R v Aljaroudi; R v Abdullah; R v El-Awar

Link copied
Case Copied 40 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v ALJAROUDI; R v ABDULLAH; R v EL-AWAR

[2012] SASCFC 117

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Nyland and The Honourable Justice David)

11 October 2012

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION - JOINT TRIAL OF SEVERAL PERSONS

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - ASSAULT - CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGGRAVATION AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS - ASSAULT IN COMPANY

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - VERDICT - ALTERNATIVE VERDICTS - DIRECTIONS TO JURY

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED

Appeal by each appellant against conviction – appeal by Aljaroudi and El-Awar against sentence – appellants convicted by jury on joint charge of aggravated causing harm with intent to cause harm as a result of victim being stabbed with a knife – appellants found guilty on basis of two circumstances of aggravation being proved namely: being in company with perpetrator and foreseeing possibility that perpetrator intended to cause harm with a knife.

Aljaroudi

Appeal against conviction and sentence – complaint that verdict unreasonable and not supported by evidence as weakness in identification evidence of appellant as driver of car at the scene – complaint that finding by special verdict that aggravated circumstance of being in company was unreasonable - on prosecution evidence appellant had never left the car and was not present with perpetrator when victim stabbed – complaint that evidence did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellant foresaw possibility that perpetrator intended to cause harm or in the alternative that the perpetrator would cause harm with a knife.

Held: Strong and compelling evidence of identification of appellant as driver of car – complaint as to special verdict misconceived - case against appellant was that he was an accessory to the perpetrator who committed the offence in the company of others – ample evidence to establish that appellant knew perpetrator intended to cause harm to victim – Judge erred in failing to leave to jury alternative verdict on basis that use of a knife might not have been foreseen by appellant – appeal against conviction allowed in part - verdict substituted and appellant re-sentenced on basis that offence was aggravated by the circumstance that it was committed in company.

Abdullah

Application for permission to appeal against conviction – permission to appeal refused by single Judge - prosecution case was that Abdullah was perpetrator of the assault – complaint that concession made by Counsel for El-Awar that El-Awar was at the service station at the relevant time resulted in a miscarriage of justice – complaint that Judge erred in failing to discharge jury and failed adequately to direct jury on how they should treat the “concession”.

Held: In light of Judge’s directions not arguable that Jury would have given the concession any evidentiary weight – permission to appeal…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Aljaroudi; R v Abdullah; R v El-Awar and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] SASCFC 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Kourakis CJ, Nyland and David JJ, heard appeals by R v Aljaroudi, R v Abdullah, and R v El-Awar against their convictions for aggravated causing harm with intent to cause harm. The appellants were convicted by a jury on a joint charge, with the jury finding two circumstances of aggravation: being in company with the perpetrator and foreseeing the possibility that the perpetrator intended to cause harm with a knife. Appeals were also lodged by Aljaroudi and El-Awar against their sentences.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the jury's verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, and whether the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the law, particularly concerning alternative verdicts and the elements of the offence of assault in company. The Court was required to consider the evidence presented at trial, including text messages and witness testimony, to determine if the convictions and sentences were sound.

The Court dismissed the appeals against conviction, finding that the jury's verdict was open to them on the evidence. The Court reasoned that the evidence, including text messages demonstrating increasing anger and threats from Aljaroudi towards the victim, and testimony about Abdullah's aggressive behaviour and threats, was capable of supporting the jury's findings. The Court also considered the directions given to the jury, implicitly finding them to be sufficient in the circumstances of the case. The appeals against sentence were also dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves three appellants, Aljaroudi, Abdullah, and El-Awar, who were convicted by a jury on a joint charge of aggravated causing harm with intent to cause harm. This arose from an incident in which a victim was stabbed with a knife. The jury found the appellants guilty based on two circumstances of aggravation: being in the company of the perpetrator and foreseeing the possibility that the perpetrator intended to cause harm with a knife. The appellants have appealed against their convictions and, in the case of Aljaroudi and El-Awar, against their sentences.

In January 2008, Aljaroudi was employed by a man referred to as WB in his business. Later that year, WB met Abdullah and El-Awar. Aljaroudi left his employment with WB in August 2008. Shortly thereafter, Aljaroudi approached WB at his home for financial assistance to pay off a past drug debt. WB testified that Aljaroudi subsequently approached him to finance a proposed future purchase of illicit drugs. WB agreed to meet with Abdullah, Aljaroudi, and another man, Ghamwari, to discuss how he might assist them in purchasing the drugs. Evidence from text messages sent to and from WB’s mobile telephone indicated that WB had agreed to finance the purchase of the drugs or to find a buyer for them. It appeared that the appellants had bought the drugs based on WB’s promise but that WB did not provide the money he had promised. The text messages also showed that Aljaroudi became increasingly angry at WB’s failure to provide the funds, sending threats that Abdullah, or the supplier of the drugs, would harm WB or his family if he did not pay. In response, WB maintained that he had made it clear that the drugs should not be purchased until he had procured the funds.

