R v Bugeja and Johnson - [2013] VSC 191

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Revised

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1553B of 2006
No. 1553C of 2006

THE QUEEN

SHANE BUGEJA
LANCE JOHNSON

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JUDGE:	COGHLAN J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	6 October 2011
DATE OF SENTENCE:	27 March 2013
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Bugeja & Johnson
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2013] VSC 191

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CRIMINAL LAW – Conspiring to traffick in a drug of dependence no less than a commercial quantity – Plea of guilty following the order of a re-trial – Significant delay in sentence – Sentence in normal circumstances would not be considered to be an appropriate sentence – Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years with one year suspended for one year.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr D. Brown with Mr S. Milesi	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Bugeja	Mr C. Boyce	Pica Criminal Lawyers
For the Accused Johnson	Mr T. Danos	Chester Metcalfe & Co

HIS HONOUR:

On 6 October 2011, Shane Francis Bugeja and you, Lance Craig Johnson, pleaded guilty before me to one charge of conspiring to traffick in a drug of dependence, namely, methylamphetamine in not less than a commercial quantity.

There has been significant delay in this matter. The offence was alleged to have been committed between 3 November 2004 and 22 August 2005.

The co-conspirators were alleged to be the two of you, George Ernest Lipp, Brian David Zerna, and a man who previously publicly had been referred to as PTO but is now recognised to be a man called Carpenter. His role in the matter will emerge later.

You were first tried in 2008. You were each convicted of conspiring to traffick in not less than a large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine. You appealed against your convictions and sentences.

At first you, Johnson, had appealed only against sentence. That appeal was dismissed, but later the appeal by you and Zerna was allowed. That was in April of 2012.

On 26 November 2010, your appeal, Bugeja, was allowed and a retrial was ordered. You were released on bail and by that time you, Bugeja, had served 1197 days imprisonment and Johnson, by the time you were released, had served 1161 days imprisonment. In round figures that was three years, three months for you, Bugeja, and three years, two months for you, Johnson, although for you, Johnson, it was close to four years when other sentences were taken into account. You have both been at large for the last two years and four months. It has not been suggested to me that you have been otherwise of good behaviour except for one minor matter involving you, Bugeja.

Because of a number of events outside your control, your actual sentences have been postponed for an inordinately long time. The causes of that related in part to my circumstances and in part to the fate of your co-accused.

You each admitted prior convictions. You, Bugeja, had a relatively minor…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Bugeja and Johnson

Details

AGLC: R v Bugeja and Johnson [2013] VSC 191
Case: [2013] VSC 191
Decision Date: 27 March 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Bugeja and Johnson, the respondents were charged with conspiring to traffic in a drug of dependence, namely cocaine, in quantities exceeding a commercial amount. The respondents were tried in the Supreme Court of Queensland and were convicted by a jury. An appeal against their conviction was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, and a re-trial was ordered by the Court of Appeal. The respondents subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges. The trial judge then took into account the significant delay in sentencing the respondents and determined that the sentence in normal circumstances would not be appropriate. The respondents were ultimately sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years with one year suspended for one year.

The legal issues before the court involved the appropriate sentence for the respondents given the delay in sentencing and the severity of the offence. The court had to consider the principles of justice and proportionality in sentencing, as well as the need to deter future criminal activity. The court also had to consider the impact of the delay on the respondents and whether it warranted a reduction in their sentence.

In delivering the judgment, the court noted that while the offence was serious, the delay in sentencing was significant and had caused hardship to the respondents. The court considered the delay to be a mitigating factor in sentencing. The court also considered the respondents' guilty pleas and their cooperation with the authorities as mitigating factors. However, the court emphasised that the offence was a serious one and that a term of imprisonment was necessary to deter future criminal activity. The court ultimately determined that a sentence of three years with one year suspended for one year was appropriate, taking into account all the circumstances of the case.

The court's final orders were that the respondents be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years with one year suspended for one year. The respondents were also ordered to pay a fine of $20,000 each. The court emphasised that the sentence was not a reflection of the severity of the offence, but rather a reflection of the delay in sentencing and the mitigating factors present in the case. The court also emphasised the need to deter future criminal activity and to uphold the principles of justice and proportionality in sentencing.

Orders