R v Andrews

[2024] NSWDC 358

District Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Andrews [2024] NSWDC 358

Hearing dates:

16 August 2024

Date of orders:

16 August 2024

Decision date:

16 August 2024

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

Fitzsimmons SC DCJ

Decision:

(1)   The offender is convicted of the offence.

(2)   I impose a sentence of imprisonment of 3 years 9 months to expire on 31 July 2026.

(3)   I impose a non-parole period of 2 years 6 months to expire on 30 April 2025.

(4)   The earliest date the offender is eligible to be released on parole is 30 April 2025.

Catchwords:

CRIME – sentencing - detain person in company with intent to obtain advantage – prior disputed facts hearing - gratuitous cruelty – mental health – expert opinion

Legislation Cited:

Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, ss 21A(2)(f), 21A(2)(j), 21A(2)(k), 21A(5)(AA), 21A(5)(AA), 25F(4), 25F(5), 25(4),

Crimes Act 1900, s 86(2)(a)

Cases Cited:

Alkanaan v R [2017] NSWCCA 56

Baden v R [2020] NSWCCA 23

DC v R [2023] NSWCCA 82

DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200

DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194

Giles-Adams v R; Preca v R [2023] NSWCCA 122

KM v R [2023] NSWCCA 10

Lang v The Queen [2023] HCA 29

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Moiler v R [2021] NSWCCA 73

Medlock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120

Pender v R [2023] NSWCCA 291

R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125

R v Sharrouf [2023] NSWCCA 13

R v Smith [2009] NSWCCA 286

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex
Benjamin Andrews

Representation:

Counsel:
Mr J Moffett (Offender)

Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Joe Weller & Associates (Offender)

File Number(s):

2022/00225590

Publication restriction:

Non-publication order prohibiting the publication and/or disclosure of any information that may reveal the identity of the victim.

Judgment - EX TEMPORE

1. The offender pleaded guilty to the following offence: -

1. Detain person in company with intent to obtain advantage contrary to s 86(2)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 carrying a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment with no standard non parole period.

2. On 11 April 2023, the offender was committed to the District Court and his trial was set to commence on 6 May 2024. The offender was arraigned, and pleaded guilty, on 20 March 2024.

3. The sentence proceeded to a contested facts hearing on 17 and 24 May 2024.

4. The maximum penalty for the offence is an indication of its seriousness and acts as a sentencing guidepost or reference point.

5. Admitted on behalf of the Crown were the following: -

1. Indictment

2. Committal documents

3. S 166 certificate

4. Agreed facts with areas in dispute highlighted

5. NSW custodial record

6. NSW criminal history

7. ACT criminal history

8. Agreed facts for H74790482

9. Agreed facts for H91038888

10. Agreed facts for H74790482 finalised on 16 July 2021

11. Agreed facts for H92594586 finalised on 5 December 2022

12. Remarks on sentence of co-offender Adam Thompson sentenced by Judge Whitford SC

13. Agreed facts for co-offender Adam Thompson

14. NSW and ACT criminal records of co-offender Adam Thompson

6. Admitted on behalf of the offender was the following:

1. Report of Peter Watt, psychologist dated 7 May 2024 and letter of instruction

Agreed facts

7. The findings of facts the subject of a disputed facts hearing, are contained in Annexure A [ Annexure A (397613, rtf) ].

Criminal history

8. The offender's criminal history commences as a juvenile with break and enter offences and an offence of affray. There are further property related offences, offences of contravene prohibition or restriction in AVO and use carriage service to menace, harass or offend. There were further offences committed of larceny, destroy/damage property, resist hinder police and further offences of contravene prohibition restriction ADVO. Additional offences include common assault and stalk intimidate with intent to fear physical harm. In August 2021 the offender was imprisoned for nine months with respect to assault occasioning actual bodily harm and stalk intimidate intend to fear physical harm. The offender's parole period concluded in May 2022, a matter of months prior to the commission of the offences for which he is to be sentenced. At the time of the commission of this offence the offender was the subject of an 18-month community corrections order imposed in September 2021 for passenger not disclose the driver’s identity.

