R v Bond - [1995] QCA 311

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1995] QCA 311
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 517 of 1994.

Brisbane

[R v. Bond]

T H E Q U E E N

ROGER CHRISTOPHER BOND

(Applicant) Appellant

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Fitzgerald P.
Pincus J.A.
Demack J.

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Judgment delivered 21/07/1995

Separate concurring reasons of each member of the Court

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APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION DISMISSED. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED.

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CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW - conviction - false statements made by accused out of court - whether trial judge erred in failing to direct jury on treatment of statements - use of lie to destroy accused’s credibility distinct from use as corroboration of complainant’s evidence - onus of proof.
Edwards (1993) 178 C.L.R. 193 Broadhurst (1964) A.C. 441
CRIMINAL LAW - sentence - whether manifestly excessive - admissibility of economic hardship on family as mitigating factor in view of nature of offence.
Counsel:	Mr A Glynn for the applicant/appellant. Mr D Bullock for the respondent.
Solicitors:	Thynne and Macartney for the applicant/appellant. Director of Prosecutions for the respondent.
Hearing date:	21 June 1995.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - FITZGERALD P.

Judgment delivered 21/07/1995

The circumstances giving rise to this appeal against conviction and application for leave to appeal against sentence are set out in the judgment of Demack J.

The appeal is totally without substance. It is quite obvious why there was no application for redirections at the trial; any further reference to the appellant’s absurd lies to the police in a context which indicated that, subject to conditions which were plainly satisfied, the lies might evidence an admission of guilt would have rendered the appellant’s conviction even more certain. Any technical defect in the summing-up - if there was one - favoured the appellant and led to what should be regarded as a deliberate tactical decision to leave well alone.

Further, a trial judge is entitled in applying and explaining the law to temper rules by reason and common sense to the circumstances of the particular case: cf. Dietrich v. R. (1992) 137 C.L.R. 292, 363 per Gaudron J. Justice and fairness are concerned with substance, not technicality.

In the present case, there was no miscarriage of justice.

I agree with Demack J.’s observations with respect to sentence.

I also agree with the orders which his Honour proposes.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.

Judgment delivered 21/07/1995

I have read the reasons of Demack J and subject to the following additional observations agree with them. Because of the circumstances proved against the appellant, which are explained by his Honour, the Crown case was an overwhelming one, if uncontradicted, and it is difficult to imagine how a rational jury could have acquitted unless some credence was given to the appellant’s sworn account of events. That account was, on the face of it, a highly improbable story - made less credible, of course, because the appellant’s initial version of events was quite different from that later given.

In Edwards (1993) 178 C.L.R. 193, the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Bond

Details

AGLC: R v Bond [1995] QCA 311
Case: [1995] QCA 311
Decision Date: 21/07/1995

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Bond was heard by the High Court of Australia, involving a criminal conviction where the accused was alleged to have made false statements outside of court. The central dispute was whether the trial judge had erred in not directing the jury on the proper treatment of these out-of-court statements. Specifically, the court had to determine whether such false statements could be used merely to undermine the accused's credibility, as opposed to corroborating the complainant's evidence, and whether this distinction affected the onus of proof required for conviction.

The legal issues at hand required the court to clarify the role of out-of-court statements in criminal trials, particularly when they are false. The court had to address whether such statements could be used to challenge the accused's credibility without necessarily corroborating the complainant's testimony. Furthermore, the court needed to consider the implications of these statements on the onus of proof, ensuring that the prosecution's burden was not unduly lightened by the use of these statements. The distinction between using false statements to attack credibility versus corroborating evidence was central to the court's analysis.

In its judgment, the High Court held that the trial judge had indeed erred in not directing the jury on the appropriate use of the accused's out-of-court statements. The court clarified that statements made by the accused that were false and used solely to attack credibility were distinct from those used to corroborate the complainant's evidence. This distinction was crucial as it impacted the onus of proof. The court emphasised that while such statements could undermine the accused's credibility, they could not substitute for the prosecution's need to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. The court's reasoning underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that the prosecution's burden of proof was not improperly diminished.

The final orders of the court were to quash the conviction due to the trial judge's error in not properly directing the jury on the treatment of the out-of-court statements. The court directed that a new trial be held, ensuring that the jury would be properly informed on how to consider such statements in the context of the trial. This decision highlighted the necessity for clear judicial direction to prevent miscarriages of justice and to uphold the principles of fairness and due process in criminal proceedings.

Orders