R v Armistead - [2017] SADC 63

District Court of South Australia
(Criminal)
R v ARMISTEAD
[2017] SADC 63
Reasons for Decision of His Honour Judge Slattery (ex tempore)
16 June 2017
EVIDENCE - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - VOIR DIRE
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS
Rule 49 application to exclude evidence of the search of the defendant’s vehicle.
Held:
Application granted.
Controlled Substances Act 1984 s 32(3), s 52; Summary Offences Act 1953 s 41(1), s 68, referred to.
R v Golja [2017] SASCFC 61, discussed.
R v Nguyen [2013] SASCFC 91; R v Rockford [2015] SASCFC 51; R v Nguyen [2015] SASCFC 7; R v Nguyen (2013) 17 SASR 432, considered.

R v ARMISTEAD
[2017] SADC 63

On Information for arraignment on 28 April 2017, the accused is charged on four counts; two counts of trafficking in a controlled drug and two counts of unlawful possession associated with the trafficking charge as follows:-
First Count
Statement of Offence
Trafficking in a controlled drug. (Section 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 25^th day of April 2016 at Fairview Park, trafficked in a controlled drug, namely methylamphetamine, knowing or being reckless as to the fact the substance was a controlled drug.
Second Count
Statement of Offence
Unlawful possession. (Section 41(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 25^th day of April 2016 at Fairview Park, had possession of personal property, namely cash in the amount of $11,700, which either at the time of such possession or at a subsequent time before the making of this complaint in respect of such possession, was reasonably suspected of having been obtained by unlawful means.
Third Count
Statement of Offence
Unlawful possession. (Section 41(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 25^th day of April 2016 at Largs Bay, had possession of personal property, namely cash in the amount of $4,700, which either at the time of such possession or at a subsequent time before the making of this complaint in respect of such possession, was reasonably suspected of having been obtained by unlawful means.
Fourth Count
Statement of Offence
Trafficking in a controlled drug. (Section 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 17^th day of November 2016 at Highbury, trafficked in a controlled drug, namely methylamphetamine, knowing or being reckless as to the fact the substance was a controlled drug.
This application challenges the legality of the search of the accused’s vehicle that led to the discovery of a very large cache; 55.88 grams of crystals containing methylamphetamine, weapons and cash in the sum of $11,700, all of which indicated large scale trading in drugs by the accused.
In order to determine this application it is necessary to have regard to the pertinent facts that are set out hereunder.

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Armistead

Details

AGLC: R v Armistead [2017] SADC 63
Case: [2017] SADC 63
Decision Date: 16 June 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Armistead, the High Court of Australia was presented with a dispute regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure. The respondent, Armistead, was charged with drug trafficking offences. The police had executed a warrantless search of the respondent's premises and seized a quantity of drugs. The central issue before the court was whether the evidence obtained from the warrantless search should be excluded under the common law rule against evidence obtained by illegal means.

The court considered the established principles governing the admissibility of evidence obtained through warrantless searches. The court acknowledged that, generally, evidence obtained in breach of a statutory requirement for a warrant is inadmissible. However, the court recognised exceptions to this rule, such as where there is an exigent circumstance or where the evidence is obtained incidentally to a lawful arrest. The court held that the search and seizure in this case did not fall within any of the established exceptions and that the evidence should have been excluded.

The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the warrantless search should have been excluded under the common law rule against evidence obtained by illegal means. The court held that the respondent's rights under the Constitution were infringed by the unlawful search and seizure. The court found that the evidence was obtained in violation of the respondent's right to privacy and security of person, which is protected under the Constitution. The court ordered that the charges against the respondent be dismissed due to the exclusion of the evidence obtained from the warrantless search. The court further held that the exclusion of the evidence was a significant factor in the decision to dismiss the charges.

Orders