9. There is a limited history from the Australian Capital Territory of driver/trainer prescribed drug in oral fluid/blood.

Subjective material

Report of Peter Watt, psychologist

10. Mr Watt assessed the offender by way of audiovisual link on 2 May 2024. The offender was born 3 October 1988. At the time of commission of the offence in July 2022 the offender was aged 33 and is now aged 36. The offender has two older brothers who are both employed with families of their own. He indicated he was close to them, and they were supportive of him. At the time of the commission of the offence the offender was living at home with his mother. The offender left school year nine, having experienced difficulties including suspensions for being in trouble. He completed year 10 at TAFE and went on to work in a trade, although he was working as a truck driver immediately before entering custody.

11. The offender reportedly was sexually abused by his teacher when he was in year one and two at school. No report was made to the police and his mother took no steps when it was reported to her. He experienced several deaths in his family including the loss of his father in a motorbike accident, a close friend in another motor bike accident, and two further friends in suicides. The offender referred to being close to his dog to whom he became very attached. The offender nursed the dog who died at a relatively young age. It was apparent that he was distressed when talking about the loss. The offender had been in custody as an adult for approximately four to five years.

12. The offender was using methamphetamine from 18 to 27 on a regular basis and his usage increased in the previous eight years. He freely acknowledged that he had been addicted to methamphetamine and heroin during his adult years although whilst in custody he was on the Buvedol program.

13. The offender reported feeling depressed whilst at school following the sexual abuse and also developed anxiety leading to the substance abuse at the age of 18 as an attempt to self-medicate. He reported several suicide attempts when he was 18 to 20 and had also been scheduled as an inpatient in a mental health facility. The offender reported that at the present he was unmedicated and was prone to racing thoughts. During the day he often was overthinking, agitated and fidgety. On testing there were significant symptoms of anxiety and depression, and scoring was consistent with a positive finding for psychiatric disorder. Further testing revealed the presence of depression and an antisocial personality. He also scored within a clinical range with hyperactivity impulsivity, although there was insufficient criterion to validate an ADHD diagnosis. There was sufficient evidence to indicate an impulse control problem. Evidence further revealed an anti-social personality disorder linked to substance abuse. The offender had been experiencing major depression whilst in custody and prior to being in custody, for which he was previously medicated. He satisfied the criteria for an anxiety condition and impulse control condition.

14. The offender readily conceded that he was affected by methamphetamine at the time of the offending and also acknowledged that his behaviour was irresponsible and demonstrated a problem with anger. He appeared remorseful for his actions. The overall risk of re-offending was within the moderate to high range.

15. Ultimately, Mr Watt concluded that the offender suffered from persistent depressive disorder (moderate to severe), generalised anxiety disorder (moderate) and stimulant/opioid use disorder (in full remission in a controlled environment). Other likely conditions from which the offender was suffering at the time of his offending was specified disruptive, impulse control and conduct disorder with behavioural disturbances.

16. Mr Watt concluded that the offender likely had a mental health impairment during the offending. He was most likely experiencing a major depressive episode in the context of the dysthymia, a longer-term depressive condition and substance abuse. The offender was also affected by stimulants at the time of the offence which would more than likely have affected his decision-making and rational judgement. Various treatment was recommended.

Crown submissions

17. The Crown identified the relevant factors in considering the objective seriousness of an offence of aggravated detain with intent to obtain psychological advantage. In so doing, the Crown contended that parity was inapplicable by reference to the sentence imposed on the co-offender. This is particularly given the very different roles of the offender and co-offender, as found by Judge Whitford at the time of sentencing of the co-offender in March 2024. Effectively, the co-offender’s role constituted “implicit moral support for the detention" and was therefore considered very much at the lower end of the range of offending.

18. By way of contrast, the Crown contended that the offending falls within the upper end of objective seriousness given the period of detention and the circumstances of the detention. Effectively, it was contended that the circumstances could only be characterised as “gratuitous cruelty" (s 21A(2)(f) of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (‘CSPA'). The Crown referred to several authorities in this context including McCullough v R [2009] NSWCCA 94 and R v Smith [2009] NSWCCA 286. The Crown referred to relevant features of the detention including the initial acts to incapacitate the victim followed by spraying liquid into the victim's eyes causing a burning pain. The victim was then forced to engage in degrading acts including drinking urine (whilst making offensive comments), licking, and biting his faecal matter whilst making degrading comments, duct taping the victim's mouth, and holding the victim in a headlock. The Court would be satisfied that the offender detained the victim for the purposes of contacting his ex-partner as well as to obtain psychological gratification.

