R v Brian Joseph Spillane

[2017] NSWDC 109

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Brian Joseph Spillane [2017] NSWDC 109
Date of orders:	16 February 2017
Decision date:	16 February 2017
Jurisdiction:	Criminal
Before:	DCJ Tupman
Decision:	See orders [127] – [155]
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence after Trial – Aggregate Sentence - Historic Child Sex Offences – Multiple Offences – Paedophile conduct - Buggery – Indecent assault – Victims male and under 16 - St Stanislaus College – Bathurst – Catholic Priest – Victim Impact Statement
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 ss 61E(1A), 79, 81 and 81A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s53A
Cases Cited:	BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123 Denham v R [2016] NSWCCA 309
Category:	Sentence
Parties:	Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Brian Joseph Spillane (Offender)
Representation:	Counsel: Ms E Wilkins SC (DPP) Mr T Warr (Offender)   Solicitors: Ms D Mansour (DPP) Mr D Gleeson (Offender)
File Number(s):	2008/55729
Publication restriction:	Publication Restrictions re complainants – see separate judgment

Judgment

1. HER HONOUR: This is the sentence for the offender Brian Joseph Spillane. He is before the Court for sentence on 16 counts of child sexual assault covered by two indictments. The first of those is dated 18 October 2016, and the second is dated 7 November 2016. He faced two consecutive jury trials before me, covering these 16 counts, which relate to nine individual complainants involving sexual assaults over a lengthy period from 1974 to 1990 for the first indictment, and from 1976 to 1988 for the second.

2. All of these offences were committed when the offender was either a teacher or chaplain at St Stanislaus’ College in Bathurst, a private Catholic boarding school. All of the complainants were students under 16 at the time of the offending.

3. There have been a series of non-publication orders in place in relation to these and earlier proceedings for a number of years in order to enable the proper administration of justice, as all trials involving this offender proceeded through the Court. These non-publication orders were, in large part, revoked by me on 5 December 2016. Some restrictions remain in relation to the offender’s family, and there are obviously permanent orders preventing the publication of anything which could identify any of the complainants.

4. To that end there have been pseudonym orders made in relation to each of the complainants before me and I will use these pseudonyms when referring to them. There is a degree of artificiality in this of course, but it does reduce the risk of identification which might otherwise arise.

5. There are some common facts relevant for each of the offences. Throughout the time period covered by both the indictments the offender was an ordained priest working at St Stanislaus’ College in Bathurst. He initially worked there as a teacher and then later became college chaplain. He had contact with, and access to, each of the complainants in one or other of these roles. Each of the complainants, for their part, was a boy enrolled at the college and, in the majority of cases they were boarders, although there were two local day students covered by these indictments. All of them were under 16 at the time of the offences.

6. Except for one count in the second indictment, all of the offences are offences of indecent assault, or offences involving acts of indecency, however they are not all brought as the same offence, or contrary to the same provision of the Crimes Act, 1900. This is purely because of changes in the statutory provisions relating to child sexual assault offences over the period covered in both indictments, and the inclusion of additional elements of statutory aggravation from the 1980s onwards.

7. The remaining count, and by far the most serious of all the counts, is the charge of buggery which occurred in 1978, when that is the way this particular offence was described. The description of such an offence in more recent times and today would be sexual intercourse with a child under 16. That terminology, however, did not apply to offences with the facts that are present here until sometime well after 1978 when this offence occurred.

8. Specifically the first indictment relates to five complainants, and the offender was found guilty of the following five offences:

9. Count 1, that between 1 and 31 December 1974 at Bathurst, he indecently assaulted the named complainant, to be known as J.

10. The facts relevant for this charge are that in 1974, J was aged 12 and was a boarder at the school in year 7. He had come from his family home in western New South Wales where he had previously been at a local Catholic primary school. When it came time to go to high school he was sent as a boarder to St Stanislaus’ College more than 300 kilometres from his home. The offender was a teacher there at the time.

11. J went up to his room on one occasion to get some sugar, which is something that he had prearranged a little earlier that day. He found the offender in his room dressed only in a singlet and underpants, apparently having just had a shower. The offender obviously knew that J was coming but opened the door without taking any steps to put on other clothing.

12. The offender sat down and moved J between his legs, hugging his thighs, and put his arm around him, nuzzled his neck and kissed him on the cheek. J felt uncomfortable and claustrophobic in the room at that time but he was only young and did not recognise this as inappropriate behaviour at the time.

13. Count 2 in that indictment is a charge that between 1 January and 30 June 1975 the offender indecently assaulted the named complainant to be known as K.

14. The facts for this offence are that during that period in 1975 K was 12 and was also a boarder at the school. He had also come from living with his family in western New South Wales. He was from a large family with parents who were both very active in the local Catholic church.

15. He had gone to the local Catholic school in western New South Wales but was able to secure some form of scholarship to attend St Stanislaus’ in high school where he started as a boarder in 1975. He was very excited to go to the school which he, and his family, believed offered him greater educational opportunities at secondary level than was then available to him in his part of western New South Wales. The offender was there a teacher and dorm master in 1975.

16. K was very homesick, this being the first time he had been away from home. He went to the offender for some comfort.

17. K gave evidence, which I accept, and which I accept in any event is inherent in the jury’s verdict, that after he went into the offender’s room the offender went into another area for a little while and then came back wearing some sort of monk’s robe.

18. He sat K on his knee and then the offender masturbated himself under this robe for 10 to 15 minutes. He kissed him on the mouth and told K that this was something his father would do. At the time K realised that this was what he described as odd behaviour and not something that would in fact happen at his home, but he too was young, only 12, and was confused.

19. This kissing on the mouth is the indecent assault, the subject of this charge, but the jury must have accepted K’s evidence about the surrounding circumstances, thus giving the kiss the sexualised context which would have allowed them to bring in a verdict of guilty.

20. These two counts, 1 and 2 in that first indictment, are both offences contrary to s 81 of the Crimes Act, 1900 relevant at the time, and each carries a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment.

21. Count 3 in that same indictment is an offence charging that between 1 May and 15 July 1985 at Bathurst, the offender indecently assaulted the named complainant, Damien Sheridan, who was then under 16, namely 13. This offence occurred in 1985 by which stage the legislation had been amended to add an element involving the age of the complainant and to increase the maximum penalty.

22. The facts relevant for this charge, as I have said, are that at the time Damien Sheridan was 13. He had also lived in western New South Wales with his family and attended the local high school in years 7 and 8. He was sent to St Stanislaus’ as a boarder in 1985. The offender was the school chaplain when Damien Sheridan started there in year 9.

