R v Carbone

[2022] NSWSC 373

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Carbone [2022] NSWSC 373

Hearing dates:

25 February 2022

Date of orders:

14 April 2022

Decision date:

14 April 2022

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Garling J

Decision:

See [70]

Catchwords:

CRIME — murder — sentence after judge-alone trial — joint criminal enterprise to cause grievous bodily harm — objectively serious crime — offence committed whilst subject to good behaviour bond — relevant psychological evidence — strong family support

SENTENCING — aggravating factors — findings of fact beyond reasonable doubt — findings consistent with verdict — verdict given by judge after judge-alone trial

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; 209 CLR 1

Filippou v R [2015] HCA 29; 256 CLR 47

Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46; 154 CLR 606

Madden v R [2011] NSWCCA 254

Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357

Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120

R v Bedford (1986) 5 NSWLR 711; 28 A Crim R 311

R v Carbone [2021] NSWSC 1552

R v Gilmore (1979) 1 A Crim R 416

R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374

Savvas v The Queen [1995] HCA 29; 183 CLR 1

The Queen v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; 199 CLR 270

Texts Cited:

Not Applicable

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

The Crown
Diego Carbone (Accused)

Representation:

Counsel:
M England / E Curran (Crown)
M Tedeschi QC (Offender)

Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Goold Law (Offender)

File Number(s):

2014/255002

Publication restriction:

Non-publication order made 19 October 2021.

Judgment

1. On 10 December 2021, I found Diego Carbone (“the Offender”) guilty of the murder of Bradley Dillon (“the Deceased”) on 11 August 2014 at Leichhardt.

2. I found that the Offender and his first cousin, Tony Bagnato, who has not yet stood trial because he has fled from the jurisdiction, engaged in a joint criminal enterprise to cause grievous bodily harm to the Deceased. In furtherance of that joint criminal enterprise, the Deceased was stabbed and shot and died shortly afterwards.

3. The Offender first stood trial in 2017, when he was found guilty of the murder of the Deceased by a jury. After a successful appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Offender stood trial before me without a jury. When first arraigned on Tuesday 12 October 2021, the Offender pleaded not guilty. A trial ensued which resulted in a guilty verdict. My conclusions and reasons for finding him guilty are to be found at R v Carbone [2021] NSWSC 1552 (“my earlier judgment”).

4. It is now time for the Offender to be sentenced for his crime.

5. The maximum penalty for the offence of murder is life imprisonment. A standard non-parole period of 20 years applies. The maximum term of imprisonment and the standard non-parole period are guideposts to which a court must have regard when imposing a sentence: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 (“Muldrock”) at [27]. The standard non-parole period is not the starting point of a sentence for an offence falling in the mid-range of objective seriousness: Madden v R [2011] NSWCCA 254 at [35].

The Statutory Regime

6. The Parliament of NSW has fixed in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 the purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender. Those purposes are: to ensure adequate punishment of an offender; to prevent crime by deterring others and the offender from committing similar offences; to protect the community from an offender; to promote an offender’s rehabilitation; to make an offender accountable for his or her actions; to recognise the harm done to the victims of the crime and the community; and to denounce publicly the conduct of an offender.

7. These purposes obviously overlap and are often in tension: Muldrock at [20]. The purposes of ensuring adequate punishment of an offender and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation, for example, are not always compatible. None of the purposes of sentencing can be considered in isolation.

8. Section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act also requires the Court to take into account, where relevant, a number of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sentence. The legislation does not require a court to increase or decrease a sentence because of the presence or absence of these factors: s 21A(5).

Common Law Principles

9. Over time, the Courts have developed legal principles to guide the exercise of the sentencing discretion by Judges. These common law principles are to be found in decided cases. Of relevance in these circumstances is the principle of proportionality, namely that the sentence should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence.

