R v Cao

[2019] NSWDC 829

District Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Cao [2019] NSWDC 829
Hearing dates:	24 July 2019
Decision date:	24 July 2019
Jurisdiction:	Criminal
Before:	Norrish QC DCJ
Decision:	Sentenced to a Community Corrections order for a period of two years with the additional conditions: The offender must obey all reasonable directions of her medical and or psychological treatment practitioners. The offender must submit to supervision by Community Corrections officer for the period of the order. The offender must undertake anger management counselling as directed by Community Corrections.
Catchwords:	CRIME – Sentence – assault occasioning actual bodily harm – victim 4 month old child of the offender – treatment for mental health problems for some time – separated from victim’s father shortly after birth –no prior criminal convictions – dealt with under s 32 Mental Health Act in Local Court – isolated from community due to mental health issues – receives Disability Support Pension – diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder, schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder – whole life affected by her mental illness – chronic condition
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Mental Health Act 2007
Cases Cited:	DPP(Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 Hemsley v R [2004] NSWCCA 228 R v Engert (1995) 84A CrimR 67
Category:	Sentence
Parties:	Regina (Crown) Zhenzhen Angela CAO (offender)
Representation:	Solicitors: Ms D Mansour (Crown) Mr A Tiedt (Offender)
File Number(s):	2018/00235388
Publication restriction:	No

Judgment

1. The prisoner Zhenzhen Angela Cao appears today for sentence in relation to an offence which is in context a very serious offence. She pleads guilty an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed on 25 July 2018, that is exactly one year tomorrow as coincidence would have it, committed upon Luna Cao at Sydney.

2. This is an offence contrary to s 59(1) Crimes Act 1900 and carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment.

3. At the time of the commission of the offence the prisoner on my calculation was 23 years of age and as I understand it she will turn 25 years of age this year. There is no standard non-parole period. There is no time spent in custody. Although the prisoner for reasons which will become self‑evident in a moment did spend a week or thereabouts in a “medical facility” after her arrest on 25 July 2018 being charged by police on 31 July 2018 and being released on conditional bail.

4. It is important to recite the facts.

The prisoner is the natural mother of the victim. The victim was born in March 2018 and thus at the time of the offence the child was only four months old. The facts themselves state that the prisoner has been treated for mental health related problems for some time. The mother of the prisoner, whom I need not name, lives a short distance from the offender and the victim.

5. I pause to point out that the father of the victim apparently had separated from the prisoner shortly after the birth or at the time of the birth, and it is a matter of some significance in the understanding of the facts of this matter that the prisoner, although she may have had the support of her mother, was largely without support within the immediate domestic situation. In my view she did not have the skills or the mental capacity, if that is the correct expression, to be properly caring for her child.

6. Forewarning of what was about to happen is reflected in the facts with the notation of events on 22 July 2018. The grandmother of the victim, the mother of the prisoner, received a phone call from the prisoner. The facts state that the prisoner said she was “not feeling very well” and indicated to her mother that she needed to take a “break” and asked her mother to look after the victim. The grandmother, given what I understand to be the history of the matter, was concerned that something had gone wrong. When she arrived at the house or the apartment where the prisoner lived she saw the prisoner was bleeding, the house was in disarray with a number of broken porcelain pieces on the floor and other broken objects around the apartment.

7. The mother, not unnaturally, felt scared and “vulnerable” and took the child and some baby items and left the apartment. She came back and assisted in the cleaning of the house, as I understand it, and then left the apartment, leaving the victim with the mother.

8. At 3am on 25 July the mother of the prisoner received another phone call from the prisoner, again to my mind significant in reflecting upon the prisoner’s mental state, as she said,

“I am not all right. I beat the baby. Can you come and help me.”

The mother replied

“you can’t beat her, she is too small”.

The prisoner replied

“But I have beaten her already”.

9. This confession was one of frankness. But it was also clearly a cry for help and of course the grandmother of the victim went over to the apartment. The prisoner was crying, holding the victim, the victim had red marks and bruising on her left cheek, and immediately had concern for the victim’s welfare. As I said, I have seen subsequent photographs which show the marking on the cheek which is extensive and marking to the lower back and the “bottom” of the victim.