23. Damien Sheridan was very homesick when he went to St Stanislaus’ as a boarder and was having nightmares. On one occasion he went to the offender at night for comfort. The offender placed Damien Sheridan on his lap and told him he had the devil in him, and then purported to perform an exorcism on him. He then masturbated Damien Sheridan’s penis until he ejaculated. The offender smiled. Damien Sheridan was crying and was experiencing some pain during the assault and felt devastated by the experience.

24. After leaving the offender’s room he went to a rubbish skip, or bin, connected with the dormitory and threw his clothes away and had a shower.

25. This offence is contrary to s 61E(1) of the Crimes Act,1900 relevant at the time, which carries a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment.

26. Count 4 in that indictment is a charge that between 1 February and 31 May 1988 at Bathurst the offender indecently assaulted the named complainant to be known as M, who was then under the age of 16, namely 13, and under the authority of the offender.

27. M started as a boarder at St Stanislaus’ in 1987 when he was 12. The offender was the chaplain at the school when he was there, and therefore was the person who exercised authority over M.

28. M was in trouble a lot at the school with disciplinary infringements like smoking, or wearing incorrect uniform, and the like. In 1988 he went into year 8 at the school.

29. On one occasion he was in the offender’s room and his school shirt was hanging out the back of his shorts. The offender put his hand down M’s shorts as if to tuck in his shirt, but in fact touched him on the skin of his buttocks and used his finger to touch M’s buttocks as he withdrew his hand from his shorts. This event occurred for a very short period of time but clearly by their verdict of guilty the jury accepted, as do I, that this was no accident and was sexualised touching by the offender.

30. M was clearly, when he gave evidence, still very angry about the offender’s behaviour towards him on this occasion.

31. Count 6 in that indictment charges that between 1 May and 31 October 1990 at Bathurst the offender indecently assaulted the named complainant to be known as N, who was then under 16, namely 12 or 13, and also under the authority of the offender.

32. In 1990 N started school in year 8 at St Stanislaus’ as a day pupil. He had been attending a different Catholic secondary school in western New South Wales the previous year. The offender was the school chaplain at the time and a person therefore exercising authority over N. N turned 13 in 1990 during year 8.

33. On one occasion during the period of the charge, when N was either 12 or 13, the offender took him from the quadrangle to the room in the school for disciplinary purposes. I accept that this was a surprise to N who was a good, and apparently well behaved, student and who had no idea of the reason for his removal.

34. Whilst in that room the offender sat him down on a chair which had an open back, and came up behind him and placed both his hands on N’s shoulders, and pushed down. As he did so the offender pushed his erect penis into N’s back through the open back of the chair. This incident also appears to have lasted for only a very short period of time.

35. These two counts 4 and 6 in that first indictment are both offences brought contrary to s 61E(1A) of the Crimes Act, 1900 at the relevant time, and each carries a maximum penalty of 6 years’ imprisonment.

36. That first indictment proceeded by way of trial with a jury before me commencing, as I have said, on 18 October, and the jury convicted the offender of all of those charges.

37. A second trial commenced before me with an indictment dated 7 November 2016 and proceeded. The jury convicted the offender of 11 counts in that indictment.

38. This second indictment relates to four individual complainants. As I have said the offender was found guilty of 11 separate counts in that indictment involving these complainants as follows.

39. Count 1, that between 1 and 31 March 1976 at Bathurst, the offender indecently assaulted the named complainant, Les Teece.

40. Count 2, that between 28 February and 1 May 1976 at Bathurst, the offender again indecently assaulted the complainant Les Teece. These two offences are brought contrary to s 81 of the Crimes Act, 1900 relevant at the time, and each carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.

41. Both of these counts relate to the same complainant who was 15 at the time of the offences. He had also come from living in western New South Wales with his family. He was part of a large family who were all very active members of their local Catholic church. He started in St Stanislaus’ in 1976 as a boarder in year 10 to complete his secondary education, because his parents thought it would give him a better education than other alternatives then available.

42. Like many of the other complainants in these two trials he too was very homesick and had difficulty assimilating into the school. The offender was a teacher at the school at the time, and Les Teece’s dorm master. He was the one to provide comfort to Les Teece and other boys who became upset when away from home for the first time, trying to assimilate into a boarding school environment. The complainant said he was crying quite a bit when he first started at the school because of feeling homesick and lonely.

43. The offender had taken Les Teece to his room on occasions and sometimes Les Teece would sleep in the offender’s room. Specifically, the events that comprised count 1 in the second indictment occurred one evening when the offender came to the dormitory and told Les Teece to come to his room to say some prayers. This had happened previously. The offender was wearing his pyjamas as was Les Teece.

44. When he got to the offender’s room Les Teece knelt down and the offender put his hand on the top of his head and started to say some prayers. He gave Les Teece some tablets and cough mixture and then grabbed his penis on the outside of his pyjamas. Les Teece was not wearing any underwear underneath his pyjama pants. At this time Les Teece was sitting on the offender’s bed with the offender alongside him.

45. The offender during this touching of his penis, which went on for a couple of minutes, asked him if he liked girls. Les Teece tried to scream but could not and I accept felt devastated by what was occurring. He woke the next morning in his bed in the dormitory but has no memory of getting back there. I accept, and will deal with this shortly, that the medication or substance, or whatever it was that the offender gave to this boy, made him drowsy or, effectively, drugged him.

46. Count 2 in this indictment also involves the complainant Les Teece, during the same year, 1976. This event occurred in much the same way as did count 1. The offender came to the child’s dormitory bed and took him to his room. He then gave him some substance or medication and Les Teece fell asleep. He woke up lying on the offender’s bed with the offender thrusting his penis against Les Teece’s bottom. Les Teece fell asleep again and woke the next morning in the offender’s bed. He heard someone knocking on the door and the offender told him to hide, which he did, and then he sent Les Teece back to his bed in the dormitory.

47. I accept that for both of these offences, counts 1 and 2 in the second indictment, the offender gave Les Teece some form of substance or medication that made him drowsy, effectively drugging him. That finding is not an integral part of the jury’s verdict for either of these two offences, but for these verdicts of guilty to have been entered at all, as for all of the others, the jury must have accepted the evidence of the complainant Les Teece as being the truth beyond reasonable doubt in relation to the necessary elements of the offence.

48. The evidence Les Teece gave about being given tablets and or cough medicine, was in my view apparently credible, was not fanciful nor illogical and in my view, having seen this complainant, it amounted to an integral part of the evidence he gave surrounding the actual offences themselves.