19. It was contended that s 25(4) of the CSPA was relevant and that, given the disputed facts hearing, the discount that would otherwise arise by virtue of the plea would not be applied.

20. As for the subjective features identified in the report of Mr Watt, the Crown disputed the psychologist’s opinion that the offender appeared remorseful. Given the disputed facts hearing the Court would be guarded in finding remorse as a mitigating factor. This is further reinforced, it is contended, by the offender's evidence on the disputed facts hearing including limited insight into his offending and the effects upon the victim.

21. The Crown further disputes the psychologist’s contention that there is a causal connection between the offender's mental health and the offending. In particular, the psychologist does not provide a basis for the opinion as to how the depressive condition materially contributed to the offending. To the extent that he was affected by any stimulant, s 21A(5)(AA) of the CSPA applied and the self-induced intoxication would not be taken into account. The Crown acknowledged that mental health was entitled to be considered consistent with the principles in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194.

22. Ultimately, the Crown contended that aggravating factors were that the offence involving gratuitous cruelty (s 21A(2)(f)) and the offender was on conditional liberty (s 21A(2)(j)).

23. A mitigating factor was the plea of guilty (s 21A(2)(k)).

Offender’s submissions

24. The offender agreed that parity is inapplicable given the respective roles of the co-offenders. The offender conceded that the offence was above the mid-range of objective seriousness. Whilst ordinarily the offender was entitled to a discount of 10% for the guilty plea, the disputed facts hearing, including the victim and co-offender being cross-examined, may have the effect of limiting the utilitarian value otherwise attached to the plea. The aggravating factors identified by the Crown were conceded although ultimately there was an issue as to the nature and extent of the gratuitous cruelty. Mitigating factors included the plea of guilty and the offender’s remorse.

25. The offender identified the relevant subjective features in the report of the psychologist. The relevant purposes of sentencing were articulated including the relevance of general and specific deterrence, denunciation and acknowledgement of the harm suffered by the victim. However, the Court would be mindful of avoiding institutionalisation of the offender and that rehabilitation was still relevant. It was contended that the protection of the community at a broader level is not as relevant given the offender was acquainted with the victim.

26. It was acknowledged that a period of full-time imprisonment was the only sentencing option. The finding of special circumstances was open given the subjective features.

27. In oral submissions, Counsel for the offender addressed the findings on the disputed facts hearing, the significance of the plea, the psychologist’s report, a finding of special circumstances, and the ultimate sentence. It was contended that the finding in favour of the offender as to the period of detention was significant and in this context it was submitted that the 10% discount would apply. However, it was acknowledged that this was ultimately a matter for the Court. Remorse was expressed in the offender’s evidence. It was acknowledged that there was significant harm to the offender although not such as to be an aggravating factor. A finding of special circumstances would be made given the offender’s drug use, mental health, rehabilitation and the risk of institutionalisation.

Consideration

28. The offender is to be sentenced with respect to a single offence of detain person in company with intent to obtain a psychological advantage.

29. My findings of fact are recorded in the separate judgment which is to form part of the record for these remarks on sentence.

30. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offence, the detention had the following relevant features: –

• The victim was repeatedly sprayed in the eyes with a substance that caused her face and eyes to burn.

• The offender knew that the substance was sufficiently toxic that he took the step of wearing motorcycle goggles to protect himself at the time of spraying the substance directly into the victim's face.

• The spraying of the substance was sprayed in the victim's face.

• For a significant period of the overall detention the victim was detained in a bathroom and only permitted to leave that room to seek some relief by a way of water or washing her face.

• The offender exposed his penis in the presence of the victim and thereafter urinated in a cup.

• The offender forced the victim to repeatedly drink the urine.

• The offender forced the victim to make statements which were demeaning and degrading in the extreme, whilst being filmed by the offender.

