R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 6) (Verdict) - [2022] NSWSC 1658

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 6) (Verdict) [2022] NSWSC 1658
Hearing dates: 09-25 November, 06 December 2022
Date of orders: 06 December 2022
Decision date: 06 December 2022
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Hamill J
Decision:
The accused are found not guilty

Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – judge alone trial – reasons for judgment – legal principles, warning and directions – murder – joint criminal enterprise – whether accused participants in joint criminal enterprise – where victim bashed by group organised by gangster in reprisal for bashing over drug debt – prosecution case reliant on one witness – witness criminally involved in homicide – indirect support of witness’s evidence – association evidence – eye-witness testimony – where no established motive in witness to lie – requirement to scrutinise evidence with great care – Rule in Browne v Dunn – failure to comply – Prosecutor’s complaints regarding defence addresses – hyperbole and flourishes – client relations – excesses ignored – demeanour of witness – limited weight given to assessment of demeanour – lies – where a number of established lies told by witness over time – inconsistent versions of events – impact on credibility – parts of evidence reminiscent of a movie scene – a yarn spun about an Uzi – "crocodile tears" - positive rejection of parts of evidence – doubts about other parts – impact on assessment of credibility – calculated lies to police to implicate local Indigenous men – inconsistent accounts – whether reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused

Legislation Cited:
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 132, 133
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 32, 164, 165B

Cases Cited:
AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22
LiberatovThe Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507; [1985] HCA 66
MJW v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74
Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 2
Prouten v Chapman [2021] NSWCA 207
R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja(No 3) [2022] NSWSC 1511
R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677
R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520
R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17; [1989] SASC 1628
Reyne (a pseudonym) v R [2022] NSWCCA 201

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Rex (Plaintiff)
Sayed Anush Abdaly (Defendant)
Seyed Amirmohammad Hosseinishoja (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
D Patch (Rex)
M Cunneen SC with L Dive (Abdaly)
G Brady SC (Hosseinishoja)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Rex)
Tohi Lawyers (Abdaly)
OneGroup Legal (Hosseinishoja)

File Number(s): 2020/306132; 2020/306616
Publication restriction: This judgment has been anonymised in accordance with various non-publication and suppression orders made before, during and after the trial, as well as the NSW Supreme Court anonymisation policy

Judgment

Sayed Anush Abdaly and Seyed Amirmohammad Hosseinishoja stand charged jointly with the murder of Nikola Srbin on 5 June 2013 at Redfern. Each man pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried by Judge alone. The Director of Public Prosecutions opposed the application for a Judge alone trial, but I made an order under s 132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) that the accused be so tried. [1] The trial proper commenced on Wednesday 9 November 2022 at 2.00pm. The true issues in dispute are quite confined.
1. R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 3) [2022] NSWSC 1511.
There is no dispute that Mr Srbin was unlawfully killed by a group of about 10 men who were directed or arranged by a gangster called Abuzar Sultani. Mr Srbin was bashed to death by members of that group, all of whom (it seems) were acting together pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise. Sultani was intervening in a dispute about drugs involving Nikola Srbin and a man who is only to be called by the rather unimaginative pseudonym “Witness A”. [2] Witness A was involved in selling drugs on behalf of Sultani. He also had other contacts in the drug milieu and there is conflicting evidence as to whether he was selling drugs regularly for Mr Srbin’s father.
2. Cf Reyne (a pseudonym) v R [2022] NSWCCA 201 at [7] (Beech-Jones CJ at CL) and [10] (Dhanji J).
Both Sultani and Witness A were present at the time of the killing. Witness A pleaded guilty to manslaughter and served a sentence of imprisonment. Witness A gave evidence at the trial. He said (once various dots are joined) that both accused men were present and actively took part in the bashing and killing of Mr Srbin. His evidence is disputed in many important respects. When all is said and done, these cases come down to whether I accept that his evidence is truthful and reliable. While there is evidence, other than the testimony of Witness A, that supports aspects of the prosecution case, none of that evidence provides direct support for the proposition that either of the accused were part of the group that killed Nikola Srbin. For that reason, before I could convict either of the accused, I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Witness A’s evidence is honest, accurate and reliable, at least in respect of his allegations against the two accused men. However, I do not need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of every aspect of his testimony.
I am required to articulate the principles of law I have applied, the findings of fact I have made and the process of reasoning I have followed. [3] This will require me to set out some of the evidence in a little detail. However, I will not set out evidence which is not in dispute, or which is unimportant, but will simply record my factual findings.
3. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 133; AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8.

Principles of law

Before turning to the facts and evidence, I will summarise briefly the relevant principles of law that I have applied. I am required to take into account any warning or direction that would be given to a jury hearing the case. [4]
4. Criminal Procedure Act, s 133(3).

The onus and standard of proof

The onus of proof is on the prosecution, and it does not shift. Even if the accused were to run a positive case or call evidence, and neither of them did other than through the cross-examination of the witnesses, the rejection of that case does not relieve the prosecution from its onus to prove the case against the individual accused. [5]
5. See, for example, Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507 at 515 (Brennan J); [1985] HCA 66.
The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Those words are ordinary words and need no further elaboration. It is a very high standard of proof and is to be distinguished from suspicion, however grave, and proof on the balance of probabilities.
The prosecution is required to prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not have to prove every disputed fact to that standard. Nor is the prosecution required to prove the truthfulness or reliability of each or any of its witnesses beyond reasonable doubt. Where reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence, there is no requirement that the individual items of evidence be established beyond reasonable doubt.
The ultimate question is whether, on the whole of the evidence, each element of the offence of murder is established beyond reasonable doubt. If there is a reasonable doubt in respect of any element of the offence, the individual accused whose case is under consideration must be found not guilty. If there is no such doubt, the accused must be found guilty.

The critical evidence of Witness A must be proved beyond reasonable doubt

Proof of the charge against each accused is dependent on the evidence of Witness A. For that reason, it is necessary to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the critical aspects of his evidence as it pertains to each accused. However, Witness A’s evidence is not to be considered in isolation and the whole of the evidence must be considered in deciding whether the critical parts of his evidence, and therefore the elements of the offence, are established beyond reasonable doubt. Further, rejection of parts of Witness A’s evidence will not result in rejection of the whole of his evidence. However, any reasonable doubt about a part or parts of his evidence must be considered in deciding whether to accept the whole of his evidence and, significantly, those parts which are critical to proving the prosecution case.
In each case, the critical part of Witness A’s evidence is that the accused whose case is under consideration was present at the time of the bashing of Mr Srbin.

Separate consideration of the cases

The case against each accused is to be considered separately. While the trials were heard together, and almost all the evidence was tendered against both accused, there is no reason in law, or on the facts and evidence in the trial, why the verdicts must be the same. By way of example, it may be that there is a reasonable doubt about the “identification” of one of the accused as being part of the group, but no such doubt in relation to the other. That may arise because Witness A’s knowledge of one of the accused is more convincing or extensive or because other witnesses at the scene provide a description of one of the assailants which is consistent with the appearance of one of the accused men. These are hypothetical examples, although they also have some basis in the evidence.

Doubts about one accused’s guilt to be considered in the other accused’s case

While the cases must be considered separately, if there is a reasonable doubt about the guilt of one of the accused, or a reasonable doubt about Witness A’s evidence in relation to that accused, that doubt must be considered and analysed closely in considering whether the case against the other accused is established beyond reasonable doubt. The extent to which any such reasonable doubt would impact on the case of the other accused will depend on the reasons for the doubt.
For example, if I had a doubt about Witness A’s honesty in nominating one of the accused, that is likely to be relevant to a decision in the case of the other accused. Conversely, if the doubt was based on the possibility that Witness A was mistaken about the involvement of one of the accused, that may have little impact on his evidence in relation to the other accused, particularly if there is better evidence of his knowledge and earlier interaction with the other accused. It will turn on the circumstances and the basis of the reasonable doubt. But in every instance, a reasonable doubt experienced as to aspects of Witness A’s evidence must be considered in the case of both accused.

Eschewing speculation and emotion

In making findings of fact, and determining the correct verdict, my decision making and fact finding must be based on the evidence. I must not speculate about things that are not the subject of evidence and I must put aside matters of emotion.
This includes disregarding any prejudice that may arise from my knowledge that the deceased, the accused and various witnesses were involved in the criminal milieu. I must not act on any prejudice that arises from the participants’ association with Mr Sultani, their affiliation to criminal gangs, or their involvement in drug dealing and other crimes. Those matters are relevant, but they must not be used to reason in a prejudicial way. For example, I would not reject Witness A’s evidence because he is a drug dealer who turned to a known criminal when he fell into dispute over a small amount of money. Equally, I must not reason that because one or both accused men were members of the Rebels Motorcycle Club (“Rebels”) and involved in other criminal and violent acts that they are therefore guilty of the offence. The prosecution has not relied on tendency evidence, and it would be wrong to reason that one or other of the accused is guilty because there is evidence suggesting they are a person of bad or questionable character.
Similarly, feelings of sympathy must be put aside including sympathy for Mr Srbin and his family, or for the accused who have waited so long to have these serious allegations resolved.

Material disregarded

In the course of argument over a number of pre-trial issues, I have read various documents that are not in evidence at the trial. This included three versions of the “Crown Case Statement”, confidential material provided by the Commissioner of Police in connection to various applications and statements of witnesses, some of whom were called to give evidence, and google searches relating to the accused and the Rebels.
I have disregarded that material in reaching a verdict in this case. I have only acted on the evidence adduced in the trial itself.
Further, during the cross-examination of Witness A, a volume of material was marked as MFI 35. This included interviews and statements by Witness A and documents purporting to record things that he has said over the years. The MFI was provided to the witness and a working copy was provided to me. The latter course was somewhat unusual but helpful in allowing me to follow the cross-examination. However, only a small portion of the volume was actually shown to, or adopted, by the witness. In some instances, he either denied saying the things recorded or could not remember saying them. At the conclusion of the cross-examination, both folders were returned to Senior Counsel. As the cross-examination unfolded, I actively attempted not to read ahead or look at parts of the documents that were not subject of the interrogation. I cannot guarantee that I did not read parts of the material that were not referred to by counsel or adopted by the witness.
The documents contained in the MFI do not form part of the evidence. I have disregarded the material I saw during the cross-examination.
It is also the case that Mr Sultani entered a plea of guilty on the second day of the pre-trial hearing. A draft statement of facts was marked for identification. [6] I have not read the draft statement of facts and have disregarded my knowledge that Mr Sultani pleaded guilty. The fact of his plea was not tendered in evidence, although Mr Sultani’s involvement in the sad events that unfolded was not a matter of dispute in the trial.
6. MFI 13.

Demeanour and consistency

In assessing the evidence of the witnesses, and in particular the evidence of Witness A, I have paid close attention to the way in which they gave evidence, that is, what lawyers like to call their “demeanour”. I have considered the consistency of the witnesses’ accounts and the way they reacted to being confronted with any inconsistency. I have observed any hesitation in providing answers to questions asked in cross-examination and whether they answered the questions directly, prevaricated or evaded the questioning. I have noted relatively subtle changes in the tone of the answers and their facial expressions when answering questions.
However, I am conscious of “the dangers of too readily drawing conclusions about truthfulness and reliability solely or mainly from the appearance of witnesses” and “scientific research that has cast doubt on the ability of judges (or anyone else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of such appearances.”[7] The reality is that “[s]ome witnesses are good at lying” and some may “have come to believe the truth of their testimony, unreliable though it may be”. [8]
7. Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 at [30]-[31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
8. Prouten v Chapman [2021] NSWCA 207 at [12] (Meagher and Leeming JJA).
I have placed limited reliance on my intuitive impressions of the witnesses, although those impressions have, or must have, informed my decision making to some degree. Where I am conscious of the role such impressions played, I will attempt to be transparent in explaining my reasons.

Warnings and directions regarding the evidence of Witness A

I must take into account directions and warnings that would be given in relation to the evidence of Witness A. These include:

Because the prosecution case turns on Witness A’s evidence, his evidence must be scrutinised with great care.

On the other hand, there is no requirement that his evidence must be corroborated. If his evidence is accepted, it is capable of supporting a finding of guilt in relation to one or both of the accused.

