R v Bridgland - [2019] SADC 162

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v BRIDGLAND
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2019] SADC 162
Reasons for the Verdicts of His Honour Judge Tilmouth
1 November 2019
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST PEACE AND PUBLIC ORDER - OFFENSIVE WEAPONS - FIREARMS
The accused was in the joint possession with his father of a Class H Evelox air pistol which he believed to be a ball bearing gun and that it was not a firearm.
Held: This is insufficient knowledge to sustain a charge of possessing a firearm thus entitling him to an acquittal.
Firearms Act 2015 (SA) s 4, s 5, s 5(14), s 6(2)(d), s 9(1), s 9(7)(c), s 52(9); Firearms Regulations 2017 (SA) reg 4, cl 2(a) Schedule 2; Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570; R v Jenner (2000) 110 A Crim R 512; R v Copeland (1997) 194 LSJS 1; R v Schullz (2016) 126 SASR 476; Pryor v The Queen [1969] 43 ALJR 388; R v Reeves [1992] 29 NSWLR 109; R v Robinson and Tiplady (1985) 123 LSJS 37, 38; Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; King v The Queen (2003) 215 CLR 150; R v WG (2010) 199 A Crim R 218; R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207; R v Gibb & McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155; Moores v Burke (1919) 26 CLR 265; R v GNN (2000) 78 SASR 293; R v Pham & Tran (2005) 187 A Crim R 21; R v Sandery [2013] SADC 38; Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; R v Joyce [2014] SADC 125; R v Khan (No 2) [2014] SADC 207; R v Hunt & Becirovic [2016] SADC 22; Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; R v Frangos (1979) 21 SASR 331; Rehaif v United States 588 VS1 (2019); Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32, referred to.
He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; R v Marafioti (2014) 118 SASR 511, applied.
R v Fuller & Zazzaro [2012] SASCFC 101, not followed.

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - TRAFFICKING
The accused was admittedly in possession of 91.75 g of crystalline substances containing 76 per cent pure methylamphetamine. He claimed it was for his own use.
Held: Given the quantity, purity and value of the drug, in conjunction with $7,000 in cash made up entirely of $50 notes, the tight security of the premises, the wholly implausible nature of the explanation given by the accused as to how he acquired the cash and a further $6,000 to purchase the methylamphetamine together with the other surrounding circumstances, prove he was in possession with the intention to sell. A verdict of guilty is entered on count 2.
Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32(3), s 32(5); Controlled Substances (Controlled Drugs, Precursors and Plants) Regulations 2014 (SA) Schedule I; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34P(2)(a), s34Q, s 34R; R v Anderson (1992) 60 SASR 90; R v O'Connor [2017] NSWCCQA 300; Abbott v Western Australia (2005) 162 A Crim R 186; R v Zampogna (2003) 85 SASR 56; KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; R v Bunting (No 2) (2005) 92 SASC 241, referred to.

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES - RECEIVING AND POSSESSION OF PROPERTY STOLEN OR REASONABLY SUSPECTED OF BEING STOLEN OR UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED - POSSESSION OF PROPERTY STOLEN OR SUSPECTED TO BE STOLEN OR UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED - SUSPECTED OR REASONABLY SUSPECTED OR SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN STOLEN OR UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED - REASONABLENESS OF SUSPICION
Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 41(1) and (2), referred to.
Tepper v Kelly (1988) 47 SASR 271, applied.
R v Phong Hoang Nguyen (2015) 117 SASR 432, considered.

R v BRIDGLAND
[2019] SADC 162
Contents
The charges - overview
The formal charges
Count 1 – Firearms offence
Count 2 – Trafficking in methylamphetamine
Count 3 – Unlawful possession
Additional items of evidence in the prosecution case
The Defence case
The charges - analysis
Count 1 – Aggravated possession of a firearm without a licence
Count 2 – Trafficking in methylamphetamine
Count 3 – Unlawful possession of $7,815 in cash
Conclusion and Verdicts
The charges - overview

Matthew Bridgland is before the court on trial by judge alone, charged with an aggravated offence of possessing a firearm without a licence, trafficking in the controlled drug methylamphetamine and the unlawful possession of cash. He entered pleas of not guilty on 26 August 2019. Much earlier he made the election to be tried by a judge, which was granted by another judge of the court.
The trial proceeded on 26 and 27 August 2019 when it was adjourned due to the unavailability of a prosecution witness. It resumed on 8, 9, 11 and 14 October 2019, when judgment was reserved.
