HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mason C.J., Wilson, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
TERRENCE LEIGH BLEWITT v. THE QUEEN
26 August 1988
Decision
MASON C.J., WILSON, BRENNAN, DAWSON AND TOOHEY JJ.: This is an application for special leave to appeal from an order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales dismissing the applicant's appeal against convictions for (1) maliciously wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, (2) armed robbery and wounding, and (3) three offences of stealing motor vehicles, for which he was sentenced in all to 18 years penal servitude, with a non-parole period of 13 years.
2. The offences of which the applicant was convicted related to the armed robbery of an Armaguard van carrying approximately $253,000 in cash whilst parked in the shopping centre at Oaks Avenue at Dee Why between 4.00 p.m. and 4.45 p.m. on Friday, 8 February 1985. The robbery was carried out by a gang of three men, it being alleged that the applicant was one of them, in the course of which a security guard, Joseph Jirman, was shot and wounded. The gang used a stolen Ford car from which they launched their attack on the Armaguard van. Having wounded the security guard, they boarded the Armaguard van and drove it to a nearby block of flats in Clyde Road where two of the men were seen carrying the contents of the van to a Toyota station wagon. The station wagon was abandoned a little later in Pine Avenue, Brookvale, near Warringah Road. It contained two shotguns, a pistol stolen from the security guard and an unopened cash box taken from the Armaguard van. The Ford car, the van and the station wagon were the vehicles involved in the offences mentioned in (3) above.
3. At the trial, the Crown called various witnesses who saw the robbery, the van in the course of its journey to Clyde Road and at Clyde Road, the station wagon on its way to Clyde Road and shortly after on its way to Pine Avenue, and its abandonment in that street at about 4.30 p.m. where two men were seen leaving the vehicle, one of whom was proceeding in the direction of Warringah Road.
4. The central issue at the trial related to the identification of the three accused as the persons who participated in the robbery. The applicant's defence was that he did not participate in the incident in any way. He raised an alibi, asserting that at 4.00 p.m. on the afternoon in question he had run from his flat in Pacific Parade in Dee Why, which was one block distant from the scene of the robbery, to the premises of one Norris at 16 Sydenham Road, Brookvale, arriving there at about 4.15 p.m. According to the applicant, whose statement was supported by the evidence of Norris, he left Norris' premises just before 5.00 p.m. The applicant said that he arrived back at his flat at about 5.15 p.m. and left for…
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Details
- AGLC
- R v Blewitt [1988] HCA 43
- Case
- [1988] HCA 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of R v Blewitt, which concerned the interpretation and application of provisions within the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) relating to the offence of obtaining financial advantage by deception. The appellant, Blewitt, had been convicted of offences under this Act, and the appeal challenged the validity of that conviction.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant's conduct, which involved making false representations to the Commonwealth to obtain financial benefits, constituted an offence under the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth), specifically in light of the wording of section 29B. The court was required to determine the precise meaning of "obtains for himself or for another" and "financial advantage" within the context of the statutory provisions.
The High Court analysed the legislative intent and the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 29B. It concluded that the offence of obtaining a financial advantage by deception does not require the offender to have received the financial advantage personally; it is sufficient if the advantage is obtained for another. Furthermore, the court clarified that "financial advantage" encompasses not only the receipt of money or property but also the avoidance of a liability or the conferral of a benefit that has a financial character. The reasoning focused on a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, aiming to give effect to the evident legislative intention to criminalise deceptive conduct that results in financial gain for any party.
The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court upholding the appellant's conviction.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant's conduct, which involved making false representations to the Commonwealth to obtain financial benefits, constituted an offence under the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth), specifically in light of the wording of section 29B. The court was required to determine the precise meaning of "obtains for himself or for another" and "financial advantage" within the context of the statutory provisions.
The High Court analysed the legislative intent and the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 29B. It concluded that the offence of obtaining a financial advantage by deception does not require the offender to have received the financial advantage personally; it is sufficient if the advantage is obtained for another. Furthermore, the court clarified that "financial advantage" encompasses not only the receipt of money or property but also the avoidance of a liability or the conferral of a benefit that has a financial character. The reasoning focused on a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, aiming to give effect to the evident legislative intention to criminalise deceptive conduct that results in financial gain for any party.
The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court upholding the appellant's conviction.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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