SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v BRAY; R v MALATESTA
[2017] SASCFC 104
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Kelly and The Honourable Justice Stanley)
21 August 2017
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - IN GENERAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - SENTENCE - TRAFFICKING, TRADING, SELLING, SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT
These are two appeals against sentence.
Both appellants pleaded guilty in the District Court to one count each of trafficking in a controlled drug contrary to s 32 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA). Bray’s plea related to 54 tablets of ethylone. Malatesta’s plea related to 50 tablets of ethylone. Both appellants were motivated by greed, and were not intending to traffic to service a drug habit. They were each sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years, 9 months and 18 days, with a non-parole period of 15 months, to be served on home detention. Each appellant was also ordered to pay a fine of $2,500.
Each appellant contends that there has been both an outcome error and a process error in the sentences passed. Both appellants contend that the learned sentencing judge erred in failing to find good reason to suspend their respective sentences. In the case of Bray, he contends that the learned sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account a material consideration, namely the impact a home detention order wold have on Bray’s employment. In the case of Malatesta, he contends that the learned sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account a material consideration, namely that Malatesta gave sworn evidence identifying the person from whom he had acquired the drugs in question. Malatesta contends that this evidence amounts to cooperation with the investigation.
At the appeal hearing, Counsel for Bray sought the Court’s permission to adduce further evidence relating to the difficulties that the home detention order placed on Bray’s employment.
Held, per Stanley J, Vanstone and Kelly JJ agreeing:
1. The further evidence should not be received (at [19]).
2. Neither appellant has demonstrated a process error made by the sentencing judge at ([26], [30]).
3. A decision by a sentencing judge as to whether good reason exists to suspend a sentence of imprisonment involves the exercise of a discretion. No House v The King error has been demonstrated (at [31]).
4. Appeals dismissed (at [1], [2], [32]).
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10A, s 10(1)(h), s 33BB; Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32, referred to.
R v Dorning (1981) 27 SASR 481; R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587;
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- Case
- [2017] SASCFC 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to suspend the sentences of imprisonment imposed on the appellants. Mr Bray also sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal. The court was required to consider whether, in light of the circumstances of the offending and the personal circumstances of each appellant, there was a demonstrable error in the sentencing judge's determination that there was no good reason to suspend the sentences.
The Full Court reasoned that while suspension of sentences for drug trafficking offences is permissible, no error had been demonstrated in the sentencing judge's finding that good reason to suspend did not exist. The judge had properly balanced the mitigating factors, such as the appellants' personal circumstances and positive prospects for rehabilitation, against the seriousness of the profit-driven offending and the significant need for general deterrence. The court affirmed the principle that street-level drug dealing, particularly when motivated by lifestyle enhancement rather than addiction, is viewed as objectively serious. The court found that the sentencing judge's approach was open to him and did not disclose a *House v The King* error.
Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The court upheld the sentencing judge's decision not to suspend the sentences, finding that the home detention orders, combined with the fines, adequately addressed the aims of punishment and deterrence. The application for fresh evidence by Mr Bray was not explicitly addressed in the provided text, but the outcome of dismissing the appeals suggests it was either refused or did not alter the final decision.
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