Police executed a search pursuant to a warrant issued under s 52(9) of the Firearms Act 2015 (SA) authorising the search of premises at Davoren Park. On arrival having identified themselves as police officers, they were unable to gain entry, as the front door was concealed behind a roller-door shutter. The police next attempted to gain entry by climbing the roller-door only to find the front door itself was blocked from the inside. A pathway led them to the rear yard where entry was gained into the home through a rear door. Closed circuit television cameras were seen pointing towards the front driveway and a second to the rear of the property overlooking the backyard. Inside the house Mr Bridgland’s father was seen in one bedroom of the property, whereas the accused and his son were on a bed in a second bedroom. The accused’s partner arrived at the property sometime after police gained entry.
The formal charges
Count 1 – Firearms offence
The aggravated charge of possessing a firearm without a licence is brought under s 9(1) of the Firearms Act. The firearm in question was seized by police at the Davoren Park address occupied by the accused on 22 January 2018. This firearm is proven by ballistics evidence to be a Class H Evelox air pistol. This was found by Detective Sergeant White on a crate in the backyard, in a tool bag left on the top of shelving. The location and the pistol itself can be seen in the photographs.[1] The firearm was forensically examined, from which a DNA profile was recovered, which provided ‘extremely strong support’ for the proposition that the accused contributed to the DNA sample located on it.[2]
[1] Exhibit P3, Nos 1-6.
[2] T117.16-.38.
Count 2 – Trafficking in methylamphetamine
The second count of trafficking in the controlled drug amphetamine, is brought pursuant to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA). This was found underneath a bed in the bedroom occupied by Mr Bridgland when police entered. It was placed in an Uncle Toby’s cereal box within a green and black backpack. Crystalline substance found in a plastic bag within the box weighed 86.5 g.[3] In addition, two small plastic containers found in the same backpack, contained crystalline material weighing exactly 2.08 g each, with 1.40 g and 1.65 g of pure methylamphetamine respectively.[4] A third plastic container from the backpack held crystals weighing 1.09 g, containing methylamphetamine.[5] The total weight from these seizures is 91.75 g, with a purity of 76 per cent.[6] The prosecution case is that this quantity of methylamphetamine was possessed by Mr Bridgland for the purposes of sale.
[3]    This can be seen in photograph 1 of 13 of Exhibit P5 and photograph 14 of Exhibit P3.
[4]    These containers can be seen in photographs 16 and 17 respectively of Exhibit P5.
[5]    This can be seen in photographs 18 and 20 of Exhibit P5.
[6]    Exhibit P17, T4.4-.5, T203.22-.28, Exhibit P17 agreed fact 5h.
Count 3 – Unlawful possession
Cash totalling $7,815, $7,000 of which was made up in $50 notes was also found in the backpack. A second bundle of cash from a wallet also found within the backpack totalled $815, made up by a mixture of $100, $20, $10 and $5 notes.[7] The wallet also held Mr Bridgland’s expired driver’s licence. All this cash is the subject of count 3, the charge of unlawful possession contrary to s 41 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA). Sections 41(1) and (2) thereof provide:
41—Unlawful possession of personal property
(1)     A person who has possession of personal property which, either at the time of possession or at any subsequent time before the making of a complaint under this section in respect of the possession, is reasonably suspected of having been stolen or obtained by unlawful means, is guilty of an offence.
…
(2)     It is a defence to a charge for an offence against this section to prove that the defendant obtained possession of the property honestly.
[7]    This wallet and the cash within can be seen in photographs 2 and 3 of Exhibit P3.
Additional items of evidence in the prosecution case
Additional seizures included a mobile telephone, two tablets one red and one green, along with 15 boxes of Sudafed (a prescription drug) and one blister pack of Telfast, also seized from the same backpack. The 15 Sudafed boxes (containing pseudoephedrine) held 90 tablets, that is six in each box, obtained by prescription in the name of Mr Bridgland’s father. The boxes could be expected to contain around 200 tablets if each blister pack was completely full.[8] A search of a chest of drawers in Mr Bridgland’s bedroom produced a set of knuckle dusters,[9] and what prosecution counsel described as ‘a spud or potato gun’.[10] A relatively large number of plastic resealable bags were found in various places around the house.[11]
[8] Exhibit P5, photo 21.
[9] Exhibit P5, photo 22.
[10] T7.5-6, Exhibit P5, photo 23.
[11] Exhibit P3, photos 17 & 18, Exhibit P6, photo 25.
The Defence case
Mr Bridgland elected to give evidence in his own defence. He called no other evidence, although he tendered a receipt,[12] and of course he was a party to a statement of agreed facts.[13] Amongst other things, by these agreed facts it is admitted that he was a resident of the property at Melbury Street Davoren Park on 22 January 2018 was endorsed with this as his address at the date of issue on 27 January 2012. It expired on 18 March 2013.[14]
[12] Exhibit D18.
[13] Exhibit P17, Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 34.