49. Despite cross-examination and some conflicting evidence about whether or not he suffered headaches at the time he entered St Stanislaus’, nonetheless I accept beyond reasonable doubt that, in fact, the offender did give this complainant some medication at the time which had the effect of making him drowsy and that he did so with the intention of making him more compliant and more easily able to sexually abuse. This does not suggest that the offender had available to him some medical cabinet full of stupefying drugs but rather I accept the complainant’s evidence as the truth beyond reasonable doubt as the jury did. This amounts to an aggravating factor in relation to these two offences.

50. These offences have had a seriously adverse impact on Les Teece. He did not disclose any of these events to anyone until he made his statements to the police many years later and I accept from evidence that he gave at trial that thereafter he suffered what he described as a nervous breakdown which had a very serious impact on his life, employment and personal relationships. There was evidence at trial that when he gave his statement to the police he was extremely emotional and crying and that evidence was from the officer who first took the statement. All of this is actual evidence before the Court, amounting to the impact these offences have had on Les Teece and the degree of harm he has suffered.

51. I also received and considered a victim impact statement from Les Teece which was read in court. Whilst it does not comprise actual evidence, nonetheless I note in large part it reflects the evidence given by Les Teece at trial about the adverse consequences to him of this sexual abuse. I note he believes the abuse inflicted on him by the offender has adversely affected the whole of his life. This is a common thread, not only amongst most of the complainants in these trials, but also, to the knowledge of the Court, the experience of child victims of sexual assault generally.

52. It is to be hoped the final disposition of these matters will allow Les Teece, and all of the other survivors for that matter, to continue the process of healing so they can all genuinely claim to be survivors of sexual abuse and no longer victims. No doubt this will be a difficult process for them all, but it would appear Les Teece has commenced this process and he ought to be commended and encouraged for the strength he has shown in doing so.

53. There then follows in this second indictment a group of charges all involving the same complainant to be known as P. This group contains the most serious of the offences, the offence of buggery. The offences are as follows.

54. Count 4 that between 1 February and 31 May 1978 the offender indecently assaulted P. This is another offence contrary to s 81 of the Crimes Act, 1900 relevant at the time with a maximum penalty of 5 years.

55. Count 5 that between 1 April and 31 July 1978 at Bathurst the offender procured the commission of an act of indecency by the complainant P with him. This is an offence contrary to s 81A of the Crimes Act, 1900 relevant at the time and carries a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment.

56. Count 6 is another offence contrary to s 81 of the Crimes Act, 1900 that between 1 June and 31 July 1978 at Bathurst the offender again indecently assaulted the complainant P.

57. Count 7 is another offence contrary to s 81 that between 1 June and 31 September 1978 at Bathurst the offender indecently assaulted the complainant P.

58. Count 8 is a charge that between 1 June and 30 September 1978 at Bathurst the offender committed an act of buggery with the complainant P. This is an offence contrary to s 79 of the Crimes Act, 1900 relevant at the time which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment.

1. Count 9 is the remaining offence involving the complainant P, and is a charge that between 1 June and 30 September 1978 the offender again indecently assaulted the complainant P. This is again an offence contrary to s 81 of the Crimes Act, 1900 relevant at the time.

2. All of these five offences involving P occurred during 1978 when he was either 14 or 15. He was a day pupil at St Stanislaus’. At that stage the offender had the role of Dean of Discipline at the school. The complainant had a difficult family life at the time. His family were not well off but perhaps more significantly, his mother was very ill at the time, which caused disruption at home and understandably caused upset to P, who whilst being upset and emotional about his mother’s very serious illness, at the same time did not want to say or do anything which would make his mother worse.

3. He started to get into trouble at school and was sent to the offender for discipline. The offender was initially comforting towards him and asked him the reason for his bad behaviour. P told him about his mother’s serious illness and how it upset him and made him emotional and P told the offender that he thought this was probably part of the reason he was behaving badly at school. Initially the offender hugged him and attempted to console him.

4. In March or April 1978 P was sent to the offender’s office for disciplinary reasons after some form of misbehaviour. The offender initially greeted him in a friendly manner and kissed him on the cheeks but then placed his hands on P’s bottom and in P’s words played with his bottom for five to ten minutes. This is the subject matter of count 4, the first of the counts involving P.

5. A little later in about May or June P was again sent to the offender’s office for disciplinary reasons. Again the offender cuddled him and put his hands on P’s bottom and squeezed his bottom, but he then grabbed P’s left hand and placed it on his own crotch so that P was touching his penis on the outside of his clothing. At the same time the offender undid P’s zipper and put his right hand onto P’s penis and started to masturbate him, whilst at the same time P was masturbating the offender on the outside of his trousers. This went on for about five to ten minutes. These facts constitute the relevant facts for counts 5 and 6 in the second indictment.

6. It seems that on neither of these two separate occasions, that is the occasions covering counts 4, 5 and 6, albeit that P was sent to the offender’s office for disciplinary reasons, did the offender ever administer any form of discipline, but appears to have used this as an opportunity to sexually assault P.

7. In relation to counts 5 and 6 it seems to me from other evidence that was called, that the offender behaved particularly manipulatively because he told P not to tell anyone about what had occurred because no one would believe him. Further, he also referred to P’s mother’s serious illness and reminded P, who was only 14 or 15 at the time, and who the offender knew was very emotional and upset about his mother’s illness, that if his mother found out about such an allegation the effect on her would be serious. It was a poignant part of P’s evidence at trial, in my view, that when he recounted this incident he said of the offender, “He knew that I would never do anything to hurt Mum”.

8. A further sexual assault with P occurred in July or August 1978 and this event is covered by counts 7 and 8 in the second indictment. P was again sent to the offender’s office for disciplinary reasons. The offender spoke to him about why he had been sent. The offender then locked the door to his room. He placed his hands on P’s shoulders and was rubbing his shoulders and kissed him on the back of his head. He again squeezed his bottom as he had done previously. He then undid P’s pants and started to masturbate him with his left hand while still caressing his bottom with his right hand. This is the indecent assault, the subject matter of count 7.

9. The offender then moved P over to a small room or area or cupboard, as it has been variously described, inside the office. He came up behind P and bent him slightly forward, undid his own trousers and put his penis into P’s anus moving it backwards and forwards whilst continuing to masturbate P with his left hand. This caused P great pain. He told the offender that it hurt. The offender then pulled his penis out of P’s anus but continued to move it backwards and forwards between his legs from behind, more or less in the area of his buttocks, until he ejaculated. P then left and went and washed himself elsewhere in the school.

