R v AA (No 3)

[2019] NSWSC 1892

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v AA (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 1892

Hearing dates:

16, 23 December 2019

Date of orders:

24 December 2019

Decision date:

24 December 2019

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Rothman J

Decision:

(1) Convicted that, between about 19 March 2009 and about 1 April 2010, in Australia and elsewhere, the offender engaged in conduct that contravened a United Nations sanction enforcement law contrary to subs 27(1) of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) the particulars of which include:

(a)   The United Nations sanction enforcement law contravened was the making of unauthorised sanctioned supplies, contrary to reg 10 of the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions-Iran) Regulations 2008 (Cth);

(b)   The sanctioned supplies were the supplies, sales or transfers to HlCo Fze of export sanctioned goods, namely approximately 90 tonnes of export sanctioned nickel alloys, ordered by HICo Fze from Metalloy Pty Ltd pursuant to HICo purchase orders HlC/C.E/1078 and HIC/C.E/1079, as a direct or indirect result of which supplies, sales or transfers those goods were transferred to Bandar Abbas, Iran; and

(c) This conduct occurred partly in Australia pursuant to s 15.1(1)(a)(i) and s 16.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth).

(2)   The offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years to commence on 24 December 2019 and expiring on 23 December 2021. The term of imprisonment is to be served by way of intensive correction in the community in accordance with the Crimes (Administration of Sentence) Act 1999 (NSW).

(3)   This Intensive Correction Order is subject to the following standard conditions:

(a)   The offender is not to commit any offence while subject to this Intensive Correction Order;

(b)   The offender must submit to supervision by a Community Corrections Officer.

(c)   The relevant agency for the purposes of supervision is Hornsby Community Corrections District Office.

(4)   This Intensive Correction Order is subject to the following additional conditions:

(i)   The offender is to report to Hornsby Community Corrections Office for the purpose of implementing the foregoing, on or before 6 January 2020.

(ii)   The offender is to perform 18 hours of Community Service Work per month during the entirety of the duration of the Intensive Correction Order (being a total of 432 hours).

(iii)   Subject to the receipt of an appropriate assessment, the offender is to be released to home detention for the period of the Intensive Correction Order.

(iv)   The Court directs that Corrective Services assess the offender for home detention and provide the report within seven (7) days of its completion and by 3 February 2020.

(5)   The above conditions are entered by the Court whilst taking into account the offence notified under s 16BA, namely, that the offender gave false information to another person, reckless as to the risk that it will be given to a Commonwealth entity in connection with the administration of a United Nations sanction enforcement law.

Catchwords:

CRIME – SENTENCING – breach of United Nations sanctions against Iran rendered criminal by operation of Commonwealth legislation – discussion of culpability and subjective circumstances – offence was committed by Iranian citizen, domiciled in and resident of Iran at time of offence, who is now a permanent resident of Australia – effect on culpability and general deterrence – appropriateness of sentence other than full-time custody – Intensive Correction Order imposed;

CRIME – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – effect of Barbaro – counsel entitled to put submissions that include opinion as to appropriate sentence, but not thereby imply “bounds” of judicial discretion

Legislation Cited:

Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions-Iran) (Export Sanctioned Goods) List Determination 2008 (Cth), Sch 1

Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions-Iran) Regulation 2008 (Cth), reg 10

Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), ss 27(1), 28

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss s 16A(2)(h), 16BA, s 17A(1)

Crimes (Administration of Sentence) Act 1999 (NSW)

Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2014 (NSW)

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 4

Cases Cited:

Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2

GAS v R (2004) 217 CLR 198; [2004] HCA 22

House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Hunter Quarries Pty Limited v Morrison; Badior v Morrison (2017) 96 NSWLR 658; [2017] NSWCCA 326

Jimmy v R (2010) 77 NSWLR 540; [2010] NSWCCA 60;

Kutchera v R [2007] NSWCCA 121

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40

Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Regina (Crown)
AA (a pseudonym) (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
M McHugh SC / A McGrath (Crown)
S Buchen SC / J Roy (Offender)

Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (Crown)
Watsons Solicitors & Barristers (Offender)

File Number(s):

2016/321937

Publication restriction:

Suppression orders made under s 7(1) of the Court Suppression and NPO Act 2010 (NSW)

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

1. HIS HONOUR: The Court is required to sentence AA (a pseudonym), and hereafter referred to either as the offender or AA). AA pleaded Guilty to a breach of the United Nations sanctions against Iran in the period between 19 March 2009 and 1 April 2010.

