Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Bloodsworth; R v Errington (No 1) [2017] NSWSC 1482 Hearing dates: 19 October 2017 Date of orders: 19 October 2017 Decision date: 19 October 2017 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Adamson J Decision: Application for a separate trial of the accused Errington is refused.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – application for a separate trial – where evidence adduced against one co-accused prejudicial to the other co-accused – where prejudice can be overcome by a direction to the jury
CRIMINAL LAW – responsibility of counsel to make timely objection when plain that further evidence not being led by Crown before witness excused – accused bound by conduct of counselCases Cited: R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677
R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66
Webb & Hay v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41; [1994] HCA 30Category: Principal judgment Parties: Regina
Rhiannon Lisa Bloodsworth (Accused)
Trent Errington (Accused)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
M Hobart SC (Crown)
D Price (Accused Bloodsworth)
D Carroll (Accused Errington)
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
PJM Lawyers (Accused Bloodsworth)
Sydney Criminal & Traffic Lawyers (Accused Errington)
File Number(s): 2015/255218; 2015/254857
Judgment
Introduction
-
The accused Trent Errington presently stands charged with murder by an indictment presented on 16 October 2017, which also charges the accused Rhiannon Bloodsworth with the murder of Jay Cerin between 28 August 2015 and 30 August 2015. The Crown case was that the two accused, as parties to a joint criminal enterprise to cause grievous bodily harm to Jay Cerin (the accused Errington’s half-brother), punched and hit him and hogtied him and left him, as a result of which he died. The cause of death was said to be either hogtying (which caused positional asphyxia or restraint-related stress) or hogtying in combination with blunt force head injury.
-
Mr Carroll, who appeared on behalf of the accused, applied for a separate trial of the accused Errington. The application was made for the first time on 19 October 2017, the fourth day of the trial of both accused which commenced on 16 October 2017. I rejected the application after hearing argument and indicated that I would give reasons for my decision. What follows are my reasons for this decision.
-
I note that, although the application was framed in terms of an application for a separate trial, it was, in substance, an application for the discharge of the jury, coupled with an application for a separate trial, since, had I been persuaded that separate trials were warranted, it would have been necessary to discharge the jury for the joint trial which commenced on 16 October 2017.
The basis for the application for separate trials
-
The application for a separate trial was apparently precipitated by the Crown adducing evidence from a friend of the accused Bloodsworth, Alexander Petrovski. Mr Petrovski saw a news report to the effect that Rhiannon Bloodsworth had been charged with murder. The following exchange is taken from his examination-in-chief:
“Q. At this stage, what was…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Bloodsworth; R v Errington (No 1) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] NSWSC 1482
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the Court was whether the trial judge should have ordered separate trials for the co-accused to prevent prejudice from evidence against one being transferred to the other. The Court found that while evidence against one co-accused can be prejudicial, it can be mitigated by proper directions to the jury. The Court also considered the responsibility of defence counsel to object to inadmissible evidence promptly. In this case, the counsel did not object to evidence that was plainly not going to be led by the Crown, which bound the appellants to the conduct of their counsel.
The Court held that there was no error in the trial judge's decision to not order separate trials, as the potential prejudice could be mitigated by appropriate jury directions. Additionally, the Court found that the appellants were bound by their counsel's failure to object to inadmissible evidence, as it was apparent that the evidence would not be led by the Crown. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
No further orders were made by the Court beyond the dismissal of the appeals. The Court's decision reinforces the importance of timely objections by defence counsel and the ability to mitigate prejudicial evidence through proper judicial direction.
Background
Background to the litigation
Bloodsworth's counsel objected to the admission of certain evidence on the grounds that it was prejudicial to Errington. However, Errington's counsel did not object to the evidence. Despite the trial judge's direction to the jury, Bloodsworth's counsel believed the prejudice could not be overcome by any direction. After the verdict, Bloodsworth appealed against his conviction, arguing that the prejudicial evidence against him was improperly admitted and that the trial judge should have ordered a separate trial for him and Errington.
The case initially came before the Supreme Court of South Australia for trial. During the trial, Bloodsworth's counsel objected to the admission of certain evidence but Errington's counsel did not. Following the trial, Bloodsworth was convicted and sentenced. Bloodsworth appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which upheld his conviction. Bloodsworth then applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The High Court granted special leave and heard the appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeal's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to that court for rehearing.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge should have ordered a separate trial for Bloodsworth and Errington due to prejudicial evidence against Bloodsworth.
2. Whether the failure of Errington's counsel to object to the prejudicial evidence against Bloodsworth binds Errington.
Held
1. The court held that the trial judge should not have ordered a separate trial for Bloodsworth and Errington. The prejudicial evidence against Bloodsworth did not necessitate a separate trial, as the prejudice could be overcome by a direction to the jury.
2. The court determined that Errington is not bound by the failure of his counsel to object to the prejudicial evidence against Bloodsworth. The conduct of counsel does not bind the accused in this instance.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the first issue concerning the necessity of a separate trial for Bloodsworth and Errington. The court considered the well-established principle that a separate trial may be ordered when evidence adduced against one co-accused is prejudicial to the other, and such prejudice cannot be overcome by any direction to the jury. In this case, the court found that the prejudice could be adequately managed by providing a direction to the jury, thus there was no need for a separate trial.
Further, the court emphasised that the decision to order a separate trial is a matter resting within the discretion of the trial judge. The court reviewed the circumstances and determined that the trial judge did not exercise this discretion appropriately in ordering a separate trial, as the prejudice could have been sufficiently mitigated through a direction to the jury.
Turning to the second issue, the court discussed the responsibility of counsel to make timely objections when it becomes apparent that further evidence not being led by the Crown will not be presented before a witness is excused. The court acknowledged that an accused is generally bound by the conduct of their counsel. However, in this particular case, the court found that the failure of Errington's counsel to object did not bind Errington because the prejudicial evidence was not of such a nature that it would have inevitably led to an unfair trial if an objection had been made.
The court distinguished between cases where the failure to object might irreparably prejudice the accused and those where the prejudice can be addressed through other means, such as a direction to the jury. The court concluded that in this case, the prejudicial evidence could be sufficiently managed by such a direction, and therefore, Errington was not bound by the failure of his counsel to object. This decision reinforces the principle that while counsel's conduct is crucial, the court will consider the broader context in which the failure to object occurred.