R v Alfred
[2022] ACTSC 216
•7 July 2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v Alfred |
Citation: | [2022] ACTSC 216 |
Hearing Date(s): | 6 July 2022 |
DecisionDate: | 7 July 2022 |
Before: | Norrish AJ |
Decision: | See [60] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – Aggravated Burglary – Theft – Damage to Property – Young Offender – Totality of Criminality – Plea of Guilty – Promotion of Rehabilitation – Imprisonment – Individualised Justice – Combined Sentences |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT), s 24 |
Cases Cited: | Forster-Jones v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 31 |
Parties: | The Queen ( Crown) Braiden Alfred (a pseudonym) (Young person) |
Representation: | Counsel B Morrisroe ( Crown) S McLaughlin ( Young person) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ( Crown) Legal Aid ACT ( Young person) | |
File Number(s): | SCC 110; 113; 114 of 2021 |
NORRISH AJ:
The young person appearing before me today is 17 years old. He is today to be sentenced in relation to two groups of offences of very similar character.
The first group of offences was committed on 25 October 2021 when the offender entered the Westfield Belconnen Shopping Centre in company with two unknown persons and broke into a business called CeX, located on level 3 of the shopping centre. There he and the others stole a number of items to the value of $51,208, those items being a number of mobile phones, laptops, electronic tablets, video games and other electronic and digital goods in respect of which CeX was in the business of selling and exchanging. That business specialised in selling second-hand goods.
There are three charges that arise out of this offending, one offence of aggravated burglary which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years' imprisonment plus a substantial fine; one offence of theft, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment and a fine; and a third offence which would ordinarily be dealt with summarily, in the Children's Court, that of trespass, which I am informed carries a maximum fine of $2,200.
The second group of offences with which I am concerned were committed at the Canberra Centre, which is a shopping centre in Civic in Canberra, where the offender in company with another person, firstly, broke into the shopping centre causing damage to a glass window, and then once inside the centre broke into the Apple store by smashing another glass window wherein he and his co-offender stole electronic equipment belonging to the Apple Corporation including iPhones, headphones, air pods, and other items manufactured by it to the value of $60,791.
The four offences within this second occurrence of offending ultimately ended up on an indictment which was filed in this court on 6 July 2022. Count 1 is concerned with an offence of aggravated burglary, which, of course, carries the same maximum penalty to which I earlier referred. Count 4 relates to an allegation of theft, which carries the same maximum penalty that I identified earlier. Counts 2 and 3 are counts of damage to property of the Canberra Centre and of the Apple Corporation. Each carries a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment as well as a substantial fine. Pecuniary penalties are out of the question in this particular offender's case.
The offender has been in continuous custody since 31 January 2022. My understanding is however that he spent two days in custody on 19 and 20 January after his arrest on 19 January 2022 before being granted bail. That bail was revoked approximately nine or 10 days after he entered it. All time in custody will be taken into account.
The facts in relation to the first set of offences committed at CeX in October 2021 are set out in considerable detail in a statement of facts provided by the Crown which is not challenged.
Sometime after 3.50 am on 25 October 2021 the activities of this offender and the other two people were captured on CCTV footage. It appears from the available evidence that the offenders were aided in the removal of the stolen property by the use of a motor vehicle, registered to a person with whom the offender was either staying or living at the time of the offence. It was at the address of the registered owner of the vehicle, that a number of items from CeX were recovered, as well as items of clothing consistent with the appearance of the offender on CCTV footage.
The offender was first spoken to in relation to the crimes committed on 25 October, when police executed a search warrant at the premises of the registered owner of the vehicle on 3 November 2021. The offender denied any knowledge of the offending.
Subsequently, on 18 December 2021 his mobile phone was examined and the examination of it showed a film of the offender in the presence of or in possession of electronic equipment with stock markings from CeX. There was also a video found on the phone showing the offender wearing clothing consistent with that shown on the CCTV footage on the morning of the burglary.
In relation to this group of offences, the offender was arrested on 19 January 2022, the same day as he was arrested in relation to the second group of offences, and was charged in relation to the various offences with which I am concerned as well as others which are no longer pertinent. As at 23 February 2022, $7,115 worth of items stolen from CeX had been recovered. That still represents a substantial loss to the owners of the business.
