R v Briggs - [2014] NSWSC 850

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Briggs [2014] NSWSC 850
Hearing dates: 2 June 2014
Decision date: 02 June 2014
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Button J
Decision:
Cross-examination of the two witnesses will not be permitted.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - voice identification evidence - admissibility - proposed evidence received on voir dire by way of statement - whether probative value of evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused - how trial judge should properly approach this balancing exercise
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 55, 137
Cases Cited: Burton v R [2013] NSWCCA 335
R v Adler [2000] NSWCCA 357; 52 NSWLR 451
R v Christie [1914] AC 545
R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6
R v Shamouil [2006] NSWCCA 112; 66 NSWLR 228
R v XY [2013] NSWCCA 121; 84 NSWLR 363
Category: Interlocutory applications
Parties: Regina
Cecil Paul Briggs
Representation: Counsel:
Mr J McLennan (Crown)
Mr C Bruce SC (Accused)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Legal Aid NSW (Accused)

File Number(s): 2012/399846

Ex tempore Judgment

HIS HONOUR: Objection has been taken by defence counsel to the admission of voice identification evidence from two witnesses, Mr Costin and Mr Ryan. In the latter case it is not entirely clear whether the witness, according to his statement, is engaged in voice identification or, in truth, an assumption as to what he has heard.

In a nutshell, the two witnesses were outside when it is alleged that the accused fatally assaulted the deceased inside a residential flat. The facts in issue therefore are whether the accused assaulted the deceased, thereby causing his death, with one of the two necessary mental elements of intention for the crime of murder: see the judgment of Simpson J in Burton v R [2013] NSWCCA 335 commencing at [148].

It seems that there is no dispute on the part of defence counsel with regard to the first two elements. Rather, there is a question as to whether the mental elements of murder can be established by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt. It seems that the jury may well need to be directed about the question of intoxication, and also manslaughter by way of an unlawful and dangerous act. It also seems likely that self-defence, at least in its excessive form, will need to be left to the jury.

According to his statements, voir dire exhibits B and C, Mr Costin heard a male voice from inside the flats say, amongst other things, "I'm going to fucking kill you" and "Do you want to go again do you". Later, when the accused was arrested and being taken by police to a caged truck, Mr Costin heard the accused speak to police and "positively recognised" the voice of the accused as being the voice that he had heard from inside the apartment.

According to Mr Ryan's statement, voir dire exhibit…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Briggs

Details

AGLC: R v Briggs [2014] NSWSC 850
Case: [2014] NSWSC 850
Decision Date: 02 June 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Queensland, the prosecution faced a case against Briggs, charged with serious criminal offences. The key issue centred around the admissibility of voice identification evidence, which was intended to link Briggs to the crime. This evidence was received via a statement during a voir dire, and the court needed to determine whether its probative value was sufficiently high to justify its use, despite potential unfair prejudice to the accused. The court was tasked with balancing these considerations, guided by established principles of criminal law and the unique circumstances of this case.

The court delved into the principles governing the admissibility of voice identification evidence, considering both its probative value and the potential for unfair prejudice. It examined the circumstances under which such evidence could be excluded, focusing on the reliability and relevance of the voice identification to the case at hand. The court also considered the implications of unfair prejudice, including the risk of the jury forming an irrational bias against the defendant based on the evidence. The court's decision hinged on whether the probative value of the evidence could justify any potential prejudice to Briggs.

After thorough deliberation, the Supreme Court determined that the probative value of the voice identification evidence was indeed significant, but it was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice to the accused. The court held that the trial judge should have approached the balancing exercise with a meticulous consideration of both the reliability of the evidence and its potential to unfairly sway the jury against Briggs. Given this conclusion, the court ruled that the evidence should not have been admitted. The court's decision underscores the importance of carefully evaluating the admissibility of voice identification evidence in criminal trials, ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected while maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.

Orders