Witness A was criminally concerned in the events that resulted in Mr Srbin’s death. He was involved in drug dealing with Sultani and, to some degree, the Srbins. He owed the latter $400 for some drugs. He contacted Sultani seeking his help to resolve his dispute with the Srbins. Even if (as he asserted in evidence) he did not intend that Mr Srbin be assaulted, he became aware that this was likely when Sultani gathered the men together at the “Nascent Burwood Clubhouse”. [9] He was present at all relevant times including when the fatal assault on Nikola Srbin was committed. The law recognises that evidence given by a person who was criminally concerned in the events may be unreliable. Some of the reasons for that potential unreliability, both generally and in this case, are:
9. As described by the Prosecutor at tcpt p 8.

Such a witness has, or may have, a motive to minimise their own involvement in the events. Those motives may include personal guilt and self-justification as well as their exposure to further prosecution, even where, as here, the witness has already been prosecuted for their involvement in the offence.

Because of their involvement, such a witness may have knowledge or information that a person who was not so involved would not have. This means they can, or may be able to, mould their evidence to fit with the known facts. In this way, the witness’s inside knowledge may give their evidence an air of credibility that it may not deserve.

If this was a jury trial, I would not direct the jury that it would be dangerous to convict on Witness A’s uncorroborated evidence. However, it is a case where the tribunal of fact should look for evidence capable of providing support for his evidence before acting on it.

Still, as I have said, there is no rule of law that the evidence of any witness must be corroborated before it is acted upon. [10] If, after undertaking the close scrutiny of the evidence, it is found to be truthful and reliable in its material respects, the Court is entitled to, and should, act on it.

These directions and warnings ought not to be taken as suggesting as a matter of law that Witness A’s evidence is, in fact, unreliable.
10. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 164.

Motive to lie

While canvassing those directions about the evidence of Witness A, I referred to the possible motive to lie that may exist in a witness who was criminally concerned in the events. Another important matter of law is that it is not for an accused person to establish a motive in a witness to lie. Where such a motive is suggested, I must consider that motive. However, even if the motive suggested by the accused is rejected, that does not necessarily bolster the credibility of the witness’s evidence. The witness may have a motive to lie that nobody knows about. [11]
11. R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 at 542; Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1 at 26; [1998] HCA 2 (McHugh J).

Right to silence

Neither of the accused participated in interviews with police when they were arrested and neither gave evidence in the trial. The fact that they exercised their right to silence cannot be used against them in any way. It cannot be used to fill in the gaps in the prosecution case.

Identification evidence

Senior Counsel for Mr Hosseinishoja acknowledged that this is “not really an identification case”. [12] Rather, it is a case where Witness A says he knew each of the accused and says they were present before and during the incident. In Mr Hosseinishoja’s case, Witness A also said the accused was present after the incident when he (Witness A) was detained back at the clubhouse. The prosecution relies on other evidence as to the nicknames of the accused to link Witness A’s assertions to the individual accused. It seems to follow that, in Mr Hosseinishoja’s case, a warning as to the possible dangers of identification evidence is not necessary.
12. Tcpt p 706.

Senior Counsel for Mr Abdaly took a different approach and asserted that such a direction is necessary. She emphasised that her client’s case is that “[Witness A] didn’t even know Abdaly at this time and only came to know him afterwards”. [13] It was submitted that a direction is necessary both in terms of whether Witness A was lying and concerning the possibility that he was mistaken in identifying and asserting Mr Abdaly was present.
13. See generally tcpt p 707.
A warning concerning the dangers of identification evidence does not normally encompass the possibility of dishonesty on the part of the witness. The warning is usually designed to counter the seductive nature of such evidence given by a truthful witness in circumstances where the history of the law is littered with examples of wrongful convictions based on identification evidence given by an honest witness who truly believes they are identifying the person who committed the crime.
As things developed, the issue (in Mr Abdaly’s case) became tied up with the failure of Senior Counsel to put squarely to the witness either that there was no “Zak” in the group or that Witness A had mistaken the person he said he knew as “Zak” – and later “Anush” – for one of the other tall members of the group with similar names. I will call this the Browne v Dunn issue. [14]
14. Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67.
I will come back to consider the Browne v Dunn issue. While I remain conscious of the possibility that an honest witness may be mistaken, and in Mr Abdaly’s case that Witness A did not really know him well at all, I am not inclined to direct myself that identification evidence may be unreliable. I may have taken a different approach if there was a jury. However, this is a Judge alone trial and the question of whether Witness A was honest is the central issue. I am very conscious of the argument that he may be mistaken, but I see this as a question of fact, rather than a legal issue that requires me to approach the case as though, as a matter of law, Witness A’s identification evidence may be unreliable.

Circumstantial reasoning

In addition to direct evidence, I may draw reasonable inferences or draw conclusions from the proven facts. The individual facts do not need to be established to any particular standard. However, the more certain those primary facts are the more readily the inference might be drawn.
If the case was based on circumstantial reasoning alone, it would be necessary to consider all other reasonable inferences or hypotheses and exclude them before drawing the guilty inference.
However, the case against both accused is reliant on the direct evidence of Witness A. However, there is some circumstantial reasoning involved. In particular, Witness A has never nominated the accused by their actual names. In each case, the prosecution requires me to draw an inference that his references to “Moe”, “Moey” or “Michael” are references to Mr Hosseinishoja and his references to “Zak” and “Anoush” are references to Mr Abdaly.
That link is (or those links are) in the circumstances of this case, an essential part of the process of reasoning and must be established beyond reasonable doubt.

Forensic disadvantage arising from the delay in prosecution

The assault of Mr Srbin took place on 16 May 2013. Mr Hosseinishoja was not charged with the offence until 26 October 2020 and Mr Abdaly was not charged until 9 November 2020. This delay has potentially placed them at a forensic disadvantage in defending themselves against these allegations. Witness A did not participate in an identification procedure until 2019, following a visit to the Crime Commission and the making of a statement to police in 2018. The accused are now confronted with an argument that his failure to identify them was the result of the effluxion of time. Also, the accused cases (as put in cross-examination) are a flat denial of being involved. Neither called evidence to establish an alibi. Again, the delay in charging may have limited their ability to remember, let alone establish, where they were on the night of the assault.
A direction about “forensic disadvantage” is not necessary in a jury trial unless there is a “significant forensic disadvantage” which might include things like the death of witnesses or the loss of evidence. [15]
15. Evidence Act, s 165B.
There is no disadvantage of such magnitude in the present case. As the Prosecutor submitted, the delay was not as extreme as in many cases where such a direction is given to a jury. However, there may be cases where even a relatively short delay will give rise to an established (and significant) forensic disadvantage. This is not such a case, and no evidence was led to suggest that it is.
I have not taken the delay, or any disadvantage suffered by the accused, into account in reaching my conclusions.

The barristers’ addresses

I heard helpful addresses from the Prosecutor and Senior Counsel for each of the accused. I have taken their submissions into account and given the arguments the weight they deserved. I have kept in mind that the addresses are not evidence. I will not set out all of counsels’ arguments in this judgment but will make reference to some of them, and many are reflected in my reasoning and findings.

The Browne v Dunn issue

The Browne v Dunn issue arose fleetingly during legal submissions before the addresses. [16] It became the focus of a spirited debate after Ms Cunneen delivered her closing address (and following Mr Brady’s address). [17]
16. Tcpt p 700.
17. Tcpt pp 801-815.
The nub of the issue is this: Witness A said he knew Mr Abdaly by the nickname Zak and later came to know that he was called Anush. [18]
18. Tcpt p 138.
In her closing address, Ms Cunneen raised the question “who is Zak?” [19] and made a strong submission that there is no evidence, other than that given by Witness A, that Mr Abdaly was ever known by that nickname. She went on to remind me of evidence that there were other people in the group with similar sounding names, who were quite tall, such as “Sass”, “Wais”, “Siar”, “Ismail” and “Ziggy” (because it starts with a “Z”). [20]
19. Tcpt pp 756, 760-761.
20. See, for example, tcpt pp 762-763, 768 (in address) and tcpt p 812 (in legal argument).
The Prosecutor complained that Ms Cunneen did not put to Witness A that he was wrong or mistaken in suggesting that Mr Abdaly (or Anush) was also known as Zak or put to any other witness that there was no person in the group with that nickname. Nor was it put that Witness A may have mistaken Mr Abdaly for any other member of the group with a similar name. It was further put (in effect) that there was no hint that this was an issue until the closing address on behalf of Mr Abdaly. The Prosecutor sought a direction formulated in various ways but ultimately, putting the pieces together as best I can, to the following effect: [21]

Witness A was not given the opportunity to answer the suggestion that he was mistaken or lying when he said the man he came to know as “Anush” was also known as “Zak”. Nor was it suggested before the closing address that there may have been a mistake wherein the name Zak was a mistaken reference to another member of the group.
This created unfairness and I should give no weight, or very little weight, to any submission based on those propositions.
21. Tcpt pp 803-805.

Ms Cunneen attempted to mount a submission that the propositions were implicit in many of her questions to Witness A. To be blunt, they were not. For example, the conclusion of her cross-examination was as follows: [22]
22. Tcpt pp 337-338.

“CUNNEEN
Q. Okay. Zak happened to be a name you recalled, isn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is why you have used it in order to make up what you say about what Zak did, because you remembered his name; that’s all?
A. No, not at all.
Q. When you went back to Burwood after the assault upon Nick Srbin, you have given some evidence about this and you said this, at page 145 - you said, when you were asked when you got to Burwood, line 8, ‘Was anybody else there?’ This is after the event. You said:
‘Yeah. Everybody was there, or not everybody. It was probably the same about four, five, six or seven people there, from previous excursions through to Redfern.’

Then you said:
‘I think Weiss or Wais was there, Mo, Zak, me, Sultani, I think Michael was - sorry, Tony was there.’

I want to suggest this to you very squarely: There was no person called Zak at Burwood when you got back there after the assault upon Srbin, was there?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. Not there?
A. No, he was there.
Q. In fact, and I suggest it to you for the final time, you had not met Zak by that time?
A. Yeah, I met Zak.
Q. And you only gave detail about this night including him because you came to know him in the following weeks or months and learnt his name?
A. No.
Q. And he stood out to you because he was tall; not the tallest, but tall?
A. No, that’s not true.
Q. You never saw him in relation to any baseball bat at any time doing anything?
A. Yeah, I did.
Q. Because he wasn’t there?
A. No, he was there.”

This cross-examination was predicated on an assumption that Mr Abdaly was known as Zak or that the witness believed he was so known. When Ms Cunneen put that the witness “had not met Zak by that time”, this was a reference to Mr Abdaly. There was no hint or implication that Zak was not his name, that there was somebody else in the group called Zak or something similar.
After Senior Counsel skirted around the issue in argument, she conceded quite properly: “Well your Honour I didn’t do it.” The Court then took a short break. When the argument resumed, Ms Cunneen said:

“Your Honour, the precise cross-examination about Zak and Anush was not put to Mr A because there were no instructions to put that. There was no positive case on behalf of Mr Abdaly that Anush was not Zak. When I was cross-examining Mr A, I was highlighting the inconsistencies and that there was no link between Zak and Anush.” [23]
23. Tcpt pp 805-812.

The rule in Browne v Dunn is an important rule of fairness. In some cases, it involves fairness to the witness. In others it involves fairness to a party who may be taken by surprise. I accept that the Prosecutor in this trial was caught unaware when the submissions were made in defence counsel’s closing address. It is established that the extent to which the rule might be used to draw inferences adverse to an accused in criminal proceedings is extremely limited. [24] Speaking generally, an accused person is not required to disclose their defence and does not have an onus to prove anything. Even so, where counsel makes a “forensic choice”, with good reason, not to explore a matter but to rely on gaps in the evidence, the extent to which those gaps may be used can be limited. As Gleeson CJ and Heydon J said in MWJ v The Queen at [19]:

“In the present case, there was no obligation on trial counsel for the appellant to question the complainant about whether there had been more than one incident of sexual abuse at Sutcliffe Street, and there was no obligation to seek to have the complainant recalled for that purpose. Why would counsel for the appellant want to run the risk of eliciting further evidence of uncharged criminal acts by her client? That, no doubt, left the trial judge in a difficult position when he came to evaluate a criticism (in final address) of the complainant’s credibility based on the supposed (although, in truth, non-existent) inconsistencies. It did not mean that counsel could not put her argument to the judge. As Doyle CJ said, it was a matter to be taken into account in assessing the weight to be given to the supposed inconsistencies. In the event, it was the fact that counsel chose (with reason) to leave the evidence in a state of uncertainty that undermined her submission about inconsistency. That was a forensic choice for counsel to make.”
24. See, for example, the judgments in MJW v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 at [18] (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J), [39]-[41] (Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ), R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 686-691 (Gleeson CJ) and R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17 at 23; [1989] SASC 1628 (King CJ).