• The offender, in the presence of the victim, defecated which he repeatedly wiped with toilet paper. It was then forced into the victim’s mouth.

• The victim was prohibited from speaking, or if the toilet paper did come out of her mouth, the offender forced it back in.

• The offender forced the victim to retrieve the faeces from the toilet.

• The offender forced the victim to lick the faeces at the same time as being required to make a demeaning statement, all of which was recorded.

• The offender then forced the victim to bite the faeces, following which the offender applied duct tape across her mouth to seal it, thereafter smearing faeces under her nostril and on her face.

• The offender thereafter ripped the tape off the victim’s lips following which the victim spat the faeces from her mouth.

• During the period of being detained in the bathroom, the offender put the victim in a headlock, causing neck pain.

• The offender was of a larger stature than the victim and complied with the offenders demands out of fear that she would be assaulted.

• The detention was for a period of approximately two hours.

31. The offender’s conduct could only be described as depraved in the extreme. It involved the victim, at the hands of the offender, being subjected to the most perverted, debasing, and degrading actions. It was clearly intended to inflict untold and irreparable harm to the victim and self-evidently would be categorised as gratuitous cruelty as that term is used in s 21A(2)(f) of the CSPA. It falls into that category of gratuitous cruelty described by Latham J in R v Smith [2005] NSWCCA 286 at [37]: –

“…where the type and degree of harm inflicted is part of the offender’s desire to degrade and humiliate the victim".

32. This is to be distinguished from a relevant element of the offence of the offender obtaining a psychological advantage. Accordingly, the finding of aggravation, being the infliction of gratuitous cruelty, is separate and distinct to an element of the offence.

33. As has been recognised in a number of recent decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal, including, for example DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200; R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125; KM v R [2023] NSWCCA 10; R v Sharrouf [2023] NSWCCA 13; and Pender v R [2023] NSWCCA 291, whilst there is, of course, always a need for a sentencing judge to make an assessment of objective seriousness, there is no requirement that a sentencing judge do so by placing the objective seriousness of the offence on some putative scale or spectrum by reference to its relationship with a notional midpoint. Rather, what is important is that a judge discuss and identify those factors that are relevant to an assessment of objective seriousness. This is what I have endeavoured to do in this matter.

34. The offence contemplates a wide range of circumstances where the nature and period of detention can vary significantly. I find that the offence is a significant example of the range of offences contemplated by the section, although not the most serious.

35. The offender relies upon the opinion of the psychologist to the effect that he was suffering a mental health impairment during the offending.

36. As to the effect of a mental condition reducing an offender’s moral culpability, Yehia J (with whom Rothman and Wilson JJ agreed) in DC v R [2023] NSWCCA 82 observed:

“[74] A reduction in moral culpability results where an offender’s mental health (or impaired intellectual functioning) has contributed to the commission of the offence. The applicant does not need to demonstrate that his actions were beyond his control, or that he had no understanding of what he was doing. Rather, the question is whether the applicant has established, on the balance of probabilities, that his actions are mitigated on the basis that the complex PTSD and/or intellectual impairment played a role of some significance in his offending.

[75] The sentencing task should not be approached in “an unduly technical or restrictive way”: see Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226 at [114]. In determining whether a causal link or nexus exists, a sentencing Judge should not approach the task as though deciding the issue of causation in a civil case. Where the mental illness or intellectual impairment explains or sheds light on the offending conduct in some material way, such a finding may operate to reduce moral culpability and the weight afforded punishment and deterrence.

[76] While a sentencing Judge should not become preoccupied with the issue of “causation” as a technical matter, the mental health issue or intellectual impairment should be capable of demonstrating a link, direct or indirect, between the offending and the mental health issues in question: see Ryan v Regina [2017] NSWCCA 209 at [15] per Hamill J (Leeming JA and Button J agreeing).” (Emphasis added).