With regard to the facts of the second group of offences, they were committed in the early hours of 19 January 2022 when the offender, using a clawhammer, broke the front entry glass window of The Canberra Centre and then shortly afterwards smashed the front glass window belonging to the Apple store inside the centre. The CCTV footage of the commission of the crime or crimes within those premises shows this offender and the unknown person moving in and out of the shop through the smashed window, at various times searching in the sales area or one of the sales areas of the shop, and then ultimately going to the rear of the store which contained a storage area. He attacked a gyprock wall with the clawhammer in order to gain entry to that sealed off area, which he ultimately did after smashing a hole in the wall and reaching through to unlock the door that enabled him to get into the storage area.
A number of Apple products were carried away by the two offenders in various shopping bags. The precise details of the property stolen are set out at paragraph 31 of the agreed statement of facts. One of the exhibits in the sentencing proceedings shows a series of videos obtained from the CCTV footage within the store. It shows the offender and his colleague coming and going from the premises, seeking to disguise themselves with hooded tops and covering across their faces. The video shows quite clearly the determined effort by the offender, with the aid of the clawhammer, to break through the wall to get into the rear storage area from where property was taken.
There is also evidence before me in a video uplifted from the offender's mobile phone showing him sitting in a motor vehicle surrounded with the spoils of his crime of 19 January 2022, as I would understand it, boastfully doing an impersonation of an Afro-American rapper talking about himself and his accomplishments. I will quote part of what he said:
Hey, look at me. I ain't fuckin' round. Canberra is my city, bitch arse nigga.
I apologise to anyone offended by the use of the last word but that is the language used by the offender. At that point the offender is clearly taking pride in his 'achievement' and flaunting it, in my view, in a manner very inconsistent with the way in which he has presented himself to this court and to the reporter from the Child and Youth Protection Services (CYPS), who prepared a very detailed report on the offender for the court to which I will later refer.
There are many details in the agreed statements of facts concerning the investigation of those matters which ultimately led to the offender being arrested. I note in relation to one set of facts that at various times the offender was in company with a person, who I understand is also a young person, the fate of whom has not been made known to me.
Obviously quite dedicated and clever police work led to the arrest of the offender on 19 January 2022 shortly after 7.42 pm, the day of the second group of offences. When arrested in relation to these various matters the offender declined to be interviewed. He was in possession of $600 in cash but none of the property stolen on 19 January 2022 has been recovered.
As I earlier pointed out, he was initially granted bail and that bail was revoked on 31 January. Any sentences I impose, as I foreshadowed in my remarks to the parties at the Bar table, will commence on 29 January 2022.
The Crown, in its very helpful written submissions, sets out in considerable detail a number of authorities concerned with various issues including the assessment of the objective gravity of the offending. One authority relating to the assessment of objective seriousness offending in a general sense is Forster-Jones v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 31 at [29]‑[30].
In relation to sentencing for offences of aggravated burglary, I am referred to authorities such as R v Hancock [2021] ACTSC 52, particularly at [33], and R v Po'oi [2021] ACTSC 151, particularly at [48]. In relation to sentencing for theft and damage offences, I am referred to two authorities: R v Bowler [2015] ACTSC 298, particularly at [20]; and R v Dawson [2022] ACTSC 64, particularly at [43]. I have had regard to what has been cited by the Crown as relevant principles in respect of those matters.
In addition to the Crown's scholarship, I note other decisions of this jurisdiction relating to sentencing offenders in respect of dishonesty offences in the character of burglaries. Once such authority is the decision of R Fusimalohi [2015] ACTSC 220 at [10] per Murrell CJ. That cited with approval the observations of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in the guideline judgment of R v Ponfield (1999) NSWLR 327 (Ponfield), at [48] per Grove J.
Not all of the observations within these various authorities have particular relevance to this case of course. There are a range of factors, as was pointed out in Ponfield, that will need to be taken into account that will vary in intensity when dealing with an offence of burglary or of similar character.
The characterisation of the offending here that I am concerned with in relation to both groups of offences is correctly outlined in considerable detail in the Crown's written submissions, for which I am grateful, and no issue has been taken with it. Both groups of offences were similarly executed on properties that were clearly known to the offender to have within them valuable commodities for further sale, although there is no evidence as to the offender himself selling any particular items to any particular people.