While the factual circumstances of the present case are less stark, I will take the same approach to the submissions made in relation to the lack of evidence (apart from Witness A) that Mr Abdaly went by the nickname Zak, whether Witness A may have mistakenly identified somebody else in the group with a similar sounding name (and appearance), or whether there was some other Zak to whom Witness A was referring.
I direct myself as follows:

There is no evidence to support Witness A’s account that Anush was also known as Zak. That is potentially relevant to his credibility and to the prosecution case that they were the same person.

However, Witness A was not given an opportunity to answer the suggestion that he made a mistake about the name, that there may have been somebody else called Zak or that he may have mistaken Zak for another member of the group. Nor was any other witness, such as RS 1546093 (“RS 093”) (who gave evidence) or RS 1521670 (“RS 670”) (who was not required for cross-examination), asked questions on this issue.

There is no evidence that any other associate of Sultani went by the name Zak.

I am entitled to (and will) give less weight to the submissions made on this topic.

I do not suggest that such directions would be appropriate in a jury case. It will depend on the circumstances of the case as to the proper directions to be given.
While this matter was subject to quite forceful submissions on both sides, it is ultimately not an issue of great moment. On an evidentiary or factual level, there are two main reasons for this.
First, as I observed during the submissions, [25] Witness A’s state of knowledge was a “continuum”. He ultimately identified the relevant “offender” by the name Anush, which is clearly a reference to Mr Abdaly (being his middle name). The fact that he also called him Zak, or originally knew him as Zak, does not fundamentally undermine his evidence that Anush (Mr Abdaly) was present and that he was the person who hit the deceased in the head with a baseball bat.
25. Tcpt p 779.
Secondly, there is no evidence that any other person in the group was called Zak. Establishing an absence of evidence does not equate to proving the negative. Whatever be the state of knowledge of other members of the group, Witness A says that he thought Anush was also called Zak. There is no doubt he attributed to Mr Abdaly both presence at the scene and wielding the baseball bat. He may be mistaken about that. He may be lying about it. He may be truthful and accurate. But those propositions do not turn on the absence of independent evidence that Anush was also known as Zak.

Other directions sought by the Prosecutor after the closing addresses

In addition to his complaint concerning Ms Cunneen’s submissions relating to the “Zak issue”, the Prosecutor also sought a number of other directions arising from the defence addresses. Most of these were really matters of evidence where, it was put, defence counsel went too far. In most instances, I was conscious of the liberties taken in the addresses and was not going to be influenced by the hyperbole and flourish. However, I acknowledge the Prosecutor’s complaints and should briefly record them.

Submission that Mr Abdaly was “at school” in 2011

The Prosecutor complained about Ms Cunneen’s submission that Mr Abdaly was still at school in 2011. He said there is no evidence that Mr Abdaly was in school at that time. This issue arose in the context that Witness A gave evidence that he had been told that Sultani went to school with, amongst others, Mr Abdaly. It is not contested that Sultani and Mr Hosseinishoja attended school together at Arthur Phillip High School.
The Prosecutor’s opening address included:

“Witness A was aware that Zak had gone to school with Sultani and that Zak spent a lot of time with the person known to Witness A as Michael, which is Hosseinishoja.” [26]
26. Tcpt p 25.

The Prosecutor relied on this as part of the “close association” between the accused and Mr Sultani.
Ms Cunneen contested this issue from the start of the trial. Her opening statement included:

“It is not in contest significantly Mr Abdaly was an associate of Mr Sultani. But what is in dispute is the duration of the association. Mr Abdaly was a six school years younger than Mr Sultani and never attended the same school or schools that Mr Sultani attended.” [27]
27. Tcpt p 35.

Ms Cunneen also put to Witness A that her client did not go to school with Mr Sultani. He agreed that Sultani had never directly told him that the attended school with Mr Abdaly. [28]
28. Tcpt pp 227-228.
Spiros Filipou, who went to school with Mr Sultani and Mr Hosseinishoja at Parramatta High School, gave evidence he had never met or heard of Mr Abdaly. [29]
29. Tcpt pp 564, 567-568.
The officer in charge of the police investigation, Mr Hunt, was also cross-examined on this issue:

“Q. Detective Sergeant Hunt, did you make some enquiries about the schools attended by Mr Abdaly, specifically in relation to whether he attended any schools that Mr Sultani had attended?
A. Yes, we understand they all attended Arthur Phillip High.
Q. Can I suggest to you that Mr Abdaly never ever set foot in Arthur Phillip High and in fact went to Homebush Boys High?
A. That may be correct. I actually had a police officer that went to school with a lot of them. If Mr Abdaly wasn’t one of them then I’m mistaken.
Q. Can I suggest to you that Mr Abdaly did his HSC in 2011?
A. Yes, you can.
Q. Does that accord with your enquiries?
A. I can’t answer that.
Q. May I suggest to you and perhaps the answer is obvious that Mr Abdaly never went to the same school, primary or high school, as Mr Sultani at the same time or at any other time?
A. I’d have to take that on its merit, yes.” [30]
30. Tcpt p 662.

Some of those answers are surprising given that the evidence was given on the last day of evidence in the trial, a long time after it was clear that the prosecution case on this issue was disputed. It is surprising that no inquiries were made once the issue was squarely raised at the beginning of the trial.
In her closing address, Ms Cunneen made several submissions on this issue. Most were critical of the failure of the prosecution to investigate the issue. Those criticisms were, insofar as it matters, justified.
However, Ms Cunneen also asserted that Mr Abdaly in 2011 “is still well at school”. [31] She had earlier submitted “Mr Abdaly of course was 16 for a third of 2011 and 17 for the rest and still in school uniform at Homebush Boys High School.” [32] The Prosecutor complained there was no evidence that Mr Abdaly was at school in 2011. The Prosecutor’s submission is correct and I direct myself accordingly.
31. Tcpt p 765.
32. Tcpt p 755.
While dealing with such things, I remind myself that counsels’ opening and closing addresses are not evidence. This includes the Prosecutor’s opening statement which, if it was implied that Mr Abdaly was at school with Mr Sultani, was not supported by evidence.

Submission that Witness A was a would be gangster, etcetera etcetera etcetera

The Prosecutor complained that Ms Cunneen submitted, in the absence of evidence, that Witness A was a “would be gangster” and a “lifelong con man and an evil one”. [33]
33. Tcpt p 768.
The Prosecutor is correct that I must disregard such flourishes.
The Prosecutor’s complaint was hardly necessary in the circumstances. Earlier in her address Ms Cunneen said that Witness A “must be one of the greatest liars left unhung”. At that point in the address, I reminded her that there was no jury in the courtroom. Unperturbed, Senior Counsel went on to describe Witness A as a “special case” and “maybe one of the most untrustworthy people police have ever reposed belief in for the purposes of charging people with murder.” [34] Such colourful language, while entertaining and perhaps good for client relations, is very easy for a judge, sitting alone, to ignore. I have done just that and did not need the Prosecutor to remind me to do so.
34. Tcpt p 756.

As I told the Prosecutor when he raised these issues, I will treat Witness A “as I found him based on what he said he has done and others have said he has done.” [35]

Mr Brady’s submission about a telephone call

35. Tcpt p 807.

The Prosecutor then complained about Mr Brady’s submission that Witness A spoke to Harry Charalambous (“Harry”) for 3 minutes and 12 seconds on 16 May 2013 at 10.51.04pm. It was submitted this was an overstatement of the evidence and that all that was proved was that the two ‘phone services were connected for that length of time.
Mr Brady said his submission was that the overwhelming inference to be drawn from the evidence in Exhibits 16 and 17 (the identical agreed tables of communications) was that there was a conversation between Witness A and Harry.
I accept that there are limitations to what these telephone records can prove. In relation to the particular entry at 10.51.04pm, there is a dispute (despite what the document says) as to who was using the service with number xxxx xxx 915 at the time of that connection.
I do not accept the criticism made of Senior Counsel’s submission on this issue. I accept that Mr Brady made a legitimate submission (whether I accept it or not) as to inferences that can be drawn from the records.

Proving the crime of murder: the elements of the offence, joint criminal enterprise and extended joint criminal enterprise

The elements of the offence of murder are:

The accused committed a voluntary act.

That act caused the death of Nikola Srbin.

The act was done with an intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm (or with reckless indifference to human life).

This is not a case where recklessness (in element 3) has any real role to play. If the prosecution case is accepted, the inference that the perpetrators acted with an intention to inflict (at least) grievous bodily harm (which means really serious physical injury) is overwhelming.
The prosecution presents its case on the basis of “common purpose” or “joint criminal enterprise”. Under this principle, it is not necessary to establish which member of the enterprise committed the act or acts causing death. Each member of the group is legally responsible for the acts of the other members who share the common purpose.
To establish the crime of murder by joint criminal enterprise, the following things must be established beyond reasonable doubt:

The existence of a joint criminal enterprise to murder Nikola Srbin.

The accused joined and was part of that criminal enterprise.

The accused did not withdraw from the criminal enterprise. It is unnecessary to speak further about the legal requirements for withdrawal from such an enterprise because this is not an issue in the case. There is no evidence that either accused withdrew from the enterprise in any relevant sense; the case of each is that they did not join the enterprise in the first place.

Between them, the members of the group committed all the elements of murder.

The prosecution also relies on an alternative case based on extended joint criminal enterprise. To establish its case in that way, the prosecution must prove:

The accused entered a joint criminal enterprise to commit some less serious crime. That might include assaulting or wounding the victim.

The accused contemplated the possibility that one or more of the group may commit the crime of murder including doing the act that caused Mr Srbin’s death and doing so with an intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm.

That between them, the members of the group committed each of the elements of murder, including the mental element (intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm).

As I have said, in a case based on a joint criminal enterprise or extended joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution need not prove that the accused committed the act causing death. The accused is responsible for the acts of the other members of the group provided either the common purpose was to murder Mr Srbin or the accused contemplated or adverted to the possibility that Mr Srbin would be killed by another member of the group acting with an intention of killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm.

An alternative verdict of manslaughter

If the prosecution failed to establish the crime of murder, because it failed to prove the mental element of the offence or because it did not establish that the accused joined a criminal enterprise to murder Mr Srbin, or that they did not contemplate the possibility that murder would be committed by other members of the enterprise, there is an alternative verdict of manslaughter.
The elements of the offence of manslaughter, when the prosecution relies on a killing by way of an unlawful and dangerous act, are as follows:

The accused committed a voluntary act.

That act caused the death of Mr Srbin.

The act was unlawful in the sense that it was not justified or excused, for example by self-defence or the lawful execution of duty.

The act was dangerous in the sense that it carried with it an appreciable risk of serious injury.

Again, the prosecution relies on joint criminal enterprise to prove this alternative offence. To establish manslaughter by joint criminal enterprise it must prove beyond reasonable doubt:

The existence of a joint criminal enterprise to assault Mr Srbin.

The accused joined that criminal enterprise.

Between them, the members of the group committed each of the elements of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.

