistically addressed.  Care must, therefore, be taken in fixing both the head sentence and non-parole period.

5. Offences of this kind, committed by the appellant over a six month period where he was overwhelmed by the handicaps which had afflicted him from when he was a child, did not require the imposition of head sentences of the severity imposed.

6. I would not interfere with the penalties imposed for the offences committed between May and early September which have been grouped as A, B and C.  The offences committed in Kent Town and Tusmore involved goods of substantial value.  The offence of aggravated serious criminal trespass in the house at Tusmore in which the child was asleep was particularly serious.  The offences in early September involved goods including jewellery of a substantial value.  The sentences imposed reflected the general penalty standard for offences of this kind approved in Delphin.  The total sentence for Groups A and C (the Group B sentence was concurrent with the Group A sentence) was not so high as to require moderation on account of the sentencing limits to which I referred in [21]-[25] above. 

7. However, save for one offence of serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Adelaide, the offences from late September to October 2012 in Group D generally involved the theft of items of lesser value.  The one offence of aggravated serious criminal trespass was committed because the occupier unexpectedly returned home.  Overall, the relative gravity of the offending was less than in the other groups of offences. 

8. The starting point for the offences in Group D was high, particularly when it was imposed cumulatively upon the earlier sentences totalling seven years.  Every year served thereafter was a substantial additional punishment.  The extent to which each additional year increased general deterrence was marginal but detracted substantially from the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation.  Standing back, it is necessary to recognise that the appellant had fallen into a pattern of thieving from which he was psychologically incapacitated and from which he could not extricate himself and to moderate the sentence accordingly.  Importantly, as I have already observed, the longest term of imprisonment the appellant had served before the sentences imposed by the Judge was just under 21 months.

9. I would therefore reduce the starting point for the Group D offences from 12 years to eight years with a further reduction to six years for the guilty pleas.

10. I would not interfere with the penalties for the miscellaneous other offences on which the appellant was sentenced in the District Court nor with the orders as to the commencement of those sentences. 

11. The total head sentence for the District Court offences therefore becomes 13 years.  I would fix a non-parole period of seven years.  It is a little more than 50 per cent of the head sentence, as it must be, because of the appellant’s poor past performance in rehabilitation. 

12. The first of the sentences, those imposed for the Group A and B offences, and the non-parole period are to commence from 5 September 2012.

13. I would not reduce the sentence imposed by the Magistrate but I would order that it be served as to three years concurrently with the District Court sentence.  It will therefore nominally commence 10 years after 5 September 2012, namely on 5 September 2022.

14. I would extend the non-parole period on account of the imprisonment imposed on the Magistrates Court offences by just three months.

    Orders

15. I would make the following orders:

    1Permission to appeal against the sentence imposed in the District Court granted, appeal allowed.

    2Set aside sentence of nine years imposed in the District Court on the Group D offences and fix instead a sentence of six years commencing on the expiration of the sentence imposed in the District Court on the offences in Group C of Appendix 1.  Fix a non-parole period for all of the sentences imposed in the District Court of seven years commencing on 5 September 2012.

    3Allow the appeal against sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court and set aside the order that the sentence be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed in the District Court imposed on the offences in Group D of Appendix 1.

    4Order instead that the sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court be served three years concurrently with the sentence imposed in the District Court and therefore commence on 5 September 2022. 

    5Extend the non-parole period fixed for the District Court offences from seven years to seven years and three months commencing on 5 September 2012.

16. PEEK J:                I agree with the orders proposed by the Chief Justice and with his reasons.

17. NICHOLSON J:   I agree with the orders proposed by the Chief Justice and with his reasons.  

    Appendix 1

Charges		Sentence	Salient Features
1	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Erindale (5 September 2012)	A Single penalty of three years imprisonment, reduced from four years on account of early guilty pleas	The appellant broke into the house and stole property of about $15,000 in value.  Two watches were recovered.
2	Theft from residence in Erindale (5 September 2012)
3	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Brighton (8 September 2012)		The appellant broke into the house, taking some of the owner’s most treasured and valued jewellery, valued at about $41,000.
4	Theft from residence in Brighton (8 September 2012)

5	Trespass in workshop in Glenelg non-residential (10 May 2012)	B 18 months imprisonment, reduced from 24 months for early guilty pleas.  Served concurrently with three years imprisonment	The appellant took jewellery and other equipment to the value of $1,995 from the workshop.  He returned to the same premises on 4 August when the owner noticed some panels were removed.
6	Theft (10 May 2012)
7	Unlawfully on property of same workshop in Glenelg (4 August 2012)