2. Essentially, AA procured representatives of an Australian company, Metalloy Pty Ltd (hereinafter “Metalloy”) to engage in conduct that contravened a United Nations’ sanction against Iran, which is prohibited by Australian law, in that Metalloy was procured to make an unauthorised supply of approximately 90 tonnes of export sanctioned nickel alloys to an Iranian-owned Dubai-based company HICo Fze (hereinafter “HICo”) for the nickel alloys to be then transferred to Iran.

3. Further, AA seeks the Court to take into account, in the sentencing for the foregoing offence, an offence being the providing of false information to a representative of HICo’s previous Australian supplier of high-grade nickel alloy materials, Western Australia Specialty Alloys Pty Ltd (hereinafter “WASA”), in the course of email correspondence, during which she concealed that the true destination and end user of the material was in Iran. That latter offence, to be taken into account pursuant to the terms of s 16BA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) occurred on or about 21 April 2009.

4. When the s 16BA offence occurred, AA knew that the information she gave to WASA was incorrect and was reckless as to whether it was to be provided to Australian authorities in order to allow the transfer of goods to Iran to proceed.

Legislative Scheme

5. The breach of the United Nations sanctions against Iran is prohibited by Australian law and rendered a criminal offence. The criminal offence is created by a combination of a statute of the Commonwealth Parliament, regulations promulgated pursuant to that statute and Instruments recognised by the statute and/or regulation.

6. The provisions of s 27(1) of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), prohibit an individual from engaging in conduct that contravenes the United Nations sanction enforcement law. Relevantly, the United Nations sanction enforcement law was prescribed by reg 10 of the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions-Iran) Regulation 2008 (Cth), which provided that a person contravened s 27(1) of the Charter of the United Nations Act, if they made a sanctioned supply and that sanctioned supply was not an authorised supply. Regulation 7 of the foregoing Regulations made it clear that a sanctioned supply was one in which a person supplied, sold or transferred export sanctioned goods that, as a direct or indirect result, were transferred to Iran.

7. Regulation 5 of the aforesaid Regulations allowed for a determination to be published as to that which were export sanctioned goods. By Sch 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions-Iran) (Export Sanctioned Goods) List Determination 2008 (Cth), nickel and its alloys equal to or greater than 25% of the alloy by weight, were, relevantly, listed as sanctioned goods.

8. In terms of the notified offence that the Court is required to take into account in sentencing for the relevant offence, s 28 of the Charter of the United Nations Act makes it an offence to give false information to a Commonwealth entity, or to another person being reckless that the person would give it to a Commonwealth entity, where the information is provided in connection with the administration of a United Nations sanction enforcement law.

9. As a consequence of the foregoing, complicated though it may be, a breach of the United Nations sanctions against Iran is a Commonwealth offence and punishable under Commonwealth law. The maximum penalty for the offence is 10 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of up to 2,500 penalty units ($250,000). Further, the legislative scheme and prohibition has some extraterritorial effect and certain conduct performed overseas, which is a contravention of the provisions, is punishable under Australian law.

10. Lastly, it should be noted that the United Nations sanctions were applicable to goods that could contribute to uranium enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities; the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; or to the pursuit of activities about which the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter “IAEA”) had expressed concerns.

11. The fact, and it is accepted as a fact, is that the nickel procured by AA for transfer to Iran could be utilised in the foregoing manner, but there is no evidence to suggest that the goods were used for other than peaceful purposes. Nickel of that quality can be used for turbines in any kind of power generation process.

12. I find that the transferred nickel was intended to be used for peaceful purposes; that AA believed it was to be used for peaceful purposes; and the nickel was, in fact, used for peaceful purposes: see Agreed Facts, [9], [16], [30] and [65]. Further, there is no evidence that AA was aware that the goods could be used for other than peaceful purposes.