[14] Exhibit P17, Agreed Fact 15.
The evidence of Mr Bridgland is to be assessed in the same manner as with any other witness: Brown v The King,[15] and is not to be discounted simply because he is an accused person: R v Jenner,[16] R v Copeland.[17] In the event of the rejection of Mr Bridgland’s evidence on any count, it remains necessary for the court to consider whether the charge or charges are nevertheless proven beyond reasonable doubt: R v Schullz.[18]
[15] (1913) 17 CLR 570, 589.
[16] (2000) 110 A Crim R 512, [31].
[17] (1997) 194 LSJS 1, 7.
[18] (2016) 126 SASR 476, [35].
As an accused person, Mr Bridgland is not required to prove his innocence, nor is he required to give or call any other evidence in the defence case Pryor v The Queen.[19] He comes before the criminal court with a presumption of innocence in his favour, that is to say he is presumed to be innocent unless and until a charge or charges are proven to the requisite degree: R v Reeves.[20] He is entitled to be given such credit as is appropriate for having taken this course and making his defence by way of evidence on oath: R v Robinson & Tiplady.[21]
[19] [1969] 43 ALJR 388, 389.
[20] [1992] 29 NSWLR 109, 117.
[21] (1985) 123 LSJS 37, 38.
The prosecution bears the onus of proof in respect of each charge beyond reasonable doubt, statutory exception apart: Woolmington v DPP.[22] Accordingly Mr Bridgland is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt that emerges on the evidence in respect of each count: King v The Queen.[23]This is the highest standard of proof known to the criminal law, in contrast to proof on the balance of probabilities. Accordingly it is insufficient to establish guilt by showing an offence charged might have been committed, or even if it is more likely than not that it was committed: R v WG.[24]
[22] [1935] AC 462, 481.
[23] (2003) 215 CLR 150 [18].
[24] (2010) 199 A Crim R 218, [10].
As a general principle, each offence must be separately considered according to the evidence admissible in respect of each offence: R v Schlaefer,[25] and R v Gibb & McKenzie.[26] This topic is referred to again later, as and when it arises.
The charges - analysis
[25] (1984} 37 SASR 207, 210.
[26] [1983] 2 VR 155, 163-164.
Count 1 – Aggravated possession of a firearm without a licence
It is an agreed fact that Mr Bridgland held no licence authorising him to possess or own the Class H Evelox air pistol. It is equally accepted that the lessee of the Davoren Park property is his father. The evidence of Mr Bridgland was that he had resided at the property earlier in 2012 on a rent-free basis, and that he lived there a second time from mid-January 2017, on the same basis.[27] As of January 2018 his partner Ms Christiansen also resided there as did his 11 year old son Tristan and occasionally his two daughters when they visited.[28] In between time he lived at another address in Davoren Park with a former girlfriend.
[27] T140.11-.18.
[28] T141.4 -.23.
Mr Bridgland frankly admitted to having seen the firearm about ‘6 months previous’ when it was shown to him by his father. He said his father asked if he wanted it, which he did not.[29] At this time he admitted to handling the gun, which may serve to explain why the DNA profile to which Mr Bridgland was a contributor, was found on an unspecified place on the weapon with a statistical ratio of greater than 100 billion times more likely to be the profile of Mr Bridgland than somebody else.[30] He denied having used it and understood that it was a ‘BB, that is all I know it as’, a ‘BB’ being on his understanding a ball bearing type weapon.[31] He denied otherwise handling the firearm at any other time.[32]
[29] T145.16-.26.
[30] T117.10-.15.
[31] T145.27-.34.
[32] T147.24-.29.
Ballistics evidence before the court reveals this pistol was a .177 calibre steel ball bearing pistol fired by means of a Co²cylinder fitted to the butt and that it was 216 mm in length. It was fitted with an effective trigger guard and safety mechanism. In the expert opinion of Brevet Sergeant Shedden, these attributes brought it within the definition of a firearm in s 4 of the Firearms Act ‘as it is designated to fire a projectile’ and because ‘it is an actual firearm it is therefore excluded from the definition of an imitation firearm’ under Regulation 4 of the Firearms Regulations 2017 (SA).[33] A ‘handgun’ is defined by s 5 of the Firearms Act to mean:
… a firearm with a barrel length of less than 400 mm that is designed or adopted for aiming and firing from the hand and is reasonably capable of being carried concealed about the person.
[33] Affidavit of Brevet Sergeant Shedden – 22 January 2018 at pp 5-7.
Brevet Sergeant Shedden considered the firearm to be in good functioning condition, although it was not subject to safety tests or test firing. No cylinders of the kind needed to fire the weapon or ball bearings of the kind designed for that purpose were found or seized by police, although it contained an ‘uncharged’ or empty cannister, as seen in photograph 6 of Exhibit P3.[34]
[34] Affidavit of Brevet Sergeant Shedden – 24 February 2018, para 20.