10. Another common law principle of relevance here is that where an offender is convicted after a retrial, as this Offender has been, he should not ordinarily receive a longer sentence or non-parole period than that imposed after the first trial, unless there is some significant subsequent circumstance to be taken into account: R v Gilmore (1979) 1 A Crim R 416; R v Bedford (1986) 5 NSWLR 711; 28 A Crim R 311.

11. The common law principles have continuing relevance because s 21A(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act preserves the entire body of judicially developed sentencing principles: Muldrock at [18]. As well, factors established by the common law as being relevant to sentence, such as whether incarceration may be particularly burdensome, are also to be taken into account: Muldrock at [19].

12. What the sentencing task requires of a Judge is that they have regard to the relevant legislation, including the purposes of sentencing, the statutory guideposts of the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period, the aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of the common law. Against that legal framework, the sentencing Judge has to identify the significance of all the relevant factual circumstances of the offending and the offender. The sentencing Judge is then able to undertake an “instinctive synthesis” whereby he or she “makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case”: Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [51]; Muldrock at [26].

13. As the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing embodies a value judgment, there is no such thing as a single correct sentence. I will bear in mind the legislation by which I am bound, and the common law principles developed by the Courts, when proceeding on the task of sentencing this Offender.

The Facts

14. In my earlier judgment I made extensive findings of fact. However, it is necessary to make further findings of fact that are relevant to sentencing. Contextual and other background facts referred to here are from my earlier judgment and I use the same terms as in that judgment.

15. In setting out the findings of fact which I have made, it is important to note that I am not entitled to make a finding of fact against the Offender for the purpose of sentencing unless I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of that fact. Any finding in favour of the Offender needs only to be established on the balance of probabilities: The Queen v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; 199 CLR 270 at [27].

16. It is well established that a judge’s findings of fact on sentence must be consistent with the verdict as to an offender’s guilt: Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; 209 CLR 1 at 14, citing R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 at 377-378.

17. I am not constrained by my earlier findings of fact, which were made in a different context and for a different purpose, so long as any finding of fact on sentence is consistent with the verdict which has been reached and the reasons I gave for that verdict. In other words, if I determined a matter of fact on the balance of probabilities for the purpose of reaching the verdict that I did but did not find that I could not be satisfied of that fact beyond reasonable doubt, I am not now precluded from being satisfied of that fact beyond reasonable doubt: cf Filippou v R [2015] HCA 29; 256 CLR 47 at [68].

18. This is entirely appropriate given, as I have said, the different context and purpose for which facts are found on sentence. In this regard, the parties have tendered other evidence for the purpose of sentence, and I have had the benefit of further submissions by both parties.

19. By way of background, it is clear that there was a dispute between a Mr Adrian Riccio and Ms Cassie Dillon, the sister of the Deceased, about a sum of money amounting to $1,300 which Ms Dillon had lent Mr Riccio to enable him to attend a rehabilitation centre in Queensland, and a further sum of $1,000 which Ms Dillon alleged Mr Riccio had caused to be stolen from her handbag. Ms Dillon and Mr Riccio had been living together but, at the time the dispute erupted, their relationship was rapidly declining.

20. Mr Riccio resisted all attempts made by Ms Dillon to recover the money, including by lying to her and giving her information that he knew to be false. He attempted to interpose intermediaries in their communications and made threats to Ms Dillon.

21. Ms Dillon turned to her brother, the Deceased, for assistance. She told Mr Riccio that she would get her brother involved if he did not repay the sums he owed. Mr Riccio and the Offender’s first cousin, Tony Bagnato, were at the time members of a gymnasium called the “St Michael’s Fight Club”. The Offender had at one time been a member of the Fight Club but was not so at the time of the offence.

22. The Deceased, who knew several the members the Fight Club, attempted to arrange a meeting through various members of the Fight Club with Tony Bagnato, who was regarded as a man of influence amongst Fight Club members, including by Mr Riccio. The Deceased’s intention was to resolve the matter peacefully. Part of his motivation was that Mr Riccio had also made threats against his wife and children, and he wanted to make sure that no harm would come to them.