10. P suffered some ongoing pain, in addition to the immediate pain he felt when his anus was penetrated. He had aching in his stomach and lower abdomen the following day and continued to have pain and stinging in the area of his anus for a few days afterwards. This latter part of the narrative comprises the relevant facts for count 8, the charge of buggery. It is by far the most serious of any of the individual offences which the offender faces.

11. A further sexual assault involving P occurred in July or August of the same year and is count 9. P was 15 by then. He was again sent to the offender’s room for disciplinary purposes. He noticed that the offender was not as friendly towards him on that occasion. He ordered P into the small room or area or cupboard at the back of his room and again locked the main door. He undid P’s clothing and also his own clothing and started to attempt anal intercourse again. P, in his own words, freaked out and said, “No, I can’t, it hurts. It couldn’t happen anymore”.

12. The offender then put his penis in between P’s legs from behind, again more or less in the area of his buttocks, but not in his anus, and rocked backwards and forwards until he ejaculated. The offender said to P after this occurred, “I don’t know what we’re going to do with you if you keep getting into trouble”. P left the room and went to wash himself and went back to class.

13. This offence, count 9, is a charge of indecent assault with a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment. It is not a charge of attempted buggery and it is important that the offender on this charge only be sentenced for the charge of which he has been found guilty, not for an offence of attempted buggery. However, in the circumstances it is a relatively serious incident of indecent assault committed in the way it was, with the background of the act of buggery that had occurred not long beforehand.

14. A number of years after leaving school, P was back at St Stanislaus’, probably in relation to some form of pre-marriage counselling that was occurring, and I accept confronted the accused about his actions. There was considerable evidence in cross-examination about this topic at the trial and it may be P’s recollection of where and in what circumstances this occurred was not good, particularly as, on his own admission, at the time he was drunk.

15. I do accept, however, that this occurred, namely that the confrontation did occur. He did confront the offender and I accept the offender replied, “There’s nothing I can do for you”. This cannot and does not amount to any admission on the offender’s part and indeed it is either neutral or a denial. It would have been an opportunity to confess but the offender did not take that and continues to deny these offences. It is matter of note, but it is not a matter that can increase the relevant sentence simply because he did not use that as an opportunity to confess his offending.

16. The remaining counts in the second indictment involve two separate complainants, Q and R. Count 10 is an offence that between 1 February and 30 June 1987 at Bathurst, the offender indecently assaulted the named complainant to be known as Q, who was then under 16, namely, 12 and under the authority of the offender.

17. Count 11 is an offence that between 1 February and 30 June 1987, the offender again indecently assaulted the complainant Q, who was under 16, namely, 12 and under the authority of the offender. These are also offences contrary to s 61E(1A) of the Crimes Act, 1900 and each carries a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment. At the time Q was 12 or 13 and was in year 8 at St Stanislaus’.

18. Q’s evidence was before the jury in my trial by way of pre-recorded evidence. There had been a previous trial which had not finished for one reason or another, in which the offender was charged with a number of offences against a different group of complainants, one of whom was Q. The reason it did not finish is not relevant, but the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1986 now in force, meant Q’s previous evidence, which had been video recorded, could be used and relied on as his evidence in this trial.

19. At the time of these offences the offender was the college chaplain. Q was apparently a bright child who did very well at school. He had hopes of a very successful future. He went to St Stanislaus’ as a boarder in year 7 in 1986 on a scholarship. Like many of the other complainants he, too, was very homesick and the offender would provide him with comfort including encouraging him to visit his room. There had been some inappropriate touching of Q by the offender during his first year at school but that was not the subject of any specific counts. The events comprised in counts 10 and 11 occurred in 1987 when Q was in year 8. He was still suffering severe homesickness and went to see the offender in his room for comfort. The first offence occurred in the morning when Q was still wearing his pyjamas, the offender sat him on his lap and masturbated his penis, that is count 10.

20. About two weeks later, again in 1987, Q went to the offender’s room again for comfort one evening because he was feeling homesick. Again, the offender in the guise of providing comfort masturbated Q’s penis. They are the relevant facts for these two offences.

21. The way in which Q’s evidence came before the Court is an indication of the attempts the justice and court systems have made in more recent times, to alleviate the burden on complainants in trials such as these, who often need to come to court more than once, in circumstances where for whatever reason, a trial either does not finish or there is a need for a new trial after appeal. Both the Crown and counsel for the accused in the trial before me, to my observation, worked cooperatively to ensure that much of the unfortunately extensive and often irrelevant cross-examination of Q at the previous trial, was edited out and did not go to the jury. Different counsel appeared for the offender in that earlier trial and his cross-examination extended over two days. Even after editing however, there was some material in Q’s evidence that was irrelevant, unnecessary and from time to time, in my view at least, bordering on the offensive. It was impossible however for the parties before me to edit out all of that material, whilst at the same time allowing Q’s evidence to maintain some sort of flow.

22. Q in his victim impact statement, which I received and considered, and which he read out to court, expressed his view that the legal system had not delivered anything that he regarded as timely justice. It is easy to see why he would hold such a view and, whilst I cannot undo what has occurred over the many occasions he has come to court, including in the earlier trial that did not finish, I nonetheless acknowledge the negative experience that he has endured and have already, and again, express to him the Court’s regret that this has occurred.

23. Q himself, in his victim impact statement referred to Edmund Burke when mentioning his hopes for a future, in which he quoted the following, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing”. I might, in the current times be bold enough to add the words, good men AND women. It is unlikely that there was not ONE person at St Stanislaus’ College who noticed what this offender had been doing for almost 20 years. Fortunately, as I understand it, the college has offered an apology to all of those who were abused by this offender and others at that college. Also the legal system, albeit after some time, appears to have brought all of these matters to finality. Hopefully, Q will go away with a view that good men and women, ultimately, have done something in these cases to overcome the evil that is apparent here.

24. The last count in the second indictment, count 12, is an offence that between 1 August and 31 October 1988 at Bathurst the offender indecently assaulted the named complainant to be known as R, then under the age of 16, namely 14 and under his authority. That is also an offence contrary to s 61E(1A) relevant at the time which carries a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment.