10. The prisoner at the time that she was seen by the mother was not trying to harm the victim, she had obviously realised that she had done something wrong and she realised she needed help. The facts state that she handed over the victim to her mother and emergency services were contacted. Police and paramedics attended. The prisoner frankly admitted to police that she “slapped” the victim on the bottom at least 12 times and then on her face maybe six or seven times which without the aid of any medical opinion seems entirely consistent with what I have seen in the photographs.

11. The prisoner also said, I think significantly in the context of material I am going to turn to in a moment,

“I do not believe I can look after the child anymore”.

She said that she wanted her mother to

“help me look after Luna”.

12. She referred to the earlier incident of the damage to items within her home although she claimed that that had happened “quite accidentally” which to my mind is quite inconsistent with the range of damage observed by the mother on 22 July.

13. The prisoner had told police that she was suffering from mental health issues and that she was taking medication, that she was receiving monthly injections, I would have thought for the treatment of psychosis, she was taken to a mental health facility for assessment.

14. The victim herself was taken to the Randwick Children’s Hospital. There was obvious swelling and bruising to the left side of her face below her left eye from the midline out to her left ear and down onto her upper neck, and she had bruising and swelling across both buttocks extending to her nappy line. These injuries were visible 24 hours later but no other injuries were observed. As I said, in one sense it was a good thing that there were no more serious injuries. Then again the prisoner would be charged with more serious offending.

15. Family and Community Services were advised and an arrangement had been made for the welfare of the child who is no longer with the prisoner as one would expect. There is a current two year apprehended violence order in relation to the protection of the victim that was issued on 26 September 2018 and the prisoner is not to contact the victim.

16. She has no prior criminal convictions. But the Crown properly has brought to my attention two matters. One matter from November 2014 when the prisoner is alleged to have assaulted a person who was living with her, a type of “flatmate”, and another matter occurring on 9 December 2015 when the prisoner bit her husband or then partner to the right bicep area. I have read the facts of those matters. They were dealt with in the Local Court, I am told, pursuant to s 32 of the “Mental Health Act” which does not surprise me having regard to the facts and the history concerning the prisoner.

17. I have a pre-sentence report from Community Corrections which sets out some details of her background. It paints a picture of a person who is largely estranged from her family, although she lives in what is described as “permanent accommodation owned by her father”. She is isolated from the community largely because of her mental health issues and is a person who has hardly ever worked and is currently receiving a Government Disability Support Pension.

18. Whilst there is reference to her having some insight in relation to her offending behaviour that insight is clearly restrained by the character of her mental illness or disability. She reflects upon her relationship with her family which may not necessarily present a true picture. But again any failure of the prisoner to represent the true picture in my view is largely dictated by her mental capacity, not an attempt by her to deliberately mislead anybody.

19. She asserts to the Community Corrections officer that the assault committed on the child was, to use my words, channelling anger towards her husband who had abandoned her shortly after the child was born. That may be her way of expressing it, and it may in fact reflect the truth of the matter, but again that assertion has to be seen through the prism of the available evidence concerning her mental state.

20. The prisoner in the history to the Community Corrections Service and in greater detail to Dr Emily Kwok, a psychologist, sets out details of mistreatment she claims that she has suffered through her life. But again, whether that is true or not is difficult to say. She is a person who is very dependent upon other people. She has a stepsister who has described the prisoner as being a “non-violent person” to Community Corrections. The Community Corrections Service reflects the diagnosis of particular mental illnesses by others. There is reference to some feelings of paranoia and concerns about leaving the shelter of the accommodation in which she lives.

