SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v BURNS
[2013] SASCFC 20
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Anderson, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
3 April 2013
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES - ROBBERY - SENTENCE
The appellant was charged with one count of aggravated robbery pursuant to s 137 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (CLCA) and one count of aggravated intentionally causing serious harm pursuant to s 23 of the CLCA - the appellant pleaded guilty to the former charge and as a consequence the Director of Public Prosecutions discontinued the latter charge - the sentencing judge imposed a period of 9 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years - the appellant appeals against his sentence - whether there was a miscarriage of justice because of the appellant's suggested inadequate representation - whether the head sentence and non-parole period are manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Held: Appeal allowed - the sentencing judge sentenced on a version of events submitted by defence counsel - counsel did not adequately put the appellant's position to the sentencing judge - sentence manifestly excessive - sentence set aside - the appellant is re-sentenced to a head sentence of 6 years and 9 months and a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 23 and s 137, referred to.
R v Place (2002) 81 SASR 395; R v Schultz [2010] SASCFC 47; R v Harradine [2012] SASCFC 103, considered.
R v BURNS
[2013] SASCFC 20Court of Criminal Appeal: Anderson, Peek and Nicholson JJ
ANDERSON J.
Introduction
The appellant was charged with two offences, namely one count of aggravated robbery contrary to s 137(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935 (SA) and one count of aggravated intentionally causing serious harm contrary to s 23(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. On 17 June 2011 the appellant pleaded guilty to the aggravated robbery charge in the Adelaide Magistrates Court. As a consequence of the appellant’s plea, the Director of Public Prosecutions discontinued the proceedings relating to the aggravated intentionally causing serious harm charge.
The appellant was sentenced in the District Court on 23 September 2011. He was sentenced to a period of 9 years imprisonment, reduced from 12 years on account of the plea of guilty, with a non-parole period of 6 years commencing from 6 February 2011 when he was taken into custody in New South Wales for extradition to South Australia.
The appellant appeals against his sentence. His grounds of appeal relate to a suggested inadequate representation at the time of the sentencing submissions and whether this caused a miscarriage of justice and secondly, whether the head sentence and non-parole period is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Mr…
Continue reading R v Burns
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Burns [2013] SASCFC 20
- Case
- [2013] SASCFC 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether there had been a miscarriage of justice due to inadequate legal representation and whether the head sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the offending. The court was required to consider the appellant's version of events, particularly regarding the intent behind the injury caused to the victim, and to assess whether this had been adequately put before the sentencing judge.
The Court of Appeal found merit in the appellant's submissions. It was held that the sentencing judge had proceeded on a version of events that did not adequately reflect the appellant's position, specifically that the blow with the hammer was not intentional. The court determined that counsel had failed to adequately put the appellant's instructions to the sentencing judge, which may have characterised the offending differently. Furthermore, the court considered the starting point of 12 years for the head sentence to be too high, even acknowledging the seriousness of the offence and its consequences for the victim. Applying the principles from *R v Place*, which provides a benchmark for aggravated robbery, the court concluded that the resultant head sentence of nine years, even after a discount for the guilty plea, was manifestly excessive.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The original sentence was set aside, and the appellant was re-sentenced. The court imposed a new head sentence of six years and nine months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and six months. The court found no criticism of the proportion between the head sentence and the non-parole period.
Orders
Orders of the court
Held: Appeal allowed - the sentencing judge sentenced on a version of events submitted by defence counsel - counsel did not adequately put the appellant's position to the sentencing judge - sentence manifestly excessive - sentence set aside - the appellant is re-sentenced to a head sentence of 6 years and 9 months and a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: ANDERSON J, PEEK J
Ms Ingleton submitted that the standard in R v Place is a starting point for the “standard” aggravated robbery on a “soft target”. She argued that this is not an inflexible standard. She pointed out that that court emphasised the need to not only consider the individual circumstances of each offence but also the individual circumstances of each offender. Ms Ingleton submitted that there is no error demonstrated by the sentencing judge in exceeding the 8 years as a starting point. She said it was appropriate for the sentencing judge not only to take into account the aggravated robbery but also the impact upon which it had on the victim, which in this case, was a serious injury. Ms Ingleton submitted that it was of little importance whether or not the appellant intended to cause that injury because he clearly intended to swing the hammer at the victim.Consideration In my view there is merit in Mr Boucaut’s submission that the judge has sentenced on the basis of the view expressed by him during submissions, namely, that the offending was violent and vicious. The appellant’s contention is that the appellant’s statements that the blow with the hammer was not intentional and were not put to the judge is an important omission. It may have characterised the offending differently in the mind of the judge if submissions had been made to that effect. Counsel should have put that submission to the judge based on his instructions assuming they were consistent with the version given by the appellant to the police. It is also the case in my view that the starting point of 12 years for the head sentence is too high. R v Place is relevant in setting a benchmark for this type of offending, although each case must be considered on its own individual merits. This was a very serious example of the offence of aggravated robbery with very serious consequences for the victim. Nevertheless, given the circumstances of the offending and the manner in which the injury came about, the offence was not such as to warrant a 50% uplift to the higher end of the range discussed in Place. The resultant head sentence of 9 years after discount for the plea of guilty was manifestly excessive. There is no criticism of the proportion which the non-parole period bears to the head sentence. In my view the appeal should be allowed and the appellant re-sentenced.Conclusion I would start with 9 years for the head sentence. Reducing that, for the plea of guilty, in the same proportion as used by the judge brings the head sentence down to 6 years and 9 months. Then further reducing that by one-third, again using the same proportion as the judge, I would fix the non-parole period at 4 years and 6 months. I agree with the orders proposed by Anderson J and with his reasons.NICHOLSON J: I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Anderson J.