R v Cant

[2014] QCA 334

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	R v Cant [2014] QCA 334
PARTIES:	R v CANT, Craig
(applicant)
FILE NO/S:	CA No 108 of 2014 SC No 549 of 2013
DIVISION:	Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:	Miscellaneous Application – Criminal
ORIGINATING  COURT:	Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:	16 December 2014
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	6 November 2014
JUDGES:	Gotterson and Morrison JJA and McMeekin J Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made
ORDER:	The application is refused.
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS – PAROLE – BREACH AND REVOCATION –
where the applicant was sentenced in 2001 and 2004 for
federal drug offences – where the applicant was released on parole – where the applicant was issued a Notice of Revocation due to breaches – where the breaches included travelling
interstate without obtaining written permission of the authorised Queensland Corrective Services officer and associating with someone who unlawfully possesses, uses or sells any
substance that is a drug or a narcotic preparation – where
parole was revoked
CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – WARRANTS,
ARRESTS, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL
POWERS – WARRANTS – GENERALLY – where the
applicant applied to a Queensland magistrate for the issue of a warrant under s 19AW(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to
fix a new non-parole period – where a new non-parole period of 39 months was set – where that amount was half way
between the date of revocation of parole and the full time
release date – where the applicant appealed the magistrate’s decision to a single judge of the Supreme Court – where the
primary judge confirmed the non-parole period of 39 months
– where the applicant alleged that 39 months was excessive in
the circumstances – where the applicant sought to argue on
appeal that because he was not brought before the magistrate as a consequence of being arrested under s 19AV of the Crimes Act, the magistrate lacked the power to issue the
warrant under s 19 AW – whether that contention is open to the applicant – where the applicant also advanced that
particular facts against him were incorrect
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 19AU, s 19AV, s 19AW, s 19AY
Cant v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
[2014] QSC 62, related Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10, considered
COUNSEL:	The applicant appeared on his own behalf S J Hamlyn-Harris for the respondent
SOLICITORS:	The applicant appeared on his own behalf Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) for the respondent

1. GOTTERSON JA: I agree with the conclusion reached by Morrison JA and the order he proposes.

2. I also agree with his Honour’s view that the manner in which the case for the

   applicant was conducted before the learned magistrate and then the learned primary

   judge makes it unnecessary to decide the correctness of the applicant’s contention that the words “under section 19AV” in the introductory clause to s 19AW of the

   Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) have the effect that the prescribed authority may act in accordance with that provision only if the person is brought before him or her under s 19AV thereof.

3. MORRISON JA: The applicant was sentenced in 2001 to 14 years imprisonment, on the Federal offence of being knowingly concerned in the importation of the drug

   known as “Ecstasy”. At the same time he received a non-parole period of eight

   years six months. He appealed unsuccessfully in respect of that conviction.

4. In 2004 the applicant was convicted of the Federal offence of being knowingly

   concerned in the importation of cannabis resin. He was sentenced to a partly

   1

   concurrent term of 12 years six months, ending on 18 May 2019. The court also fixed a single non-parole period in respect of that sentence, and the sentence imposed in 2001, of nine years and six months.

5. The Commonwealth Attorney-General, by an authorised delegate, issued a parole order on 16 February 2011, directing that the applicant be released on parole on 18 May 2011. The relevant conditions of the parole order will be discussed below.

6. On 24 October 2012 a “Notice of Revocation” of the applicant’s parole was issued pursuant to s 19AU(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (“the Crimes Act”). The breaches

   specified for that notice will also be considered below. The applicant had 14 days to respond. Written submissions on behalf of the applicant were made, but rejected, and parole was revoked on 29 January 2013.

7. On 12 June 2013 the respondent applied to a Queensland magistrate, constituted as the “prescribed authority” for the purposes of s 16 of the Crimes Act, for the issue of

   a warrant under s 19AW(1) fixing a new non-parole period. The magistrate set a new non-parole period of 39 months, namely half way between the date of revocation of parole and the full-time release date.

8. The applicant appealed against the magistrate’s decision, to a single judge of the

   Supreme Court. The learned primary judge confirmed the non-parole period of

   2

   39 months, set by the magistrate.

9. The applicant seeks to challenge the decision of the learned primary judge, on the

   single ground that the primary judge: “erred in confirming the 39 month non-parole

   period as issued by the magistrate in the first instance”.