21. The Community Corrections officer noted that the prisoner had a “simplistic understanding of her offending” but again that has to be seen in the context of the prevailing mental illnesses from which she suffers. She is not cognitively capable of undertaking or complying with a home detention order, although she is willing to undertake community work and is deemed “suitable for light duties at Community Corrections” in the city. She is assessed as being at a medium to low risk of reoffending on the basis of the actuarial instrument used by Community Corrections. Community Corrections will implement a supervision plan requiring her to undertaken mental health assessments and engage with treatment, and also to engage in interventions and programs to address her anger management issues, and I propose to make orders to that effect. There are other comments made about home detention which I need not dwell upon at this particular point of time

22. I have made various references to the issue of her mental health to come to the direct evidence in this regard, although the Crown facts themselves identify mental health issues as being relevant to the matter. I have a short report from Dr Wong who is a psychiatrist who has the prisoner under his care. He has been treating her consistently since October 2011 and has made a diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder, with mixed features of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. She has been treated in China before 2011 with both inpatient and outpatient care. She was initially diagnosed according to Dr Wong in China with schizophrenia. But was also treated for mood disorder consistent with bipolar disorder and had been trialled on a number of psychotropic medications, including antipsychotic medications and antidepressants. Her main problems in the opinion of Dr Wong are “mood fluctuation, poor frustration tolerance, paranoia, delusion, self-harm, difficulty with concentration as well as difficulty in handling interpersonal relationships.” When one dwells upon those features of her presentation one can see a great risk for the child in her care, because it is quite clear that her actions towards her child could be interpreted as arising out of poor frustration tolerance, consistent with mood fluctuation and difficulty with handling interpersonal relationships, it could even be given her history of threats of self-harm consistent with that characteristic.

23. Her whole life as I understand it has been affected by her mental illness. She came to Australia for an education but that education as she explained to the psychologist was interrupted by her mental illness. She suffered isolation and she claimed some victimisation at school, perhaps that is the product of the mental illness, perhaps that is just the reality of the person that she is.

24. At the time of reporting she was free of any paranoid delusions but her mood remains unstable. She is very susceptible, Dr Wong said to “any psychosocial distresses which easily precipitate her into the lapse of her Schizoaffective Disorder. This condition is chronic and relapses occur as a result of stressors in her life and essentially “she can only look after herself on a day to day basis”. Her prognosis is very poor. Her condition is unlikely to improve and she may experience a gradual decline in her psychosocial functioning. It may be in the context of this analysis and other evidence that will be available from time to time that she will never be able to care for her child and the burden of that will fall to other people.

25. It is to be fairly said of course that these are conditions that are not self‑inflicted. How they have come about of course is something I cannot answer and probably medical practitioners cannot answer. Whilst we have a victim here of these conditions, as they affect the prisoner’s behaviour they are conditions over which the prisoner has almost no control.

26. I have had regard to a very extensive history provided to the psychologist. The psychologist Dr Kwok prepared a report dated 18 July 2019. I do not need to dwell upon that history. The prisoner through her perspective gives an account of a relationship with her father, her mother and her husband. She claims abuse, including physical abuse at the hands of her husband, whether that is true or not is not really for me to determine. Clearly if it be true that her husband did abandon her and the child, that would be a cause of frustration or anger. With a rational person one would obviously observe that that was not to be taken out on the child. But the prisoner is clearly not a rational person.

27. The psychologist’s examination of the prisoner included a history of her medical conditions. She has confirmed, amongst other things that the prisoner had been scheduled into St Vincent’s Hospital psychiatric care in April 2018. This was after she allegedly “physically assaulted the nanny”. But this is after the birth of the child. I do not know the detail of that. What the circumstances are I do not know. Clearly a matter concerned with a mental illness, but it is to my mind of some significance that if she was scheduled after the birth of the child the alarm bells should have been ringing as to the potential threat to the child’s welfare. There was a report made to the DOCS Helpline on 30 April 2018. Again this is five weeks after the child was born. The mother of the prisoner reported that the prisoner was “constantly crying” and mentioning “looking for knives”. This is not information that I hasten to say apparently comes from the prisoner. It comes from other sources. The prisoner apparently the night before the report being received by the DOCS Helpline, was taken to St Vincent’s Hospital but not admitted. According to records that the psychologist saw the prisoner’s mother had called an ambulance three times in the period before the offending occurred in the hope to have the prisoner reassessed but not admitted.

28. The evidence arising from those investigations of the psychologist really reflects upon the extent of the prisoner’s distress over an extended period of time and provides some proper context for understanding how these events unfolded, they could have been avoided if perhaps there had been greater attention paid to the prisoner’s plight, not by her mother but by people in authority.