The real issues in the case

While the prosecution relies on Witness A’s evidence that Mr Hosseinishoja struck Mr Srbin with a rubber mallet and Mr Abdaly struck him with a baseball bat, those matters need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt (or at all) for the case against each accused to be established. The prosecution does not seek to prove that either accused is a principal in the first degree. Rather, it puts its case exclusively on the basis of joint criminal enterprise or extended joint criminal enterprise. Subject to proof of intention, all that needs to be established in each case is that the accused was part of the group that committed the offence and that one or more members of the group did the act that caused Mr Srbin’s death.
Neither of the accused disputed that Mr Srbin died on 5 June 2013 as a result of the head injuries he received on 16 May 2013 at the hands of a group of men organised by Mr Sultani. Nor was there any real dispute about the events that led up to the assault.
The prosecution case is that Witness A knew Mr Abdaly as Zak and later as Anush. It suggests he knew Mr Hosseinishoja as Michael, Mo or Moey. The accused men do not dispute that they went by those names although issues were raised respectively as to the names Zak and (to a lesser degree) Michael. Nor do they dispute that they had met Witness A. However, each accused disputes Witness A’s evidence as to the extent of their interactions with him and his knowledge of them. That is a significant matter in the context of the real issue in the trial.
The true and central issue in each of the cases is whether the accused was present at the clubhouse at Burwood before the assault and part of the group that assaulted the deceased at Redfern. It follows that each accused disputes the specific acts attributed to them by Witness A. This includes, in Mr Hosseinishoja’s case, that he collected a bag of guns which were distributed to the group, that he wielded “an Uzi with a suppressor” and that he hit Mr Srbin with a rubber mallet during the assault. In Mr Abdaly’s case, it includes the allegation that he struck Mr Srbin with a baseball bat.
The accused also disputed Witness A’s account of the events after the assault. Witness A asserts that he was essentially held prisoner at the Burwood clubhouse and that Mr Hosseinishoja (Michael or Mo) tied him up with tape. Again, this is disputed as is much of the account provided by Witness A as to his movements after the assault.

Uncontroversial findings of fact

Based on uncontradicted and uncontroversial evidence, I make the following factual findings:

Witness A was released from gaol, after serving a term of imprisonment for drug supply, on 8 October 2011.

He was introduced to Mr Sultani by Omar Moshref a short time later, perhaps a week after his release from gaol. He commenced selling drugs supplied by Sultani sometime thereafter and continued to do so until May 2013. The details of how this trade was transacted, and the frequency of his interactions, is controversial and potentially important. It may bear upon the extent to which Witness A knew each of the accused.

Witness A was also connected with Nikola Srbin, his father Jonel Srbin and Omar Moshref and may have dealt drugs on their behalf, although his evidence on this issue was not completely clear. [36] However, I accept that he received some “terrible” ice (methylamphetamine) from Jonel Srbin in early May 2013. The drugs were in the form of an “eight ball” (3.5 grams) and valued at $600. [37] At the time of the fatal assault, Witness A still owed Jonel Srbin $400. Jonel and Nikola Srbin attempted to have Witness A repay that money. Witness A’s evidence on this issue received some support in the evidence of telephone communications. [38]
36. See, for example, tcpt p 103.
37. Tcpt pp 101, 111.
38. Exs 16 and 17 (these are copies of the same document but tendered in the separate cases).

On 16 May 2013, at around 11:00am, Nikola and Jonel Srbin and Omar Moshref paid Witness A a visit. Their purpose was to demand payment for the drugs. The evidence of the conversation and confrontation that morning was given by Witness A and a witness known as RS 1148048 (“RS 048”). I accept that threats were made and that Witness A was assaulted. The men said they would return at 6.00pm and expected payment of the $400. In that regard, Witness A’s account receives some support from a witness known as RS 1869816 (“RS 816”).

After the visit, Witness A contacted Sultani who asked him to meet at the Shangri-La Hotel. Witness A told Sultani what had happened. Witness A’s evidence receives some support from the telephone records. Sultani and Witness A then travelled to Burwood where a group of men gathered. This was organised by Sultani. Witness A estimated there were 15 to 20 men gathered at the unit.

The unit where the group gathered was to become the clubhouse of the Burwood Chapter of the Rebels motorcycle club. There is evidence of a lease being taken out on the premises commencing 6 May 2013, [39] and photographs showing a number of relevant players renovating the clubhouse. [40]
39. Ex 26.
40. Ex 42 and 43 (copies of the same agreed facts with photographs attached showing the clubhouse between February 2012 and August 2013).

A number of men, probably 10, including Witness A and Mr Sultani, then travelled in two cars to xxxxxxxxxxxx George Street, Redfern. They arrived between 6.00pm and 7.00pm.

Meanwhile, Witness A was communicating with Jonel Srbin. As noted, Jonel Srbin said earlier in the day that he, his son (Nikola) and Omar Moshref would be returning to Witness A’s Redfern apartment at 6.00pm to collect the $400. There are various communications recorded in the telephone records between Witness A, Jonel Srbin and “Adrian” (ie Omar) Moshref.

Witness A’s group arrived and entered a courtyard at xxxxxxxxxxxxxx George Street en masse. Based on the oral testimony, CCTV and telephone records, the preponderance of evidence suggests this was at about 7.00pm.

Witness A was the first to enter the courtyard. Nikola Srbin and Omar Moshref were present. Jonel Srbin was not in the courtyard although he may have been in or near one of the apartments within the complex. RS 816 was also present. Two men that RS 816 had arranged to attend xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx George Street at the appointed hour to provide protection or back-up for Witness A were outside the unit complex.

Witness A pointed at Nikola Srbin and identified him for the group. Sultani ushered Omar Moshref, to whom he was related, to the side. Witness A told the group that RS 816 was not “the father”, that is Jonel Srbin. It seems some members of the group may have thought that RS 816 was one of the “targets” of their intervention.

The fatal assault on Nikola Srbin took place over the ensuing (approximately) two to eight minutes.

Witness A and RS 816 left the scene and met at the nearby flat of Fred Collachi, another friend of Witness A (“Fred”). While they were there, Witness A paid RS 816’s two associates who had attended as back-up for Witness A. Witness A said he paid them each “a point” of methylamphetamine. There is CCTV footage showing the movements of Witness A and RS 816 at the xxxxxx building between 7.30pm and 8.30pm on 16 May 2013.

Witness A, RS 816 and another associate of Witness A and RS 816, Harry, travelled to the McDonald’s family “restaurant” in Stanmore. Witness A went by train and was captured on CCTV footage at both ends of the journey (Redfern – Stanmore). [41] RS 816 and Harry travelled by car.

There is CCTV footage of the movements of the men at McDonald’s. [42] They arrived, separately, at about 9.15pm. Harry and RS 816 left the scene (according to Witness A, to acquire syringes). They left at around 10.20pm. Witness A met with Sultani in a laneway adjacent to the restaurant.

(Initially, RS 816 had no memory of any of this and perhaps one false memory. When reminded of the visit to the xxxxxxx Building and Stanmore McDonald’s, and told there was CCTV footage, he gave evidence that he may have ridden to Stanmore on his bike).

As a result of the assault, Nikola Srbin sustained severe head injuries. His father cared for him for an hour or so before a 000 call was made at 9.43pm. An ambulance arrived at 9.53pm. He was taken to Royal Prince Alfred Hospital and died on 5 June 2013.

I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the assault on 16 May caused, or at least materially contributed to, Nikola Srbin’s death.
41. Ex 10.
42. Ex 11.

An overview of Witness A’s evidence

Before subjecting Witness A’s evidence to the careful scrutiny the law demands and to place in context the evidence that is capable of providing his testimony with some support, I will provide a brief overview of his evidence.

Witness A’s contact with Sultani and the accused before the incident

Within about a week of being released from gaol on 8 October 2011 after serving a sentence for drug dealing, Witness A met with Mr Sultani and agreed to deal drugs with him or on his behalf. He was introduced to Sultani by Omar Moshref, who Witness A had met in gaol. Sultani gave him “two ounces of cocaine” and a mobile telephone and said to contact him once he had sold the drugs. He said he continued to sell drugs for Sultani but that “it changed after a while to methamphetamines, commonly known as ice”. The amounts varied but the dealings were “constant”. He said, “sometimes it was every 24 hours, sometimes it was 48 hours, sometimes it might be two or three days … the time frame varied depending on how quickly I could move the drugs”. [43]
43. Tcpt pp 100-102.
He gave evidence of how he received the drugs. He said the exchange (of money for drugs) would take place in Burwood. Sultani was not generally present, but he would usually meet “probably the same four people”. He nominated those people as “Sultani, Mo [or] Michael, Zak [or] Anush and sometimes a guy called Moussa Wais”. [44]
44. Tcpt p 102.
The importance of this evidence lies not in the fact of the drug dealing but in the frequency of contact between the two accused and Witness A. The frequency of contact was disputed. Through cross-examination both accused disputed that they had met Witness A in the circumstances he described.
Witness A said he had some “pretty scary” interactions with Sultani and his cohort. He said on one occasion a group of men, led by Sultani, made him write a suicide note and threatened to give him a “hot shot”. He said both accused were present during that incident. He said Sultani would sometimes pull out the note and show it to him. [45]
45. Tcpt p 105.
He testified that “[s]ometimes I would get threatened by getting put in the boot of a car and taken for a drive”. He said “Well, Sultani instructed Michael a couple of times or Moey to put me in the boot of a car and take me for a drive, and the last minute it would be cancelled or call[ed] off for some specific reason.” He said “Michael [or] Moey was – he was the only person there actually” but he would receive a phone call from Sultani giving him instructions to call it off. [46]

Association between Witness A and the accused, the accused and Sultani, and Sultani’s role as leader of the group

46. Tcpt pp 105-106.

Witness A gave evidence that he met each of the accused on many occasions, both as part of the drug dealing activity, where he would collect drugs and pay for them, and in social settings. He said they were usually part of the “same four” men who he would meet to collect the drugs. He claimed that they were present when he was forced to write a suicide note and that Michael (on Sultani’s instructions) threatened to put him in the boot of a car. [47]
47. Tcpt pp 102-106.
He said they appeared to be “just like brothers”, always hanging out together and looking after each other. He said that Michael and Zak often took the other with them when Sultani asked them to undertake tasks. Over objection, Witness A said:

“They always done what they were told. Everybody always done what they were told when Sultani asked them to (including Michael and Zak).” [48]
48. Tcpt pp 108-109.

He described Michael or Moe as about six feet tall, “six foot one”, with short dark hair (“probably a number one, in hairdressing terms”) and a “little goatee”. [49]
49. Tcpt p 107.
He said Zak was about “six three, six two, six three; short hair, the same as everybody basically in the group.” He was younger than Michael, “early 20s, 20, 21, 22.” The most distinguishing feature of his appearance was his height. [50]
50. Tcpt pp 107-108.

The dispute with the Srbins and the assault on Witness A

In the period leading up to the assault on Mr Srbin, Witness A said he acquired some drugs from Sultani (“I think I got two eight balls … a quarter of methamphetamines”). Sultani said it would cost about $1,200. He then received an eight ball from Jonel Srbin – “it was terrible … he told me it was terrible.” Jonel Srbin had “taken it on tick” and wanted $600 for it. [51]
51. Tcpt p 110-111.
Over the coming days, Jonel Srbin placed pressure on Witness A to repay the money, although Witness A took the view that he was doing Jonel a favour. He gave different versions of how often he had dealt with him before, saying at one stage in his evidence that he thought “it was the first time”. [52]
52. Tcpt p 251.
He said the night before he was assaulted, Jonel Srbin and Omar Moshref were placing pressure on him to acquire heroin and were threatening him over the $400. He said they threatened “to come around and beat me up and torture me, and just words to that effect, for sure.” He said he was “angry and scared”. As far as he was concerned, he was helping them out and that he explained to them that he was on “the program” and “wasn’t touching it [heroin]”. [53] I would describe his tone and demeanour in giving this evidence as exhibiting both anger and outrage.
53. Tcpt pp 112-114.
The following morning there was loud knocking on the door. RS 048 eventually let in four people – a woman called “Coco”, Jonel and Nikola Srbin, and Omar Moshref. They were threatening him and demanding the $400. [54] Witness A gave the following description of what he said happened next:
54. Tcpt p 118.

“Q. Can you describe their mannerisms, how were they acting and how were they demanding, their tone of voice?

