SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Bannout; R v Abdul-Hassien; R v El Sayed [2019] QCA 156
PARTIES:
In CA No 8 of 2019:
R
v
BANNOUT, Mohamad
(applicant)In CA No 9 of 2019:
R
v
ABDUL-HASSIEN, Mohammad Saher
(applicant)In CA No 10 of 2019:
R
v
EL SAYED, Hassan
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 8 of 2019
CA No 9 of 2019
CA No 10 of 2019
DC No 770 of 2018DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Applications
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Southport – Date of Sentences: 17 December 2018 (Kent QC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
16 August 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
25 July 2019
JUDGES:
Fraser and Gotterson JJA and Applegarth J
ORDERS:
In CA No 8 of 2019:
Application refused.In CA No 9 of 2019:
Application refused.In CA No 10 of 2019:
Application refused.CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – PARITY BETWEEN CO-OFFENDERS AND OTHER RELATED OFFENDERS – where the three applicants each pleaded guilty to four counts of dishonestly gaining a pecuniary benefit for themselves, one count of attempting to obtain dishonestly a pecuniary benefit for themselves and one count of dealing with identification information for the purpose of committing an indictable offence – where the applicants were successful in withdrawing $187,675 from ATMs using cloned credit and debit cards on four trips to the Gold Coast – where there was evidence that the applicant Abdul-Hassien was in contact with a taxi driver who was in some way connected with the people who were doing the cloning and supplying of the cards – where the applicants were represented by one counsel during sentencing – where the applicants’ counsel did not press an argument that the applicant Abdul-Hassien had a greater role in the offending – where the learned sentencing judge considered that the evidence did not place the applicant Abdul-Hassien in a more serious position than his co-accused – where the learned sentencing judge sentenced the applicants to identical sentences – where the applicants Bannout and El Sayed contended that there was a relevant difference in the offending of the co-accused – whether there was a relevant difference in the offending of the co-accused – whether the applicants needed to have been separately represented during sentencing – whether the learned sentencing judge failed to apply the parity principle
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE – SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT – where the applicants each pleaded guilty to four counts of dishonestly gaining a pecuniary benefit for themselves, one count of attempting to obtain dishonestly a pecuniary benefit for themselves and one count of dealing with identification information for the purpose of committing an indictable offence – where the learned sentencing judge sentenced each of the applicants to an effective sentence of three years imprisonment, suspended after 12 months imprisonment for an operational period of…
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- Case
- [2019] QCA 156
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether there was a relevant difference in the offending between the co-accused, whether separate representation was necessary during sentencing, and whether the sentencing judge failed to apply the parity principle. Additionally, the court considered whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive and whether the applicants' personal circumstances warranted a lesser sentence. The applicants argued that the sentencing judge did not sufficiently consider their individual circumstances and that the sentences were excessive.
The court found that the sentencing judge had appropriately considered the evidence and the role of each applicant in the offending. The judge had sentenced the applicants to identical sentences, which was appropriate given the parity principle. The court also determined that there was no misapplication of principle in the sentencing process. Each applicant's personal circumstances, including mental health issues and family responsibilities, were considered, but the judge found them insufficient to warrant a different sentence. The appeals were dismissed, and the sentences imposed were upheld.
The final orders in these appeals were that the applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused in each case. The sentences of three years imprisonment, suspended after 12 months for an operational period of three years, were confirmed as appropriate and not manifestly excessive.
Orders
Orders of the court
In CA No 8 of 2019:
Application refused.
In CA No 9 of 2019:
Application refused.
In CA No 10 of 2019:
Application refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicants, Bannout, Abdul-Hassien, and El Sayed, were convicted and sentenced in the lower court. They subsequently appealed against their sentences to the higher court. The grounds for the appeal included arguments regarding parity between co-offenders, the necessity for separate legal representation during sentencing, and the contention that the sentences were manifestly excessive. The applicants specifically argued that Abdul-Hassien's role in the offending warranted a different sentence and that their personal circumstances should have led to more lenient sentences. The higher court was tasked with determining whether there was a relevant difference in the offending of the co-accused, whether separate representation was necessary, and whether the sentencing judge applied the parity principle correctly. Additionally, the court examined whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive given the applicants' personal circumstances.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was there a relevant difference in the offending of the co-accused that warranted a different sentence for Abdul-Hassien?
2. Was it necessary for the applicants to have been separately represented during sentencing?
3. Did the learned sentencing judge fail to apply the parity principle correctly?
4. Did the learned sentencing judge misapply the principles in determining the length of the suspended sentences for Abdul-Hassien and Bannout?
5. Was the sentence imposed on the applicants manifestly excessive?
Held
1. The court held that there was no relevant difference in the offending of the co-accused that warranted a different sentence for Abdul-Hassien.
2. The court held that it was not necessary for the applicants to have been separately represented during sentencing.
3. The court held that the learned sentencing judge did not fail to apply the parity principle correctly.
4. The court held that the learned sentencing judge did not misapply the principles in determining the length of the suspended sentences for Abdul-Hassien and Bannout.
5. The court held that the sentence imposed on the applicants was not manifestly excessive.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants, Bannout, Abdul-Hassien, and El Sayed, each pleaded guilty to multiple counts of dishonestly gaining a pecuniary benefit and other related offences. They were sentenced by the learned sentencing judge to identical sentences of three years imprisonment, suspended after 12 months imprisonment for an operational period of three years. The applicants contested various aspects of their sentences on appeal. The court addressed the issues raised by the applicants in turn.
In considering whether there was a relevant difference in the offending of the co-accused that warranted a different sentence for Abdul-Hassien, the court noted that while Abdul-Hassien was in contact with a taxi driver connected to the people who were cloning and supplying the cards, the evidence did not place him in a more serious position than his co-accused. The learned sentencing judge had considered the evidence and found no significant difference in the roles of the co-accused, and thus, no basis for a different sentence for Abdul-Hassien.
On the issue of whether the applicants needed to have been separately represented during sentencing, the court found that there was no legal requirement for separate representation. The applicants were adequately represented by one counsel, who did not press an argument for a greater role for Abdul-Hassien in the offending. The court concluded that separate representation was not necessary under the circumstances of this case.
Regarding whether the learned sentencing judge failed to apply the parity principle correctly, the court found that the sentencing judge had appropriately applied the principle of parity between co-offenders. The judge had considered the offending of each applicant and imposed identical sentences, which demonstrated adherence to the parity principle.
In relation to the alleged misapplication of principles in determining the length of the suspended sentences for Abdul-Hassien and Bannout, the court held that the learned sentencing judge had correctly applied the relevant principles. The judge had considered the personal circumstances of each applicant and imposed sentences that were commensurate with the seriousness of the offending and the need for deterrence and rehabilitation.
Finally, the court considered whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. The applicants argued that their personal circumstances warranted lesser sentences, but the court found that the sentences were not manifestly excessive. The judge had considered the personal circumstances of each applicant and had balanced these against the need to impose a sentence that reflected the seriousness of the offending and the need for deterrence and rehabilitation.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in sentencing co-offenders, the court must ensure parity unless there is a relevant difference in the offending. Where there is no such difference, separate representation is not necessary, and the principle of parity should be applied. The court must also ensure that the sentence imposed is not manifestly excessive, taking into account the personal circumstances of the offender and the need for deterrence and rehabilitation.