29. The prisoner’s assessment of risk by the psychologist involves consideration of her poor emotional regulation, lack of prosocial activities and peers, her social withdrawal which I have already noted, her unemployment, her “perceived lack of family support” and of course her mental health problems.

30. The psychologist felt, however, that the prisoner was not “inherently antisocial” in attitudes or behaviour. That is, she is not a person without mental problems who would act in a violent or antisocial fashion. She has expressed regret for her behaviour to the extent that she can realistically express regret or contrition.

31. The psychologist stated that the history available for her of a medical treatment reflected upon a mental illness had its origins in childhood. She has heightened sensitivities because of the character of her upbringing and has various negative perceptions of her relationship with her mother but also fear of losing connection with her mother. She has always had interpersonal relationship difficulties and these may have affected the character of her relationship with her husband. I am not blaming him for anything. I do not have enough evidence of course to blame anybody for any particular breakdown in relationship but it is unfortunate that if the husband did separate from her that he separated without regard to the potential danger to his child of a person so unstable as this prisoner having the care of the child.

32. The psychologist’s analysis of the matter having regard to her clinical analysis of the prisoner and the review of “historical documents” was that these various matters provided the criteria for a diagnosis of “borderline personality disorder”. She noted the material from Dr Wong and the diagnosis which are able to be made by psychiatrists that I have earlier referred to. The psychologist expresses the further information that there is a “genetic overlap of borderline personality disorder with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and major depression” and each of the symptoms of those various conditions need to be addressed in treatment. She was of the view that the offending behaviour was “best understood in the context of her longstanding mental health disorders, the breakdown of the relationship with her husband, poor coping skills and lack of access to external support.

33. I just pause for a moment to point out, of course, it seems clear that the mother was a source of external support. She was doing her best both immediately before the offending, immediately after the offending, and in the weeks before the offending to provide assistance but in fairness to the prisoner her reporting of these matters and her relationship with her mother has to be understood in the context of her mental condition.

34. So far as the prisoner’s said condition of borderline personality disorder she noted that when a person such as this prisoner with that condition suffers rejection and her need to belong is not quite satisfied she would experience “quite intense emotional distress, failure of self-regulation and maladaptive behaviours”. It seems to me self-evident from the history that I have that she had an extended period of extreme distress, not just confined to the day of the assault upon the child.

35. The psychologist was of the view that the conditions of a prisoner can be quite adequately sourced within the community. She does not necessarily require hospitalisation. However it might be fairly pointed out that these are matters for medical practitioners, not psychologists. However, if she extends to self-harming and suicidal thoughts she made need some hospitalisation.

12. The psychologist also notes that the prognosis is guarded. She noted that mental conditions result in

“maladaptive behaviours that reflect underlying failures of self‑regulation...the prisoner’s conditions is longstanding and continues to exert a noxious influence upon her life currently.”

37. The psychologist expressed the opinion that the prisoner’s engagement in

“further inappropriate behaviours will in part be a function to what extent she engages in and responds to future treatment that aims to reduce the risks of reoffending”.

38. The learned counsel for the prisoner was proposing to call his client, as I understand it, to simply state that such histories as she has provided were to the best of her ability truthfully reported. In my view, sensibly, the Crown does not require to cross‑examine her about that and in the circumstances of the matter there is always a challenge for a mentally ill person to be giving evidence. But as I said, in the context of discussing that aspect of the matter with the parties, this is not the case that we so often see of people coming to Court having never ever received medical treatment before, claiming all sort of psychiatric and psychological disabilities.

39. The Crown’s written submissions, reflect much truth in terms of sentencing an offender who might be not burdened by the conditions that this prisoner faces. Obviously the maximum penalty is a relevant consideration in the exercise of sentencing discretion, and I point out of course that this prisoner was charged with wounding or recklessly wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm or reckless inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent, or even recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm providing that she could plead to such a charge in all the circumstances one would be approaching the matter in a somewhat different fashion than I do now. But it is self‑evident that the character of the charge defines the proper sentencing context. I am aware of the types of injuries that might constitute actual bodily harm and I am certainly well aware of the need for condign punishment of those who abuse children.