25. R was 14 at the time of the offence. He started at St Stanislaus’ in 1988 in year 9 as a boarder. The offender was the college chaplain at the time. There was ample evidence that at the time the offender regularly conducted prayer meetings or groups in his room, involving a number of boys at the same time. Despite the offender’s denials about some of the aspects of these groups, I accept there were regularly groups of boys at these prayer meetings who usually would attend in their pyjamas at night after their study period had ended. They were all boarders. From time to time the offender either would, or would pretend to, talk in tongues. Witnesses called in his own case at trial gave evidence this would occur too, within adult groups, and it has been described as channelling the holy spirit. I accept this behaviour needs to be seen in its historical context, namely, the church appears to have been going through a period of revival at the time and these sorts of charismatic preachings and group events were not uncommon.

26. However, the way in which this offender conducted them with boys at the school I accept had little connection with genuine faith and much more to do with creating opportunities for sexual interaction with these boys under his authority. It was, in my view, entirely inappropriate, and should never have been condoned, to allow the offender in the guise of his role as chaplain, to conduct so called prayer groups at night with boys attending in their pyjamas, all lying around on the floor in a group, with music playing, candles burning and the offender, at least so far as the boys were concerned, apparently talking in tongues. These were impressionable teenage boys, all boarders, all away from their homes and so without any independent sounding board to check this behaviour against reality. In any event, I accept that this is what occurred. R attended one of these evening prayer group sessions and arrived a little late when it was already underway. He lay on the floor in a relaxed state with a group of other boys, he heard chanting and heard the offender apparently speaking in tongues. There was another adult present whose identity is not known, but who was not a school staff member.

27. During this event the offender touched his penis on the outside of his pants whilst he was lying on the floor, apparently in a relaxed state. It would appear that on this occasion he was not wearing pyjamas, but rather pants. The offender then put his hand inside R’s pants and underpants and touched his penis briefly on his bare skin. R realised what was happening and tried to get up, but for some reason felt unable to do so. The offender then removed his hand from inside R’s pants and said something to the other adult male to the effect that R was not ready yet and that he would remember what happened. There was some discussion or perhaps argument between the two adults, but the offender did not persist. R was able to sit up and not long afterwards left the room.

28. Clearly the jury accepted R’s evidence as the truth beyond reasonable doubt, as do I, which includes my acceptance of his evidence about what he heard the offender say to the other adult male in the room.

29. I accept from this evidence that what was occurring was that these impressionable teenage boys were being persuaded into some sort of sleepy, almost trance like state. This was to allow the offender to sexually assault R in the way he did.

30. These are the 16 counts before me for sentence and the facts relevant for each of them.

31. I turn now to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending. All these offences are serious because they are all instances of child sexual assault. The use of children by any adult for sexual purposes is a gross violation of that child’s rights. Children should be able to trust all adults to treat them as children and they are entitled to expect protection from adults, not abuse of any kind. This extends to all contact between adults and children, but it is even more the case when those adults have a special position of authority over that child, such as a parent, teacher or religious instructor.

32. That is exacerbated even further when children are in positions of helplessness or special dependency because of their own circumstances, like in the cases before me, where most of the complainants were boarders, a long way from home, and in many cases away from home for the first time. It is even further aggravated here because the offender was not just any teacher or adviser, but an ordained priest into whose care these parents entrusted their boys, believing that their shared faith would benefit their children. In almost all, if not all of the cases before me, the complainants came from staunchly religious Catholic families who all viewed priests in very high regard.

33. Many of these complainants did not initially realise that what was happening to them was in fact inappropriate, in large part for the very reason that it was a priest who was treating them in this way. They were confused about that and therefore did not tell anyone about these events for many years. Perhaps even more insidiously, they did not expect that they would be believed, perhaps not even by their own families, because their strongly religious upbringing would mean that they simply could not bring themselves to accept that someone as revered as an ordained priest would behave in this way. That is part of the insidious nature of these offences, because this was well known to the offender and he took advantage of that. He knew he could act with impunity and with almost no chance that his behaviour would be revealed. That forms part of my assessment of the objective seriousness of his offending for all offences.

34. I do not intend to analyse each of the offences otherwise and make a determination about the individual objective seriousness of each of them. Some of the instances of indecent assault are less physically intrusive than others, but each of them is serious. Clearly enough, an instance of indecent assault involving a brief kiss on the lips or pressing an erect penis into a child’s back whilst both parties are fully clothed, is a less physically intrusive event than one involving the offender masturbating a complainant’s naked penis or placing his own erect penis between a child’s buttocks and ejaculating, and that clearly enough affects any individual assessment of objective seriousness.

35. However, in addition to the matter I have already referred to, there are many other serious aggravating factors in all these charges, which means that an assessment of objective seriousness based only on the nature of the physical interaction with the child is of limited significance. These include the fact that the offender took advantage of that position of trust in a way I have already referred. He knew that most of these complainants were desperately homesick and offered them comfort, only to sexually abuse them.

36. For one of the offenders he raised the prospect of his mother’s illness, in the context of counselling him not to tell about the sexual abuse. This young boy was not a boarder and therefore had ready access to his family each day, but his mother was seriously ill and he believed she would be made worse if she became aware either of his complaint or, in the event that he was believed, became aware of what the offender was doing. The offender obtained this young boy’s silence by reminding him of his mother’s illness in a way which I regard as wickedly manipulative.

1. For some of the more recent offences, the fact that the offender was in a position of authority is a statutory circumstance of aggravation and cannot be viewed as a separate aggravating factor. It is a serious abuse of authority, however, which incorporates the breach of trust to which I have already referred, arising in the special position the offender held as an ordained priest. For the offences earlier in time, as a matter of fact in each case, the offender was in a position of authority over the child and breached the trust that this position of authority gave him, which aggravates the seriousness of those offences.

2. None of these offences can be seen as individual one-off offences. They were part of an entrenched course of conduct by the offender over a long period of time spanning almost 20 years, from 1974 to 1990. It was deliberate conduct. Some of the offences involved the offender’s use of religious rituals to increase his power over the victim, including purported exorcisms and involvement in prayer meetings, both of which on the facts at trial were at the very least preambles to sexual abuse. For others he prayed over the child before sexually assaulting him, no doubt in order to create a false sense of security. All of this increases the objective seriousness of the offending in each case.

3. In each case the complainants have suffered some form of psychological distress and consequences. Three of them have compiled victim impact statements which in large part I have referred to already. I have received and considered each of those victim impact statements, including the victim impact statement of the complainant Damien Sheridan, which was read out in court by his son. There was evidence, too, in the trial about the impact these offences have had on all or at least most of the complainants the subject matter of these charges. Even though complainants, other than the three named complainants who provided victim impact statements to the Court, have not in fact provided victim impact statements, nonetheless there was evidence about the psychological distress that they have suffered, some worse than others.

