R v Armistead
[2017] SADC 63
•16 June 2017
District Court of South Australia
(Criminal)
R v ARMISTEAD
[2017] SADC 63
Reasons for Decision of His Honour Judge Slattery (ex tempore)
16 June 2017
EVIDENCE - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - VOIR DIRE
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS
Rule 49 application to exclude evidence of the search of the defendant’s vehicle.
Held:
Application granted.
Controlled Substances Act 1984 s 32(3), s 52; Summary Offences Act 1953 s 41(1), s 68, referred to.
R v Golja [2017] SASCFC 61, discussed.
R v Nguyen [2013] SASCFC 91; R v Rockford [2015] SASCFC 51; R v Nguyen [2015] SASCFC 7; R v Nguyen (2013) 17 SASR 432, considered.
R v ARMISTEAD
[2017] SADC 63
On Information for arraignment on 28 April 2017, the accused is charged on four counts; two counts of trafficking in a controlled drug and two counts of unlawful possession associated with the trafficking charge as follows:-
First Count
Statement of Offence
Trafficking in a controlled drug. (Section 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 25th day of April 2016 at Fairview Park, trafficked in a controlled drug, namely methylamphetamine, knowing or being reckless as to the fact the substance was a controlled drug.
Second Count
Statement of Offence
Unlawful possession. (Section 41(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 25th day of April 2016 at Fairview Park, had possession of personal property, namely cash in the amount of $11,700, which either at the time of such possession or at a subsequent time before the making of this complaint in respect of such possession, was reasonably suspected of having been obtained by unlawful means.
Third Count
Statement of Offence
Unlawful possession. (Section 41(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 25th day of April 2016 at Largs Bay, had possession of personal property, namely cash in the amount of $4,700, which either at the time of such possession or at a subsequent time before the making of this complaint in respect of such possession, was reasonably suspected of having been obtained by unlawful means.
Fourth Count
Statement of Offence
Trafficking in a controlled drug. (Section 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984).
Particulars of Offence
Edward Dale Armistead on the 17th day of November 2016 at Highbury, trafficked in a controlled drug, namely methylamphetamine, knowing or being reckless as to the fact the substance was a controlled drug.
This application challenges the legality of the search of the accused’s vehicle that led to the discovery of a very large cache; 55.88 grams of crystals containing methylamphetamine, weapons and cash in the sum of $11,700, all of which indicated large scale trading in drugs by the accused.
In order to determine this application it is necessary to have regard to the pertinent facts that are set out hereunder.
Sometime after midnight on 25 April 2016, police were tasked to a Fairview Park address at Von Nida Street, an address near to Ferrier Street. The police officers present were Constable Grasby and Senior Constable Newell. The police had received reports of a large white utility driving loudly up and down the street. It appears that the vehicle was travelling on Von Nida Street. The complaint came from a resident of Von Nida Street. A police fleet attended at Von Nida Street and saw a white utility vehicle parked on the wrong side of the road and partially across a driveway. The police drove past the utility. At the time the lights of the police vehicle were shone into the cabin of the utility but no person could be seen present. The police turned into Ferrier Street to check if there were other white utility vehicles about the place. None could be found.
As the police were in Ferrier Road and intending to return to Von Nida Street, a message was received which was communicated to them by radio, that a resident of Von Nida Street had phoned police to say that a person had been seen inside the vehicle and sat up after the police car had gone past. Constable Grasby then telephoned the number of the resident and was informed of the facts relating to the person sitting up in the vehicle. The police car returned to Von Nida Street and parked 10 metres away from and facing towards the front of utility.
Constable Grasby got out of the police vehicle, walked towards the utility vehicle. At that time or slightly before that time, the occupant of the utility sat up in the driver's seat. He was approached and spoken to by Constable Grasby. His details were taken and they were checked by Constable Grasby who returned to the police vehicle. Soon afterwards, Constable Grasby returned from the police vehicle having left the occupant, Mr Armistead, with Senior Constable Newell. He walked to the passenger side of the utility. He walked around the white utility and shone his torch, as he said, in through the passenger side window. When doing so, he said that he could see gloves lying on the floor of the utility and positioned under the driver’s legs. They were black.