40. The Crown notes what Latham J observed in Smith [2005] NSWCCA at [54]. However this is not a case where one can simply identify it as one of an offence committed “as a result of momentary lapse of control”, which was, I hasten to say not the case there in Smith. This is not a case of “momentary lapse of control”. It certainly is a case of “lapse of control”. But driven by a very serious existing mental illness but I accept fully what the Crown has quoted as authorities and statutory principles relating to the ordinary case of abuse of children, if I could describe such cases in such terms, and domestic violence offences.

41. The Crown submits that the offence falls above the middle range of objective seriousness. I would take that to be for a case of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The middle range of objective seriousness of course is a term specifically required to be considered when one is sentencing somebody for an offence that carries a statutory standard non-parole period. S.54A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 identifies what relevant matters are to be considered in determining the objective seriousness of an offence for determining its relationship to the middle range of objective seriousness. Whilst I appreciate of course here there is no need for me to consider s 54A(2) directly, I am mindful of the fact that the relevant matters to determining objective seriousness in that context are matters only concerned with that aspect and not other matters that might otherwise be relevant to the sentencing task as covered by s 54B(2) of the Act.

42. Here, of course, in reflecting upon the objective gravity of the offending one needs to have regard to the age of the victim, the harm that was actually done and of course aggravating factors that arise under s 21A(2) that clearly are relevant to the assessment of the objective facts, and in fact conceded by learned counsel for the offender by the prisoner. That the offence was committed in the home of the victim which was of course the home of the prisoner, that the prisoner by assaulting her child did so as an abuse of trust or authority in relation to the victim and that the victim was vulnerable. In fact the victim could not be any more vulnerable than this particular victim.

43. That having been said and those matters considered there is also other factors which the Crown has referred to. The character of the injuries, in this case fortunately not permanent, but nor would they be in the context of a claim of actual bodily harm. The absence of planning and premeditation which is clearly the case here. And, in my view, what appears from the objective facts to be the fact that the prisoner in context had earlier opportunities to cause harm to the child but had not done so. The Crown points out that the attack upon the child was “sustained”. That may be so but in that sense the period of time over which the slapping occurred may have been in reality a relatively short period of time.

44. But that is not the end of the matter because as I said there is an overarching issue for consideration in this case, having regard to the available evidence. That overarching issue, or those overarching issues, fall from a decision such as the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP(Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194, where McClellan CJ at CL, a very wise and experienced judge, reflected upon authorities that had gone before relating to the appropriate way of considering the issues of mental illness, intellectual handicap or other problems in sentencing an offender. I will not cite the then pre-existing authorities and I need not reflect upon the fact that there have been a number of authorities since 2010 reiterating and perhaps expanding upon the matters identified by the learned Chief Judge. But pertinent to this matter given the fact that by reference to the purposes of sentencing that usually in sentencing for an offence of this type general deterrence has a very significant role to play in the sentencing exercise having regard to the context of the maximum penalty. His Honour pointed out that:

“Where the state of a person’s mental health contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way, the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced” and that is so here.

He said:

“Consequently the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a reduction in the sentence”.

He went on to say that:

“It may also have the consequence that an offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed.”

45. That is the case here and significantly so. This person is not a vehicle for the message of general deterrence. There is also the issue if a custodial sentence was to be imposed it may weigh more heavily upon the person because the sentence will be more onerous for the person having regard to their vulnerability by reason of the condition. A condition may reduce or eliminate the significance of specific or personal deterrence and I believe that is the case here.

46. It is to be fairly pointed out, as his Honour noted, that in cases such Hemsley the decision of Sperling J, and the decision of Engert a decision of Gleeson CJ sometimes offenders with mental health conditions contributing to offending may require greater weight to be given to their personal deterrence or to “specific deterrence”. But this is not the case here. That is not to say that the prisoner’s mental condition is not one that may contribute to further offending but it is not a condition over which he has control and it is not a condition which to my mind in the present circumstances makes her presently a danger to the community, and that is the other matter that his Honour referred to, that is, when a person’s mental illness presents as a danger to the community considerations of specific deterrence may result in an increased sentence. It is correct to point out by reference to s 3A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act that various purposes of sentencing are required to be considered. An examination of those principles, for example set out in De La Rosa, show that whilst many aspects of the issues that arise under s 3A of the Act are required to be taken into account, for weight to be given to them is to be determined both by reference to the objective facts and relevant subjective circumstances, particularly those that inform the character of the offending.