23. During the afternoon of 11 August 2014, the Offender and Tony Bagnato made arrangements between themselves to meet up for the purpose of meeting with the Deceased. The Offender got into the car being driven by Tony Bagnato at about 4.51pm in Loading Dock 7 at Leichhardt Market Town. He sat in the passenger’s seat. Three minutes later, whilst Tony Bagnato and the Offender were together in Tony Bagnato’s Holden Astra motor vehicle, the “burner phone” which was registered in a false name and had been brought along by Tony Bagnato, was used to telephone the Deceased’s iPhone on three occasions over a four-minute period. Each connection was for a very short period of time. The Deceased returned those three phone calls at 5.06pm in a call which lasted 58 seconds. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that during that 58 second phone call, arrangements were made for a meeting to shortly take place between Tony Bagnato, the Offender and the Deceased at the TAB, which was in the shopping centre adjacent to Leichhardt Market Town. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender was present and heard in these conversations whilst in Tony Bagnato’s car.

24. The Deceased arrived at the TAB at about 5.15pm and notified Tony Bagnato and the Offender. He waited there for nine minutes or so. At 5.20pm, an SMS was sent from the burner phone to the Deceased with the message “carpark under TAB”. It is not possible to determine whether the Offender or Tony Bagnato actually sent the text message. However, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender knew the contents of the message. That message was received at about 5.25pm and, following a further phone call from the Deceased’s iPhone to the burner phone of about 30 seconds, the Deceased went to the carpark. Tony Bagnato and the Offender had parked their motor vehicle in Treadgold Street, a location which was a few hundred metres away from the underground carpark and which, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, was chosen to enable a quick and unimpeded escape route after the meeting with the Deceased.

25. Tony Bagnato was, at this time, armed with a 9mm Glock pistol which he had in the pocket of the left-hand side of his loose-fitting trousers. Having regard to the size of such a pistol, the obvious bulge visible in that pocket (as seen from the CCTV footage of him leaving the apartment) and the fact that the Offender and Tony Bagnato were seated immediately next to each other in the two front seats in the Holden Astra, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender knew that Tony Bagnato was armed with the pistol.

26. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, at least by this time, the joint criminal enterprise to cause grievous bodily harm to the Deceased had commenced.

27. Tony Bagnato and the Offender went to the underground carpark. There were only three people there present: Tony Bagnato, the Offender and the Deceased. I am satisfied that the Deceased was not carrying any weapons when he went to the underground carpark.

28. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, based upon the injuries sustained by the Deceased and other evidence from the crime scene, that there were two weapons in the carpark, namely a 9mm Glock pistol and a knife – both of which were used to inflict injuries upon the Deceased, which injuries preceded his ultimate death. I am satisfied that the Glock pistol was being carried, and was used, by Tony Bagnato.

29. In the underground carpark, I am satisfied that in the north-eastern corner there was a physical struggle between the Offender and the Deceased. At one point during that struggle the Offender, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, held the Deceased from behind using his arm in a hold resembling a choke hold during which the Deceased reached behind him with his left hand and scratched the Offender’s left cheek which resulted in the DNA of the Offender being found underneath the fingernails of the left hand of the Deceased.

30. During the course of that struggle or immediately afterwards and whilst he was still in the north-eastern corner, I am satisfied that the Deceased was intentionally stabbed from behind on four occasions and seriously wounded. I am not able to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the stab wounds were inflicted by the Offender. However, I am satisfied that they were inflicted during or immediately after that struggle. Shortly thereafter, as the Deceased attempted to flee, he was shot at and struck by three of the five bullets fired by Tony Bagnato from the Glock pistol. The bullet wounds which struck the Deceased in his upper body would have, on their own, caused his death.

31. The Offender and Tony Bagnato then ran from the scene and escaped in the Holden Astra vehicle which, as I have said, had been driven to the area and parked in a location which, I am satisfied, was deliberately chosen to facilitate a ready get away.