As a result of seeing gloves on the floor of the vehicle he walked around to the driver's side, saw the gloves again and saw what he thought was a screwdriver but what was in fact what appeared to be a pink straw.
Mindful of the powers available under s 68 of the Summary Offences Act,[1] Constable Grasby said that he formed the view there was reasonable cause to suspect that in the utility there were stolen goods, or that there was an object in possession which constituted an offence, or that there was evidence of a commission of an indictable offence.[2] A search was carried out and as a result of that search 55.88 grams of crystals and crystalline powder containing 44.38 grams of methylamphetamine was discovered. Police also located $11,700 in the cavity of the passenger side headrest along with typical indicia of sale, including two mobile phones, a tick list and plastic resealable bags. Under a s 52 Controlled Substances Act warrant, the police searched the premises resulting in a seizure of further money in the sum of $4,700 locked in a safe.
[1] Section 68 — Power to search suspected vehicles, vessels, and persons
(1)A police officer may do any or all of the following things, namely, stop, search and detain—
(a)a vehicle or vessel in or upon which there is reasonable cause to suspect that—
(i)there are stolen goods; or
(ii)there is an object, possession of which constitutes an offence; or
(iii)there is evidence of the commission of an indictable offence;
(b)a person who is reasonably suspected of having, on or about his or her person—
(i)stolen goods; or
(ii)an object, possession of which constitutes an offence; or
(iii)evidence of the commission of an indictable offence.
(2)In this section—
stolen goods includes goods obtained by the commission of an offence.
[2] Constable Grasby did not make clear whether he had one, two or all points of view at the relevant time.
By substituted application for directions under rule 49, the applicant seeks orders that evidence which was seized by police on 25 April be excluded from evidence in the trial, and that consequentially all evidence following the execution of the s 52 Controlled Substances Act warrant at 403 Military Road, Largs Bay, which was the residence of Mr Armistead, also be excluded from evidence. The basis was that the information upon which the s 52 warrant was based was that which was obtained from the initial search. The prosecution has conceded before me today that in the event that the evidence concerning the initial search is excluded, the evidence concerning the second search would also fall.
The primary challenge before me is to the search by the police officers of the utility early in the morning of 25 April 2016. As I have said, the basis of the search is s 68 of the Summary Offences Act. The assessment required is both from the point of view of the police officer which is subjective, and from the point of view of the dispassionate objective observer in the shoes of the relevant police officer or officers which is objective. The question for both is whether there is reasonable cause to suspect any or all of the matters in s 68(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Summary Offences Act. Such a view is to be formed in the whole of the background circumstances then known by the person at the time that the suspicion is formed. That in turn means that each situation turns on its own peculiar facts and as the accused correctly conceded, particular cases are only of limited assistance because of the varying circumstances of such cases. That said, the principles seem reasonably well settled. Thus particular cases with different factual circumstances will have varying degrees of weight and importance. That is typical of any requirement to consider the whole of the background facts and events that may or may not lead to the formation of any such suspicion.
As in every aspect of life, if it was necessary, in the formation of a subjective view, or on the assessment of an objective position, to state the importance of particular matters with precise definition, the burden would be too great. The enquiry would also be misplaced. This is because the legislation requires the person to reasonably suspect: the test is as general and specific as that.
Parliament has deliberately used the approach of 'reasonably suspects' and in the interpretation of that section the authorities do not require the formation of a concluded view about the existence of a particular thing or about particular conduct. That is not the feature of the formation of a view that allows the police officer, and therefore the objective person, to reasonably suspect particular things or conduct. I think it is unhelpful to over analyse the section particularly with an emphasis upon one or other particular subparagraph.
The power of search is obviously an invasion of a person’s privacy and individual interests. Searches properly conducted regularly produce evidence of serious criminal conduct that so readily would attack the health and welfare of our society based, as it is, on principles of “individual” freedoms. Parliament, as the legislative arm of government, has seen fit to prescribe those circumstances where these individual freedoms are postponed to the need for the ascertainment of criminal conduct. The authorities on this issue are sufficiently well-known and do not require rehearsal here.[3]
[3] R v Nguyen [2013] SASCFC 91; R v Rockford [2015] SASCFC 51; R v Nguyen [2015] SASCFC 7.