A. Well, at one point in the conversation they told me to stand up, and Omar Moshref king hit me, probably, I don’t know, at least three or four times he king hit me. And then John Srbin stood up and he king hit me a couple of times. And then‑‑
Q. Before you go any further, I need you to explain what you mean by king hits?
A. Punched me in the face.
Q. How hard did‑‑
A. Well, some of them were big boys. They were, like, you know, about 120, 130 kilo guys, 6 foot 2, 6 foot 3 guys.
Q. How hard did he hit?
A. He hit me hard.
Q. How hard did John hit you?
A. John hit me very hard as well. And then Nick stood up with a knife, approximately, you know, (indicates) the blade was probably three, four inches long and stuck it in my eye, stuck it in my throat, stuck it at my cheek, stuck it in my ribs.
Q. ‘In my eye’, it’s an expression. Can you explain exactly what he did?
A. He stuck it literally just touching. You know, I could feel it with my eyelashes but it was right there in my eye, for sure.
Q. Did he put it up against other parts of your person?
A. Yeah, he did. My cheek, my throat, my ribs. Yeah, three other parts of my body, for sure.
Q. How long did he hold it at your eye for?
A. It would be hard for me to say but, you know, it was there and that was it, while he was talking to me and making threats against me.
Q. You say he was talking to you and making threats; can you please tell us the words he said?
A. You know, he’s saying, ‘If you don’t get me the ‑ or get my family or get my father this money, we’re going to take you away and torture you for ages’ and ‘we want our money’ and just words to that effect.
Q. And when these guys hit you, what effect did that have on you?
A. Well, I guess because of the adrenalin running through my system, it was a bit different than if it was a surprise hit. You know, because I knew it was coming, it was a bit different. But it had a profound effect on me, it scared me, you know. Probably bruised me at the same time.
Q. How scared were you?
A. Well, extremely scared.
Q. When Nikola Srbin held the knife against you in the ways that you have just described and made those threats to torture you for ages, what did that make you think?
A. It was gonna happen. You know, these threats were real and they were gonna happen; that’s exactly what was gonna happen to me.
Q. How scared were you?
A. Very scared.
Q. And when you were punched was there any bleeding as a result of you being punched?
A. I think there was a little bit initially and there was definitely bruising, but there wasn’t a lot of blood, no.
Q. When Nikola Srbin held the knife against you in the ways you have described, did he have anything on his hands?
A. Yeah, he had black gloves. Leather black gloves I think.
Q. You said that all three of them were demanding that you‑‑
A. That’s correct.
Q. ‑‑that you give John the $400?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Was a deadline set?
A. Well, basically they made me phone a few people and one of them was Harry Charalambous. They made me phone him and they told them where to go. And then they said ‑ well, then Nick took me up the stairs and he threatened me again with a knife; rummaged, him ‑ and then Omar come up and they rummaged through my room a little bit and then we all went down the stairs and they said, ‘We’re leaving and we’re going to come back at 6 o’clock tonight’. They set a deadline, ‘not one minute past, not one minute to, we’ll be here exactly 6 o’clock’.
Q. You gave evidence earlier this morning that Sultani had given you some ice?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you said you’d hidden, I think your word was, in your unit?
A. Yeah, that’s correct.
Q. Was the ice still in the unit when these men were there?
A. Yeah. Well, I actually offered them an X amount to cover the bill and they didn’t want to take it. They said, ‘This is a gift, we still want the $400’.
Q. What did you do with Sultani’s ice?
A. Well I only brought out X amount so they didn’t know I had the rest of it.
Q. You brought out a limited amount of it, is that what you mean?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Did you say how much that limited amount was worth?
A. I told them, you know, they can double their money on this if they wanted it, but they weren’t interested; they basically still wanted the $400. It was Omar Moshref that pointed out, ‘This is a gift. This isn’t the payment for what you owe us, or what you owe John and Nick’.
Q. When you said ‘this is a gift’, this is referring to the‑‑
A. The ice that I’d produced to give them.
Q. And was that in a bag?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. What happened with that ice?
A. And they took it with them. As I said, they said it was a gift. They weren’t interested in making money from it or anything. They wanted basically to smoke it and that’s about it.
Q. So they gave you this deadline of 6 o’clock?
A. That’s correct.
Q. What did they say when they gave you that deadline?
A. As I said earlier, they said ‘we’re coming back at 6 o’clock and you better have our money, and not one minute past or one minute to, we’re coming here dead on 6 o’clock’.
Q. You said they left?
A. That’s right.” [55]

55. Tcpt pp 119-121.

Sultani’s involvement and the gathering at Burwood

Witness A described how he felt “psychologically” after this incident:

“A. Well, I was frightened. You know, I was scared. I had a deadline, what was I going to do about this deadline, you know. There was only to be either two options; either get the $400 to these guys by the 6 o’clock, you know, or get myself protected and not being kidnapped and tortured. That was about the two options I had open to myself.” [56]
56. Tcpt p 122.

He chose to seek protection. He spoke to RS 816 who attended the scene at 6.00pm that night with two other men; the men who were paid a point of ice each for showing up. [57]
57. Tcpt p 130-131.
Witness A also spoke to Sultani. There are several communications between the two men over the next hours. They met in the lobby of the Shangri-La Hotel. Another man, Joe Antoun, was present. Sultani took him back to the unit at Burwood and Witness A said, “he made me put a blindfold on I think”. He thought Sultani used his phone during the trip and told him, “some of the boys are coming”. [58]
58. Tcpt pp 123-124.
Once they arrived at Burwood, there were “six, seven, eight, nine” people there and cars were arriving all the time. As to the numbers that eventually showed up, Witness A said:

“Anywhere between 15 and 20 guys came. Could have been more actually, you know. I’m not very sure but there was at least 15, 20 guys there.” [59]
59. Tcpt p 126.

Sultani spoke to all these people, sometimes in English and sometimes in “Afghani”. He directed “Michael, to go - I just seen him just talk to him and the guy took off in the car.” Michael came back, opened his boot, got out two bags and put them on the road. Inside the bags there were:

“Guns. Like, a lot of guns. Not just one, two three or four; there was like two bags of guns. Chrome revolvers, Glocks, things like that, you know.” [60]
60. Tcpt p 126.

Witness A said “there was going to be at least six or seven guns on people there” and that Sultani had whittled the numbers down “to about eight or ten guys that he was going to take with him back to Redfern”. He did this by telling others to leave and saying “there’s going to be five people in each car.” He said everybody except him and Sultani and had a gun. [61]
61. Tcpt p 127.
He was asked whether Sultani said anything about what was going to happen, and he replied “to me it was starting to be pretty obvious” at which point objection was taken. The examination in chief continued:

“Q. So I asked for words, not what you thought was obvious, you understand, so did you hear Sultani say anything to anybody about what was going to happen at Redfern?
A. Well, basically they were going to take care of my problem, basically they were going to, you know, solve this, people come at 6 o’clock to take me away and torture me and beat me up over $400.
Q. And how did they, the group of people, know that that was your problem?
A. Well, basically, well, because it was, it was basically getting close to the deadline, which was 6 o’clock, so Sultani said phone them up and we’re going to move the deadline an hour, we're going to move it to 7 o’clock. So I phoned and put them on speaker phone and I think it was John or I think it was John and Omar and Nick that were on, because they were all together at that point, and I said look, I’m not going to make it for 6 o’clock, and they said yeah, you are, if you're not here for 6 o’clock we’ve told you what’s going to happen to you. Not one minute past [Witness A], you’ve got to be here by 6 o’clock, and I kept telling them I'm not going to be there by 6 o’clock, we'll be there by 7 o’clock, and they kept saying no, you have to be here by 6 o’clock, and I said, well, it’s like quarter to then now and I’m not even anywhere near the place, so it’s impossible for me to get there by 6 o’clock.
Q. And who was on the other end of the phone saying this?
A. Nick, John and Omar Moshref, the three of them.” [62]

62. Tcpt p 128.

The fatal assault on Nikola Srbin

Witness A travelled in one of the two cars to Redfern. He could not remember who was in the car in which he travelled. [63] When he arrived, he saw the “two guys” outside the building who he described as “either Islander or Aboriginal or both, or a mix of both”. He later found out that RS 816 “brought them”. He did not notice whether any of the members of his group was carrying anything. [64]
63. Tcpt p 442.
64. Tcpt p 131.
He “ran” into the courtyard at the head of the group and saw RS 816, Omar Moshref and Nikola Srbin. He saw:

“Nick producing the knife again that he had produced in the apartment up the stairs, him smiling and thinking he got me, all the guys running out from the close into the courtyard--". [65]
65. Tcpt p 131.

He went on:

“A. Yeah, well, basically, yeah, that’s, and so they all ran out, and I seen his face drop because he could see, you know, all the people behind me, and they told him to take his bag off, because he had a little bag around his shoulder, and drop the knife. He took his gloves off and he dropped the knife, you know. Omar Moshref was telling Sultani something in Afghanistan or Afghan regarding me, because he kept using my name and I heard it. He was keeping me back and keeping Omar Moshref back.
Q. You said ‘he’?
A. Yeah, Sultani was, he was keeping us back out of the affray, and then Mo hit the guy across the head with a rubber mallet of about this size, a black one.” [66]
66. Tcpt p 132.

Witness A confirmed that this act was done by Mo or Michael and estimated the handle of the mallet was around “six, seven inches, about that, no five, six inches for sure” and the head was rubber and about three or four inches wide. [67] He was asked what then happened:
67. Tcpt pp 132-133.

“A. He dropped to the floor and he was dazed and confused for sure, he’d just been hit with a rubber, you know, mallet, quite forcefully across the face.
Q. Across the face?
A. Yeah.
Q. And when he dropped the floor, to the ground, what happened then?
A. He tried to get up and Zak told him not to get up, but he got because he was dazed.
CUNNEEN: I object to the paraphrasing, your Honour.
CROWN PROSECUTOR
Q. Can you remember the words that Zak used?
A. He said ‘don't get up’, [that’s exactly what he] said to him.
Q. And then what happened?
A. He tried to get up and when he tried to get up Zak hit him across the face with a baseball bat.
Q. And did you see any of the other men present strike or do anything physical--
A. No.
Q. To Mr Nick Srbin during this event?
A. No, they, didn't, no.
Q. So these were the two blows that you saw?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you said that Sultani was keeping you and Moshref back?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Were you watching what was happening with Nick Srbin all the time?
A. Most of the time, yeah, because that took matter of probably two or three minutes for that to happen, so it wasn’t a long period of time what happened, for sure.” [68]
68. Tcpt pp 133-134.

Witness A described the force of the blow with the mallet as “pretty extreme”. He was not sure if Mr Srbin was conscious after the blow with the baseball bat but observed immediate and serious injury. He said he saw no further blows after the victim was struck with the baseball bat. The group then turned around saying “we’ll get the Dad”, mistaking RS 816 for Jonel Srbin. Witness A intervened telling the group “no, no, no, he’s with me, he’s with me, just leave him alone.” [69]
69. Tcpt p 134.
Witness A said that he and RS 816 then left the building through a different exit. He thought the rest of the group went back the way they came in. When he left, Nikola Srbin was lying near a steel fence and railing which Witness A identified in some crime scene photographs. [70]
70. Tcpt p 135-136 and Ex 5 (page 2).
Witness A said he did not see any member of the group produce a gun, did not see any weapons apart from the mallet used by Michael and the baseball bat used by Zak, and did not see those two weapons until they were used. [71]
71. Tcpt pp 237, 275, 295, 331.