   Circumstances of the breach

   3

[10] The parole order contained 12 conditions, of which two are relevant to the breaches

which resulted in parole being revoked. They are clauses 2(h) and (i):

“(h)	You must not associate with anyone who unlawfully possesses, uses or sells any substance that is a drug or a narcotic preparation within the meaning of the Narcotic Drugs Act 1967.
(i)	You must not leave the State of Queensland for seven days or less without first obtaining the written permission of the authorised Queensland Corrective Services officer for the
area in which you are residing.”[4]

[4]

1. The material placed before the magistrate was contained in an affidavit by a Federal

   agent of the Australian Federal Police. That affidavit exhibited a “Statement of

   Facts” in relation to the applicant’s conduct prior to 7 August 2012.[5] On that date

   [5]

   the applicant was arrested and charged with three offences, namely trafficking in methylamphetamine, production of cannabis, and possessing a mobile telephone used in the commission of an offence of trafficking. Those charges had not been resolved by the time of the hearing before the learned primary judge.

2. The affidavit set out the essential evidence concerning the breaches. It was conveniently summarised by the learned primary judge as follows:

“[13]

Relevant also to the applicant's breaches of parole was evidence contained in the statement of facts that concerned a number of interstate trips which the applicant had made without obtaining the necessary consent of the authorised Corrective Services officer. Also relevant was the evidence of the

applicant's association with persons who were in possession of
drugs. The evidence showed that:

(a)	In March 2012, the applicant travelled to Adelaide on a flight paid for with his co-tenant's credit card. Electronic evidence showed that the applicant's telephone was located in Adelaide on the afternoon of 11 March 2012. He flew back to Brisbane from Adelaide on 12 March 2012, and was observed and digitally recorded by police exiting the arrival gate in Brisbane, after departing the flight from Adelaide.
(b)	Further evidence demonstrated a link between the applicant's telephone being used to contact a certain other associate, and this other person was, in turn, linked to a further associate by telephone calls. That final associate was intercepted by police on 16 March 2012 carrying 42 clip seal bags containing methamphetamine, with a total net weight of 2.246 grams pure. Telephone records show that on 18 March 2012, that same person's telephone was used to contact the applicant's telephone.
(c)	Electronic evidence demonstrated that, on 20 April 2012, the applicant's telephone (and, by necessary inference, the applicant himself) travelled into northern New South Wales, returning on 21 April 2012.
(d)	Police surveillance showed that in March 2012, certain other people with whom the applicant was associated travelled to Alice Springs. One of those people made contact with the applicant by telephone. A few weeks later, police executed a search warrant at the business premises of that person, and located 57.73 grams of methamphetamine. Telephone records then show numerous telephone calls between the applicant's telephone and those belonging to his associates. On 7 May 2012 the applicant himself travelled to Alice Springs, via Cairns. The airline booking had been made in the name of the applicant's son, Vaun Taylor, but was paid for using the applicant's credit card. Closed circuit TV at the Alice Springs airport showed him exiting the airport with the associate at whose premises the police had located the 57.73 grams of methamphetamine. The records of a particular motel at Alice Springs record a booking for the applicant, and detail his mobile telephone number. Telephone records indicate that, while in Alice Springs, the applicant's telephone was used to contact a number of his associates' telephones. Closed circuit TV footage at the Alice Springs airport on 8 May 2012 show the

applicant passing through security to board a flight

to Sydney. He then travelled on to Brisbane.”[6]

[6]

1. Thus the breach of condition 2(i) was that the applicant travelled outside Queensland without the relevant permission, in March 2012 to Adelaide, in April 2012 to northern New South Wales, and in May 2012 to Alice Springs. The breach of condition 2(h) was associating with a number of people who possessed or used

   drugs; inferred from the records of calls to and from the applicant’s telephones.

   The hearing before the magistrate

2. The applicant was represented by a legal officer from Legal Aid Queensland on the hearing before the magistrate. A number of points were made on behalf of the applicant, all directed to the sole issue which was the setting of a new non-parole

   period. Relevant to the applicant’s contentions before this Court were the following:

(a) it was conceded that the applicant had breached his parole

7

conditions;

(b) the applicant’s lawyer made it clear that there was no contest as to

the facts advanced in respect of the breaches, saying:

“I wasn’t really wanting to argue about the details of

those because I’m accepting for today’s purposes that

he has breached those conditions because the ruling’s

already been made by the Attorney-General”.[8];

[8]