The first group of offences, the offences at CeX, were absent the feature of damage done to premises as occurred in the second group of offences. Each group of offences occurred at commercial premises in the early hours of the morning with a clear motive of financial benefit. They necessitated in some respects multiple entries, although these occurred in a very short period of time in the context of one criminal transaction.
The second set of offences at the Canberra Centre had the additional feature, as I have said earlier, of damage done both to the shopping centre in order to gain entry to it and to the retail premises. Both groups of offences, in my view, were planned. The offender and his colleague sought to disguise themselves by their clothing. In the second set of offences, the offender was further armed with a hammer to facilitate entry to the premises that were plundered and also to facilitate entry to secure areas within the premises. Obviously there were no persons present at the time of the offending.
On the evidence shown within the CCTV footage concerning the second set of offences, it seems to me the offender and his colleague clearly knew what they were looking for and knew where to look for it. There is no other explanation for them visiting the rear storage area. It would seem that ironically the greater value of the property taken in the second set of offences arose not from the quantity of goods taken but because, unlike the first set of offences, the property taken was new whereas the first set of offences concerned secondhand property.
The planning involved in these offences was not sophisticated, as was submitted by the offender's counsel, but it involved a degree of pre-meditation and deliberation in order to target the subject premises and by being prepared to enter premises in the knowledge, I would expect, that the events would be captured by CCTV footage. Hence, the disguises. The value of the property stolen on each occasion is substantial and roughly similar in each instance. As the Crown points out, this is a matter of relevance to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending.
I would class the offending in respect of each group of offences, so far as the burglary and thefts are concerned, at the lower end of the middle range of objective seriousness. Bearing in mind that the middle range of objective seriousness, as it has been described in New South Wales by relation to the consideration of 'standard non-parole periods' (which do not apply in the ACT) per Spigelman CJ in R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131 'is not a narrow band'.
The Crown very kindly brought back to me memory of my sentencing of a group of criminals in 2019 in the decision, R v Hernandez; R v Mendoza; R v Tiznado; R v Garcia; R v Munoz [2019] NSWDC 882 particularly at [115]-[116]. I should point out in relation to Hernandez and the other offenders that these were mature adults with histories of offending in their native Chile who came to Australia as a gang solely for the purpose of committing burglaries upon commercial and private premises to enrich themselves and transfer the proceeds back to Chile where they proposed to return. Their arrest and their imprisonment obviously has interrupted their plans in that respect.
There was a level of professionalism and experience amongst those criminals as well as a greater maturity than exists in this particular matter. I accept in relation to the second group of offences that the damage occasioned was in furtherance of the commission of the substantive offences of burglary and theft committed at that time. They were not offences of gratuitous damage. But the damage was substantial although the exact amount of cost to the respective owners of the property is not made known to me. The detail of the actual damage I have taken into account as part of the factual matrix of those matters.
The Crown produced, as it was required to in the case of the sentencing of a young person, a very detailed report from Child and Youth Protection Services. This report runs to 15 pages. As with counsel for the offender who skillfully represented his interests, I cannot do justice to the detail of the report in this judgment otherwise I would be speaking for another hour and a half. I have taken into account its details. It presents a picture of the offender that is very much a mixed bag, if I may say so, but some of the positive matters that are identified include a recent development of maturity and some positive attitude changes also reflected in a letter addressed to the court prepared by the offender.
The report needs to be considered in the context of the offender's criminal history. However, although, it must be conceded that his previous criminal history represents appearances in the Children's Court not before the Supreme Court of the ACT going back to 2018. His criminal activities in the ACT were interrupted for a period of approximately 14 to 16 months that he spent in Africa when, according to the history available to the court, he was taken over there by a parent and apparently abandoned in Kenya, wandering off to South Sudan from where his family originally came before being returned to Australia.
Prior to his travels to Africa and certainly subsequent to his arrival back in Australia from Africa the offender has been regularly charged and appeared in court in respect of a range of offending. His range of offending as shown in the criminal history reveals offences of theft, burglary, unlawful possession of stolen property, aggravated robbery in company, joint commission of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm as well as a large number of driving offences. The preponderance of his offences however appear to have been committed after he had returned from Africa.
