R v ALJ No. Sccrm-00-164 - [2000] SASC 357

R v ALJ
[2000] SASC 357
Court of Criminal Appeal: Prior, Debelle and Lander JJ
1................ PRIOR J:........................ I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Lander J. I add a little with respect to the first ground of appeal.
2      The trial judge’s directions on reasonable doubt adopt the directions given by the trial judge in R v Britten & Eger[1]. The transcript of proceedings before the Court of Criminal Appeal discloses that counsel for Eger complained that the passage now complained of was “an attempt at definition of reasonable doubt” which may or may not be correct “depending on the setting of the entire case”. The Court did not identify any misdirection within the general directions given by the trial judge in that case. Neither King CJ nor Millhouse J said that the passages now complained of were erroneous.[2] Mohr J described these directions as unexceptional.[3]
[1] (1988) 49 SASR 47 at 62
[2] (1988) 49 SASR 47 at 54 - 55, 62 - 65. See also Cox J in R v Pahuja (1988) 49 SASR at 204 - 212
[3] (1988) 49 SASR 47 at 51
3      In The Queen v Wilson, Tchorz and Young[4], King CJ referred to what was stressed by the High Court in Green v The Queen[5], that judges should adhere to the conventional formula that the burden is on the prosecution to prove a charge and each ingredient of it beyond reasonable doubt. No attempt should be made to explain or define reasonable doubt. If amplification is desired it should go no further than to tell the jury that a reasonable doubt is one which they, as reasonable persons, are prepared to entertain. A judge may, in an appropriate case, warn the jury against resorting to fanciful or unreasonable possibilities as affording reasons for doubt but if a judge does so care must be taken to add that if jurors at the end of their deliberations, as reasonable persons are in doubt about the guilt of an accused the charge has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires that doubts, irrespective of degree of strength which they attain, be given effect to if the jurors, as reasonable persons, are prepared to entertain them.
[4] (1986) 42 SASR 203 at 207
[5] (1971) 126 CLR 28
4      In R v Pahuja[6], King CJ referred to these observations in Wilson, and said:
[6] (1988) 49 SASR 191 at 194
“The expression reasonable doubt is a composite expression meaning a doubt which would be entertained by a reasonable person in the circumstances, or as Latham CJ put it in Burrows v The King[7], ‘a doubt such as would be entertained by reasonable men, recognising their responsibility to the accused and to the law’. An explanation which conveyed that meaning accurately to a jury would not be a misdirection. But although an explanation of the meaning of reasonable doubt…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2000] SASC 357
Decision Date: 19 December 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, ALJ, was found guilty by a jury of an offence of gross indecency and an offence of indecent assault. The appellant appealed against the conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeal was required to decide whether the trial judge's directions to the jury on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof were correct, whether the trial judge adequately put the defence case to the jury, and whether the trial judge correctly exercised her discretion under s 34I of the Evidence Act 1929.

The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trial judge's directions on reasonable doubt did not constitute a misdirection and did not import an objective or analytical approach to the concept of reasonable doubt. The Court found that the trial judge had adequately put the defence case to the jury and that the trial judge had correctly exercised her discretion under s 34I of the Evidence Act 1929.

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Orders