13. During the course of the proceedings on sentence, the Crown relied upon an Expert Report of Dr Shanahan of the Lowy Institute, dated 29 January 2019. Objection was taken to the Report as not meeting the criteria or form required of expert reports by the Court. The Court declined to rule that the rules of evidence applied: see s 4 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

14. The Report is not directly relevant to the sentence to be imposed upon AA. Rather, the Report confirms that which would, ordinarily, be within the knowledge of the Court, as to the necessity for United Nations sanctions and the necessity for the legislative scheme. While many might regard a breach of the United Nations sanctions as technical, it is an important, if not essential, aspect of global relations.

15. Sanctions under the regime implemented by the United Nations are an attempt to deter governments from conduct that breaches international standards relating to human rights or the relations between nations. In this instance, the sanctions imposed were for the purpose: of dissuading Iran from engaging in the development of nuclear weapons; and of implementing the various policies associated with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

16. The alternative to sanctions, in situations such as this, is military action or the acquiescence of the world in aggressive or potentially aggressive development of weapons of mass destruction. The foregoing is recited, not because it is particularly relevant to the sentencing of AA, but because it ought not to be thought that the breach of United Nations sanctions is a mere technicality, warranting leniency.

17. Ultimately, the seriousness of the offence is determined by the legislature, which has fixed, for a worst category of offence, a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment (as earlier stated) and/or an appropriate fine. It is that maximum sentence that is the guidepost for the fixing of an appropriate sentence for AA, bearing in mind that the Court may only impose a sentence of imprisonment, if it is satisfied that it is the only appropriate sentence: s 17A(1) of the Crimes Act.

The Circumstances of the Offending

18. The plea of Guilty and the cooperation between the Crown and AA has resulted in Agreed Facts being tendered to the Court. It is those Agreed Facts, which the Court takes into account in determining the full details of the offending in question. It is unnecessary to recite all of the facts. They form part of Exhibit A in the sentencing proceedings.

19. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to set out some general aspects of the conduct in question. AA was, at the relevant time, a citizen and resident of Iran. She was employed by an Iranian company to import, relevantly, nickel into Iran to be supplied to power generation companies in Iran.

20. As earlier stated, the goods transferred to Iran were high-grade nickel alloys, also called super alloys, which transfer was organised through Australia. AA, as an employee of Hirbodan Management Company and/or HICo (they are related entities), which are incorporated in Iran and the Jebel Ali Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, respectively.

21. AA was employed by Hirbodan from about 5 May 2008 and worked under the banner of HICo. Her immediate superior or managing director at HICo was [REDACTED] and she was responsible, according to her own draft Curriculum Vitae, for sourcing and procuring enquiries received from market companies and negotiating, selling and contracting with clients in that respect.

22. As earlier stated, AA was predominantly living and working in Iran for an Iranian company (Hirbodan), but performed work for HICo, which was registered in the United Arab Emirates. For that purpose, AA travelled from Iran to Dubai and to Oman on dates that have been provided.

23. The nickel that was to be transferred was for the use of MAPNA (a Farsi acronym for Iranian Power Projects Management Company), which is a group of companies, headquartered in Tehran, with core business activities that include: engineering; procurement and construction of thermal and renewable power plants; oil and gas projects; railway transportation; and manufacturing of equipment such as steam turbines and blades, electrical generators, boilers, gas compressors and locomotive equipment. Another recipient of the nickel was PARTO (which is the acronym for MAPNA Turbine Blade Engineering & Manufacturing Company) involved in the design, engineering and manufacture of gas turbine blades and cores.

24. AA’s offending occurred as a result of her role working for Hirbodan, in HICo, and procuring, on their behalf, the supply of super alloys to HICo clients, being PARTO and MAPNA. It is unnecessary to detail all of the emails that were exchanged, but it is clear from the emails between AA and her supervisor, [REDACTED], between 18 May 2008 and 2 June 2008 that AA was aware that the end user was in Iran and that she was not to disclose that information to suppliers.

25. As part of her employment functions, she then sought to organise, and did organise, the supply of the metal alloy through companies registered and operating in Australia. In the first instance, AA sought to contact WASA (or a person associated therewith) for the delivery of 50 tonnes of nickel, which quantities increased over a period. In August 2008, the HICo contract with WASA had expanded to the supply of 100 tonnes of super alloy, made up of five separate quantities at a total cost of over US$4 million.

26. On 21 August 2008, in another email relating to delivery from Malaysia, it became clear that AA was prepared to substitute Banda Abbas, if there were issues about delivery of goods to Iran, notwithstanding that the goods were always intended for Iran.