In the case at bar, the prosecution case depends almost entirely on the evidence of Constable Grasby. He is a police constable of five years’ experience. On 25 April 2016, he was working on night shift. He was then paired with Senior Constable Newell. Just after midnight on 25 April 2016, he responded to a police tasking to Von Nida Street about the behaviour of a white utility vehicle. They attended the street and a white utility vehicle was identified. The police drove past it. They noticed it was parked on the incorrect side of the road and could see nobody in either the passenger or driver’s seat. The police then drove into Ferrier Street and looked to see if there was another utility vehicle in the area. In that process, Constable Grasby made a phone call to the reporting person, having received a radio communication that suggested there was a person in the utility on Von Nida Street, who had allegedly reacted to the passing police vehicle by looking up. The reporting person advised Constable Grasby that he had seen the police drive past the utility vehicle and that the person in the utility sat up when the police car was out of view.
This person had lain back down once the police had left the street. Some of these facts are a little difficult to reconcile. My understanding of Constable Grasby's evidence is that this conversation with the resident took place in Ferrier Street. Accepting those facts it is difficult to know what significance should be placed upon the occupant looking up. This may have significance if, for example, there was evidence that the occupant saw the police coming up Von Nida Street. There is no such evidence.
The police car returned to Von Nida Street and was then parked some 10 metres in front of a white utility vehicle and facing it. Constable Grasby exited the vehicle and he said he intended to walk up to the utility vehicle to see if the bonnet was warm to touch. As he got close he could see somebody, a human figure, moving about in the cabin. He said he was not looking to see a person in the car. I found that evidence difficult to comprehend unless he was certain that there was someone in the utility vehicle. Before this time he had received information from the resident that there was a person in the car. In any event, consistent with what he was told, that there was a person within the vehicle, he saw someone in the driver's seat and went to the driver's side door and had a brief conversation with Mr Armistead. He asked him his name and what he was doing there and he asked him for his licence. Mr Armistead provided his name and driver's licence. He said that he had had “a fight with his missus”, and that was about the extent of the conversation. Constable Grasby returned to the police car, conducted checks on Mr Armistead’s information. Nothing came up on those checks in relation to the licence or in relation to any criminal record of Mr Armistead. At the time he made the check, Constable Grasby left Senior Constable Newell with Mr Armistead.
After he had made the check at the police vehicle, Constable Grasby returned to the vehicle and wanted to walk around checking the tyres to check for signs the vehicle had been doing burnouts. He was using his torch; this was at about 1 a.m. on 25 April 2016. While inspecting the tyres he looked inside the vehicle where he saw some gloves in the driver’s side foot well and also a mobile phone in the centre console and what looked like a black bum bag. He described the gloves as black, full-fingered gloves with some orange writing or marking. He then said that there was also a mobile phone on the floor. It was difficult to reconcile this evidence with the other evidence of a mobile phone being in the centre console.
In clarification of questions from me, Constable Grasby said he first saw the gloves when he pointed the torch through the passenger side window of the utility. Having done that he went to the rear of the vehicle and then came around to the driver's side door of the vehicle. Senior Constable Newell remained with Mr Armistead. Constable Grasby said he wanted to confirm whether the gloves were where he saw them; he looked at the gloves from the driver's side door and then saw what he thought to be a screwdriver. This was the straw on the floor of the vehicle. It matters not whether or not Constable Grasby was mistaken about that, if he had a belief that there was a screwdriver on the floor that might be sufficient.
These events all sit in the background that Constable Grasby also knew that there had been a conversation between Senior Constable Newell and another police officer about a white utility. That conversation suggested that a white utility may have been involved in an earlier tasking that night. He could hear the communication about that, and having heard all of the communications that night, including from a resident, and having conducted his walk around of the car and looking inside the car, he decided to proceed to search the vehicle under s 68 of the Summary Offences Act.
He said that in his mind there was a reasonable cause to suspect that there may be stolen items in the car or items, possession of which constituted an offence, or that there was evidence of an indictable offence having been committed. He said he based his suspicion on the fact that the utility vehicle had been involved in multiple taskings that had come to police attention. He had heard this on police communications. There had only been one previous tasking in relation to this utility on that night and that was at Target Hill Road at Greenwith. At that time there had been a domestic disturbance reported by residents and police were called to the utility. Mr Armistead was not in the utility and it was occupied on the passenger side by a woman by the name of Danielle Edwards. There was some slightly obscure evidence that a person “Ed”, who had been earlier with Edwards, was seen in a taxi going past the Target Hill Road tasking point. Nothing came of this in the evidence. And because of the suspicion aroused in the mind of the police officer at that time, the vehicle was searched at Target Hill Road but with no result.