4. The Court has become aware over a number of years of the wealth of material about the impact of sexual abuse on children and the long term serious consequences. I take that into account and no further evidence is required. However, there was evidence at trial that many of the complainants suffered adverse life events, including evidence that some of them deliberately behaved badly at school shortly after the assault in an attempt to be expelled from school and escape from the offender. As a result, the school performance of many of them dropped and almost certainly many of them have not achieved their full potential because of that. One of them ended up in the Children’s Court following an incident involving a stolen car, which he attributed to an attempt on his part to be expelled from the school. Others later turned to alcohol and drugs in a way that they have each described as attempting to deal with the loss of trust that they felt. Many have given evidence of having difficulties trusting authorities.

5. As I have said, the evidence each of them gave was different, as might be expected, because the experiences of them and the life circumstances of them have all been different. One common issue, however, for all of them was what they described as a loss of religious and spiritual faith. A notable feature for all was that each of them declined to take a religious oath when giving evidence. Many described their sadness at this loss of faith because the church had been such a large part in their lives, and in many cases continued to be important to their families. The impact then on each of these complainants, albeit different in each case, and more or less serious in each case, is serious. There is no evidence, in my view, that the impact on one particular complainant would be so serious as to amount to a separate aggravating feature.

6. For all these reasons then, each of these offences before me is a serious offence. Only fulltime terms of imprisonment would be sufficient to deal with the objective seriousness for each of the offences.

7. Count 8 in the second indictment, the charge of buggery, is far and away the most serious offence before the Court. The maximum penalty of 14 years means that it is, of itself, a more serious offence. This is a relatively serious example of this offence, however, taking into account the very same aggravating factors that are present for all of the indecent assault offences, to which I have already referred.

8. One of the factors that might be taken into account in any sentence before the Court is the degree of remorse and contrition that is shown by an offender. These are not matters that I can take into account on this sentence. There is no remorse and contrition shown here. The offender, as is his right, maintains his innocence in relation to all these offences.

9. There was before the Court in both trials a body of evidence which was admissible before the Court as tendency evidence in relation to four other complainants, who were also students at St Stanislaus’ school, in relation to whom the offender had on an earlier occasion pleaded guilty to four counts of indecent assault and had been sentenced by Judge Hatzistergos in this Court. An extract of the agreed facts signed by him in those sentence proceedings was relied on as tendency evidence in both of the trials. However, even this glimmer of remorse and contrition, it seems to me, was extinguished during the course of the offender’s trial.

10. He gave evidence in relation to those four specific matters, where his pleas of guilty might normally be seen as some evidence of remorse and contrition, in which he effectively sought to resile from his plea of guilty in relation to the most serious of those four offences, and also sought to minimise his guilt in relation to the remaining three. It was notable that the one in relation to which he sought to resile from his admission of guilt, was the most serious physical interaction, involving his touching that complainant on his penis, and the others were less physically intrusive, involving kissing them on the mouth. His evidence at the second trial before me in relation to this, on my finding, indicates not only a lack of credibility on his part, but also displayed the sort of manipulative behaviour which is a hallmark of paedophilia and has been part of all of these offences. It serves to reinforce the fact that there is no remorse and contrition on this offender’s part. As I have said, he went to trial and did not plead guilty. He cannot be given additional punishment for doing no more than is his right, but nor does he obtain any benefit by way of discount or otherwise.

11. The offender’s subjective case before me was limited, consisting largely of a series of references, and I have also been referred to the content of sentencing judgments of three other judges of this Court. The offender is now 74. He has been in custody since 30 November 2010 in relation to convictions for other offences of child sexual assault, to which I will refer shortly. Whilst he has been bail refused for the offences before me since then, none of the time he has spent in custody has been referable only to these offences.

12. The offender, I accept, has apparently done some good things in his life. There are positive references tendered on this sentence, mainly from people who were his parishioners or people who have known him for a long time. I accept that these references are genuinely given by good people, and are all provided with the understanding of those people of the offences for which the offender is facing sentence. This means that the offender was not, even at the time he was committing these offences, all bad. He was charismatic and was genuinely well regarded at the school and within the church by a large number of people. However, it is also clear that at the very time he was undertaking some of these good works in the church and impressing all these people, he was using his respected position to abuse these children, including the children the subject of the other trials to which I will refer shortly.

13. As is often the case in matters such as this, it was his respected status in the community as teacher and spiritual adviser which allowed him to commit these offences. So whilst I have read all these offences and take them into account, and respect the views of those referees, they do not in reality provide a basis for mitigation of sentence to any real extent.

14. Even though the offender is now serving sentences for other offences, at the time he committed the offences before me he was a person without any criminal convictions and therefore to that extent can be seen as a person of good character at the time he committed the offences. I have been invited on his behalf to take that into account. Whilst this is strictly accurate, he cannot in my view be regarded as a person of good character because he was in fact committing this whole series of offences on an ongoing basis, albeit that they had not been discovered. Even if he were strictly a person of good character at the time because of no previous convictions, almost no weight can be given to that in this case, because he was in fact using that good character and his position to gain confidence and commit these offences.

15. After the offender left St Stanislaus’ he went for a period of time to a suburban parish in Sydney as parish priest as I understand the evidence. He appears, on the material before me, to have made a valuable contribution to that parish and I accept that information provided in many of the references. He left the church in 2004 after having met his now wife, they married and have two children. There is a letter from his wife, who did not meet him until 1998, well after he had left St Stanislaus’.

16. I accept that their life together as a family has been an enjoyable and positive one up until the time of his arrest in 2008. He worked in part time paid employment after leaving the priesthood and supported his family to an extent and did so until he was arrested for these and other offences in 2008. I accept that he has been a good husband and father in that period of time.

17. There was a time after he went into custody in November 2010 that the authorities prevented him from having any contact with his children, a matter that was subsequently reversed. That was a matter of considerable concern both to him, his wife and his children. His wife and children have suffered adverse consequences as a result of his commission of these offences and ultimate arrest and first conviction, including the reflected adverse publicity. It is for that reason I have continued the order preventing publication of anything that might identify them. It is not fair that they become further victims of this offender’s actions. The impact on the offender’s family however, whilst it is adverse, is not such that it ought reduce what would otherwise be the appropriate sentences.