27. Between about November 2008 and February 2009, four shipments of nickel alloy, which were not then sanctioned goods, totalling about 79,000 kg, manufactured by WASA, were shipped from Australia to the United Arab Emirates and then to Iran. At that point in time, the sanctions legislative scheme did not apply and the sale, supply and transfer did not contravene any Australian law or United Nations sanction. Further, the end use of the material in Iran was not concealed.

28. Nevertheless, on 11 and/or 12 March 2009 WASA emailed AA’s account, informing her that there will be changes to Australian customs regulations as of 19 March and that the shipment would have to be concluded before then. This referred to the fifth and final shipment of the original order of 100 tonnes. The fifth and final shipment did not eventuate.

29. The Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions-Iran) (Export Sanctioned Goods) List Determination 2008 (Cth) commenced on 19 March 2009. On 25 March 2009, WASA emailed AA stating that Australian customs now required certain information, including the final destination (end user) for the purchased goods and certain other information.

30. A reply from AA was sent on 21 April 2009, in which she stated that the end user was “Euroturbine company in Netherland, who has its own turbine casting company in France” and was for “gas and steam turbines in power generation industry usage”. At the time of sending that information, AA understood that MAPNA, in Iran, was to be the end user of the goods.

31. The foregoing relates to the s 16BA offence, to be taken into account in fixing a sentence for the charged offence. Further it relates, either directly or indirectly, to the state of knowledge of AA in relation to sanctions against Iran.

32. In relation to the charged offence, there are relevant matters in the Agreed Facts dealing with AA and the relationship she developed with the person who is now her husband. The chronology of purchase, ordered through AA, in her role for Hirbodan and working for HICo, are before the Court.

33. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to recite all of the correspondence or all of the matters that were the subject of correspondence. It is sufficient to recite that AA introduced her husband to managers and other employees of Hirbodan and HICo in Iran, in or about January 2009. Thereafter, AA contacted her husband and his business partner in relation to the supply of high-grade nickel alloys. Her husband was not then in a relationship with AA.

34. AA’s husband and his business partner were in business in Australia and both were Australian residents. They established a joint business venture under the company title Metalloy Pty Ltd, which was incorporated on 4 June 2009 in Australia.

35. AA procured Metalloy, generally through AA’s husband, to obtain quotations for and production of super alloy nickels from Firth Rixon Metals Ltd in the United Kingdom. Through Metalloy, or its individual employees or directors, AA procured the production of the relevant 90 tonnes of nickel alloy and their shipment from England, where they were produced, to the United Arab Emirates, knowing it was intended for Iran. The shipments arrived in two orders: the first Metalloy order was for 60 tonnes of high-grade nickel alloy; and the second order was for 30 tonnes of high-grade nickel alloy.

36. AA organised for the purchase and delivery of the goods to Jebel Ali, without disclosing the end user, thereby allowing the supply to occur without referencing any United Nations sanctions against Iran. The first shipment arrived in Dubai on or after 14 September 2009 and the second shipment arrived in Dubai on or after 19 October 2009. From there, the shipments were transferred to Iran and AA was aware of the location of the end user when the orders were placed and/or organised. The shipments were worth approximately US$3.6 million.

37. In detailing the foregoing facts, the Court makes it clear that the Statement of Agreed Facts for Sentence, which forms part of Exhibit A, and details all of the conduct of AA, as agreed between the parties, has been taken into account in forming part of the factual basis for the sentence to be imposed.

18. There are subjective features to which the Court will come. Nevertheless, the foregoing summary recites, in a very general sense, the conduct in which AA was engaged and which gave rise to the offence in question and the s 16BA offence.

Seriousness of the Offence

39. Ordinarily, the Court would treat the objective seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the offender (absent subjective circumstances) as almost synonymous. This case is a little different, because one of the aspects relevant to the level of culpability could easily be regarded as either or both an objective factor or a subjective factor.

40. I refer to the circumstance that AA was a citizen and resident of Iran and an employee of an Iranian company, during the offending in question. The immediately preceding statement does not suggest that the operation of Australian law is either impermissible or inappropriate. These are United Nations sanctions that enforce world-wide attempts to restrain the Iranian Republic. Further, the offending by AA has an obvious connection to Australia.