It might be noted that Brevet Sergeant Shedden also examined the unknown brand single shot potato pistol designed to fire potato pellets by means of a spring powered striker, found in a wardrobe in the room occupied by Mr Bridgland and his son at the time the police entered the premises. He considered it to be in good working order. His opinion was however that it was not a firearm under the Firearms Act as it did not ‘fire shot or projectile by means of burning propellant or compression air or gas’, and he could not exclude the fact that it was a toy or a novelty item’.[35] The agreed fact 10 in Exhibit P17 is to the effect that this gun could not be adapted to function as a firearm.
[35] Addendum statement of Brevet Sergeant Shedden – 12 October 2019 paras 8 and 9.
The evidence of Mr Bridgland to the effect that this belonged to his son and was bought by him from the supermarket for $4.95, is consistent with these conclusions.[36] The possession of this item is therefore of no probative value to the firearms charge, or the remaining two counts for that matter, so it is excluded from further consideration.
[36] T178.28-.33, T157.38-158.2, T178.28-.30.
The fact that Mr Bridgland was aware of the Evelox pistol and where it was stored suggests he was in joint possession of it in conjunction with his father, a conclusion strengthened by the offer by his father to give it to him. In that event he is in the eyes of the law in the possession of it, albeit jointly with his father: Moores v Burke.[37] Of course mere knowledge of the presence of the weapon is of itself insufficient to establish the element of possession. In this instance the evidence is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the intention to exercise physical control over the pistol to the exclusion of all others in conjunction with his father: R v GNN,[38] R v Pham & Tran.[39] Mr Bridgland is in any case effectively deemed to be in possession by virtue of his admitted status as an occupier of the premises by virtue of s 6(2)(d) of the Firearms Act: R v Sandery.[40]
[37] (1919) 26 CLR 265, 271.
[38] (2000) 78 SASR 293, [20].
[39] (2005) 187 A Crim R 21, [45].
[40] [2013] SADC 38, [18].
Even so there remains an outstanding question as to the precise degree of knowledge required. When police entered the subject premises they were voluntarily directed to the handgun by Mr Bridgland. After cautioning him, Brevet Sergeant Renko asked ‘if there was anything he wished to declare, whether it was firearms, drugs, or large sums of money’.[41] According to Renko, Mr Bridgland declared a ‘BB gun’ as he pointed from a position seated in the kitchen to the backyard and ‘told us it was out the back … on a back shelf’.[42] Seeing Mr Bridgland indicating in that direction Detective Senior Sergeant White walked over to the shelving unit where he found the firearm, in one piece in the bag of tools on the shelving.[43] During the course of a video recorded ‘walk through’ of the premises that morning, Mr Bridgland is recorded as stating ‘it’s not a firearm, it’s a BB’.[44] He was consistent about this during the course of his evidence by reasserting that he was unaware it was a firearm, still less a Class H firearm.[45]
[41] T63.28-.29.
[42] T63.30-64.6.
[43] T20.26-.3.
[44] MFI P2A, 114, Exhibit P2.
[45] T146.2-.4.
In light of the objective circumstances, the spontaneous manner in which Mr Bridgland indicated knowing of the firearm and where it was stowed, whilst believing it was not a firearm means there is more than a reasonable doubt that he knew otherwise.
In general there is a presumption at common law that an accused person can only be held guilty of a grave criminal offence upon proof of full criminal intent or knowledge of the wrongfulness of the charged act, together with the knowledge of the existence of and nature of the item in question: He Kaw Teh v The Queen.[46] As Lord Reid observed in Sweet v Parsley:[47]
… whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, we must read in words appropriate to require mens rea.
[46] (1985) 157 CLR 523, 589.
[47] [1970] AC 132, 148.
Although the provisions of s 6(2)(d) of the Firearms Act serves to deem Mr Bridgland to be in possession as an occupier of the property, it is silent as to knowledge. There is no ‘sufficient indication of a contrary intention’ to be found in the 2015 Firearms Act: He Kaw Teh v The Queen,[48]
[48] (1985) 157 CLR 523, 539.

In R v Fuller & Zazzaro,[49] it was held that the provisions of s 5(14) of the Firearms Act 1977 (SA) did not require an accused to have knowledge that the object was a firearm. A differently constituted court of Criminal Appeal in R v Marafioti,[50] considered the same presumptive provisions were broadly consistent with the common law concept of possession. As seen above, the common law concept of possession requires knowledge. The decision in R v Fuller & Zazzaro was not referenced in Marafioti. Subsequently in R v Joyce,[51] Judge Lovell applied Marafioti to hold that simple awareness of the existence and place of a weapon does not amount to possession and accordingly that knowledge that it was a firearm was required. For similar reasons in R v Khan (No 2),[52] and in R v Hunt & Becirovic,[53] I held that knowledge that the item possessed was a firearm is required. As the authorities presently stand R v Marafioti remains binding on this count.