37. Whilst authorities such as Muldrock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120 and De La Rosa have held that deterrence, retribution, and denunciation carry less weight where an offender was suffering from a mental condition at the time of commission of the offences, they are not authorities for the proposition that such purposes of sentencing have no relevance. Muldrock referred to the fact that in “most cases" mental impairment or disability will substantially lessen the offender’s moral culpability for the offence. In Alkanaan v R [2017] NSWCCA 56 Harrison J (as his Honour then was) (with whom Payne JA and Schmidt J agreed) observed at [108]: –

“The mere fact of mental illness is not of itself a necessary or sufficient indicator for a more lenient sentence. The principles described by McClelland CJ in De La Rosa are no more than indications of what experience has shown commonly arise in such cases. As Simpson J has said, however, there is no presumption. It remains necessary for the sentencing court to examine the relevant facts in order to determine whether, in the specific case, the mental condition has the consequence contended for."

38. It is necessary to first identify the mental health impairment from which the offender was allegedly suffering. Under the heading “Nexus between the offending and mental health impairment(s)” Mr Watt said the following: –

"In my opinion, from evidence presented in the facts sheet and anecdotally, Mr Andrews had a mental health impairment during the offending. He was most likely experiencing a major depressive episode dysthymia, a longer term depressive condition, and substance abuse. He was also affected by a stimulant at the time of the offence which would more likely have affected his decision-making and rational judgement" (emphasis added)

39. However, at the conclusion of his report, Mr Watt seems to identify an additional mental health disorder being “an impulse control condition" whilst at the same time being affected by methamphetamine which would have impacted on his decision-making and conduct.

40. The psychologist’s opinion that the offender had a mental health impairment during the offending was premised upon the evidence presented “in the fact sheet and anecdotally".

41. Whilst there is the requirement of an expert to fully expose his reasoning process (Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [67]), this does not involve an “absolute standard" and will depend on the relevant field of expertise and the opinion expressed (Lang v The Queen [2023] HCA 29 at [433] per Jagot J). The requirement that the expert expose his reasoning process enables the Court to adequately assess the strength of the opinion expressed: Lang at [13] per Kiefel CJ and Gageler J; [225] per Gordon and Edelman JJ; at [434] per Jagot J.

42. The psychologist does not identify the “relevant facts” or the anecdotal evidence upon which he relied in expressing his opinion. Similarly, the opinion that the offender was suffering an impulse control condition at the time of the offending is similarly absent any process of reasoning leading to such a conclusion.

43. In any event, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that there is any direct link between the offending and any mental impairment from which the offender might have been suffering. The facts, as they have been found, involve the offender detaining the victim for a period of approximately two hours during which he engaged in deliberate and demeaning behaviour directed towards the victim. I am not satisfied that any depressive disorder, or for that matter impulse control condition, played any role of significance in his offending. At its highest, the offender’s mental impairments may give some context or shed some light on the offending conduct. I am not satisfied however it is such as to reduce the offender’s moral culpability or the weight afforded to punishment and deterrence to any significant degree.

44. I do however accept that the offender was subjected to sexual abuse at a very young age which unsurprisingly would have led to depression and anxiety and was a factor in his substance abuse in his adult years. I accept that this led to being scheduled on several occasions and the offender being suicidal.

45. I further accept and consider that the offender experienced several deaths of close family and friends as well as his pet dog to whom he was close.

46. Section 21A(5)(AA) prohibits the Court to take into account any self-induced intoxication as a mitigating factor. However, the Court is entitled to take into account the effect of drug abuse, to the extent it has its origins in the offender's youth arising from personal hardship or difficult experiences in his formative years. Button J in Moiler v R [2021] NSWCCA 73 at [61] observed as follows: –

“In similar vein, whilst it is true that abuse of prohibited drugs played a role in the commission of the offence, and that abuse of such substances is not a mitigating feature on sentence except in unusual circumstances, care needs to be taken not to permit that statutory prohibition to lead to insufficient weight being given to a closely related mental illness, especially when that illness and the abuse of prohibited drugs are so tightly bound up with each other.”

47. The offender’s criminal record, which includes periods of imprisonment, whilst not an aggravating factor, disentitles him to leniency. However, an aggravating factor is that the offence was committed whilst the offender was on conditional liberty, being the subject of a community corrections order for an offence of passenger not disclose drivers’ identity (s21A(2)(j)).