41. The connection in relation to the offence to be taken into account under s 16BA of the Crimes Act (the “notified offence”) involved giving false information, albeit in communications from another country, to a person and entity in Australia, either with knowledge of, or recklessness to, the provision of that information to a Commonwealth entity to avoid the effect of the sanctions. The charged offence involves the procuring of sanctioned goods through Australian intermediaries and by communications with those intermediaries, while those persons were in and operating from Australia.

42. Nevertheless, AA was, as has been stated more than once, a citizen and resident of Iran and was employed under the direction of an Iranian corporation. As a consequence, when the Court considers issues of general deterrence and the seriousness of the offence, the issues associated with the engagement in misconduct in Iran, as distinct from in Australia, cannot be ignored.

43. The Court is prepared to assume that Iran is a theocracy, but takes judicial notice of the fact that its regime implements a strict and seemingly less forgiving power structure. An employee, even in Australia, is under the reasonable directions of the employer. The repercussions that would have been suffered by AA, were she to have refused to procure the supply of the alloy into Iran, are not known. And the Court does not assume that there was any form of duress imposed on AA to carry out the instructions.

44. Nevertheless, the Court is prepared to take into account the subtle, and not so subtle, effect of living in a country under a regime of the kind that the United Nations considered required sanctions, and refusing to perform a function, which refusal would or might be seen to be inconsistent with the interests of that country.

45. There is a significant difference between a person procuring a breach of the United Nations sanctions when that person is in Iran, from the same person performing the same acts when that person is not in Iran. Thus, whatever general deterrence is to be given effect, it is a significantly different level of general deterrence and culpability than would be taken into account if the person were operating in Australia or in countries outside Australia that were not politically linked to Iran.

46. The Crown submits that AA’s role in HICo was in a managerial or supervisory function and, in terms of the procurement of the transfer, it could be said that she, on behalf of HICo had principal or major responsibility for the transaction and the breach of the United Nations sanctions that is prohibited.

47. As is clear from the material before the Court, not only did she organise with the persons in Australia for the orders to be issued and the deliveries to be made, initially to Dubai Free Zone, but she negotiated the terms of the contracts; she communicated the chemical composition of the metals; she organised for tests on the metals to ensure that those goods delivered conformed with the specifications ordered; and she organised payments under the contracts and the letters of credit for the shipping.

48. Her role involved, as the Crown submits, high-level knowledge and skill and she was involved in a large number of communications to effect the transfer. However, all of the foregoing was performed as an employee and not in the exercise of an independent discretion. The Crown has not proved the exercise of an independent discretion beyond a reasonable doubt. AA was subject to the control of her employer, through her immediate supervisor, [REDACTED].

49. Nevertheless, there is no suggestion that the goods imported were goods used for the purpose for which the sanctions were implemented. The nickel was used in the production of energy for the population of Iran.

50. As earlier stated, the offender was also aware of the quantity and content of the nickel alloy. The quantity was extremely large and the quality high.

51. Further, from the facts as agreed, and the effect of the plea, it is clear AA was at least reckless as to the fact that the nickel alloys were export sanctioned goods under Australian law, each of which is sufficient to give rise to the offence. Moreover, AA was involved in a deception in order to mislead producers of the super alloy and to avoid detection for the breach of Australian law.

52. I have outlined the objective facts of the offence itself, generally, without comment. There are some issues that require development.

53. The Crown’s reliance on the Report of Dr Shanahan and the effect of the nuclear development of Iran is interesting, an important background to the promulgation of the legislation, its necessity and importance. Yet it does not inform the seriousness of the particular offence within the range of offences to which s 27(1) of the Charter of the United Nations Act applies.

54. Plainly, the offending in question is not in the worst category. The offences, to which the provisions apply, encompass the transfer of nuclear weapons; the transfer of military weapons or means of subjugating the population; material directly used for the development by Iran of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; technology to aid its nuclear desires; and expertise to develop such weapons or technology.

55. One does not assess the characterisation of objective seriousness merely by imagining worse scenarios. Unfortunately, one can almost always imagine a worse scenario.

56. Nevertheless, as already indicated, this material was intended to be used (and, as far as the evidence goes, was used) for peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity for the general population.

57. AA was not a “low-ranking employee”, but, on the evidence, neither was she a principal. AA was directed by her immediate supervisor and following the instructions of her clients.