18. There has also been adverse publicity surrounding this offender and some of it quite serious, but like other judges before me who have sentenced this offender, I do not regard this as extra curial punishment. Publicity is to be expected surrounding this type of offending. He has been spared it in more recent times because of non-publication orders so as not to jeopardise his right to a fair trial. No doubt there will be further adverse publicity now that the non‑publication orders have been lifted and following this sentence. If that goes beyond appropriate publicity, and particularly if it descends into the realms of threats or the like from individual members of the community, that of course could never be tolerated and hopefully would be dealt with by appropriate law enforcement authorities. However, as Judge Woods noted when sentencing the offender for an earlier group of offences, denunciation is part of the sentencing process so that general deterrence can be effected, and particularly so for offences such as this. The offender has escaped this public denunciation until 2008, almost 40 years after his first offending, whilst his victims have continued to live with the consequences from the time they were abused. In the circumstances this does not amount to extra curial punishment.

19. I now turn to consider the appropriate sentences for all of these offences. I accept that the law is that sentences for historical child sexual offences should follow the pattern of sentencing for such matters apparent at the time of offending. I accept that a recent decision of Denham v R [2016] NSWCCA 309 reconsidered this area of sentencing law. I do not propose to go through this decision in any great detail. I do not understand that decision to have overturned the general proposition that sentencing for historical child sexual offences should follow the pattern apparent at the time of offending, but rather for it to be authority for a proposition that where no sentencing range can be determined, then sentencing should follow the ordinary principles of sentencing. That itself of course carries its own particular problems because the maximum penalties for the offences can never be more than they were at the relevant time. The Crown has argued that there is no discernible pattern of sentencing here, as I understand it on the same basis that this was argued in Denham, namely that there was no sufficient body of cases for offending of such a serious nature.

20. It seems to me that if that proposition is made good, something of which I have real doubt, that Denham v R is distinguishable from the matters before me, exactly for the reason that this offender has already been sentenced by three judges of this Court, for the very same sorts of offences for which I now sentence him, and apparently in accordance with the application of proper legal principle by those three judges. There have been no Crown appeals from those earlier sentencing judgments and each of the sentencing judges referred to the general law that sentences for historical child sex offences should follow the apparent sentencing pattern at the time the offences were committed.

21. The offender has already been dealt with after convictions for sexual offences involving children during the same period covering the matters before me. He was convicted of 21 other offences involving indecent assaults on 12 children. Three of those covered nine offences against girls, which were the subject matter of trial proceedings before Judge Finnane. They were all offences occurring between 1976 and 1981, towards the end of that period being a period that the offender was away from St Stanislaus’. None of those cases occurred at St Stanislaus’. These were girls who the offender was in contact with in his role as a priest.

22. He faced nine charges and received an aggregate sentence of 9 years for each offence with an aggregate overall non-parole period of 5 years which commenced on 30 November 2010. The offender appealed against that decision and it was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in a decision BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123.

23. Specifically the Court considered a complaint on behalf of the offender that Judge Finnane had failed to take into account the relevant sentencing patterns at the time. After reviewing his sentences, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that he in fact applied the relevant sentencing practices at the time and upheld his sentences.

24. Judge Woods in this Court sentenced the offender to an aggregate sentence of 9 years with an aggregate non-parole period of 5 years for a series of indecent assault offences occurring in the 1980s, involving five complainants, all of whom were boys and were students at St Stanislaus’, Bathurst. All of those charges in the trial before Judge Woods have a great deal of similarity with many of the indecent assault offences that are before me. His Honour paid particular attention in his judgment to the sentencing patterns for the relevant period, namely in the 1980s, in fact noting that not only was he aware of the sentencing patterns of the time, but that he himself had been part of the law reform push creating some of the very offences for which he was then sentencing the offender. There was no Crown appeal against these sentences.

25. Then Judge Hatzistergos sentenced the offender for indecent assault offences involving four boys from St Stanislaus’ during the overall period covered by the matters before me. I have already referred to these offences and they are the matters that were led in the trials before me as independent tendency evidence. He too purported to apply what he found to be the sentencing patterns at the time and in the circumstances of those offences fixed an overall aggregate sentence of 3 years for each offence with an aggregate non-parole period for each of them of 18 months. Again there have been no appeals against these sentences.

26. In my view these previous sentences, on the particular facts and circumstances of these trials, set out what was in fact the relevant sentencing pattern at the time, particularly so those fixed by Judge Woods because of his particular position, having been personally involved in the law reform process at the time. I too was involved from the late 1970s right through into the 1990s in cases involving both the prosecution and defence of child sexual assault offences. Additionally, from 1978 onwards I was involved in organisations and professional bodies making submissions in relation to child sexual assault, including the Women Lawyers Association of NSW, the Law Society of NSW and the NSW Bar Association. I have personal knowledge of sentencing practice at the time and have frequently, over the last 21 years as a judge of this Court, been called on to a sentence in historical child sexual assault offences, taking into account the principles and sentencing patterns that were relevant at the time, including one large historical child sexual assault offence involving a priest of the Catholic church in Sydney. There are also, and I have had access to, statistics published by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales in relation to the offence of buggery which sets out a range of sentences imposed up until the time that offence was repealed, albeit perhaps for a later period of time.

27. All of this, in my view, means that there is a pattern of sentencing discernible for all of the offences of indecent assault at the relevant time and a pattern of sentencing for the offence of buggery.

28. I do not propose to become bogged down in individual sentences and then attempting to put together some sort of jigsaw with precision as to how each of those sentences fits with the other. As other judges have done, I propose to deal with these matters, with the exception of the buggery charge, by imposing aggregate sentences.

29. I also do not propose to become bogged down in a debate about how to assess the appropriate non‑parole period by trying to discern what was the appropriate practice for doing so, either in the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s. I accept the Crown submission that whatever the relevant practice or sentencing pattern was at the time in relation to the appropriate quantum of non-parole period compared to head sentence, that in the end there should be an appropriate overall non‑parole period that reflects the objective seriousness of the total offending and a sufficient period on parole with supervision to ensure the possibility of rehabilitation and the reduction of any risk to the community.

30. It is hard to assess the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation in this case. He shows no remorse and takes no responsibility for his offending. That is one aspect of his prospects of rehabilitation. I take into account the findings of the earlier sentencing judges in relation to rehabilitation. As did Judges Woods and Hatzistergos, I accept a guarded view should be taken about his prospects of rehabilitation. However, to the extent that his prospects of rehabilitation are limited to the likelihood of reoffending, I accept that this becomes more reduced as time passes, as he ages and as the date on which he will be released from prison becomes further away. It does not appear likely on the evidence before me that the offender will change his thinking in relation to his offending, so that is not a matter I can take into account in terms of assessing his prospects of rehabilitation. However, he is now 74 and he will be well into his 80s by the time he is ultimately released from custody. As I said on an earlier occasion, there is a prospect he will die in prison. Nonetheless, he is in relatively good health for a man of his age but he does suffer from hypertension and arthritis. He is noted by those who are his friends and by his family, to have aged a lot since going into custody.