(c) in relation to the respondent’s outline at the magistrate’s hearing, the

applicant’s representative said that: “The only part of the outline, your Honour, that I’m in disagreement with is the last three paragraphs on

the last page.”;[9] that was a reference to paragraphs [49], [50] and [51],

[9]

which advance submissions as to the appropriate non-parole period;

earlier in the outline paragraphs [16] and [17] had set forth the facts

10

concerning the breaches, and the evidentiary source for them;

(d) the magistrate asked the applicant’s legal representative: “Do you

wish to be heard in relation to the topic of the breaches? The reasons

for the breaches.”; the answer was, “Your Honour, I don’t. And I don’t

because they’ve already been established. I don’t think that I can

really argue”;[11] immediately following that answer the applicant’s

[11]

legal representative indicated that she would take instructions in relation to the breach concerned with associating with others who possessed or used or sold drugs; and

(e) the respondent pointed out that if there was to be a challenge to the

Attorney-General’s decision to revoke parole on the two grounds

nominated, the appropriate avenue was by judicial review, which had

not occurred; the applicant’s legal representative replied: “And I think, your Honour, that’s why I say that it is accepted that those conditions

were breached and the parole was revoked on that basis.”[12]

[12]

1. The magistrate was told: that the applicant had been arrested on 7 August 2012,

13

and charged with State offences under the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld); since

14

7 August 2012 he had been on remand; and the applicant’s appearance in the Magistrates Court was “as a result of an attendance authority issued by the court for

the purposes of s 69 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld)”.[15] Thus it was

[15]

evident that the applicant had not been arrested under s 19AV of the Crimes Act. Notwithstanding that fact, both the applicant and the respondent submitted that the magistrate should proceed on the basis that the only issue to be determined by the magistrate was the setting of the new non-parole period under s 19AW of the

Crimes Act. Thus the respondent told the magistrate, without objection, that “[I]t’s merely a question of determining the appropriate non-parole period”[16] and on the application, “[I]t’s purely to set a non-parole period”.[17] The applicant’s legal representative announced the applicant’s position as being “that your Honour would set an almost immediate non-parole period …”, and the applicant:

[16]

[17]

“is essentially here today for the breaches of those conditions which

are accepted. The Attorney-General has already revoked his parole

order and it’s simply now the setting of a new non-parole date.”[18]

[18]

1. The respondent’s legal representative took no issue with those parts of the

   respondent’s outline which revealed that the applicant had been arrested on

   7 August 2012 on charges of State offences, held in remand since that time, and had

   been brought to the Magistrates Court by a process otherwise than by arrest under

   19

   s 19AV of the Crimes Act.

2. The learned magistrate made a number of observations in the course of her reasons

   to conclude that 39 months was an appropriate non-parole period. They included:

   there were multiple occasions of breach; the applicant had a serious criminal history

   with significant periods in custodial settings; she inferred that the applicant well

   understood the criminal justice culture and the non-negotiable nature of his obligations to

   comply strictly with the rules; the breaches were not only multiple, but aggravated

   because they occurred in combination with one another, and in the context of a serious

   20

history, and also the context of no mitigating circumstances or any pro-social

21

observations.

The hearing before the primary judge

1. Relevant to the applicant’s submissions to this Court, some matters were made clear

   to the primary judge in the course of the hearing. First, the applicant’s only

22

challenge was that the period of 39 months was excessive in the circumstances.

Secondly, the applicant did not challenge what was described as “the legality of the

warrant”,[23] which was clarified as meaning that the applicant did not seek to submit

24

that there was any defect in the way in which he was brought before the magistrate.

25

Thirdly, the applicant accepted that he had breached his conditions of parole.

[23]

1. Fourthly, there was no dispute as to the facts upon which the breaches were based. This point needs some further explanation. At one point, having recited some of the facts upon which the breaches were based, the applicant said:

   “… the AFP statement of facts are refuted and should not have been

   relied upon as evidence or had anything to do with the process at the

   time, which the Magistrate has clearly done.”[26]

   [26]

   A discussion then ensued between the applicant and the primary judge to identify precisely what he was referring to, which turned out to be the statement of facts

   attached to the agent’s affidavit. In particular, the applicant was referring to the

   evidence that the applicant’s telephone travelled south into northern New South

   27

Wales near Coffs Harbour. As to that, the following exchange occurred:

“HIS HONOUR:	Are you saying somebody else took your phone to New South Wales?
DEFENDANT:	Well, the phone could have been left in the
car or anything, your Honour. That’s not to
say that this – these facts are disputed.
HIS HONOUR:	Were they? Were the facts disputed?
DEFENDANT:	No, they will be disputed at the appropriate time in upcoming court matters.
HIS HONOUR;	Will they? Well, in any event- - -
DEFENDANT:	Nothing was disputed because we accepted the warrant and I was prepared to be re-
sentenced and given a new non-parole period.”[28]

[28]

1. Subsequent to that exchange the primary judge was told on two occasions that the

29

sole point that the applicant wished to agitate was that the 39 months was excessive. At

the end of the hearing the applicant asked, “Your Honour, am I allowed to explain why I was – give evidence to explain why I went interstate and things like that or …”[30] The primary judge pointed out that the applicant “should have done this by way of an affidavit but, in any event, you want to – now you want to give me the explanation for why you were interstate”. The applicant acknowledged that it “probably should

have been done at the Magistrates’ Court but I was … I was sick at the time and my

solicitor just went with it”.[31] The applicant then gave an unsworn explanation that the

travel to Adelaide and Alice Springs was to see horse racing and that none of the

people he was associating with “were smoking marijuana around me”.[32]

[30]

[31]

[32]

The decision of the primary judge

1. The learned primary judge noted the applicant’s position that there was no issue

   with the way he was brought before the magistrate, and no issue that the magistrate

33

had the power to determine the application under s 19AW of the Crimes Act.

His Honour also recorded that there was no dispute in respect of the Statement of

34

Facts, nor that the applicant had breached his conditions of parole. Having recited

the evidence detailed in the Federal agent’s affidavit, his Honour observed that it

was “hardly surprising that the allegations of breach of parole were not challenged”.[35]

[35]

1. The bounds of the appeal from the magistrate’s decision were encapsulated in this

   statement:

[36]

“[20]	Beyond contending that the non-parole period of 39 months fixed under the warrant was excessive in the circumstances, the applicant did not identify any factual or legal error by the learned magistrate. Nor did the applicant identify any erroneous
exercise of the learned magistrate’s discretion, beyond the
contention that the non-parole period was excessive.”[36]

1. The learned primary judge reviewed the authorities put forward as comparables, but

   did not find them of assistance. No challenge to that was made on the appeal to this

   Court. Ultimately his Honour held that the period of 39 months was within the

   proper exercise of discretion by the magistrate, not excessive and not infected by

   37

error.

The basis for that was outlined in several earlier paragraphs, and included:

(a)	the applicant’s significant criminal history;[38]
(b)	that repeated breaches of the conditions of parole had occurred,

[38]

based on undisputed facts; those conditions were designed to reduce

the risk of the applicant returning to involvement in drug related

39

criminal activity;

(c) that it was objectively a matter for concern that the applicant had

committed those repeated breaches within 12 months of his release

on parole, and that was a matter which justified the approach taken

40

by the magistrate; and

(d) the breaches of parole were deliberate and planned, and the evidence

of interstate travel demonstrated “a significant amount of deception,

together with ongoing association with criminal associates, who had

convictions for narcotics offences”.[41]

[41]

1. The learned primary judge took the view that the magistrate was clearly correct in

   her observation that there were multiple breaches, aggravated because they occurred

   in combination with one another, they occurred in the context of a serious criminal

42

history, and in the context of no mitigating circumstances or pro-social observations.
Discussion of the applicant’s contentions on appeal

1. Before this Court the applicant sought to argue that because he was not brought before the magistrate as a consequence of being arrested under s 19AV of the Crimes Act, the magistrate lacked the power to issue the warrant under s 19AW. Given the way the application was conducted before the magistrate, but more particularly the way in which the appeal to the learned primary judge was conducted, this contention is not open to the applicant. The applicant expressly said that there was no challenge to the warrant, no issue with the way in which he was brought before the magistrate,

   and no issue with the magistrate’s power to make the determination.[43]

   [43]

2. Both before the learned primary judge and this Court, the respondent advanced

   submissions to the effect that in s 19AW(1) the words “before whom a person is brought under section 19AV because of an order revoking a parole order or licence”

   should not be read as a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under

   s 19AW, but rather as “machinery provisions”. It was contended that it could not

   have been the intention of the Commonwealth legislature, in the case of someone lawfully brought before a magistrate but not as the result of an arrest under s 19AV, that a magistrate would lack power under s 19AW, and in particular to set a non- parole period. What would follow, on that argument, is that someone who voluntarily attended before a magistrate in circumstances where there was an order revoking their parole, or was brought by lawful means other than an arrest under s 19AV, would effectively have to serve out the balance of their sentence without the opportunity for a non-parole period to be set, or if one was set, having the benefit of an appeal.