He had a large number of offences dealt with in February 2020, some of which went back several years, with a number of penalties imposed including good behaviour orders, terms of imprisonment suspended and other forms of community-based sanction. He appeared again in the Children's Court in July 2020 charged with another raft of further offences which resulted in the revocation of good behaviour orders and also the revocation of some of the suspended sentences to which he had previously been subjected. He re-appeared in the Children's Court in May 2021, on which occasion he was sentenced to a term of 'full-time detention' in respect of the offences of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, aggravated robbery in company and common assault.
He returned to the Children's Court in August 2021 in respect of a range of driving offences as well as escaping from lawful custody. For all of these offences he was fined, save for the offence of unlawful possession of stolen property for which he was sentenced to 'two months imprisonment' by way of 'full time detention'. It could be truly said in the context of the pre-sentence report that up until the present time little has worked arising out of the intervention by the courts. He has neither been deterred by periods of detention, nor has he been changed by any periods of supervision that have been provided to him. His mixed reaction to supervision - usually unsatisfactory - is recorded.
However, the pre-sentence report is ultimately positive, although it notes a number of concerns relating to his drug and alcohol use, his association with criminal peers, and his behavioural problems in custody. Positive changes have been observed by correctional staff at the centre where he is held, and by the reporter over a period of time. Contrary to his performance previously when subject to court orders, he is described as being 'compliant' during the period of the remand, and it is said that his engagement with the Service has shown 'a significant improvement from his previous involvement'.
The report details matters of his background that I will not dwell upon, other than noting that whilst he was born in Australia he is the son of Sudanese parents, is one of a large family of 10 and in his upbringing there has been a considerable disruption and dysfunction to which his counsel referred in his submissions. I have noted his travels to Kenya and his period of time in Africa apparently unsupervised.
Reading between the lines it would seem as though he has not had a great deal of support and in many respects, judging from the surrounding facts relating to the offending as to where he was living, the people he was associating with and the like, he has been allowed over a number of years to basically run his own race interrupted only by the commission regularly of criminal offences and a large number of antisocial behaviours that attract the attention of police.
The situation of this offender is ultimately summarised in the report at page 11. Under the heading 'Assessment', it is noted that the offender was polite throughout the process, in contrast with his historic involvement with CYPS in a Youth Justice capacity. He has been reflective and in-depth with his discussion around his offending and has demonstrated appropriate remorse to the reporter. He has shown a genuine motivation to change.
The ‘Assessment’ notes his 'significant and complex trauma' throughout his short life, including acts of violence perpetrated against him within the family framework, and a history of poor parental supervision, exposure to domestic violence, physical and emotional abuse and neglect.
His counsel submitted, and I do not believe it is challenged by the Crown, that this is a case, in the context of the history we have available to us, of a person who has had a period of upbringing that has been featured with dysfunction and disadvantage that permits the court to reflect upon what are sometimes described as 'Bugmy' principles. That is, the requirement of the court to take into account that disadvantage and dysfunction as being relevant to the sentencing exercise, affecting the offender in ways that may explain his regular adverse contact with the authorities and his attitudes.
Whilst in custody the offender has been undergoing educational programs within the detention centre. The service reports that he has 'shown tremendous dedication to obtaining his Year 10 certificate', which is in stark contrast from his previous engagement. He says he understands the seriousness of the offending and understands the involvement of the court system and seeks additional support. It correctly notes that should the offender not address his 'antisocial and criminal behaviours', it will be likely that he will continue to be involved with the justice system.
The relapse into offending after a period of compliance within the community is concerning, as has happened in the past in relation to this offender. He is aware of his age and the implications for him for not accepting help previously and the implications for him in taking steps to actively change his behaviours. He understands that he will be required to actively involve himself with his supervision. The programs that can be provided to him will assist him in reducing his risk of recidivism.
There is attached to the report what can be called a 'Risk Assessment Tool', or an actuarial instrument, which assesses him at being at a moderate risk of reoffending within the area of general recidivism. I have had regard to various observations made about the advantages of supervision and the types of programs that might be suitable for him. Supervision is thought to be capable of addressing a number of his issues and it is felt that he is in a much more positive state of mind to engage with supervision than he has in the past. There are issues in relation to his future accommodation and the like and they will need to be sorted out in the next few months before he is released from custody. The truth of the matter is, however, that by the time he is released he will fast be approaching an age when continued conduct of him of the character with which I am concerned will lead to significant incarceration in adult custody.