Constable Grasby also took into account that on the initial attendance the utility vehicle appeared empty and the police received a call through, suggesting that the person in the car had shown himself. Also, he said the gloves in the car were commonly used by people committing offences. He also thought the mobile phone could have been stolen. He was unable to suggest any basis on which he could form the view about the mobile phone. He said that he thought the car may have been used in offences of breaking into other cars. Thus the suspicion was that the people in the car had been committing the offences. He was wearing a body camera but he did not operate the body camera correctly and he explained why that was so. There was no recording of these events as a result.
During the course of his evidence, Exhibit VDP1 was played. This is the disk containing a record of the police communications. Constable Grasby explained that one of the reports in relation to the white utility vehicle was that a mention was made of a “402” and a “101”. A 101 is a code for a domestic disturbance, a 402 is code for suspicions of persons on property. The later evidence received suggested there was no connection whatsoever between the vehicle and the suspicions of persons on a property. He said that after hearing the calls over the police communications system he immediately searched the vehicle. The greater likelihood is that the calls did have an influence on the decision he made to search the vehicle. That was because, as he said:-
The vehicle was already sort of coming into police suspicion that it was being involved in, you know, a 402 which is a person unlawfully on premises. People were already calling in about the vehicle in those areas so the 101 tasking would have been called in by someone.”
As I have said, the 402 report was not connected with the vehicle and the 101 was a domestic tasking.
Constable Grasby was cross-examined. He was questioned about the statements that he had provided in support of his evidence. He confirmed that he had not made any record of any conversation with Mr Armistead before he commenced the search. The first time he purported to record any alleged conversation with Mr Armistead was when he prepared his statement which was signed off on 15 June 2016. He also agreed that notwithstanding that he was duty-bound to do so, he did not put his suspicions to Mr Armistead for recording on tape. He did not do it because it did not occur to him, although he agreed that it was something that he should have done. As a result, Mr Armistead was never given an opportunity to agree or disagree with the content of conversations alleged to have occurred between Constable Grasby and Mr Armistead.
Constable Grasby then confirmed that at no stage did anybody suggest that the person or persons connected to a white utility were involved in identifiable criminal activity. He said that there was no information conveyed to him in any form to suggest that the vehicle might have stolen goods in it. He also agreed that there was no information conveyed to him that the vehicle might have in it an object, the possession of which would constitute the offence. There was no suggestion that the vehicle or Mr Armistead had been involved in any serious offending. Although Constable Grasby agreed with all of those propositions, that is not necessarily fatal to the formation of a reasonable cause to suspect. However, when regard is had to the content of s 68 they are very important matters.
It also became clear in cross-examination of Constable Grasby that there was no recording of what was said during the initial conversations with Mr Armistead and that it was only recently that he has gone back and listened to the communications records held by the police. The suggestion is that there has been some ex post facto reinforcement of the view formed. He denied that there was any reconstruction on his part but he did agree that the only time he listened to the police recordings was in the last month or two. He agreed that initially the only pertinent information that was recorded from the communications passed on to him was the fact that a vehicle had been observed driving up and down the street doing burnouts and there was a white utility vehicle hanging around on one or two occasions. He agreed that burnouts or the mere presence of a vehicle would not have justified the search of the vehicle. He also agreed there was nothing discernible about the vehicle that was consistent with burnouts and that although a person sitting up when the police drove off and sitting down again afterwards, may not be suspicious. It may also be explicable of someone sitting up as a consequence of lights attracting his attention.
Constable Grasby agreed that he did not have any evidence that Mr Armistead was hiding from anyone including police; he accepted that he may have been lying prone across the two front seats of the vehicle. He was then asked about the observations he made concerning the gloves and the mobile phone at Mr Armistead’s feet while he was seated. He confirmed that he saw the gloves when he shone the torch at the passenger side door for the first time. He confirmed that he had no information at all that Mr Armistead, his utility or the gloves, were in any way connected with any theft or break-in on any occasion, and that the presence of those gloves were equally consistent with the tools of trade of a genuine occupation.