47. Section 3A of course also refers to need to promote the prisoner’s rehabilitation. I appreciate the analysis that the prognosis in the medical sense for this prisoner is guarded and may remain guarded for the rest of her life but that does not mean that there should not be some proper consideration to promoting her rehabilitation.

48. To be entirely fair, to the very helpful submissions of the learned Crown Prosecutor, the Crown did submit that the s 5 threshold had been passed. The Crown was not submitting necessarily that if a term of imprisonment was imposed that that term of imprisonment should be by way of full-time custody. In fairness to the learned Crown Prosecutor, the Prosecutor appearing today does not seek to inhibit the learned Director’s attitude to the offending. But in fairness I acknowledge what was pointed out in her oral submissions. I have given very close consideration to that matter. I certainly do not believe at this stage that this prisoner should be committed to full-time custody. But I have also given very serious consideration to the issue of whether the s 5 threshold has been passed. When I have regard to subjective circumstances, when I have regard to the purposes of sentencing, when I have regard to the objective gravity of the offending within the context of a five year maximum penalty, but also factor in lesser weight being given to general deterrence and specific deterrence, and also noting the substantially reduced moral culpability of the prisoner, I have ultimately concluded that in this matter at this point the s 5 threshold has not been passed.

49. So far as matters that might otherwise arise from the Crown’s submissions the Crown is in agreement with the defence as to the aggravating factors which I have already dealt with. I accept, as I have said earlier, that the prisoner’s criminal history, if it could be called a criminal history, the charging of her in relation to matters dealt with pursuant to s 32 is not significant, albeit that those matters clearly are connected to her unstable personality. There is no suggestion in the material available to me that the prisoner prior to the offence with which I am concerned had mistreated her child, allowing for the fact that, as I said, in reality the child should not have been in her care.

50. So far as the prospects of rehabilitation I accept the Crown submissions, as I have already noted, about the guarded approach that one must take and I could not find on balance that her prospects of rehabilitation are good. As I could not find that there is an unlikelihood on balance of her not reoffending. But these are matters of course to be seen in the context not of her desire to act in an antisocial fashion but the stranglehold upon her of her mental condition.

51. I accept I hasten to say, that the prisoner is contrite. She has expressed regret for her actions but it seems to me with respect that her calling her mother immediately after she had harmed the child, the plea for help, the fact that on the facts she is seen on the bed cradling the child having previously administered this punishment to the child for no good reason other than her mental illness reflects real contrition. It is not expressed as such. We constantly, in the context of sentencing, have to deal with claims of contrition, months and months after the relevant events expressed in general terms and are invited to determine on balance that this is a mitigating factor. I have always felt that one of the most significant aspects of contrition is not the way that it is expressed but the timeliness of it. In this particular case from the Agreed Facts I can see the timeliness of “real contrition” by the actions of that are described in the facts. Even if the prisoner did not have the mental capacity to express it in a manner that might readily be interpreted as contrition. I have already commented upon some other matters that were raised by the learned counsel for the prisoner. When I refer to ‘contrition’ of course I am also referring to in the same breath what is expressed in s 21A(3)(a)(i) as “remorse”.

52. I also accept on balance that the offender was not fully aware of the consequence of her actions because of her mental disability pursuant to s 21A(3)(j) but the analysis of that is very much reflected in my analysis of the medical evidence and the reference to an application of the principles in De La Rosa.

53. A plea of guilty is of course a mitigating factor for which she receives a discrete discount. Ultimately I have concluded that the justice of this case at this time, having regard to the character of the charge, is one that requires me to convict the offender but to consider an alternative to imprisonment, and that I do by proposing to make an order pursuant to s 8 of the Act.

