R v Arthur Hoyle - [2017] ACTSC 24

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

R v Arthur Hoyle

Citation:

[2017] ACTSC 24

Hearing Date:

3 February 2017

DecisionDate:

13 February 2017

Before:

Robinson AJ

Decision:

I allow the tendency evidence.

I decline to order separate Trials.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – similar facts – judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence – pre-trial application to rely upon tendency evidence – pre-trial application for separate trials.

Legislation Cited:

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 55, 97, 101, 137, 192A

Cases Cited:

El Haddad v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 10; (2015) 88 NSWLR 93

IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14; (2016) 90 ALJR 529
R v Ford [2009] NSWCCA 306; [2009] 201 A.Crim R 451
Sokolowskyj v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 55; (2014) 239 A Crim R 528

Vojneski v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 57

Texts Cited:

John Dyson Heydon AC QC, Cross on Evidence (LexisNexis Butterworths, 10^th ed, 2014)

Parties:

The Queen (Crown)

Arthur Hoyle (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel

Mr T Hickey (Crown)

Ms L Chapman SC (Defendant)

Solicitors

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)

Bradley Allen Love Lawyers (Defendant)

File Number:

SCC 150 of 2016

ROBINSON AJ:
1. This judgment deals with two pre trial applications under s 192A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) which I will call “the Act” in these reasons.

2. Arthur Hoyle, the Accused, faces trial on an indictment containing 11 counts which I set out below.

3. The Crown seeks to rely upon tendency evidence. The Accused applies to sever the indictment so that there is one trial on five counts of the indictment and a further trial consisting of six counts. The five counts are concerned with one complainant. The Accused took no issue with the remaining six counts, which involve five other complainants, being tried together.

4. Counsel for the Accused, Ms Chapman SC foreshadowed the possibility of a further application being brought in due course based upon the ground of contamination or concoction. However, inquiries are still in progress concerning that matter. At the present time there is no application concerning that matter on foot.

5. The trial is fixed to commence on 20 March 2017.

6. It is useful to set out the counts in the indictment in abbreviated form:

That on 20 April 2015 at Canberra Arthur Marshall Hoyle committed an act of indecency in the presence of ZG, without her consent, being reckless as to whether she was consenting.
That on 20 April 2015 at Canberra aforesaid Arthur Marshall Hoyle committed an act of indecency on ZG, without her consent, being reckless as to whether she was consenting.
That on 23 April 2015 at Canberra aforesaid Arthur Marshall Hoyle committed an act of indecency on KA, without her consent, being reckless as to whether she was consenting.
That on 23 April 2015 at Canberra aforesaid Arthur Marshall Hoyle committed an act of indecency on TL, without her consent, being reckless as to whether she was…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Arthur Hoyle

Details

AGLC: R v Arthur Hoyle [2017] ACTSC 24
Case: [2017] ACTSC 24
Decision Date: 13 February 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Arthur Hoyle, was charged with two counts of indecent assault and one count of attempted rape. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of the relevant jurisdiction. The primary issue before the court was whether the prosecution should be permitted to rely on evidence of prior similar acts by the appellant, which had not resulted in criminal charges, and whether the appellant should be granted separate trials for each of the charges.

The court considered the discretion available under the Evidence Act to admit or exclude evidence of prior similar acts. The appellant argued that the evidence was prejudicial and irrelevant, and that it should be excluded under section 97 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution contended that the evidence was relevant to the issue of intent and should be admitted under section 97 and 98 of the Act. The court also considered the appellant's application for separate trials, which he argued was necessary to prevent prejudice from the evidence of similar acts.

The court found that the evidence of prior similar acts was relevant to the issue of intent and should be admitted. The court held that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudice to the appellant. The court also found that there was no sufficient ground for ordering separate trials, as the charges were part of a single transaction and could be conveniently tried together. The court declined the application for separate trials and allowed the admission of the tendency evidence. The appellant was subsequently found guilty on all counts.

Orders

Orders of the court

I allow the tendency evidence.

I decline to order separate Trials.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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Case Title:	R v Arthur Hoyle
Citation:	[2017] ACTSC 24
Hearing Date:	3 February 2017
DecisionDate:	13 February 2017
Before:	Robinson AJ
Decision:	I allow the tendency evidence. I decline to order separate Trials.
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – similar facts – judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence – pre-trial application to rely upon tendency evidence – pre-trial application for separate trials.
Legislation Cited:	Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 55, 97, 101, 137, 192A
Cases Cited:	El Haddad v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 10; (2015) 88 NSWLR 93 IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14; (2016) 90 ALJR 529 R v Ford [2009] NSWCCA 306; [2009] 201 A.Crim R 451 Sokolowskyj v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 55; (2014) 239 A Crim R 528 Vojneski v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 57
Texts Cited:	John Dyson Heydon AC QC, Cross on Evidence (LexisNexis Butterworths, 10^th ed, 2014)
Parties:	The Queen (Crown) Arthur Hoyle (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel Mr T Hickey (Crown) Ms L Chapman SC (Defendant)
Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Bradley Allen Love Lawyers (Defendant)
File Number:	SCC 150 of 2016