32. Tony Bagnato fled from Sydney to Thailand. The Offender was arrested at Sydney International Airport as he too was attempting to leave Sydney and fly to Thailand.

Objective Seriousness

33. The nature of the murder of the Deceased was objectively serious. It consisted of a joint criminal enterprise between Tony Bagnato and the Offender to cause grievous bodily harm to the Deceased during which he was stabbed, shot and killed. The seriousness of the offence includes the fact that it involved the actual use of violence, the use of two weapons – a gun and a knife, that it was committed in company and that it had been planned, although within a relatively short period of time before it happened. It was not a spontaneous offence. There is nothing in the evidence of the exchanges between the Deceased on the one hand and Mr Bagnato and the Offender on the other, to indicate that the Deceased in any way initiated or provoked the physically violent attack to which he was subjected. He was attempting to have money repaid to his sister and was seeking the intervention of the others to assist in the resolution of the dispute between Mr Riccio and his sister, Cassie.

34. There are no mitigating factors of any kind which are relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of this offence.

35. The attack upon the Deceased was brutal and his killing was gratuitous and callous. I am satisfied that the offence falls above the mid-level of objective seriousness for the offence of murder.

36. So far as the Offender is concerned, even though I have not been persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that he wielded the knife to stab the Deceased in the back, given that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was a joint criminal enterprise between him and Mr Bagnato to attack the Deceased and cause him grievous bodily harm, he is taken to be responsible for the actions of Tony Bagnato in furtherance of that enterprise. In other words, he is equally guilty of this brutal, callous and gratuitous murder.

37. Although I have found that this offence of murder falls above the mid-level of objective seriousness, I also need to take into account any disparity between Tony Bagnato and the Offender in the role which each played in the joint criminal enterprise, and also in their age, background and general character to the extent relevant: Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46; 154 CLR 606 per Gibbs CJ at p 609. As it was put by Brennan J at 617: “ regard must be had to the comparative gravity of the conduct of the co-offenders and to their respective antecedents”.

38. I am well satisfied that the Offender’s role in this joint criminal enterprise was a subsidiary one to that of Tony Bagnato. Clearly, Tony Bagnato brought the Glock pistol to the meeting and was the person who shot the Deceased. However, the role of the Offender was not one of being a mere bystander doing nothing at all. As noted earlier, I am satisfied that the Offender engaged in a physical struggle with the Deceased before the Deceased was shot whilst trying to escape.

39. I have not been persuaded by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender stabbed the Deceased. I am also not persuaded on the balance of probabilities that it was Tony Bagnato who did so. I am unable to find who stabbed the Deceased.

40. The Offender’s moral culpability for the murder of the Deceased whilst significant is clearly substantially less than that of Tony Bagnato. Tony Bagnato was, I am satisfied, a much more forceful character than the Offender, who was young and much less mature than his cousin. The Offender’s personality was such that he would have found it difficult to resist taking part in the meeting and falling in with Tony Bagnato and his wishes, or perhaps what the Offender perceived those wishes to be.

41. I accept the submission of the Offender’s counsel that the Offender did not receive any financial or other benefit from his participation in the joint criminal enterprise.

42. There is no sufficient evidence that would enable me to find beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender expected that Tony Bagnato would actually kill the Deceased, at least not until just before the firing of the five bullets commenced.

43. Whilst, as I have already noted earlier, the offence was one above the mid-level of objective seriousness, any sentence imposed on the Offender for his participation in the offence must reflect his reduced moral culpability having regard to the role he undertook.

The Offender’s Subjective Circumstances

44. The Offender was 23 years old at the time of the murder. He will shortly turn 31. He was born in Sydney and grew up in a family with Italian heritage. He has two brothers – one older and one younger, and a sister. There is nothing remarkable about his upbringing. He had a good childhood, was educated and played sport of his choosing. His parents had a good relationship, and they were hard-working, loving and caring. His parents ran a seafood business in Leichhardt in which he worked from time to time. He generally lived at home with his parents. He left school on completing Year 10.