[49] [2012] SASCFC 101, [72]-[73].
[50] (2014) 118 SASR 511, [23]-[24].
[51] [2014] SADC 125, as his Honour then was.
[52] [2014] SADC 207, [89]-[93], [101]-[103].
[53] [2016] SADC 22, [56]-[59].
This approach is consistent with that taken in controlled substances and drugs importation cases, in which the prosecution is required to prove knowledge that the goods in question are controlled or narcotic goods: Kural v The Queen,[54] R v Frangos.[55] On this basis and in the present state of the authorities, Mr Bridgland is entitled to an acquittal on count 1 because it is not proven he knew the handgun was a firearm. It would follow from this analysis that it is unnecessary for the prosecution to prove an accused knew that the firearm was of a particular class or category of firearm, a question that does not directly arise for resolution in this instance: contrast Rehaif v United States.[56]
[54] (1987) 162 CLR 502, 504-505.
[55] (1979) 21 SASR 331, 337.
[56] 588 US 1 (2019).
Despite this conclusion, it is as well to deal with the alleged circumstance of aggravation. Count 1 of the Information before the court is endorsed:
It is further alleged that Matthew Tristan David Bridgland committed the offence in connection with, or at the same time as, an act or omission that would, if proved, constitute a prescribed offence against the Controlled Substances Act 1984.
This allegation stems from s 9(7)(c) of the Firearms Act 2015 which provides:
9—Possession and use of firearms
(7)An offence under this section is an aggravated offence if it has been proved that—
…
(c) the offender committed the offence in connection with, or at the same time as, an act or omission that would, if proved, constitute a prescribed offence against the Controlled Substances Act 1984.
Clause 2(a) of Schedule 2 to the Firearms Regulations 2017 (SA) prescribes for the purpose of s 9(7)(c) of the Firearms Act, an offence of trafficking under s 32 of the Controlled Substances Act. For reasons to become apparent, when the charge of trafficking laid on count 2 is considered, the element of aggravation on count 1 is otherwise duly proven.
Count 2 – Trafficking in methylamphetamine
It is to be recalled that in all 91.75 g of crystalline substances located in the backpack have an agreed purity of 76 per cent methylamphetamine. Most was stored in a single plastic bag in the Uncle Toby’s box.
Mr Bridgland frankly admitted during the course of his evidence-in-chief that the crystalline material containing methylamphetamine found in the Uncle Toby's yoghurt box within the backpack under the bed was his.[57] He told the court he placed it there a week or two beforehand, claiming he was a ‘heavy drug user at the time’ consuming on a daily basis, which he measured in teaspoon quantities.[58] He claimed to have purchased the drugs from an associate of a mate in the nearby suburb of Elizabeth Downs for $6,000.[59] He told the court the money for the purchase came from the sale of a ‘CNC’ machine to a Mr Tran Nguyen for $13,400 in cash.[60] He tendered a photocopy of what purported to be a receipt for this transaction on 8 January 2018.[61]
[57] T149.18-.22.
[58] T149.23-150.17.
[59] T150.30-151.13.
[60] T152.19-153.35.
[61] Exhibit D18.
Mr Bridgland asserted the two smaller portions of methylamphetamines were his ‘daily dose’ measured in half a teaspoon quantities, placed there the night before, in the containers so that he could mix them with water.[62] He added that by buying such a large quantity of methylamphetamine he ‘could get ‘em cheap so I bought a heap, I had the money’.[63] He added that his partner also consumed methylamphetamine ‘probably a teaspoon a day’, but not much more was otherwise said about her or that topic.[64]
[62] T153.33-154.3, T155.2-.19.
[63] T163.14-.17.
[64] T165.35-166.2.
Mr Bridgland’s account of how he came by the cash is a convoluted one. It began with an explanation that it was the proceeds of the sale of the CNC machine inherited from his mother.[65] He described this as ‘a computer controlled cutting for metal’ in which he had no expertise.[66] He gave an account of storing it for some 18 months with no particular desire to do anything with it, storing it outside at the Davoren Park property.
[65] T151.21-152.18.
[66] T152.8-.18.
His evidence as to the circumstances giving rise to the sale to Mr Nguyen was this:[67]
[67] T152.19-153.8.
QYou mentioned something about selling it. Do you recall when it was that you sold this machine and how you sold it.
A.I sold it on the 8th January.
Q.Where did you sell it.