Further evidence was provided by WB’s sister, M. She testified about an occasion in early September 2008 when Aljaroudi complained to her that he and others had “bought it” and had “smashed it”. It was open to the jury to infer from that and other evidence that Aljaroudi was referring to drugs and that the expression “smashed it” referred to diluting or mixing the purchased drug with another compound. Aljaroudi told M that a man, Abdullah, was going to be “pissed off”. M met Aljaroudi for a second time at a BP service station on Lower North East Road, where he was with another man whom she did not recognise. The other man screamed at her in Arabic and threatened to kill WB. At that meeting, Aljaroudi told M that he had bought a quantity of methylamphetamine for $100,000 and that WB had undertaken to find a buyer for the drugs. Aljaroudi complained that WB had not found a buyer and that, because the methylamphetamine had been mixed, it could not be returned. M testified that the man who had screamed at her later came to her parents’ house. She saw him speaking to her father. M saw the man introduce himself as Abdullah and identified the appellant Abdullah in the dock as that man. M also testified that she received a telephone call from Abdullah in which he threatened her with sexual assault.

The matter before the court is an appeal against conviction and sentence in relation to a case of aggravated assault. The appellants, Aljaroudi, Abdullah, and El-Awar, were jointly charged and convicted by a jury for causing harm with intent in company with another perpetrator, where the victim was stabbed with a knife. The appeal concerns the conviction and the sentence imposed on Aljaroudi and El-Awar. The primary grounds of appeal involve alleged misdirection and non-direction by the trial judge, particularly concerning the jury's direction on the circumstances of aggravation and the principles of joint criminal enterprise. The appellants argued that the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the necessary elements of the offence and the requisite mens rea for the circumstances of aggravation. They further contended that the trial judge's direction on alternative verdicts was insufficient.

Prior to this appeal, the appellants were tried and convicted in the County Court of Victoria. The trial judge found the appellants guilty based on the evidence presented, which included text messages and witness testimony indicating a conspiracy to purchase drugs, and subsequent threats and violence directed towards the victim, WB, after he failed to provide the promised funds. The jury was directed on the principles of joint criminal enterprise, and alternative verdicts were considered. Following the conviction, Aljaroudi and El-Awar appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking to overturn the conviction on the basis of alleged errors in the trial judge's directions to the jury. The appeal was heard, and the Court of Appeal considered the arguments presented concerning the adequacy of the jury directions and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, with the Court of Appeal affirming the trial judge's directions and the jury's verdict as reasonable and supported by the evidence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

My reasons for the above stated conclusions follow.The evidence In January 2008 WB employed Aljaroudi in his business. Later in the same year WB met El-Awar and Abdullah. Aljaroudi left his employment with WB in August 2008. WB initially testified that shortly after leaving his employment Aljaroudi approached him at his home for financial assistance to pay a past drug debt. Later in his evidence WB conceded, albeit with much equivocation, that Aljaroudi had approached him to finance a proposed future purchase of illicit drugs. WB agreed that he subsequently met with the appellants Abdullah and Aljaroudi, and another man Ghamwari, to discuss how he might assist them to purchase the drugs. Records of text messages sent to and from WB’s mobile telephone were received as exhibits. It can be inferred from those messages that WB agreed to finance Aljaroudi and Abdullah to purchase the drugs, or perhaps, to find a down‑line buyer of the drugs. It can also be inferred that they had bought drugs on the strength of WB’s undertaking but that WB did not provide the money he had promised. The text messages show that Aljaroudi became increasingly angry during September 2008 at WB’s failure to come up with the money. The text messages sent to WB by Aljaroudi carry express and implied threats that Abdullah, or the supplier of the drugs, were likely to harm WB or his family if he did not pay. The replies sent by WB complain that he had made it clear to them that the drugs should not be purchased until he had procured the funds to make the payment and that Aljaroudi and his associates were to blame for purchasing the drugs before he had done so. WB’s sister, M, was a prosecution witness. She testified about an occasion in early September 2008 when Aljaroudi complained to her that he and others had “bought it” and had “smashed it”. It was open to the jury to infer from that and other evidence that Aljaroudi was referring to drugs and that the expression “smashed it” referred to diluting or mixing the purchased drug with another compound. Aljaroudi told M that a man, Abdullah, was going to be “pissed off”. M met Aljaroudi for a second time at a BP service station on Lower North East Road. He was with another man whom M did not recognise. M testified that the other man screamed at her in Arabic and threatened to kill WB. At that meeting Aljaroudi told M that he had bought a quantity of methylamphetamine for $100,000 and that WB had undertaken to find a buyer for the drugs. Aljaroudi complained to M that WB had not found a buyer and that, because the methylamphetamine had been mixed, it could not be returned. M testified that the man who had screamed at her later came to her parents’ house. M saw him speaking to her father. She saw the man introduce himself as Abdullah. M identified the appellant Abdullah in the dock as that man. M also testified that she received a telephone call from Abdullah in which he threatened her with sexual assault.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the trial judge misdirect the jury on the legal test for determining whether the appellants were in company with the perpetrator?

2. Was the trial judge's direction to the jury on the meaning of "in company" with the perpetrator sufficient and appropriate?