54. In relation to the charge to which the prisoner has pleaded guilty, consideration has been given to the safety of the victim of the “domestic violence offence”. The victim is not at any threat from the prisoner under the current arrangements.

55. Ms Cao, in relation to the offence to which you pleaded guilty you are convicted.

56. Pursuant to s 8(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 instead of imposing a sentence of imprisonment you are ordered to comply with a Community Corrections order for a period of two years.

57. The standard conditions of the order apply.

You must not commit any offence and you must appear before Court if called to do so at any time during the term of the order.

The following additional conditions apply:

The offender must obey all reasonable directions of her medical and or psychological treatment practitioners.

The offender must submit to supervision by Community Corrections officer for the period of the order.

The offender must undertake anger management counselling as directed by Community Corrections.

58. Ma’am, if you fail to comply with the conditions of the order, further action can be taken against you, this may require you to return to court to be resentenced. In other words I can set aside this order and impose a term of imprisonment.

59. Finally, you are now directed to attend the Court Registry where a copy of this order will be explained and given to you.

60. Are there any other matters, Madam Crown?

61. MANSOUR: No, your Honour.

62. HIS HONOUR: Any other matters from you, Mr Tiedt?

63. TIEDT: No, your Honour. I will assist Ms Cao in attending the registry.

64. HIS HONOUR: That is very kind of you, thank you. I just want to check her address. Could I have the file please, I just want to check it because this order will be sent to Community Corrections. I am going to read it aloud, Mr Tiedt, could you double-check that this is right. XXXXX X Harbour Street, Sydney 2000.

65. TIEDT: I don’t believe it is, your Honour, I’m just obtaining instructions at this point.

66. HIS HONOUR: I am surprised you don’t know your client’s address, Mr Tiedt, I’ve got to say, I would have thought that you’d know your client’s address.

67. TIEDT: It’s just changed, your Honour, that’s the reason why.

68. HIS HONOUR: She hasn’t notified the Court.

69. TIEDT: Your Honour, the address is XXXXX X Harbour Street.

70. HIS HONOUR: XXXXX XX Harbour.

71. TIEDT: Yes, your Honour.

72. HIS HONOUR: What will happen of course is I need the right address because Community Corrections will write to her and communicate with her to come in and visit them at their office, so we need the exact address because if she fails to report when requested then we’ll get a breach report and I or some other Judge will have to spend time sorting out the mess. XXXXX X Harbour Street, Sydney, 2000, is that right?

73. TIEDT: Haymarket, your Honour, in fact. It’s Haymarket.

74. HIS HONOUR: Haymarket?

75. TIEDT: Yes, your Honour.

76. HIS HONOUR: That’s a part of Sydney, isn’t it?

77. TIEDT: I can only tell you that’s my instruction, your Honour.

78. HIS HONOUR: What is the postcode for Haymarket.

79. TIEDT: 2000, your Honour.

80. HIS HONOUR: That’s the same postcode as for Sydney. Anyway I have written that on the file so that will help the Registry staff. Through the interpreter, Madam Interpreter, could you ask the prisoner, does she understand the order or the orders I have made?

81. OFFENDER: Yes, I understand.

82. HIS HONOUR: So you have got to be of good behaviour for two years, do you understand that?

83. OFFENDER: Yes, I understand.

84. HIS HONOUR: And you have to do what Community Corrections tell you to do. And you have to attend upon your doctors and receive treatment. Do you understand that?

85. OFFENDER: Yes.

86. HIS HONOUR: Do you understand that if the Community Corrections Service ask you to attend upon courses you have to do that?

87. OFFENDER: Yes.

88. HIS HONOUR: Anything else, Madam Crown?

89. MANSOUR: No, your Honour.

90. HIS HONOUR: Anything else from you, Mr Tiedt?

91. TIEDT: No, thank you, your Honour.

92. HIS HONOUR: Thank you both very much for your help. I will just give that order to my associate. The other thing is, Madam Interpreter, are you able to go up to the registry with the prisoner and interpret for her please, thanks very much. Thank you.

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Amendments

28 February 2020 - removed address of offender

Decision last updated: 28 February 2020