44. The Offender told a psychologist, Ms Grujoska, that he had begun using illicit drugs between the ages of 16 and 17. Ultimately, he said that he ended up using methamphetamine (Ice) regularly – generally each day – and was addicted at the time of the offence.

45. In 2017, Mr John Macklin conducted an intelligence test which indicated that the Offender was then performing at a level consistent with a borderline developmental disability. In 2017, it was noted that the Offender met the formal psychiatric diagnoses of adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression, a previous major depressive disorder or persistent depressive disorder, and a substance use disorder which was in remission.

46. In 2022, Ms Grujoska, after testing, expressed this view of the Offender:

“… [he is] an individual who is detached from others and likely experiencing feelings of pessimism, glumness, a loss of hope and an inability to experience pleasure. He furthermore has tendencies to turn to others for security and nurturance, which suggests he takes on a more passive role in interpersonal relationships and can lead to him submitting to the will of others. In addition, his results reflect insecurities such that he allows others to take advantage of him and feels that he deserves to be shamed.”

48. Ms Grujoska thought that the Offender’s early learning difficulties and experience of being bullied at school impacted upon his emotional stability, triggering depressed moods and anxiety. She also thought that his symptomatology at the time of the offence would meet criteria for a substance abuse disorder which may cause impairment across areas of decision-making ability and judgment. She noted that he had a personality characteristic of dependence. Ms Grujoska concluded that the Offender was of a personality type that would suggest that he would have followed others in order to gain approval and acceptance rather than being particularly assertive in any relationship.

49. At the time of Ms Grujoska’s report, the Offender met the criteria for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder.

50. The Offender did not give evidence in support of the history which he provided to Ms Grujoska or to Mr Macklin in 2017. It is necessary to be careful in accepting the expert opinions in circumstances where the facts upon which they are based are not attested to. Nevertheless, I do take them into account.

51. Members of the Offender’s family provided material to the Court. His mother wrote a letter to Justice Mathews in 2018. His sister deposed an affidavit of some length describing the Offender. It is clear that the Offender has in the past, and continues to have, considerable family support from a very stable and loyal family. As well, individual members of the community, who say they know the Offender well, have attested to their high opinion of him. These community members find it hard to accept that the Offender has been convicted of the offence of murder because such a conviction is inconsistent with their knowledge of him.

52. The Offender has written a letter to me. He did not enter to the witness box to tell me that the contents of that letter were true. Nevertheless, in the course of the letter, the Offender expressed his regret at having been involved in the offence. He also puts before the Court a description of the hardships of prison – particularly due to the COVID pandemic. He acknowledges the ongoing support being provided to him by his family and tells me that he has been well behaved in jail.

53. The Offender wrote a similar letter to Justice Mathews after his conviction by the jury in first trial. That letter was tendered on the sentencing proceedings before me. He told Justice Mathews that in the last couple of years leading up to the offence, he had got caught up with the wrong group of people and started taking drugs (mainly Ice) which had ruined his life. In the letter to Justice Mathews he apologised for what had occurred but maintained a denial that he had killed anyone or had any intention to harm anyone in that way.

54. Again, considerable caution needs to be taken in accepting at face value the letters of the Offender, which have not been supported by any sworn evidence.

55. At the time he committed this offence, the Offender was subject to a 12-month bond which required him to be of good behaviour, having been convicted on 26 June 2014 of an offence contrary to s 114(1)(d) of the Crimes Act 1900 of entering a building with intent to commit an indictable offence. Whilst in company, the Offender had entered residential premises at Darlinghurst with the intention of committing an indictable offence in the building, namely, to rob the occupant of certain property. Accordingly, he was on conditional liberty at the time of his participation in the joint criminal enterprise. This is an aggravating factor: s 21A(2)(j) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

56. I am also satisfied that the offender’s mental health conditions, which have been described by Mr Macklin and Ms Grujowska, will mean that his time in custody will be more burdensome than would otherwise be the case.