3. In my view it is not necessary to resolve the issue of the proper construction of

   s 19AW(1) in these particular circumstances. The applicant’s position before the

   learned magistrate and the learned primary judge was clearly one where the applicant sought that the court proceed on the basis that s 19AV had effectively been satisfied, and the power under s 19AW was open. Before the learned primary judge the applicant confirmed that he did not take any issue with the way in which he had been brought before the magistrate, nor any issue with the fact that the magistrate had power to make the determination under s 19AW. On any view the position being adopted was that the court should treat the applicant as having been brought before the court under s 19AV, without proof that that was so. In those circumstances it is simply not open for the applicant to now contest that issue, and it makes it unnecessary to resolve the question of construction of the relevant sections.

4. The applicant also sought to contend that the factual basis for making the non-

   parole order was untrue or unsubstantiated. That contention also must be rejected.

   44

   As revealed above the hearing before the magistrate proceeded on the basis that

   there was no relevant challenge to any of the facts, or the existence of the breaches.

   45

The same was the case before the learned primary judge. The applicant was clear

46

in stating that there was no factual dispute before the magistrate.

1. The learned primary judge correctly held that the appeal from the magistrate,

   pursuant to s 19AY of the Crimes Act, was one by way of re-hearing, and was in the

   third category of appeals referred to by the High Court in Lacey v Attorney-General

   47

   (Qld). That requires the appeal court (the learned primary judge in the case of the

   appeal from the magistrate) to conduct a hearing “on the materials before the primary

   judge”, but with power to receive additional evidence. No additional evidence was

   sought to be placed before the learned primary judge. The closest the applicant

   came to doing anything of the sort was when he advanced an unsworn and untested

48

account of why he travelled interstate. There are several difficulties with what was said in that respect. First, it was not testimony given on oath. Secondly, no application had been made to adduce additional evidence. Thirdly, the unsworn explanation was directly contrary to the accepted Statement of Facts. Fourthly, even if it was true, it did not avoid two conclusions, namely that the applicant had breached the parole order by travelling interstate without permission, and that he had, at the same time, been in contact with his associates by telephone (in March 2012) and in person and by telephone (in May 2012).

1. The applicant sought to advance a number of arguments as to why particular facts were incorrect or had been refuted. Even if that course were possible, notwithstanding the approach taken before the magistrate and the learned primary judge, the contentions cannot be accepted. The following summary of the main points suffices to demonstrate why:

(a) the Statement of Facts recorded that the telephone call data showed

that the applicant’s telephone had been taken into northern New

49

South Wales near Coffs Harbour on 20 April 2012; this was said to

be refuted by the evidence from a parole officer that on 20 April 2012 the

50

applicant had reported to him; the contention ignores the fact that

the parole officer said that the applicant reported “by telephone”;

thus it did nothing to dispel the inference that the applicant was with

his telephone in New South Wales;

(b) the Statement of Facts referred to the telephone calls evidence that

showed that on 11 March 2012 the applicant’s telephone was located

51

in Adelaide; this was said to be refuted by the evidence of a witness

from Virgin Australia, who deposed that on that day “a person using the name of [the applicant] was scheduled to travel” to Adelaide, and that “a person travelling under the name of [the applicant] checked

in” for the relevant flight;[52] obviously that evidence does not refute

[52]

the fact that the applicant’s telephone was located in Adelaide, nor

the inference that it was the applicant who flew down on that day;

(c) the applicant characterised the Crown’s submission as that he

travelled interstate to meet persons called Hogan, Chandler, Taplin and

53

Helou; this was said to be refuted because “all of these people live in Queensland”;[54] even if that characterisation of the Crown’s submission

[54]

55

was correct the mere fact that persons lived in Queensland would not refute evidence that the applicant had met or associated with them outside Queensland;

(d) the Statement of Facts recorded that during an investigation in 2011

the applicant had “primarily resided” at an address in Bridgeman

56

Downs; this was said to be refuted by evidence from the parole

officer that “on 25 August 2011 [the applicant] advised that he resided at

156 McCauley Road, Tansey …”;[57] the fact that the applicant may

have advised the parole officer of a different address does not mean

that the Statement of Facts was wrong when it said that he “primarily

resided” at a different address.