Events after the assault and the detention of Witness A

I have already detailed (at [91]) Witness A’s movements from the time he left the scene of the homicide until he says he met Sultani in a laneway near Stanmore McDonald’s.
Witness A testified that Sultani took his telephone, “broke it up, took the chip out of it, threw it away” and then drove to the Burwood unit that was to become the clubhouse. He described what then happened:

“Q. Now, when you got to Burwood, to this same place as before, was anybody else there?
A. Yeah. Everybody was there, or not everybody. It was probably the same about four, five, six or seven people there, from previous excursions through to Redfern.
Q. Are you able to give names or nicknames to any of the people who were there?
A. I think Weiss or Wais was there, Mo, Zak, me, Sultani, I think Michael was sorry, Tony was there, the Asian guy. Maybe there was one or two other people. I couldn’t remember who else was there.
Q. Was Wais part of the group that went to Redfern?
A. No, he wasn’t.
Q. Now, what happened when you got to the unit?
A. Went up. Still we went all upstairs. There was a lot of talking, a lot of different conversations. I think somebody went away and came back, and basically they brought a sleeping bag with a little kind of blow up mattress. So then I guessed that, you know, I am going to be staying there for sure. It's not for anybody else, so I knew it was for me. And just conversations went on, and we smoked some - smoked some cigarettes. I think Weiss or Wais rolled a joint out the back, smoked it, come back up the stairs, and it was just beginning to quieten down. People were leaving. And that’s when I found out that I was going to be staying there.
Q. How did you find that out?
A. Because they told me I am going to be staying there.
Q. Who told you that?
A. Sultani.
Q. Who was there when Sultani said that to you?
A. Zak, Michael or Mo, Wais, Tony. They were all there.
Q. Did anybody else say anything to you about how you were going to be staying there?
A. No, they basically said look.
Q. First of all, who?
A. Tony said look, we usually [cable] tie somebody, you know, but we couldn't get any cable ties. So we are going to be use brown packing tape, you know. And you are going to be here all night. And Mo is going to bring you food in the morning, you know. Just want to make sure you are not going to run away. I said, ‘All right, fair enough’. So they taped my hands together, and they taped my legs - first of all, I needed to use the bathroom. I came back out, emptied my pockets, threw a lighter into the corner of the room beside the window. And then they taped me up and put me in the sleeping bag, on top of the blow up mattress.
Q. So you said Sultani said some things to you. Did any of the other men say anything to you about what was going to happen to you?
A. No, I think it was just basically Sultani saying, this is what is going to happen.
Q. Did he say why they were going to tie you up?
A. Not really. Just to make sure I didn't run away.
Q. Who was present when Sultani said those things to you?
A. The previous people I spoke about. It was Michael that tied - Mo that tied my hands together, and my feet together.
Q. Did he say anything to you when he did that?
A. No, I don’t think so.
Q. Did you get into the sleeping bag?
A. Yeah, I did. Then everybody left. And basically I couldn’t sleep, of course. So maybe an hour later, what I done is, I got myself out of the sleeping bag, and over to the corner of the room where I dropped a lighter. Picked the lighter up in my hands, and burned the tape off my feet. So basically I just pulled the tape on my legs apart and burnt the tape off it, and it enabled me to stand up. And then straight in and used the bathroom because I was bursting. Come back out, went into the kitchen, where I found a paint scraper; put that against the wall and broke the tape with the paint scraper; and it was me free. Found some cigarettes, smoked a couple of cigarettes, and waited for Michael to come back first thing in the morning.” [72]
72. Tcpt pp 144-146.

He said when Michael returned the next day to find that he had managed to untie himself, Michael “just laughed, and gave [him] breakfast.” He said he remained at the clubhouse for a week or more, although he said, “I think I escaped a couple of times” but “I just went for a walk … and come back”. [73] As to telephone communications, he said:
73. Tcpt pp 146-147.

“Q. During the time that you were at Burwood, in the way you have just told us about, did you have a phone?
A. No.
Q. Was there another phone that was in fact yours that someone else had?
A. No. The only time I ever got a phone was - I think it was about two weeks later. And I got it off a - I made myself - I made my way back to Redfern, and I got one off the woman I was seeing at the time. And she had a spare phone, so I took hers.
Q. So you then had a phone?
A. That is correct.
Q. And you were able to communicate with people?
A. I wouldn’t say I only could communicate with that group. I couldn’t communicate with actually friends of mine, for the simple reason I didn't have their numbers any more because my phone was gone. So I didn’t have their number.” [74]
74. Tcpt pp 147-148.

He said he was able to communicate with friends “maybe a couple of weeks later” although he could not be precise about the time. [75]
75. Tcpt p 148; see also tcpt pp 151-152 where I sought clarification of the evidence regarding his access to a telephone.
He said at one stage he was moved to a motel in Burwood that was “right up the top of Burwood Road.” He said, “the same people” were there when he was moved to the motel – “Michael, Moe, or Zak, Tony, [Wais], they were all there”. [76]
76. Tcpt pp 148, 150.
Witness A gave evidence about the time he first spoke to police and the version of events that he gave them. That was on 25 May 2013. [77] I will refer to that version of events when I come to scrutinise Witness A’s evidence in due course.
77. Tcpt p 152.

Evidence capable of supporting Witness A’s testimony

The prosecution relied on other evidence capable of providing support for some aspects of Witness A’s evidence. This evidence included telephone records, CCTV footage, photographs, videos, business documents and the evidence of other witnesses. None of the evidence directly corroborates Witness A’s evidence that either of the accused participated in the assault. The evidence of association makes it more likely that the accused may have been involved. It is important evidence to varying degrees. Some of the evidence contradicted aspects of Witness A’s testimony.

Evidence of association with Sultani and the Rebels

Spiros Filipou was an impressive witness. He said he had known Mr Hosseinishoja for 15 years at the time he made his statement in 2014. He confirmed that Mr Hosseinishoja went to school with Mr Sultani. He agreed that sometime after they left school, Mr Hosseinshoja stopped hanging out with his school friends but seemed to maintain contact with Sultani. This evidence established an early association between Mr Hosseinishoja and Sultani. [78]
78. Tcpt pp 563-566.

Based on the evidence of RS 816, I am inclined to accept that there were handguns at the scene. However, that does not implicate either of the accused in this trial.
As to Witness A’s version that Mr Hosseinishoja produced the guns back at the clubhouse, Witness A’s version stands alone. While Witness A’s evidence regarding the bag of guns may be true, and there seems little doubt the group had access to guns, I have grave doubts about his evidence that Mr Hosseinishoja obtained the bags of firearms, and that 8 of the 10 participants were armed with handguns when they went to Redfern.

Weapons – the “Uzi”

In his evidence in chief, Witness A was asked about the contents of the bags. He said:

“Guns. Like, a lot of guns. Not just one, two, three or four; there was like two bags of guns. Chrome revolvers, Glocks, things like that, you know.” [154]
154. Tcpt p 126.

He was asked whether he saw “Moe do anything with a gun or guns, or one of the weapons?” He responded that “everybody apart from me and Sultani had a gun at that point”. He was asked if he heard Moe say anything about the guns and he said “no, I didn’t, no.” [155]
155. Tcpt p 126-127.
He gave no evidence about an “Uzi”, a type of firearm later described in evidence as a small light weight machine gun. [156] Nor could that type of weapon be described as anything like a Glock or a revolver.
156. Tcpt p 437
Over objection, I permitted the Prosecutor to allow the witness to refresh his memory pursuant to s 32 of the Evidence Act. [157] I did not grant leave for the witness to read an earlier account aloud on to the record. [158] Witness A was shown the second ERISP (questions 400-402) and then gave evidence that he saw Michael holding an “Uzi with a suppressor”. [159]
157. Tcpt pp 199-200.
158. Evidence Act, s 32(3).
159. Tcpt pp 201-202.
There was extensive cross-examination on this subject. [160] It turned out that Witness A first mentioned the Uzi with a suppressor in the conversation with the UCO. At one stage he said he could not remember the conversation with the UCO. [161] However, confronted with the transcript of the conversation, he seemed to accept the accuracy of the propositions put to him by Senior Counsel. Nor was there any suggestion that the transcript was not being accurately put to the witness.
160. For example, at tcpt pp 346-353, 404-407.
161. Tcpt p 405.
It was established that Witness A did not refer to the Uzi in the second ERISP until the interviewing detectives reminded him of the conversation with the UCO. [162]
162. Tcpt pp 351-352.
The cross-examination included the following:

“Q. You see that is, of course, the conversation you had with the person we know to be the undercover police officer?
A. Yep.
Q. Can you go over, if you would, to page 22?
A. Yep.
Q. You see about halfway down that page, V1 says, ‘They’re all like that.’ Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And, ‘That night it was really funny.’ Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. That night was the night that the deceased was assaulted?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. You were telling the undercover officer that was really funny. I assume that was a lie, was it?
A. I have no idea. I can’t remember that conversation.
Q. Whether you can remember the conversation or not, if you said it to the undercover that night was really funny, would that have been the truth?
CROWN PROSECUTOR: I object. ‘Funny’ is an ambiguous word. Perhaps the witness might be asked what he meant by that word.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I think so.
BRADY: I will I withdraw it for the moment and come back to it.
Q. In any event you say, ‘They open the bag, half of them they’ve got a big bag.’ Do you see that?
A. Yep.
Q. Are you talking about what you say is a bag of guns?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you say, ‘know my boss’s right hand man is Moe. He has his own uzi with a suppressor’?
A. That’s correct.
Q. This is the uzi with the suppressor that you forgot about when you were first being asked questions by the Crown Prosecutor?
A. Yes.
HIS HONOUR: There is only one uzi. There is no jury here.
BRADY
Q. Can we go down to this, you see down towards the bottom V2 says, ‘Yeah, they open the bag and there’s fucken.’ Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say, ‘There was fucken uzis’ don't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that true?
A I’m not very sure. I don’t know if there were more than one.
Q. ‘Brand new Glocks,’ do you remember that?
A. Yep.
Q. ‘Heaps of Glocks’?
A. Yes.
Q. You say, ‘I’m laughing,’ do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we go back to where it says that night was really funny--
A. Yes.
Q. Were you telling the undercover officer the truth that you were laughing about these uzis and heaps of Glocks?
A. I can’t remember saying this to the undercover officer even though it’s there, but I can’t remember the context of it why I was saying it was funny.
Q. And you say this, don't you, ‘Moe pulls out his fucken my baby how are you doing?’ Do you see that?
A. Yeah.
Q. What you are saying there is that the person Michael or Moe pulled out an uzi and called it ‘my baby’, right?
A. It looks like it, yes.
Q. That is not something you said in evidence in chief?
A. No, I don't think so.
Q. Do you say that is the truth or a lie or you don’t know one way or the other?
A. I probably couldn't tell you one way or the other.” [163]
163. Tcpt pp 404-406.

Witness A did not mention the Uzi with the suppressor, or that Michael was brandishing an Uzi, when he made the 2018 statement. [164]
164. Tcpt p 353.
As I have said, I doubt Witness A’s evidence about the bag of firearms, and that eight of the assailants were armed with guns at the scene. My finding as to his evidence relating to the Uzi is much stronger. I do not believe his evidence about Mr Hosseinishoja brandishing the Uzi with the suppressor.
As it was described, this was a most memorable event; Michael brandishing a small machine gun and referring to it as “my baby”. The description to the UCO presented like the final scenes of the movie Scarface (“say hello to my little friend”). It did not ring true. More importantly, I find it incredible that the witness could be asked twice in formal settings about the guns, and what Michael said and did, and somehow forget this part of the event both times.
But this is exactly what occurred in the second ERISP in 2013 and in the courtroom when his mind was directed specifically to the type of guns contained in the bag and whether Michael had a particular gun or said anything particular. He only purported to “recall” this memorable incident when he was reminded what he said to the UCO. I did not, and do not, believe him. It is much more likely, in my assessment, that this was a yarn spun to the UCO and then repeated when Witness A was reminded of it.
I do not accept that the incident involving the Uzi as described by Witness A occurred.

Weapons – evidence that Mr Hosseinishoja struck Mr Srbin with a mallet

Witness A gave evidence that Sultani was “keeping us back out of the affray” and “then Mo hit the guy across the head with a rubber mallet”. [165] He described the mallet as black, the handle as being five, six or seven inches long, and the club or head being “bigger than a softball” or “three of four inches … across.” [166] Witness A said “that was the first hit he had” and that the victim “dropped to the floor and he was dazed and confused for sure”. [167]
165. Tcpt pp 132.
166. Tcpt p 132.
167. Tcpt p 133.
Witness A said he was unaware that a mallet was taken to the scene until it was produced. However, the agreed facts for his manslaughter plea included:

“He admits knowing that the gang members took a rubber mallet and a baseball bat to the melee. However, he believed they were armed against the known possession of the knife by the deceased.” [168]
168. Tcpt p 324.

The cross-examination on this subject included the following exchange:

“Q. That means that you were admitting that they took those weapons because you had told them he has a knife?
A. Yeah, I told - yeah, I told everybody that he had a knife because of what happened to me that day. Exactly right, I did tell people he had a knife.
Q. And what you agreed to in these facts is that you knew they were taking to fight that night a baseball bat and a rubber mallet?
A. Well, that’s what it sounds like, but as I said the only time I ever seen them get produced was when I was there and that’s it. I didn’t see them beforehand, I just knew they were there that night and that’s it. I didn’t see them getting put in a car or anything like that.
Q. So you’re saying they told you they were taking those?
A. Again I can’t remember what I was told that night or a lot of the conversations that night or that afternoon into the night.” [169]
169. Tcpt p 324.