A critical matter in this case, of course, is a consideration of the operation of Chapter 8A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (“the Act”) and how that Chapter is to be considered by relationship to general sentencing provisions within the Act; particularly of course s 7 of the Act which deals with the ‘purposes of sentencing’, which I need not set out beyond noting they include matters such as adequate punishment, denunciation, general and personal deterrence and the like.
The operation of this Chapter of the Act has been discussed in a number of authorities of the court and I particularly refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal, MT V R [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 (MT). That judgment I was required to consider in the sentencing of the same offender in relation to fresh charges (R V MT [2022] ACTSC 136).
MT was a person convicted of murder and the Court of Appeal in its judgment examined the relationship of Chapter 8A with general sentencing provisions in the Sentencing Act. The Court of Appeal in its judgment at [53] noted that Chapter 8A alters the way in which section 7 (of the Act) relating to sentencing purposes are to operate.
To emphasise rehabilitation, the Chapter elevates the importance of individualised justice. It tightly restricts a court's capacity to impose a sentence of imprisonment, particularly in circumstances where parole provisions are excluded and promotes combined sentences as a preferred way in which a young offender may serve a sentence of imprisonment.
The Court held that in the case of young offenders, the sentencing purpose of rehabilitation was prioritised and it may be given more weight than other purposes.
In discussing the purposes of rehabilitation in sentencing they noted that consideration of that does not exclude other sentencing purposes. However, Chapter 8A does not distinguish between the sentencing purposes that may be relevant when sentencing young offenders on the basis of seriousness of the offending, and the legislation does not differentiate between offenders that do or do not reflect adult behaviour, nor it does not distinguish between young offenders based on their age.
There are, of course, other considerations to take into account, including the operation of section 33 of the Act, which is referred to in some detail in the Crown's helpful written submissions. I note particularly that a sentence of imprisonment must be a last resort and for the shortest appropriate term, and the discussion about the interrelationship between sentences of imprisonment and good behaviour orders with supervision conditions. In regard to the Court of Appeal decision, I note particularly, as I have said, what the court stated in respect of section 133G and its application if a court is sentencing a young offender to imprisonment in the context of section 10 of the Act.
In relation to the threshold issue of whether a term of imprisonment was required, notwithstanding the operation of section 10, it was not submitted to me otherwise than that I should impose some form of imprisonment in the context of the principles to be considered pursuant to chapter 8A from the decisions in MT.
The Crown's sentencing submissions I have earlier noted include consideration of the various matters that arise in this particular matter pursuant to section 33 of the Act. I have already referred to a number of matters that are referred to by the Crown. The particular matter that I need to deal with is that of taking into account the pleas of guilty of the offender. Without reciting the detail of the history of the way in which those pleas were entered, it was agreed that in respect of the offences relating to the business CeX the offender was entitled to a discount of 25 per cent upon the otherwise appropriate penalty if a term of imprisonment was to be imposed, in accordance with the terms of section 35 of the Act.
The defence submitted in respect of the second group of offences that an appropriate discount, given the timing of the plea of guilty, would be 20 per cent. The Crown in oral submission to the court suggested that the appropriate discount should be between 15 and 20 per cent. I have determined that I should accord the offender a discount of 20 per cent upon the penalties to be considered by way of imprisonment.
The Crown properly in its written submissions drew my attention to principles, such as the totality of criminality, that are required to be taken into account. In this particular matter I particularly note from the authority cited by the Crown, the decision of the High Court of Australia in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 198 CLR 610, particularly at [45] in the judgment of the majority. There, the majority of the High Court said that for transparency reasons it was proper to fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then turn one's attention to the issues of concurrency and accumulation in order to reflect the totality of the criminality, within reason, as discussed, for example, in the High Court in the decision of Mill v The Queen (1988) 83 ALR 1. Another relevant feature required to be considered is the dicta of the High Court in the decision of Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357.
