R v Adamson

Case [2005] NSWCCA 7


CITATION:

R v Adamson [2005] NSWCCA 7

HEARING DATE(S): 31 January 2005
 
JUDGMENT DATE: 


31 January 2005

JUDGMENT OF:

Spigelman CJ at 1; Dunford J at 10; Hidden J at 11

DECISION:

Application for leave dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW - Appeal - When appeal lies - From interlocutory judgment or order - Opinion before trial on whether defence available - Not interlocutory judgment - Criminal Appeal Act 1912, s 5F. - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - Classification - Interlocutory judgment or order - Opinion before trial on whether defence available - Not appealable before conviction - Criminal Appeal Act 1912, s 5F.

LEGISLATION CITED:

Crimes Act 1900
Criminal Appeal Act 1912

CASES CITED:

R v Staffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633

PARTIES:

Regina
Darren William Adamson

FILE NUMBER(S):

CCA 2004/2322

COUNSEL:

J Girdham for Crown
GD Wendler for Adamson

SOLICITORS:

S Kavanagh for Crown
Van Houten Solicitors for Adamson

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):

04/11/0386

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:

Blackmore DCJ


                          2004/2322

                          SPIGELMAN CJ
                          DUNFORD J
                          HIDDEN J

                          MONDAY 31 JANUARY 2005
REGINA v DARREN WILLIAM ADAMSON
Judgment

1 SPIGELMAN CJ: This is an application for leave to appeal pursuant to provisions of s 5F(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912.

2 The applicant has been indicted on two charges. First, that he did break and enter a building and did steal certain property, contrary to the provisions of s 112(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. Secondly, that he did maliciously damage property by fire, contrary to s 195(6) of the Crimes Act 1900.

3 In an interlocutory application to the District Court, the applicant raised the topic of intoxication and particularly sought the court to consider whether he was entitled to the benefit of Pt 11A of the Crimes Act, on the basis that each of the offences with which he stood charged was an offence involving specific intent, within the meaning of that Part. If that were the case, then he would be entitled to the benefit of s 428C of the Crimes Act 1900 to the following effect:

          “Evidence that a person was intoxicated (whether by reason of self-induced intoxication or otherwise) at the time of the relevant conduct may be taken into account in determining whether the person had the intention to cause the specific result necessary for an offence of specific intent.”

4 Blackmore DCJ heard argument on this matter and rejected the proposition for which the applicant contended before his Honour and for which the applicant continues to contend in this court. His Honour concluded:

          “Having considered the submissions of the accused in my view no basis has been shown for him to rely on intoxication as a defence to either of the charges in the indictment.”

5 His Honour made no order. The submission in this court is that his Honour's reasons for decision constituted a judgment within the meaning of s 5F of the Act. Mr G Wendler, who appeared for the applicant, submitted that his Honour's judgment involved a final legal ruling on a discrete legal controversy which had arisen in the proceedings. Mr Wendler submitted that, in effect, what his Honour had done was to make a declaration that s 428C does not apply to ss 195(6) or 112(1) of the Crimes Act 1900.

6 There is no such declaration. In my view, what Blackmore DCJ did on the application of the applicant was no more than to indicate what he would do, if he were the trial judge, if evidence of intoxication were sought to be adduced over objection, or if such evidence was otherwise before the court, what direction he would give to the Jury on the issue of intention. It is clear that if his Honour was the trial judge that he would, in the latter case, direct the Jury that intoxication was not able to be taken into account on the issue of intention, on the basis that neither of the offences with which the applicant was charged was an offence of specific intent.

7 This, in my opinion, is not a judgment or order within s 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act. It does not have the requisite element of finality in terms of resolving an issue in the proceedings in a binding manner. It is closely analogous, in my opinion, to the admission of evidence. Indeed one of the two ways in which the conclusion to which Blackmore DCJ came could, in fact, be applied would be on a ruling relating to evidence of intoxication, if it were sought to be adduced over objection.

8 It is now well established that evidential rulings are not interlocutory judgments or orders within the meaning of s 5F. (See the list of authorities set out and considered in R v Steffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633, especially at 636 to 639.)

9 In my opinion, the application for leave should be dismissed.

10 DUNFORD J: I agree.

11 HIDDEN J: I agree.

12 SPIGELMAN CJ: The order of the court is as I have indicated.


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Details
AGLC
R v Adamson [2005] NSWCCA 7
Case
[2005] NSWCCA 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Adamson, the appellant faced charges before the court, contesting the admissibility of a particular defence. The case was heard in a court of criminal jurisdiction in Australia. The appellant sought to appeal an earlier decision that had ruled a specific defence inadmissible before the trial commenced. This appeal hinged on the interpretation and application of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, particularly section 5F, which delineates the circumstances under which an appeal can be made from an interlocutory judgment or order.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the decision to deem the defence inadmissible prior to the trial constituted an interlocutory judgment or order that could be appealed under section 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. The court had to determine if this ruling could be considered an interlocutory judgment that would permit an appeal before a final conviction was rendered. The appellant argued that the decision effectively prevented the presentation of a valid defence, which warranted an immediate appeal to ensure a fair trial. The prosecution contended that such a ruling was not an interlocutory judgment that could be appealed before the completion of the trial.

The court examined the statutory provisions and established jurisprudence to determine the nature of the ruling in question. It concluded that the decision regarding the admissibility of a defence before the commencement of the trial did not constitute an interlocutory judgment or order as defined by section 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. The court reasoned that an interlocutory judgment typically involves matters that can be determined without a full trial, such as evidentiary issues or procedural matters. In contrast, the ruling in question pertained to the substantive defence itself, which could only be fully evaluated during the trial. Therefore, the court held that the appellant's appeal was premature and that the decision was not an appealable interlocutory judgment under the Act. The appeal was dismissed, and the case proceeded to trial with the defence deemed inadmissible.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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