Constable Grasby said that he was aware that the vehicle had been searched earlier on 24 April at about 10.20 p.m. by police officer Ashley Craig. He said he had seen Officer Craig's statement as it was provided to him. He said that he was requested by police prosecutions to read that statement. Insofar as that is a standard procedure amongst the police it is a procedure which must stop. Constable Grasby confirmed that he read that statement of Constable Craig and since then he has provided two further statements elaborating on his reasonable suspicion. The status of those two further statements may be affected by Constable Grasby having viewed the statement of Constable Craig.
This is a risk that will always arise in that fact circumstance and may lead to an attack upon the credibility of Constable Grasby. That risk should be obviated by ensuring that in cases of this kind, such a procedure is not followed or allowed. The situation is obviously different where an officer is in the process of forming a view and has regard to all available information, including material from other officers. This is not that case.
Constable Grasby agreed that when he first shone the torch on the car and when he identified the gloves, he was not able to see any item consistent with drugs or other drug activity. He agreed that even if he suspected that there was a screwdriver there, the fact that there was a screwdriver, standing alone, was quite innocuous and would not justify a search. He was able to later identify that what he saw on the floor of the vehicle was only a plastic straw. He agreed that it must have been immediately obvious to him when he looked that it was not a screwdriver. He also agreed that the fact or suspicion of a screwdriver or the mistake about a screwdriver could not have formed any part of his decision to continue searching. He was also about to confirm that the gloves are not black. That is plainly so having regard to Exhibit VDP2.
Constable Craig was then asked to confirm the things that aroused his suspicion. The first aspect he mentioned was that he considered there was a possibility of stolen goods in the vehicle. He said that he thought there may have been stolen goods in the car and he was then asked what justified the suspicion. He said that what justified the suspicion was the information that he had received on the police radio that the vehicle had already been attended to by police.
As I have already indicated, the utility vehicle had been attended to by police in relation to a report of a domestic dispute. There was no suggestion, much less any evidence, of any aspect of a break-in associated with that attendance by police.
Constable Grasby was then asked what, in those calls, would suggest that the vehicle or anyone in the vehicle had been involved in a theft of property. He said that he was not aware of the calls at the time and he accepted that having been challenged about the fact that he was not aware of the calls, he could not have formed that suspicion because there was no information on which to base the suspicion.
He said:-[4]
The whole incident as it occurred aroused my suspicion to the fact that there been stolen property in the car, that there could have been anything in the car that been an offence.
[4] T 46.29.
When Constable Grasby was challenged about that evidence he said that he did not believe that the suspicion was based on the car being involved in a crime. He was then asked to identify on what was his suspicion based, for example, on the persons in the car. He said that what raised his suspicion was:-
The surroundings of the vehicle, that's where my suspicion arose.
I asked him what he meant by the terms “surroundings”. His response to me was:-
The incident where police were involved in that vehicle, the current process we are relating to involving that vehicle.
I then asked him to clarify his answers to my questions having regard to the content of s 68 of the Summary Offences Act. He said:-[5]
There was just a feeling at the time of everything that was involving that vehicle and Mr Armistead aroused my suspicion.
[5] T 68.10-.12.
Constable Grasby thereby confirmed that what he was operating on was “just a feeling”. He also confirmed that he did not see any evidence to reasonably suspect the commission of an indictable offence inside the white utility vehicle. He confirmed that there was no information that there was stolen goods in it and he confirmed that there was no evidence to reasonably suspect there was an object in it, possession of which constituted an offence. He confirmed that what he had at the time was a “feeling”.
I will not traverse in detail the evidence of Senior Constable Newell and Constable Craig. Senior Constable Newell was the person who was the accompanying officer with Constable Grasby on the particular evening. He did not form the view that there was reasonable cause to suspect and that matter was left to Constable Grasby. Constable Craig confirmed that the same vehicle that had been stopped at about 10.42 p.m. on 24 April 2016, on the basis that there had been a report of a domestic dispute.