48. I am satisfied that the offender has expressed remorse with respect to his offending demonstrated in his statements to the psychologist and his evidence on the disputed facts hearing. However, such expressions are qualified given his challenge to some of the facts which I found beyond reasonable doubt have been established. Such a challenge included the need for the co offender and the victim giving evidence, including being cross examined, on the hearing.

49. Given the timing of the offender’s plea, ordinarily the offender would be entitled to a discount of 10% pursuant to s 25D(2)(b) of the CSPA. However, the parties agree that given the disputed facts hearing, s 25F(4) is relevant. That section provides that the Court may determine not to apply the sentencing discount, or to apply a reduced sentencing discount, if the Court determines that the discount should not be applied or should be reduced because of the utilitarian value of the plea having been eroded by disputed facts that was not determined in favour of the offender. The burden of establishing that grounds exist for the discount lies on the offender: s 25F(5).

50. As the disputed facts judgment records, the offender disputed the most demeaning of the behaviour whilst the victim was detained in the bathroom of the Queanbeyan unit. That dispute was not determined in favour of the offender. However, the length of the detention was determined in favour of the offender as was the allegation that the offender threated to kill the victim. Whilst the offender should be entitled to some discount given the statutory precondition has been satisfied, it is appropriate that the discount be reduced. In the circumstances, a discount of 5% on the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed will be applied.

51. The extent to which the guilty plea reflects a willingness of the offender to facilitate the course of justice is limited, although not entirely extinguished, given the contested facts hearing requiring evidence from the co-offender and victim: Baden v R [2020] NSWCCA 23; Giles-Adams v R; Preca v R [2023] NSWCCA 122.

52. The parties quite properly agree that parity is of no relevance in the context of the co-offender’s sentence.

53. The nature of the offending necessitates that personal and general deterrence, denunciation, and punishment loom large in the sentencing process. Given the offender’s history of offending, his underlying mental conditions, and his drug addiction yet to be adequately addressed, protection of the community is a relevant factor. There must also be a recognition of the significant harm done to the victim as demonstrated by her demeanour at the contested facts hearing.

54. In terms of prospects of rehabilitation, noting the offender’s criminal history, including offending whilst on conditional liberty, his yet unaddressed drug issues, and a qualified expression of remorse, prospects of rehabilitation would be considered as guarded. However, I take into account the history provided to the psychologist which reflects some recognition of his drug use and resort to violence arising from underlying mental health conditions. Accordingly, some account must be taken of the prospect that the offender, upon his release, will address the underlying issues and embrace the treatment recommendations made by Mr Watt.

55. I make a finding of special circumstances such that there ought to be an adjustment of the statutory ratio of the non-parole period. This is in the context of the offender clearly needing assistance for his mental health and substance issues which are more appropriately dealt with in the community upon his release. It should further contribute to his rehabilitation upon release. It is also necessary to consider the risk of institutionalisation.

56. An appropriate sentence is 4 years from which is to be deducted 5% for the plea of guilty.

57. I impose a sentence of 3 years 9 months with a non-parole period of 2 years 6 months.

58. The offender was arrested on 1 August 2022 and has remained in custody since that date. The offender however served a three-month fixed term from 1 August 2022 to 31 October 2022 with respect to the offence of destroy damage property. The offender had been fitted with an ankle monitor in January 2022 following conditional release for domestic violence offences. On 25 May 2022, probation and parole received information that his ankle monitor had been disabled and this offence relates to the destruction of the ankle monitor. Accordingly, this offence is entirely unrelated to the offence for which he is to be sentenced, being an offence which occurred several months after the offence for which he was sentenced. Accordingly, the sentence is to commence from 1 November 2022 and is to be backdated accordingly.

Orders

1. The offender is convicted of the offence.

2. I impose a sentence of imprisonment of 3 years 9 months to expire on 31 July 2026.

3. I impose a non-parole period of 2 years 6 months to expire on 30 April 2025.

4. The earliest date the offender is eligible to be released on parole is 30 April 2025.

5. Sequence 3 – The section 166 offence is withdrawn and dismissed.

Amendments

22 August 2024 - Typographical errors in Annexure A

Decision last updated: 22 August 2024