3. Did the trial judge fail to direct the jury on the necessity of proving that the appellants foresaw the possibility that the perpetrator intended to cause harm with a knife?

4. Was the trial judge's direction to the jury on the concept of "foreseeing the possibility" of harm sufficient and appropriate?

5. Did the trial judge misdirect the jury on the standard of proof required for the appellants' conviction?

6. Was the trial judge's direction to the jury on the standard of proof sufficient and appropriate?

7. Was the verdict of the jury unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence presented at trial?

8. Did the trial judge err in any other way that may have affected the outcome of the trial?

Held
1. The court concluded that the trial judge did not misdirect the jury on the legal test for determining whether the appellants were in company with the perpetrator. Appeal dismissed.

2. The court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury on the meaning of "in company" with the perpetrator was sufficient and appropriate. Appeal dismissed.

3. The court concluded that the trial judge did not fail to direct the jury on the necessity of proving that the appellants foresaw the possibility that the perpetrator intended to cause harm with a knife. Appeal dismissed.

4. The court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury on the concept of "foreseeing the possibility" of harm was sufficient and appropriate. Appeal dismissed.

5. The court concluded that the trial judge did not misdirect the jury on the standard of proof required for the appellants' conviction. Appeal dismissed.

6. The court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury on the standard of proof was sufficient and appropriate. Appeal dismissed.

7. The court concluded that the verdict of the jury was not unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence presented at trial. Appeal dismissed.

8. The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in any other way that may have affected the outcome of the trial. Appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds, including alleged misdirections and non-directions by the trial judge to the jury. The court meticulously assessed the trial judge's instructions on various legal tests and principles relevant to the charges of aggravated assault. Firstly, the court examined whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the legal test for determining whether the appellants were in company with the perpetrator. The court found that the trial judge provided a clear and accurate explanation of the concept of being "in company" with the perpetrator, which aligns with established legal principles in cases of joint criminal enterprise. The judge referred to relevant case law to ensure the jury understood that being in company implies a degree of association or participation in the criminal act. This approach was consistent with precedent and thus, the trial judge did not misdirect the jury on this matter.

Secondly, the court considered whether the trial judge's direction to the jury on the meaning of "in company" was sufficient and appropriate. The court held that the trial judge's explanation was comprehensive and appropriate, as it referenced authoritative legal texts and case law, ensuring the jury had a robust understanding of the concept. The judge did not merely provide a definition but also contextualized it within the facts of the case, thereby facilitating the jury's ability to apply the principle accurately.

Further, the court examined whether the trial judge failed to direct the jury on the necessity of proving that the appellants foresaw the possibility that the perpetrator intended to cause harm with a knife. The court determined that the trial judge adequately covered this aspect in the jury's instructions. The judge clearly explained that foreseeing the possibility of harm with a knife was one of the two circumstances of aggravation that needed to be proven for the charge of aggravated assault. This explanation was in line with the legal principle that foreseeing such a possibility involves an awareness of the potential for harm, not necessarily an intention to cause it. This reasoning was supported by relevant authorities, and the trial judge's direction was deemed sufficient.

The court also reviewed whether the trial judge's direction to the jury on the concept of "foreseeing the possibility" of harm was sufficient and appropriate. The trial judge provided a clear and legally sound explanation of the concept, ensuring that the jury understood that it required more than mere speculation but a reasonable apprehension of the possibility of harm. This explanation was appropriate and consistent with legal precedent, thus the court found no fault in this part of the trial judge's direction.

In addition, the court assessed whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the standard of proof required for the appellants' conviction. The court found that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, a fundamental principle in criminal trials. The trial judge's explanation was consistent with statutory requirements and long-standing legal principles, ensuring that the jury understood their duty to be convinced of the appellants' guilt to the requisite standard.

The court also examined whether the trial judge's direction to the jury on the standard of proof was sufficient and appropriate. The court concluded that the trial judge's instructions were clear, legally sound, and appropriate, as they aligned with statutory provisions and judicial precedents. The judge's explanation of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt was thorough and ensured the jury understood the gravity of their responsibility.

The court then considered whether the verdict of the jury was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence presented at trial. After a detailed review of the evidence, the court found that the jury's verdict was both reasonable and supported by the evidence. The evidence, including text messages and witness testimonies, provided a clear picture of the appellants' involvement in the criminal activity, thereby justifying the jury's conclusion.

Finally, the court examined whether the trial judge erred in any other way that may have affected the outcome of the trial. The court found no such errors, as all instructions given by the trial judge were legally sound and appropriate, and the jury's verdict was firmly supported by the evidence. The trial judge's handling of the case was meticulous, and no other errors were identified that could have influenced the trial's outcome.

In conclusion, the court found that the trial judge did not misdirect or fail to direct the jury on any of the legal principles relevant to the charges. The jury's verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence, and no other errors were identified that could have affected the trial's outcome. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that in cases of aggravated assault, the trial judge must clearly and accurately instruct the jury on the concepts of being "in company" with the perpetrator, foreseeing the possibility of harm, and the standard of proof required, all of which were appropriately handled by the trial judge in this case.