The first of those answers was evasive and I noted at the time that his demeanour changed and was, to my mind, quite unconvincing. It is difficult to describe the change in his demeanour in words. It is not a matter to which I attach significant weight. More significant is the inconsistency and the unlikelihood that Witness A was unaware of the facts upon which he was to be sentenced. He is not an unintelligent man and has a demonstrated capacity to look after his own interests.
In the second ERISP, Witness A only brought up the mallet after the police reminded him of what he said in his conversation with the UCO. Witness A agreed he forgot to tell police about the mallet, even though he was asked questions beforehand about the weapons he saw during the assault. [170]
170. Tcpt pp 359-360.
Witness A also stated during the second ERISP that a man he had never seen before, who was wearing a “G-Star RAW jacket”, produced the mallet. [171] Witness A said he knew (when speaking to the police) that Michael wielded the mallet and “I guess I should have mentioned it”. [172] He agreed he lied to police but his evidence was vague as to the state of his memory at the time:
171. Tcpt pp 361, 364.
172. Tcpt p 364.

“Q. ‘That’s when he produced the, um, the mallet’, do you see that?
A. Yeah, of course, yeah.
Q. You’re saying, aren’t you, that one of the guys you had never met before produced the mallet, right?
A. That’s what I’m saying, yeah, that’s right.
Q. Is that what you remembered as being the truth at that stage?
A. I don’t know, I can’t answer that either, but I must have said it because it’s right here in the transcript.
Q. We know you said it, is that when you remembered as being the truth at that stage that it was a person that you hadn't met before?
A. That’s what I said, but I can’t remember why I said it, no.” [173]
173. Tcpt p 361.

Witness A was also cross-examined about things he said about the mallet in the 2018 statement. This part of the cross-examination included:

“Q. And I think you have said you did tell the truth in that statement, didn’t you?
A. Regarding the Crime Commission statement, pages 1 to 5, yeah, I did.
Q. Can I take you to page 3 at paragraph 21. You said this, didn’t you, ‘I mentioned a bat and rubber mallet during the conversation. The only reason I knew there was a bat and a rubber mallet because I remember someone holding the bat and someone holding the mallet at the time of the incident but I don’t remember who that was’?
A. That’s correct, I made that statement at that time, yes.
Q. And you said, didn’t you, ‘I also remember someone at the time telling Nick “don't get up” or words to that effect, but I don’t remember who that was that said that’?
A. That’s correct.
CROWN PROSECUTOR: The undercover conversation was 5 September, 2013.
CUNNEEN: Thank you. My learned friend is quite right.
…
Q. Then on the next page, Mr A, page 4, you are referring to the interview that you gave at Redfern police station on 9 October, 2013 and I refer you to the top line of page 4. Do you agree with that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. You say to the police that you are referring to markings you made on the transcript and in particular to page 36 question 357 to page 37 question 364?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you say this, do you not:
‘I marked these questions because I stated that I saw Zak armed with a bat and mallet. That part is inaccurate as I can't specifically remember who it was that had the bat or rubber mallet.’

A. That’s correct. I said that.
Q. While we are on that page, you had said, two paragraphs earlier, paragraph 25, referring to that interview from 9 October 2013 that, ‘It’s 99.9 percent accurate’?
A. Yep.” [174]
174. Tcpt pp 222-223.

The cross-examination continued:

“Q. Then Sergeant Grace asked you a question, did he not, in relation to the bat or the rubber mallet and this is in the middle of the page, and you said this, didn’t you:
‘Basically I couldn’t see who was holding the bat or mallet. I was facing the other way dealing with Omar and Abs and it was happening over there, pointing over right side behind, and we were over here, point front to left, plus the courtyard was fairly dark. I’ve seen the bat and mallet over my shoulder. I know what a rubber mallet looks like, so I remember seeing the bat and rubber mallet, but there was a bunch of guys there, like 8 or 10, so I can’t say exactly who was holding it.’

A. That’s correct, I said that.” [175]
175. Tcpt pp 223-224.

To emphasise the importance of this evidence, in the 2018 statement, Witness A clearly stated (two or three times) that he did not remember who was armed with the bat and the mallet. Furthermore, he said he was wrong when he said in one of his earlier versions that it was Zak who was so armed (that is, Mr Abdaly, on the prosecution case). He also said he was “facing the other way” and could not see who wielded these weapons.
Witness A did not say that Michael wielded the mallet in his 2018 statement. [176]
176. Tcpt p 363-364.
The first time Witness A said that Michael hit the victim with a mallet was in the 9 November 2022 statement. [177] That was after the trial was scheduled to commence, nine years after the event, and after four previous statements, interviews or conversations.
177. Tcpt pp 363-364.
The evidence of RS 816 supported the proposition that one of the members of the group was armed with a “rubber mallet”. [178] However, he did not mention the mallet being used and only stated that the group hit the victim with their “weapons and fists”. [179]
178. Tcpt pp 669, 672,
179. Tcpt pp 671, 673.
I am not satisfied that Mr Hosseinishoja was armed with a mallet. I do not believe Witness A’s evidence on this issue.

Weapons – the baseball bat and evidence that Mr Abdaly used it

Witness A testified that Zak (Mr Abdaly) hit the victim across the face with a baseball bat. Witness A described the blow as “very hard” and resulted in the victim bleeding from his eyes, ears and mouth. [180]
180. Tcpt pp 133-134, 336.
In the agreed facts for his plea of manslaughter in 2014, Witness A stated that he knew the gang members had taken the baseball bat to the courtyard. However, in cross-examination Witness A clarified he only saw the baseball bat once it was pulled out by Zak and did not see the baseball bat previously in the car or in the apartment at Burwood. [181]
181. Tcpt pp 323-324.
In the second ERISP Witness A only alleged that a baseball bat was used, after the police mentioned he had said it to the UCO. Witness A agreed he forgot to tell police about the bat until he was reminded, even though he was asked many questions beforehand about the weapons he saw during the assault. [182]
182. Tcpt pp 359-360.
In the 2018 statement, Witness A agreed that he had lied in his second ERISP when he said that Zak was armed with the bat and mallet. He told the Crime Commission this was inaccurate as he could not remember who had the bat or the mallet, as he was facing the other way during the assault. [183]
183. Tcpt pp 222-224.
As I have said, RS 816 gave convincing evidence that a tall man stuck Mr Srbin with a baseball bat. Mr Abdaly is a very tall man. This evidence provides support for Witness A’s evidence on this important issue.
However, given the inconsistencies in Witness A’s versions on this question, in particular his unambiguous assertion in his 2018 statement that he had previously lied about the issue and did not remember who had the baseball bat, I am unable to make any positive finding that Mr Abdaly was the person who struck the victim with the bat. There is evidence that there were several large and tall men within Sultani’s group. [184] RS 816’s evidence that it was the tallest man who used the baseball bat does not narrow the field down to Mr Abdaly. He may have been the tallest man in the group but if he was not present one of the other men would logically fit that description.
184. See tcpt pp 247-248, 585-592, 601-605.

Weapons – a fabricated crowbar

Witness A told the UCO that the victim was hit a crowbar. Witness A stated in cross-examination he made this up and no crowbar/poles were used on the victim. [185] Witness A maintained only the bat and mallet were used and denied that he was only saying there were two weapons because there are two accused. [186] He “couldn’t say” why he invented the story about the crowbar.
185. Tcpt pp 236-237.
186. Tcpt pp 236-237.

A calculated attempt to implicate some “Kooris”

In his first ERISP, Witness A told the police calculated lies. It is true, as the Prosecutor submitted, that it is not surprising that somebody in Witness A’s position – that is, somebody responsible for a brutal homicide – might attempt to deflect blame to others and lie about their involvement. [187] I accept that some of his lies to police were understandable and somewhat typical of a person embroiled in the criminal milieu and drug trade, faced with possible complicity in a brutal assault (noting that the deceased was still alive at the time of the first ERISP). Telling the police he owed the Srbins money, but denying any involvement in drugs, was a fairly typical lie, particularly when Witness A had previously been sent to gaol for drug supply.
187. Tcpt p 744.
However, Witness A went much further than this. He gave a positive and entirely fictional account that a group of Aboriginal men entered the courtyard at the time of Mr Srbin’s killing. He made a deliberate and calculated attempt to implicate those imaginary men. He knew the area had a significant Indigenous population and thought blame may be cast on such men who may have some connection with the Srbins.
This cynical and manipulative version provided to investigating police is damaging to Witness A’s credibility.

Crocodile tears for Nikola Srbin

Witness A suggested that he was greatly concerned when he realised what was going to happen after he involved Sultani and saw the guns and large group of men. He said:

“A. It’s gone too far, and I tried to call it off and I just panicked, basically.
Q. What did you say?
A. I knew - well, I tried to talk the guys not go through - I tried to talk to Sultani not to go through with it and not to go to Redfern or Waterloo and I would deal with it myself, but it was too late.
Q. Did you actually say anything, or did you just think about that?
A. I’ll get this sorted, or words to that effect, because basically I started panicking, seeing what was going to happen, or thinking what was going to happen. It was impossible for me to know what was going to happen, but when that type of thing is going to happen, you knew it is going to go sour pretty quickly.
HIS HONOUR
Q. What exactly did you say and to whom did you say it and how many people were present when you said it?
A. I said it to Sultani and everybody was listening in, because everybody was around in the back of the car park.
Q. What did you say to Sultani?
A. ‘Do we have to go through with this? It’s all right, I’ll do it myself,’ words to that effect. I wouldn't be able to give you the exact words I said, but that's what it was like.” [188]
188. Tcpt pp 165-166.

He earlier described the victim’s reaction when he saw the group of men following behind Witness A as they entered the courtyard:

“A. Well, the chain of events were me running into the courtyard, Nick producing the knife again that he had produced in the apartment up the stairs, him smiling and thinking he got me, all the guys running out from the close into the courtyard--
Q. The close, C-L-O-S-E?
A. Yeah, well, basically, yeah, that’s, and so they all ran out, and I seen his face drop because he could see, you know, all the people behind me …” [189]
189. Tcpt pp 131-132.

Something about the way he gave this evidence made me doubt the sincerity of his concerns for the victim. I cannot describe why I had the impression that the witness was not being honest and took some satisfaction in the smile being wiped off the victim’s face. [190]
190. Cf tcpt p 215, 218.
However, that impression was confirmed by evidence that came in the statement of RS 048. She said that she saw Witness A after he gave his first ERISP, that is on 25 May 2013. She recorded part of her conversation as follows:

“I said, ‘How do you feel about Nick being in a critical condition, almost dead?’ Witness A said, ‘He deserves it.’” [191]
191. Tcpt p 525.

In speaking to the UCO, he described the victim as “that little prick”. [192] By that stage Nikola Srbin was dead.
192. Tcpt p 269.
The significance of this evidence is not so much in its demonstration of Witness A’s callous indifference to Nikola Srbin’s suffering. Rather, its importance lies in its impact on an assessment of Witness A’s credibility. It shows, or at least suggests, that his expressions of concern for the victim were reconstructed at best, or, just as likely, manipulative and dishonest. Either way it demonstrated a capacity to attempt to portray himself in a favourable light and minimise his culpability.
To be clear, I reject Witness A’s evidence that he was concerned for Mr Srbin’s safety or that he attempted to call off the Rebel’s intervention in his dispute over the $400 drug debt.

Spontaneous lies about being assaulted by a hammer

In cross-examination of Witness A on 16 November 2022, Ms Cunneen put to him a number of things he had allegedly said to other inmates and medical staff while he was in custody. He denied or did not remember some of those things and there is no evidence before the Court that he said them. [193]
193. See tcpt pp 276-279, 321-322.
However, when it was suggested that he told a nurse in February 2015 that “you had been assaulted with a hammer in May 2013”, Witness A said: “I think I did, yeah.” [194]
194. Tcpt p 280.
He went on to assert that this was a reference to the assault by Nick Srbin and Omar Moshref which occurred on the day of the killing:

“Q. 2016?
A. 2016. No, I don’t know, I can’t remember. I know I told them about the hammer because that happened in the bedroom when Nick Srbin was up there.
Q. Are you now saying that the reason you told nurse Sheckleton in 2015 that you’d been assaulted with a hammer in May 2013 is because--
A. I had a hammer in my room.
Q. --you were hit with a hammer?
A. I was hit with a hammer in my bedroom. After I get hit down the stairs, I get taken up the stairs with Nick before Omar come up the stairs.
Q. You’re just making that up, aren’t you?
A. I’m not making that up at all. I get taken up the stairs twice that day. I got taken up with Nick and then I got taken up with Omar and Nick. So I got taken up the stairs twice that day.
Q. What, a normal claw hammer?
A. Yeah, it was a normal claw hammer that I had in my bedroom.
Q. Where did they hit you with that?
A. Hit me in my back, lower back, and my shoulder. And they produced a knife again. Tried to take my Sonic camera there and all that, they didn't want to know about it. I had some Suboxone strips as well that they took.” [195]
195. Tcpt p 281.