1. I accept from earlier findings made by sentencing judges that he is likely to have been held in forms of custody that limit his association with other prisoners because of the nature of his offending. After today he will be able to be treated fully as a sentenced prisoner, which may mean transfer to prisons where those convicted of similar offences are offered access to specialised treatments. But given his refusal to accept responsibility for his offending, these are unlikely to be successful or play much part in his prospects of rehabilitation. His physical health is relatively good, as I have said, but of course it can only deteriorate with time as he ages. Even if he survives gaol, when he does emerge on parole, he will be an old man. His prospects of reoffending, with this combination of circumstances, it seems to me, is extremely low, despite his intransigence.

2. The Crown argued that the sentence should take into account the fact that he presents a risk to the public because of his refusal to accept responsibility and the length and entrenched nature of his offending. That may well be the case in theory, but in practice I do not accept that he does in fact present a real risk to the public once he is eventually released. Partly this is because of what will be his advanced age. Further, he committed these offences before me whilst a priest and whilst in positions of authority over children. That will never occur again. Further, he has apparently not committed any offences of this or any other kind since at least 1992 or thereabouts. I do accept however that a relatively lengthy period of parole with supervision would reduce any remaining risk.

3. Taking into account all of this I have concluded for the offence of buggery, namely count 8 in the second indictment, an overall term of imprisonment of 8 years is called for. I will be setting a non-parole period of 4 years for that offence on a finding of special circumstances which is largely connected to the partial concurrence between that and the indecent assault offences and then the partial concurrence between these offences and the previous sentences.

4. For the indecent assault charges I am setting an aggregate sentence for each offence overall of 10 years with an overall aggregate non-parole period of 7 years for each offence.

5. The indicative sentence for each of these indecent assault offences are the following, on my findings:

6. Count 1 on the first indictment involving the complainant J, 12 months.

7. Count 2 involving the complainant K, 18 months.

8. Count 3 involving the complainant Damien Sheridan, 2 years.

9. Count 4 involving the complainant M, 12 months.

10. Count 6 involving the complainant N, 12 months.

11. In the second indictment, Count 1 involving the complainant Les Teece, 18 months.

12. Count 2 involving the complainant Les Teece, 2 years.

13. Count 4 involving the complainant P, 12 months.

14. Count 5 involving the complainant P, 12 months.

15. Count 6 involving the complainant P, 2 years.

16. Count 7 involving the complainant P, 2 years.

17. Count 9 involving the complainant P, 3 years.

18. Count 10 involving the complainant Q, W years.

19. Count 11 involving the complainant Q, 2 years.

20. Count 12 involving the complainant R, 2 years.

21. These are the indicative sentences. As I have said, the aggregate sentence for each will be 10 years with an aggregate non-parole period of 7 years and an aggregate parole thereafter of 3 years.

22. I then have two effective sentences, one an overall sentence of 10 years and the other, the buggery charge, an overall sentence of 8 years. If completely accumulated, that would be 18 years overall with a 12 year non-parole period. That, in my view, is excessive to reflect the total criminality of all the offences before me. There should be some partial accumulation. Overall for the 16 offences before me, including the offence of buggery, I have concluded there should be an overall term of imprisonment of 13 years with an overall non-parole period of 9 years.

23. There then needs to be considered the date on which these sentences should commence. It seems to me there ought to be some partial accumulation between these sentences and the sentences imposed by Judges Woods and Hatzistergos. Judge Hatzistergos adopted that view when effectively partially accumulating his sentences by 6 months. Judge Woods did not, but commenced his non-parole period at the expiration of the non-parole period set by Judge Finnane. It seems to me that there was, with respect, a good reason for doing so because the offences before him and before Judge Hatzistergos and before me are all offences that occurred at St Stanislaus’, all involving children who were students at the school and were offending of a different type to that covered by the trial before Judge Finnane.

24. The offences before me involve a longer time period than either of the groups of offences before Judges Woods or Hatzistergos, but there should be a consideration of totality, taking into account the total criminality represented by all of the offending covered in those three groups. In fact it involves indecent assaults on 18 individual complainants at St Stanislaus’ and the buggery offence for one of those. At present, that combination of events gives rise effectively to six and a half years on parole with three years thereafter.

25. I have concluded that overall the sentences to be imposed by me for these offences should start at a time which means that this offender’s non‑parole period will be extended by 5 years, therefore his sentences should start 4 years before 28 November 2021, namely 28 November 2017, which would give rise effectively to an overall term of 13 years that I have already identified, thus ending on 27 November, 2030 with an effective non-parole period of 9 years from 28 November 2017 to 27 November 2026.

26. Therefore I make the following formal orders. For each of the 16 offences before me the offender is convicted.

27. For the indictment dated 18 October 2016 counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 and the indictment dated 7 November 2016 counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12, pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 there will be an aggregate overall sentence for each offence of 10 years imprisonment commencing on 28 November 2017 and expiring on 27 November 2027 with an aggregate non‑parole period of 7 years commencing on 28 November 2017 and expiring on 27 November 2024, with parole thereafter of 3 years from 28 November 2024 to 27 November 2027.

28. For count 8 in the indictment dated 7 November 2016, the buggery charge, there will be a non‑parole period of four years commencing 28 November 2022, expiring 27 November 2026, with parole thereafter of four years commencing 28 November 2026, expiring 27 November 2030. Overall, eight years commencing 28 November 2020 expiring 27 November 2030.

29. There are some counts outstanding in relation to other complainants not yet the subject of any trial dates. I’ll stand those matters over for mention only to Downing Centre Court 3.1 on Friday, 17 March 2017. I note it is likely that these matters will be discontinued in some way or other. Bail not applied for is refused for the mention. The offender is excused from attending on that day.

30. The complainant, Damien Sheridan, known by the pseudonym L, has consented to being identified as the complainant in count 3 of the trial commenced by indictment dated 18 October 2016. I also note the complainant Les Teece, known by the pseudonym O, has consented to being identified as the complainant in counts 1 and 2 in the second trial commenced by indictment 7 November 2016.

31. As a result, I revoke the non-publication orders relating to the complainants Damien Sheridan and Les Teece and I revoke the pseudonym orders in relation to those complainants.

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Decision last updated: 22 May 2017