A.To a man name Tron Nguyen.
Q.Where did that sale take place.
A.At 14 Melbury Street, Davoren Park.
Q.Before that time had you met this man.
A.Previously that day.
Q.That day where did you meet him.
A.At Paramount Browns.
Q.Why had you been at Paramount Browns.
A.I was with my old man, my dad.
Q.Did you have a discussion or something with Mr Nguyen or did you take that CNC machine there.
A.I was looking at lathes and mills and I said 'I've got something that you might be interested in.
Q.How much did he pay for it.
A.$13,400.
Q.Did that transaction take place at the premises you were living in at that time.
A.That is correct, yes.
Q.Did you obtain a receipt from him in respect of that.
A.I did.
Q.Did you cause that receipt to be drawn or did he do that.
A.I did that.
It was at this point that the putative receipt of 8 January 2018 was adduced and admitted as Exhibit D19. Mr Bridgland stated that it was completed in his own handwriting.[68] There is no objective evidence supporting or refuting the provenance of this Exhibit. It was from this sale that Mr Bridgland claims to have received $13,400, from which he bought the methylamphetamine for $6,000. His evidence was that the balance of $7,000 in fifty dollar notes was change from that transaction and that the $815 cash found in his wallet was withdrawn from his bank account against his disability pension.[69] He added that he held $21,000 in a bank account as of 22 January 2018.[70] He added that the pension was paid into his State Bank Elizabeth Branch and that this amount of cash was withdrawn over the counter.[71] No primary banking records were adduced to support any of this bank related evidence.
[68] T 153.9-154.2
[69] T 163.27-29, T171.35-172.1.
[70] T 154.11-31
[71] T 171.26-172.1
Mr Bridgland’s evidence continued that as the conversation at Paramount Brown’s developed, it progressed to the point that he nominated an initial price of $15,000, but ultimately he sold the machine for $13,400, which was collected by Mr Nguyen from the Davoren Park property and taken away in a trailer, weighing something in the order of 500 kg.[72]
[72] T 169.1-.30.
He was questioned about this claim a little later:[73]
[73] T 170.35-171.14.
HIS HONOUR
Q.How did you arrive at the price.
A.Bargained a bit back and forth.
Q.I understand that but where did your original bargaining position come from.
A.I told him 15 and he didn't want to pay 15.
Q.Did you consider maybe advertising it on the internet.
A.I had no interest of selling it at that stage.
XXN
Q.But suddenly while browsing the aisles of Paramount Browns you suddenly decided to sell your CNC machine.
A.Yes.
Q.What was it at that point in time that you wanted to sell the machine for.
A.Drug addiction.
Q.You had never thought about tapping into your $21,000 before selling the CNC machine.
A.I have.
The account of these event by Mr Bridgland does not ring true. No explanation was forthcoming as to why or how his mother had such a machine in the first place. There is no explanation why he left it stand for so long as 18 months without having any need for it, or for leaving such a valuable piece of machinery in the front yard, or how Mr Nguyen was supposed to have loaded it into a trailer by himself. There was no attempt to sell it beforehand or to advertise it for sale by any other means.[74]
[74] T171.6-.11, T172.20-.25.
Obtaining a receipt on a napkin at Paramount Browns in the circumstances is suspicious.[75] Mr Bridgland claimed to have organised a friend of his father to ring Mr Nguyen in order to obtain the photocopy tendered to the court.[76] Just why he did not obtain the original is unexplained. Nor was the fact that Mr Nguyen could not be readily contacted, or subpoenaed to support the claimed sale, or to produce or confirm the validity of the receipt.[77] Of course there is no obligation on him to call any such evidence, but the point remains that none of this evidence is supported.
[75] T173.8-.23.
[76] T173.34-.38.
[77] T173.25-174.7.
This account of the events is self-evidently an unbelievable one. It is rejected as highly improbable and as unsupported in any respect.
As to the sum of $7,000 in $50 notes found in seven bundles of twenty notes, no explanation was forthcoming why Mr Nguyen gave him the cash in that form, or why it was bundled in that manner. This was simply an all too convenient device in an attempt to account for the expert evidence of Detective Nelson that the base level price for a point (0.1 g) was $50, that the preferred method of street dealers and traders were for payments in cash and that the preferred denomination is predominantly in the ‘vast majority of cases $50 notes’.[78] He explained this was because ‘it is easier to be put back into the economy by the actual trafficker themselves’ and ‘easily put back in for them to undertake normal purchases, so food and the like’.[79] Detective Nelson further explained that in his experiences ‘the two go together … where we have found drugs we found cash nearby’.[80]
[78] T88.10-.12.
[79] T88.13-.31.
[80] T88.20-.23.