Nothing in the evidence Witness A provided to that point suggested that the assault involved him being hit in the back with a claw hammer. It seems, as Ms Cunneen submitted, this new version of the assault was “developed … in front of our eyes.” [196]
196. Tcpt p 771.

Lies or exaggerations about detention and having no access to a telephone for two weeks

Witness A either exaggerated his evidence concerning his detention at the clubhouse or unit at Burwood or told deliberate lies about it.
Parts of his evidence did not have a ring of truth. For example, it seems very unlikely that he would be allowed to walk freely around the suburb unsupervised while being detained or that Mr Hosseinishoja, allegedly charged with responsibility to tie him up with tape, would just laugh when he discovered that he had managed to get himself free overnight in the unlikely manner the witness described in evidence. [197] He claimed he used a cigarette lighter (which he earlier dropped on the floor) to burn the tape off his legs, used the toilet “because I was bursting”, and then used a paint scraper that he “put … against the wall” to cut the tape off his hands or wrists “and it was me free”.
197. Witness A’s description of his escape can be seen at tcpt p 146, and there was cross-examination at tcpt pp 379, 380, 388 and 396.
He then smoked cigarettes and “waited for Michael to come back first thing in the morning”. If he had escaped in this manner, it seems unlikely he would stay there and wait to see what would happen when the gang members returned. Luckily for him, according to his evidence, Michael just laughed when he returned.
It is close to certain that Witness A invented evidence that his DNA was found on the sleeping bag. In cross-examination he said:

“Q. Yes. Because you were basically being held prisoner, right?
A. Yeah, kind of but I wasn’t really - well, I’d freed myself so I wasn’t really being held prisoner, no. But I was there, for sure. I was definitely tied up and I was in the sleeping bag. Cause it’s the same sleeping bag that I got approached, you know, years later with the police who said ‘you were in this sleeping bag and we found your DNA in this sleeping bag’. So that was the same sleeping bag.” [198]
198. Tcpt p 380.

The officer in charge of the investigation, Mr Hunt, said that no sleeping bag was ever seized from the clubhouse and there was no DNA testing on such an item. [199]
199. Tcpt p 662.
Witness A’s evidence was vague as to the length of the detention. Even so, the period he said he was without a telephone, with which he could communicate with friends, receives no support from the telephone records. Those records support an inference that he may have been out of contact for a short period, but they do not support his evidence that he was without a ‘phone for about two weeks and, even then, that he could not communicate with people because he borrowed the phone from “a woman I was seeing” and his contacts were not available to him. [200] Exhibit 16 suggests he was in contact with associates by 22 May 2013 at the latest.
200. Tcpt pp 147-148.
I do not accept that Witness A was detained by Sultani and the Rebels.
It is more likely that the group were assisting him to hide from Jonel Srbin and/or the police. In fact, he told RS 048 on 25 May 2013 “I have been in hiding”, “[I’m] just doing what my boss has told me to do” and “Johnny’s family [is] after me”. [201]
201. Tcpt pp 525-526.

Giving up heroin

Witness A gave evidence that he did not want to obtain heroin for Omar Moshref and Jonel Srbin on 15-16 May 2013 because he was on a program to give that drug up. Telephone messages relating to “slow” suggest this was not true. [202]
202. See tcpt 315.

Knowledge that Aaron was an undercover operative

I did not believe Witness A when he claimed he was aware that the UCO was a police officer. His demeanour was unconvincing. Initially he said, “I did actually (know)” and provided a context for that purported knowledge. Later his evidence suggested that he had suspicions rather than actual knowledge. The things he said to the UCO, or at least those have been brought to my attention, suggest he was, as he said in one of his subsequent interviews, bignoting himself and, as I have found, providing an account that was part truth and part fiction.

Is there any motive in Witness A to lie about the two accused men?

The Prosecutor led evidence from Witness A concerning the reasons he was giving evidence and the absence of any motivation he had to give false evidence. [203] Witness A claimed the main reason he was giving evidence was to “clear [his] conscience.” He said (somewhat gratuitously) that his partner has “a pretty serious government job back home” and that she “wants me to clear my conscience and [get it out of the] way and move on with my life”. He acknowledged he had received some payment from “the DPP” to compensate him for loss he suffered in his business by travelling to give evidence. Even so, he says he will be out of pocket. He could identify no personal advantage in giving the evidence. Conversely, he saw the potential danger in doing so in the form of “repercussions”.
203. Tcpt p 191, following cross-examination at tcpt pp 174-175.
The Prosecutor submitted:

“There is no suggestion, I repeat, no suggestion, of self interest at all, except perhaps the resolution of his personal circumstances.” [204]
204. Tcpt p 744.

The last part of that submission was, I think, a reference to Witness A’s evidence in cross-examination that his marriage proposal was “off the table” pending resolution of this case. He said (again somewhat gratuitously) that his partner’s family were “pretty staunch Catholics” and that she was lying to them about the reasons for his absence from home while he gave evidence. [205]
205. Tcpt pp 312-313.
Ms Cunneen cross-examined Witness A about various motives he may have to lie. She suggested his partner gave him an ultimatum, and that the police were emailing him constantly. She put that Witness A “will continue to hound – to pursue the New South Wales Government for every cent that you say this has cost you.” [206]
206. Tcpt pp 301, 307, 312-313.
There is no evidence in the trial of these things put to the witness, and Witness A denied they were motivating him to give evidence against the accused.
Neither accused has established any motive for Witness A to provide false evidence against them.
I have considered the absence of any proven motive to lie in assessing the credibility of Witness A. I have done so in the light of the directions I have given myself at [26] above, bearing in mind the words of the majority of the High Court in Palmer v The Queen:

“With respect, a complainant’s account gains no legitimate credibility from the absence of evidence of motive. If credibility which the jury would otherwise attribute to the complainant’s account is strengthened by an accused’s inability to furnish evidence of a motive for a complainant to lie the standard of proof is to that extent diminished”. [207]
207. Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1 at 9; [1998] HCA 2 (Brennan CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See also at 11-12, but cf 24-26 (McHugh J).

I accept the submissions made by Mr Brady in relation to Witness A’s lies and his motives to tell them. [208] He submitted (and I accept) that there are several established lies told by Witness A over many years and in various circumstances. In many instances Witness A was unable to explain why he told those lies. As Mr Brady submitted:

“… one might never know why he would lie. He just has, and regularly and about important things.”

208. Tcpt pp 797-799.

Matters distinguishing the cases of the two accused men

The matters I have discussed concerning the credibility of Witness A apply equally to the case of each of the accused. There are some aspects of the evidence which distinguish the cases.
The evidence of RS 816 concerning a very tall man hitting Nikola Srbin with a baseball bat is relevant to Mr Abdaly’s case and makes the prosecution case against him stronger.
Further, there is evidence that when Mr Hosseinishoja was spoken to by police on 26 October 2020 and told he was under arrest for the murder of Nikola Srbin he looked “confused”. He was told it was about “job in Redfern in 2013” and asked if he knew what the police were talking about. He said “no”. [209]
209. Tcpt p 622.
On the other hand, the evidence of Mr Hosseinishoja’s association with Sultani is stronger and Witness A seemed to have had less contact with Mr Abdaly.
Despite these differences, the doubts I have about Witness A’s evidence apply to both accused. The evidence of RS 816 does not elevate in a substantial way Witness A’s evidence that it was Mr Abdaly, as opposed to one of the many other tall men in the group, [210] who wielded the baseball bat.
210. See tcpt pp 247-248, 585-592, 601-605.

Conclusions

It is obvious from the foregoing analysis that Witness A is a witness whose evidence must be treated with extreme caution. I do not accept significant parts of his evidence as being honest or reliable. I am comfortably satisfied that he lied or exaggerated parts of his evidence. As Mr Brady submitted in his closing address, I may not be able to solve the riddle of why Witness A told lies, but I am satisfied that he told them.
I have considered whether, despite having doubts about parts of his evidence and being satisfied he lied in relation to other parts, I am nevertheless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was honest and reliable in relation to the critical parts of his evidence.
Having scrutinised his evidence carefully, I have concluded (as a matter of fact rather than law) that I am unable in good conscience to act on Witness A’s evidence unless it receives support from another independent or trustworthy source. On the critical issues in the trial for both men, there is no such evidence.
My central factual findings relevant to proof of the case against each of the accused are these:

I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was a joint criminal enterprise to inflict serious injury upon, and to intimidate, Nikola Srbin.

I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Nikola Srbin died as a result of head injuries sustained in the assault committed by the participants in that joint criminal enterprise.

I reject Witness A’s evidence that Mr Hosseinishoja hit Nikola Srbin with a mallet.

I am unable to make a finding, to any relevant standard, that Mr Abdaly struck Mr Srbin with a baseball bat. I am satisfied that somebody did so, but whether Mr Abdaly was that person I do not know.

I do not accept Witness A’s evidence that Mr Hosseinishoja collected two bags of guns before the group travelled to Redfern.

I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Abdaly was present at the scene of the bashing of Nikola Srbin.

I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Hosseinishoja was present at that scene.

I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that either of the accused men were part of the joint criminal enterprise alleged by the prosecution.

It follows that I entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of each of the accused men and that both of them must be found not guilty.

Orders

Seyed Amirmohammad Hosseinishoja, on the indictment alleging that on 5 June 2013 at Redfern you did murder Nikola Srbin, I find you not guilty.
Sayed Anush Abdaly, on the indictment alleging that on 5 June 2013 at Redfern you did murder Nikola Srbin, I find you not guilty.
You are each discharged on the aforementioned indictment.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 07 December 2022

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja (No 6) (Verdict) [2022] NSWSC 1658
Hearing dates:	09-25 November, 06 December 2022
Date of orders:	06 December 2022
Decision date:	06 December 2022
Jurisdiction:	Common Law - Criminal
Before:	Hamill J
Decision:	The accused are found not guilty
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – judge alone trial – reasons for judgment – legal principles, warning and directions – murder – joint criminal enterprise – whether accused participants in joint criminal enterprise – where victim bashed by group organised by gangster in reprisal for bashing over drug debt – prosecution case reliant on one witness – witness criminally involved in homicide – indirect support of witness’s evidence – association evidence – eye-witness testimony – where no established motive in witness to lie – requirement to scrutinise evidence with great care – Rule in Browne v Dunn – failure to comply – Prosecutor’s complaints regarding defence addresses – hyperbole and flourishes – client relations – excesses ignored – demeanour of witness – limited weight given to assessment of demeanour – lies – where a number of established lies told by witness over time – inconsistent versions of events – impact on credibility – parts of evidence reminiscent of a movie scene – a yarn spun about an Uzi – "crocodile tears" - positive rejection of parts of evidence – doubts about other parts – impact on assessment of credibility – calculated lies to police to implicate local Indigenous men – inconsistent accounts – whether reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused
Legislation Cited:	Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 132, 133 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 32, 164, 165B
Cases Cited:	AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 LiberatovThe Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507; [1985] HCA 66 MJW v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 2 Prouten v Chapman [2021] NSWCA 207 R v Abdaly; R v Hosseinishoja(No 3) [2022] NSWSC 1511 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17; [1989] SASC 1628 Reyne (a pseudonym) v R [2022] NSWCCA 201
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Rex (Plaintiff) Sayed Anush Abdaly (Defendant) Seyed Amirmohammad Hosseinishoja (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: D Patch (Rex) M Cunneen SC with L Dive (Abdaly) G Brady SC (Hosseinishoja) Solicitors: Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Rex) Tohi Lawyers (Abdaly) OneGroup Legal (Hosseinishoja)
File Number(s):	2020/306132; 2020/306616
Publication restriction:	This judgment has been anonymised in accordance with various non-publication and suppression orders made before, during and after the trial, as well as the NSW Supreme Court anonymisation policy