8	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Holden Hill (18 May 2012)	C Four years imprisonment, reduced from five years for guilty pleas	The victim left her premises at about 3.45 pm on 18 May and was alerted by a security company that the alarm had been activated.  A Swiss Army knife had been removed from her premises.
9	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Kent Town (30 May 2012)		At 2.00 pm, $33,000 worth of jewellery was taken.
10	Theft from residence in Kent Town (30 May 2012)
11	Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Tusmore (11 July 2012)		The appellant stole property to the value of $16,475 from a home in Tusmore.  A child was asleep in the house at the time.  The appellant made his escape by taking a car from the garage.  Some goods taken and the car were recovered on 2 August 2012.
12	Theft from residence in Tusmore (11 July 2012)
13	Unlawful use of a motor vehicle without owner’s consent from Tusmore (11 July 2012)

14	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Adelaide (28 September 2012)	D Single sentence for all 24 charges, nine years imprisonment, reduced from 12 years on account of early guilty pleas in the Magistrates Court.	The appellant broke into and stole property valued less than $2,500 from the house.
15	Theft from residence in Adelaide (28 September 2012)
16	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Royston Park (29 September 2012)		The appellant stole from a house in Royston Park property valued at about $750.  Damage was caused to the door which cost $1,200 to repair.
17	Theft from residence in Royston Park (29 September 2012)
18	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Adelaide (1 October 2012)		The appellant stole property to the value of $50,000.
19	Theft from residence in Adelaide (1 October 2012)
20	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in St Marys (2 October 2012)		Numerous items were taken to the value less than $2,500.  Some of the items were recovered.
21	Theft from residence in St Marys (2 October 2012)
22	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Glandore (2 October 2012)		Numerous items were stolen including jewellery and an iPhone.  The property was valued at less than $2,500.  The iPhone and some jewellery were recovered.
23	Theft from residence in Glandore (2 October 2012)
24	Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Glenalta (3 October 2012)		The appellant broke into the house in Glenalta sometime after 8.20 am, but was disturbed by the home owner when she returned at about 10.35 am.
25	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Hawthorndene (3 October 2012)		At 8.00 am on 3 October 2012, the victim left his premises to go to the hospital.  He returned at about 3.00 pm after being advised by police that his house had been broken into.  The items missing were an iPod and an RAA identification card.  A phone was also stolen, but it was returned by police later.
26	Theft from residence in Hawthorndene (3 October 2012)
27	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Hawthorndene (3 October 2012)		The appellant stole jewellery of significant personal value as described by a victim impact statement.  Jewellery and a mobile phone to the value of $2,000 were taken, the mobile phone was recovered and some of the items of jewellery.
28	Theft from residence in Hawthorndene (3 October 2012)
29	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Parkside (4 October 2012)		Property under the value of $2,500 was taken.  Numerous items of jewellery were taken as well as an iPad.  Some items were recovered.
30	Theft from residence in Parkside (4 October 2012)
31	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Millswood (4 October 2012)		Property under the value of $2,500 was taken.  Items taken included jewellery and an iPad.  Some items were recovered, including the iPad and several small jewellery items.
32	Theft from residence in Millswood (4 October 2012)
33	Serious criminal trespass in a place of residence in Vale Park (4 October 2012)		Numerous items including an iPad, a computer, credit and EFTPOS cards and jewellery were taken.  The iPad and the computer were recovered.
34	Theft from residence in Vale Park (4 October 2012)
35-37	Three counts of deception (4 October 2012)		Use of credit cards stolen in some of the robberies.
17 minor miscellaneous offences, the sentences of which were to be served concurrently, have been excluded.

Appendix 2

Ref	Charges	Sentence
AMCC-13-9590	1     Trespass in a place of Residence in Brighton (16 August 2012) 2     Trespass in a place of Residence in Hove (16 August 2012) 3     Trespass in a place of Residence in Seacliff Park (16 August 2012) 4     Theft from Seacliff Park (16 August 2012) 5     Trespass in a place of Residence in Clarence Gardens (21 August 2012) 6     Theft from Clarence Gardens (21 August 2012) 7     Trespass in a place of Residence in Lower Mitcham (14 September 2012) 8     Theft from Lower Mitcham (14 September 2012) 9     Trespass in a place of Residence in Mitchell Park (22 September 2012) 10  Theft from Mitchell Park (22 September 2012) 11  Trespass in a place of Residence in Unley Park (27 September 2012) 12  Theft from Unley Park (27 September 2012) 13  Trespass in a place of Residence in Edwardstown (29 September 2012) 14  Theft from Edwardstown (29 September 2012)	Four years imprisonment, with a non-parole of one year