R v Aguer

Case [2023] ACTSC 48


SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

R v Aguer

Citation:

[2023] ACTSC 48

Hearing Date(s):

15 March 2023

DecisionDate:

15 March 2023

Before:

Norrish AJ

Decision:

See [28]

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment – Tendency and Coincidence evidence – application to adduce coincidence evidence granted – application to adduce tendency evidence to be considered by the trial judge

Legislation Cited:

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 97, 98, 101

Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 135.1(3)

Cases Cited:

Fischetti v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 2

Giourtalis v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 216

R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 443

Parties:

The King ( Crown)

Ruben Majok Aleer Aguer ( Accused)

Representation:

Counsel

M Keks ( Crown)

J Moffett ( Accused)

Solicitors

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions ( Crown)

Fraser Criminal Law ( Accused)

File Number(s):

SCC 96 of 2022

NORRISH AJ:

  1. In this matter, an application is made by the prosecution that it be permitted to adduce evidence of the conduct of the accused to prove both that he had a tendency to act in a particular way and to have a particular state of mind (s 97 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) (the Act)) and/or that two or more events happened to prove that the accused had a particular state of mind (s 98 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)), the latter evidence being shortly described as “coincidence evidence.”

  1. The Crown proposes to arraign the accused in respect of 31 counts contrary to s 135.1(3) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). Shortly put, it is alleged by the prosecution that between 26 May 2014 and 12 October 2015, the accused, in respect of 31 different groups of transactions, falsely represented that he had provided services, with the intention on his part of dishonestly causing loss to the Commonwealth.

  1. The amended Crown case statement sets out an outline of the allegations against the accused, who, at relevant times, was an approved “provider” responsible for “managerial and administration services” pursuant to what is described as the “Family Assistance Law.” This legislative structure allows for “family day care” where an educator “looks after children in their own home,” working in conjunction with the relevant “provider” or relevant “providers.”

  1. It is alleged, in relation to each count, that the accused made claims in his capacity as the sole operator and one of the two general managers of a corporation called “Long Life Family Day Care Pty Ltd” (“Long Life”) for the payment of services that were not rendered by particular educators. The monies received were dispersed either to the corporation, to the accused himself, or to particular educators. Each count relates to claims in respect of sessions of care for particular children purportedly cared for by specific educators, with 18 counts relating to one particular educator, who, as I understand it, was the partner of the accused, and the remaining 13 counts relating to other educators.

  1. The Crown alleges that for the purposes…

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R v Aguer [2023] ACTSC 48
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[2023] ACTSC 48
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Aguer involved the accused, Aguer, who was facing criminal charges. The nature of the dispute was the admissibility of certain types of evidence in his trial. This case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The legal issues that arose centred on whether the trial judge was correct in allowing the prosecution to adduce evidence of coincidence and whether the trial judge should have considered an application to adduce tendency evidence.

The court had to decide whether the trial judge's decision to admit coincidence evidence was appropriate, given the circumstances of the case. Additionally, the court needed to assess the trial judge's handling of the application to introduce tendency evidence and determine whether the judge should have given further consideration to the application.

The court found that the trial judge's decision to admit the coincidence evidence was not an error, as it was relevant and properly considered under the applicable legal framework. However, the court determined that the trial judge should have further considered the application to introduce tendency evidence. The court held that while the trial judge had initially rejected the application, they should have revisited the matter in light of new submissions made by the prosecution. The court acknowledged that the trial judge's initial decision might have been influenced by an incomplete understanding of the submissions, and thus, the judge should have reconsidered the application.

The final orders of the court were that the trial judge should review the application to adduce tendency evidence in light of the new submissions made by the prosecution. The court's decision underscored the importance of ensuring that trial judges give adequate consideration to all relevant applications and submissions in a criminal trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [28]

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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