Evidence of this kind is conventionally admitted in the criminal court as evidence by police based on accumulative experience as to the character, indicia and habits of drug dealing, including pricing, packaging and supplying drugs: R v Anderson,[81] and R v O’Connor.[82] As such, limited to permissible uses in these ways, this evidence passes the threshold test of probative value substantially outweighing prejudicial effect, as required by s 34P(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). Similarly the evidence of the $7,000 in cash bundled in the way it was and secreted as it was, is equally evidence admissible on the trafficking count.
[81] (1992) 60 SASR 90, 95-97.
[82] [2017] NSWCCA 300, [12]-[13], [26]-[27].
Furthermore, the purchase price for this quantity of methylamphetamine was very likely to be considerably greater when one considers the evidence of Detective Nelson that 28 g (or an ounce) of methylamphetamine sold at this time at between $3,000 and $4,500. On this basis 91.75 g of 76 per cent pure methylamphetamine was more than likely more valuable than a mere $6,000.
It follows from the above analysis that Mr Bridgland is proven to be in possession of the methylamphetamine knowing what it was. As to the element of trafficking, the combined circumstances, including the manner of secretion, the extraordinarily tight security arrangements, the number of unused plastic bags about the place for no other apparent purpose, the $7,000 cash bundled in the way it was, the three small quantities packaged in what is consistent with more than street level or ‘point’ quantities (two of which coincidentally happened to be exactly 2.08 g), in combination leaves no reasonable doubt that he intended to sell it. Although there was not present several of the other usual attributes of drug dealing, such as ‘tick lists’, mobile phone messages suggestive of dealing and that small calibrated scales were not present, the combined evidence is sufficient to leave no reasonable doubt that Mr Bridgland was trafficking at a levels above street dealing.
The suggestion that he purchased so much in order to obtain a reasonable price, of itself is understandable at face value, but it is illogical once it is accepted that it was entirely for self-use (either alone) or with his partner, because he then unnecessarily libelled himself to conviction for an offence of a much more serious nature than simple possession of small quantities. Possessing such a large and valuable quantity leaves no reasonable possibility that it was solely for his own consumption, or himself and his partner for that matter. Count 2 is therefore proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to engage s 32(5) of the Controlled Substances Act. This provides:
(5)If, in any proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), (2), (2a) or (3) it is proved that the defendant had possession of a trafficable quantity of a controlled drug, it is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary—
(a) in a case where it is alleged that the defendant was taking part in the process of sale of the drug, that the defendant—
(i)was acting for the purpose of sale of the drug; and
(ii)had the relevant belief concerning the sale of the drug necessary to constitute the offence, or
(b) in any other case—that the defendant had the relevant intention concerning the sale of the drug necessary to constitute the offence.
It is admitted that Mr Bridgland had in his possession more than the trafficable quantity of the controlled drug methylamphetamine. Schedule I to the Controlled Substances (Controlled Drugs, Precursors and Plants) Regulations 2014 states 2 g (mixed) is prescribed as a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine. This means Mr Bridgland is ‘deemed’ to have the intention of selling it, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Section 32(5) of the Controlled Substances Act required him to prove it was more likely than not that he did not intend to sell the methylamphetamine: Abbott v Western Australia,[83] R v Zampogna.[84]
[83] (2005) 152 A Crim R 186, [52].
[84] (2003) 85 SASR 56, [42]-[44].
For the reasons explained above, Mr Bridgland has singularly failed to demonstrate even the reasonable possibility that he did not intend to sell the drugs. Alternatively, he clearly fails to prove on balance that he did not hold such an intention.
In reaching this conclusion the second tranche of $815 in cash is ignored, as there is a reasonable possibility that it was not necessarily the proceeds of drugs sales, given the mixed and small denominations of the notes. Mr Bridgland is given the benefit of the doubt about that, even though his evidence of how he acquired it makes no sense and is rather fanciful. The same applies to a green and red tablet and a blister pack of Telfast found in the backpack. Likewise evidence of CCTV monitoring of the premises is consistent with Mr Bridgland senior’s hoarding business which might have been subject to theft, is excluded as irrelevant to this charge. The suggestion that the knuckle dusters in the top drawer of the bedroom cupboard occupied by Mr Bridgland at the time belonged to his 11 year old son, is ridiculous in the extreme. To allow or instruct a child of that age to have the use of a knuckle duster is totally irresponsible and outrageous. Furthermore it contained finger holds for adult sized fingers, strongly suggesting they are likely to be on hand for use in protection of drugs kept nearby if called upon.
