R v Barnes (No 2)

Case [2014] SASCFC 123


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v BARNES (No 2)

[2014] SASCFC 123

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice Parker)

13 November 2014

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE  - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES - DANGEROUS DRIVING - GENERALLY

Application for permission to appeal against sentence.  The defendant and appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of theft and one count of driving dangerously to escape police pursuit.  The two counts of theft related to the defendant’s purchase of a motor vehicle believing that it was likely to have been stolen and his theft of a caravan.  After being called upon by police to stop driving the vehicle, the defendant continued driving for a period of about 30 minutes.  In the course of the subsequent police pursuit, the defendant drove on the wrong side of the road, reached speeds of up to 140 kilometres per hour and collided with a police vehicle.  The offending was in breach of the terms of a good behaviour bond and the Judge revoked a suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment attaching to that bond.  The Judge imposed an additional three years’ imprisonment in respect of the subject offending and ordered that this be served cumulatively upon an existing term of imprisonment imposed in the Court of Criminal Appeal in relation to prior unrelated offending.  Accordingly, the defendant faced a total term of imprisonment of six years.  The Judge fixed a non-parole period of four years. 

Whether the sentence imposed by the Judge was manifestly excessive.  Whether the sentence imposed by the Judge failed to have regard to the defendant’s existing sentence imposed in the Court of Criminal Appeal.

Held per Gray J (Vanstone and Parker JJ concurring)(refusing permission to appeal):

1.  There is no conflict between the approach of the sentencing Judge in this case and the earlier decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal.

2.  The sentence imposed was well within the sentencing discretion of the Judge.

3.  The sentence imposed had proper regard to the personal antecedents of the defendant and his prospects for rehabilitation.

R v BARNES (No 2)
[2014] SASCFC 123

Court of Criminal Appeal         Gray, Vanstone and Parker JJ

GRAY J.

  1. This is an application for permission to appeal against sentence.

    Introduction

  2. The defendant and applicant, Kym Derwyn Barnes, pleaded guilty in the District Court to two counts of theft and one count of driving dangerously to escape police pursuit.  The defendant admitted breaching the terms of a suspended sentence bond by committing these offences.  A suspended sentence of six months attached to that bond.  The pleas of guilty were entered on 10 June 2014, the date on which the matter was listed for trial. 

  3. The Judge revoked the suspension of the defendant’s sentence of imprisonment of six months and ordered that this sentence was…

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AGLC
R v Barnes (No 2) [2014] SASCFC 123
Case
[2014] SASCFC 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the sentence imposed on the defendant, R, for a dangerous driving offence. The appeal was heard by Gray, Vanstone, and Parker JJ in the Supreme Court of [Jurisdiction - implied, as not specified in text].

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was manifestly excessive, thereby warranting appellate intervention.

The Court considered the personal antecedents of the defendant and his prospects for rehabilitation. Applying the principles of sentencing discretion, the Court found that the sentencing judge had properly taken these factors into account. Consequently, the Court concluded that no basis had been shown to support the contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive, holding that it fell well within the proper exercise of the sentencing judge's discretion.

Accordingly, the Court refused the defendant permission to appeal against his sentence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
In my view, the sentence of the Judge had proper regard to the personal antecedents of the defendant and his prospect for rehabilitation. No basis has been shown to support the contention that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. I consider that the sentence imposed was well within the sentencing discretion of the Judge.Conclusion I would refuse permission to appeal against sentence. VANSTONE J: I agree that permission to appeal should be refused for the reasons written by Gray J. PARKER J: I agree with Gray J and would refuse permission to appeal against sentence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

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