In addition to the written submissions of the Crown, I have had regard to both the oral submissions of counsel for the accused and the oral submissions of the Crown. Counsel for the accused, apart from some observations made about the objective facts which I have taken into account, primarily dedicated his submissions to the embrace of the conclusions reached within the pre-sentence report. Counsel for the accused stressed particularly the matters that must flow from a consideration of chapter 8A of the Sentencing Act, and ultimately submitted to the court that in fixing appropriate orders in this matter, I should permit a period of release to the community that would allow the offender to have the benefit of supervision from the Child Protection Service rather than the adult correctional service authority.
I accept that that is so and I am prepared to structure the orders to enable potential for the offender to be released from custody approximately three months before he turns 18, to permit such supervision to occur. I specifically raised this issue with learned counsel for the Crown, and my understanding of her response to the matters that I raised with her was that the Crown did not oppose a combination order that would particularly permit the offender's release to the community before he turned 18 to permit the supervision of the offender in the community to be undertaken by the Child Protection Service rather than an adult authority.
It came to pass that in reflecting upon the appropriate penalties to be imposed I have sought to give effect to the principles of totality to which the Crown referred. One of the features of trying to fix an appropriate sentence in accordance with Mill principles is consideration of what was said by Chief Justice Street in the judgment of R v Holder (1983) 3 NSWLR 245, where his Honour noted that in order to give effect to totality there would be a requirement for a degree of ‘telescoping’ of sentences rather than a simple matter of a straight accumulation of one sentence upon another. The way in which I have structured the sentences is to provide some degree of accumulation of the sentences for the second set of offences upon the first set of offences, but essentially maintaining concurrency as between offences occurring on the same occasion.
In order to permit the offender to be released to the community before he turns 18, that has required a considerable degree of ‘telescoping’. That is, to my mind, also necessary to give effect to the purposes of Chapter 8A of the Act.
The orders I now make in relation to the offender are as follows:
The young person is convicted of each and all offences.
i.Each offence is referred to restorative justice under s 24 of the Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT).
ii.In respect of the offence of aggravated burglary (CH22/188) the Young Person is sentenced to 12 months imprisonment commencing on 29 January 2022 (reduced from 16 months imprisonment) suspended after nine months imprisonment pursuant to s 12 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) on the Young Person entering into a Good Behaviour Order for a period of 9 months commencing on 28 October 2022 and expiring on 28 July 2023 with core conditions pursuant to s 86 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005, including supervision by the Director of Child and Youth Protection Services (ACT).
iii.In respect of the offence of theft (CH 22/185) the Young Person is sentenced to six months imprisonment (reduced from eight months imprisonment) commencing on 29 January 2022 and expiring on 28 July 2022.
iv.In respect of the offence of trespass (CH 22/297) the Young Person is fined $500. I direct no time to pay.
v.In respect of Count 1 (Aggravated Burglary – SCCAN 76/2022 - 19/1/2022) the Young Person is sentenced to one year seven months imprisonment (reduced from two years imprisonment) commencing on 29 April 2022, suspended after six months imprisonment pursuant to s 12 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) on the Young Person entering into a Good Behaviour Order for a period of 18 months commencing on 28 October 2022 and expiring on 28 April 2024 with core conditions pursuant to s 86 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005, including supervision by the Director of Child and Youth Protection Services (ACT).
vi.In respect of Counts 2 and 3 (Damage to Property – SCCAN 77/2022 and SCCAN 78 of 2022) the Young Person is sentenced to 10 months imprisonment (reduced from 12 months imprisonment) commencing on 29 April 2022 suspended after six months imprisonment pursuant to s 12 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 on the Young Person entering into a Good Behaviour Order for a period of six months commencing on 28 October 2022, expiring on 28 April 2023 with core conditions pursuant to s 86 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 including supervision by the Director of Child and Youth Protection Services (ACT).
vii.In respect of Count 4 (Theft – SCCAN 79/2022) the Young Person is sentenced to 12 months imprisonment commencing on 29 April 2022 (reduced from 15 months imprisonment) suspended after six months pursuant to s 12 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 on the Young Person entering into a Good Behaviour Order for a period of six months commencing on 28 October 2022 expiring on 28 April 2023, with core conditions pursuant to s 86 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005, including supervision by the Director of Child and Youth Protection Services (ACT).
| I certify that the preceding sixty [60] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Norrish Associate: Date: 25 August 2022 |
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