Finally, 15 boxes holding 19 tablets of Sudafed medication in the name of Mr Bridgland senior found in the accused’s backpack, were proffered by the prosecution through the evidence of Detective Nelson, because they contained the precursor pseudoephedrine used in the manufacture of methylamphetamine and as used in the drug underworld as a marketable commodity ‘as good as cash’.[85] Mr Bridgland admitted as much by stating that he ‘stole the medication from his father to swap them for drugs’.[86] There is little doubt some boxes were obtained by what was described as ‘box shopping’ from Chemist to Chemist, because of proximity in point of time of the prescription dates, especially during October and December 2017.[87] This evidence may be accepted, however it is more probative of ‘a lab somewhere or a supplier who has an interest in it’, as Detective Nelson put it.[88]
[85] T88.32-89.22.
[86] T157.1-.14.
[87] Exhibit P7.
[88] T88.32-90.6.
As such this evidence is scarcely probative of trafficking even though it might be of manufacture. Viewed in that way, this evidence contains a prejudicial effect that outweighs the probative value and is therefore inadmissible on the trafficking charge under s 34P(2)(a) of the Evidence Act. Used for the stated purpose ensures due compliance with s 34Q and s 34R of the Evidence Act. As to the latter section, the above evidence which is admitted, is not used in any way to suggest Mr Bridgland is the kind of person to have trafficked in drugs or that he is a person of bad character: KRM v The Queen,[89] R v Bunting (No 2).[90]
[89] (2001) 206 CLR 221, [40].
[90] (2005) 92 SASC 241, [16].
Count 3 – Unlawful possession of $7,815 in cash
The charge here requires proof that the cash contained in two separate places in the backpack was unlawfully obtained. A charge of unlawful possession contrary to s 44(1) of the Summary Offences Act first requires proof of the possession of the $7,815. So much was admitted by Mr Bridgland. The second element of the offence is proof of the reasonable suspicion that it was stolen: Tepper v Kelly.[91] The test of reasonable suspicion is not couched in terms of whether a reasonable man could be suspicious in light of the proven circumstances, but rather whether the person in question could and did entertain that suspicion in the circumstances known to that person at the relevant time: Tepper v Kelly.[92]
[91] (1987) 45 SASR 340, 343-344.
[92] (1988) 47 SASR 271, 274-276, 277-279.
On this topic Constable Morris as designated ‘searching officer’, gave evidence of finding the Uncle Toby’s box containing a sandwich bag suspected of containing methylamphetamine, as well as other items before coming across the seven bundles of $50 notes and the $815 comprising three $5 notes, 12 $10 notes, 14 $20 notes and 4 $100 notes in the black wallet within the backpack under the bed.[93] As noted earlier the backpack was under the bed directly below where Mr Bridgland sat.[94]
[93] T34.17-37.27.
[94] T38.21-.28.
With respect to the cash, Morris spoke of forming the belief that ‘the way it was bundled and locating it with what I believed to be the drugs that it was the proceeds of drug dealing, drug trafficking’.[95] This evidence clearly more than satisfies the ‘suspicion test’ - defence counsel did not suggest or cross-examine to the contrary. Such a belief is in fact a higher state of affairs than a mere suspicion, as explained in R v Phong Hoang Nguyen:[96]
A suspicion that a fact exists is less certain than a belief in the existence of that fact. A belief is held on information which is accepted as reliable and implies a reasonable satisfaction that the fact is at least more likely to be true than any other alternative fact or facts. On the other hand, a suspicion that a fact exists, in the context of an investigation of the truth of that fact, is a working hypothesis for which there is some supporting material. There must be a rational connection between the supporting material and the suspicion. Mere curiosity, speculation or “idle wondering” about the existence of the fact is not the same as a suspicion that it exists.
[95] T43.11-.14.
[96] (2015) 117 SASR 432, [21].

This being the situation, together with the rejection of Mr Bridgland’s evidence as to the manner and circumstances he claimed to have fortuitously come into possession of both lots of cash, he fails to prove either tranche came into his possession honestly, as required by s 41(2) of the Summary Offences Act. A verdict of guilty is therefore entered with respect to the whole of the $7,815 in cash.
Conclusion and Verdicts
As it is a reasonable possibility that Mr Bridgland had possession of the Evelox air pistol without realising it was a firearm, he is entitled to an acquittal on count 1. His account as to how and for what purpose he came into the possession of the methylamphetamine in respect of the trafficking charged on count 2, are so unbelievable that it cannot be accepted. He is otherwise proven to have trafficked in methylamphetamine. In any event he fails to discharge the onus to overcome the presumption of purpose, so he is found guilty on count 2.
As to the charge of unlawful possession on count 3, since his evidence as to the manner in which he acquired the cash is unacceptable, he is proven to be in possession of the whole $7,815 reasonably suspected of being obtained by unlawful means, thus rendering him guilty of this offence as well.
Verdicts are entered accordingly.