57. The result of this conviction is that I cannot regard the Offender as a person of good character, nor is he a person who does not have any record or any significant record of previous convictions, because I regard this particular offence, which includes a degree of violence whilst in company, as being a significant previous conviction. The effect of these findings is that the Offender is not able to access any leniency which would otherwise be available.

58. However, having regard to the Offender’s good family support, the length of time he will be required to be in prison and serving a period of parole, I am satisfied that the Offender has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, but I am unable to make any finding on the basis of the available material as to the likelihood of his reoffending. He was a relatively young man at the time of the offence, and it is unlikely, once released from prison, that he will keep the same company as he did at the time of the offence.

59. Although the Offender has expressed his regret for what has happened, which I take into account, that regret does not amount to a mitigating factor of the kind contemplated by s 21A(3)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

60. I am satisfied that the Offender’s present custodial circumstances and the restrictions imposed over the last two years or more to keep correctional centres free of COVID-19 have made the Offender’s imprisonment more harsh than usual.

Victim Impact Statements

61. The Court heard a number of victim impact statements from the family of the Deceased. Those statements made clear that the death of the Deceased has caused significant harm and distress to them.

62. Pursuant to s 30E(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, I consider that it is appropriate to take these statements into account. I do so on the basis that the harmful impact on the family of the Deceased is an aspect of the harm done to the community as a whole by the Offender.

Sentencing

63. In considering the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the Offender, I commence with the reminder that the offence of murder involves the criminal taking of a human life. It is a violation of the sanctity of human life which is a concept at the heart of a civilised community. Any conviction for murder warrants a substantial sentence because the purposes of punishment and general deterrence are of significant importance. In the Offender’s case, the purpose of punishment having regard to his moral culpability for the offence is significant but, because of his particular subjective circumstances, I place less weight on general deterrence. However, the circumstances of this offence of murder are such as to require careful attention being paid to the importance of denunciation of the Offender’s conduct in the circumstances. Ultimately, the sentence imposed must be one which reflects the gravity of the offence, and the moral culpability of the Offender.

64. I am not satisfied that I should make a finding of special circumstances as the law permits: s 44(2) Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act. In my view, the usual period of parole will be adequate to assist the Offender to reintegrate into the community on the completion of his non-parole period. There is no other sufficient reason which has not already been taken into account to find special circumstances.

65. I have now discussed all of the facts relevant for sentence, including the relevant subjective circumstances of the Offender, and it is necessary to make a value judgment as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed for the offence.

66. The joint criminal enterprise was a very serious offence which fell above the mid‑line of objective seriousness of offences of that kind. It was a brutal, callous and a gratuitous murder. However, the Offender occupied a less serious role in the joint criminal enterprise than that of Tony Bagnato, who was older and no doubt significantly influenced the Offender to participate in the enterprise.

67. I take into account that the Offender’s moral culpability is substantially less than that of Tony Bagnato. I have also taken into account the particular hardship being experienced by the Offender whilst incarcerated during the pandemic, and all of the other matters which I have earlier discussed.

68. I determine the appropriate sentence for the offence to be one of 24 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years. It is appropriate to commence the sentence on 23 July 2015 – which reflects the period of time which the Offender has spent in custody prior to his conviction.

Offence of Serious Personal Violence

69. I am required to warn the Offender, which I now do, of the existence of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 and the fact that that Act applies to the offence of murder of which he has been convicted and for which he is about to be formally sentenced. At some future point in time, an application may be made that, notwithstanding the completion of his sentence, the Offender should continue to be detained or else be subject to an Extended Supervision Order impacting upon his liberty.

Sentence

70. Diego Carbone, I impose the following sentence upon you:

1. For the offence of the murder of Bradley Dillon, I impose a sentence of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 18 years with a balance of term of 6 years to commence on 23 July 2015.

2. The first date upon which the Offender will be eligible to be released on parole is 22 July 2033.

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Decision last updated: 14 April 2022