[57]

1. The applicant also contested a number of characterisations by the Crown in their case, before the magistrate and the primary judge, including that there was an

   element of deception involved in the applicant’s travel; that the applicant had

   travelled to develop a network of persons who were associated with illicit drugs, and that the breaches were deliberate and planned. All of those challenges were based upon

   the applicant’s unsworn assertion that he only travelled interstate on two occasions,

   namely to Adelaide and Alice Springs, and in each case it was merely to attend a horse racing meeting and not to facilitate criminal activity. Those challenges cannot

   succeed, because of the applicant’s acceptance, both before the magistrate and the

   learned primary judge, of the Statement of Facts, and the unsworn nature of the assertion.

2. The applicant also wished to assert that various other facts in the Statement of Facts

   were untrue for one reason or another. All of these depended upon unproven

   assertions by him as to how the Federal agent had misled the court, or how the

   58

   Federal Police had acted improperly and even corruptly. Assertions of such a serious nature would require a greater level of proof than that evident from the bare assertions by the applicant. Not least in that consideration is the fact that when the QC Parole Assistance organisation responded on behalf of the applicant to the Notice of Revocation, on 29 October 2012 the following response was given in respect of the

   breach which entailed travelling out of the State of Queensland: “In relation to point

   (a) out client has instructed that he has not left the state of Queensland and did not travel interstate.”[59] In light of the applicant’s admissions, to the magistrate, the

   learned primary judge and before this Court, that he did, in fact travel interstate, the instructions given to the QC Parole Assistance organisation were clearly false. Contentions based on the bare assertions by the applicant should be rejected.

   Conclusion

3. The applicant has not demonstrated that there was any error by the learned primary judge, whether of fact or law. On the way in which the hearing was conducted before the magistrate, and before the learned primary judge, the decision below was plainly correct.

4. I would refused the application.

   [59]

5. McMEEKIN J: I agree with the reasons of Morrison JA and the order his Honour proposes.

1

That period took into account pre-sentence custody.

2

Cant v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] QSC 62. (Reasons)

3

AB 60.

AB 61.

AB 68.

Reasons at [13].

7

AB 7.

AB 8.

AB 9.

10

AB 125-126.

AB 12.

AB 13.

13

AB 3; respondent’s outline in the Magistrates Court, paragraph [15] (AB 125).

14

AB 3; respondent’s outline in the Magistrates Court, paragraph [8] (AB 122).

Respondent’s outline in the Magistrates Court, paragraph [25] (AB 126).

AB 4.

AB 5.

AB 7.

19

Respondent’s outline in the Magistrates Court, paragraphs [8], [15] and [25](AB 123-126).

20

Apart from the applicant’s plea to the breaches.

21

AB 14.

22

AB 16, 20, 23 and 27-28.

AB 16.

24

AB 29-30.

25

AB 20 and 23.

AB 22.

27

AB 70.

AB 22-23.

29

AB 27-28 and AB 30-31.

AB 31.

AB 31.

AB 31.

33

Reasons at [7].

34

Reasons at [11].

Reasons at [14].

Reasons at [20].

37

Reasons at [25].

Reasons at [15].

39

Reasons at [23].

40

Reasons at [23].

Reasons at [24].

42

Reasons at [24].

AB 16, 23, and 30. At AB 29-30 the respondent outlined the argument that the proceedings before

the magistrate were within s 19AW of the Crimes Act. Following that the applicant said: “I’m not questioning the warrant”, and confirmed that he took no issue with the way he was brought before

the magistrate: AB 30.

44

Paragraph [14].

45

See paragraphs [19] to [20] above.

46

AB 22-23.

47

Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, at [57]-[58].

48

AB 31. This was that he went to watch a horse racing meeting in Adelaide and Alice Springs.

49

AB 70.

50

AB 73.

51

AB 69.

AB 78.

53

Applicant’s outline, paragraph 14.

Applicant’s outline, paragraph 14.

55

It was not. Those persons were co-accused in the charges brought in 2012, but only Hogan was

named in connection with the interstate travel.

56

AB 68.

AB 73.

58

Applicant’s affidavit filed 25 September 2014, pp 2-5.

AB 63.