The accused submitted that having regard to the authorities which bind me: R v Nguyen [2013] SASCFC 91; R v Rockford [2015] SASCFC 51; R v Nguyen [2015] SASCFC 7; there was no basis for Constable Grasby to reasonably suspect for the purposes of s 68(1)(a). He referred in particular to [21] and [22] of the decision in R v Nguyen (2013) 17 SASR 432, and the fact that a suspicion in the context of an investigation of the truth of a fact is a working hypothesis for which there is some supporting material. There must be a rational connection between the supporting material and the suspicion. Mere curiosity or idle wondering about the suspicion of that fact is not the same as the suspicion that a fact exists.
It was said at [22] in Nguyen that the facts must not only rationally produce a suspicion in the mind of the police officer, but it must also engender that suspicion in the mind of a person thinking reasonably about that information. It is not necessary to decide whether or not the latter aspect of that passage is a tautology having regard to the fact that the person referred to there is a reasonable bystander. The presumption would be and must be that such person thinks reasonably, otherwise that person would not fit the description of the reasonable dispassionate bystander. I leave that matter to one side.
The prosecution submitted that when the whole of the circumstances of the case are taken into account, as must be the correct approach in this matter, there was a basis for Constable Grasby to have reasonable cause to suspect. I accept that the court’s approach is to take the whole of the circumstances into account. That would be the position taken by the dispassionate observer who would view the matter having regard to the whole of the information possessed by the police officer at the time.
I agree that at the relevant time, having regard to the information that was in the possession of Constable Grasby, all that can be said was that the police officer, and so the dispassionate observer, would only have had a “feeling” at the time. I am therefore not satisfied that at the time of the search the police officer had any basis to reasonably suspect that there was, in the vehicle, stolen goods, or that there was an object, the possession of which constituted an offence, or that there was evidence of the commission of an indictable offence.
At its highest, Constable Grasby said that the only information that he had was that there were two gloves on the floor of the utility. He thought later that there was also a screwdriver on the floor adjacent to those gloves and I accept that even if he was mistaken about that, it was a matter he had taken into account. As disclosed from photographs in VDD2, that was a pink-coloured straw. He knew it was a straw before he looked further into the utility. He knew from the information that he independently received that the driver had been lying prone across the seat of the vehicle and that the vehicle was illegally parked. At the time that he decided to search the vehicle he was not aware of all of the information being provided through the police communications system. He was aware of some of the information on that system but not all of it.
Constable Grasby accepted that he also learnt later of further matters on those communications, but only recently, and not at the time that he made his decision. It is accepted that the relevant test is to be applied at the time the decision is made to search the vehicle.
In my opinion, the information that he did have, considered separately or together, was not sufficient to lead him to reasonably suspect as required for the provision.
I come to the exercise of my discretion. In R v Rockford (2015) SASC 51 Stanley J at [38] and [39] set out the matters to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion. Those matters have been recently reconsidered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Golja [2017] SASCFC 61, from [33]. At [35] in Golja Stanley J again addresses this question of the enlivenment of the discretion and the competing considerations. On the one hand are the public interest and the protection of citizens from the possible abuse of police powers. On the other, the need to ensure that the public interest in seeing the guilty convicted is not frustrated where the unlawfulness or impropriety of police conduct is not the result of some conscious or deliberate flouting of the limitations on the exercise of the search power or the result of some systematic misunderstanding by police about the limits of that power.
I do not suggest that in this case there has been a deliberate flouting on the limitations of the exercise of the search power, although I have some criticisms in relation to some of the processes used by the police. They can be easily corrected. I am dealing only with the aspect of systematic misunderstanding about the limits of that power.
Even if the test was of impropriety, I would find that there was no impropriety. However, when a police officer forms a view on a feeling that he had at the time, having regard to the information that was before him, I find that is a very significant feature militating in favour of the exercise of my discretion in this matter to exclude this evidence. I therefore would exercise my discretion accordingly.
On the application for directions that is dated 13 June 2017, I make an order that all of the evidence and items seized by police on 25 April 2016, from a white Ford utility bearing South Australian registration number S272 ABD be excluded from evidence in the trial of the applicant.
I make a further order that all evidence and items seized by police on 25 April 2016, following the execution of a s 52 Controlled Substances Act warrant at 403 Military Road Largs Bay be excluded from evidence.
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