58. While the evidence is not conclusive, it seems that her clients were government instrumentalities in Iran. This is a country that is notoriously strict, with an economy in tatters.

59. The evidence before the Court is that only 14.9% of women have paid employment; and 40% of the population lives below the poverty line (US$3.10 per day). Iran has been the subject of sanctions, of one kind or another, since the Revolution in 1979; is notoriously corrupt; undemocratic; restrictive of free-speech; a society in which women face considerable barriers to participation in society and cannot generally travel alone without a male guardian. It is a society that inflicts corporal punishment for a range of “offences”.

60. It is an offence in Iran for a Muslim to disavow his or her religion. People have been flogged for mixed dancing at a graduation party and consuming alcohol. The foregoing derives from the Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of June 2018 (part of Exhibit 3 on Sentence).

61. These are factors that inform the culpability of AA in carrying out, without protest or refusal, her employment tasks in Iran. This is a very different level of culpability from a person performing the same or similar functions in breach of Australian law in Australia (or any other relatively free society).

62. The facts on which the Crown relies to disclose AA’s managerial role do not detract from the fundamental aspect that she was an employee (albeit not a low-ranking one), subject to the direction of her superior. Further, her conduct in Iran was, under Iranian law, perfectly legal. Her refusal to carry out the directions of her employer may have been unlawful in Iran. In Australia, such a refusal of direction would be unlawful.

63. The fact that AA signed certain documents, but not others, does not point to a role of importance or seniority. Further, her draft Curriculum Vitae involves a degree of “huffing”.

64. Having made those comments, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that AA was aware the goods with which she was dealing were sanctioned, although she was unaware of the intricacies of Australian law that effected that result.

65. As for the depiction of her conduct as failing to desist from a course of conduct that was initially legal, I see that depiction as being neutral. The conduct still involved all that has been summarised.

66. Further, the circumstance that the concentration of nickel did not meet the United Nations prescription is irrelevant to the objective seriousness of the offence under Australian law. It may be relevant and important for the legislature in promulgating Australian law, but I take the law as it has been prescribed by the relevant Australian legislature.

Other Factors to be taken into Account

67. All of the foregoing deals with the nature and circumstances of the offence with which AA has been charged and to which she has pleaded. The provisions of s 16A of the Crimes Act require the Court to take into account a number of matters apart from the nature and circumstances of the offence. That list is not exhaustive, but consideration of the prescribed criteria is mandatory: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40.

68. The Court has already referred to the offence notified pursuant to the terms of s 16BA of the Crimes Act and the circumstances of that offending. The offending in question is part of the one course of conduct, but deals with a separate transfer to Iran and a deliberate subterfuge to avoid the operation of Australian law.

69. In the circumstances, I do not consider that the s 16BA offence renders the criminality involved in the charged offence significantly greater. Nor do I consider that any substantial or significant increase in sentence should be occasioned by the s 16BA offence.

70. Nevertheless, the offence does show the deliberate and intentional conduct of the offender and adds to the culpability for which a sentence is required to be imposed.

71. Notwithstanding the submission of the Crown, I do not consider that the offence has caused injury, loss or damage. I do consider that the offence prevented, to some minor degree, the obtaining of a benefit by the United Nations and/or Australia as a party to the United Nations sanctions. However, the offence did not damage Australia or the international community.

72. In particular, I do not consider that the actions of the offender damaged the interests and reputation of Australia. It would seem, if damage occurred to the interests and reputation of Australia, it occurred as a result of the conduct of those people in Australia who organised the supply of the material.

73. Further, whatever possible damage was occasioned to the interests and reputation of Australia as part of the global community, such damage would have lasted only so long as Australia declined to prosecute for the offence.

74. The offender, as earlier stated, entered a plea of Guilty on 8 May 2018 in the Local Court, which was the earliest possible opportunity. The Court takes into account that Guilty plea and the extent to which the Guilty plea shows contrition for the offence in question. I also take account of the utilitarian value of the plea.

75. The offender is now a permanent resident of Australia and, from the point of view of the Court, there seems to be no reason why she should not remain a permanent resident. The offender has expressed remorse during the course of the interviews, associated with the Reports that were submitted in these proceedings, and I accept that she has displayed genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility, together with a willingness to facilitate the course of justice in Australia. Further, it would seem to me, provided that the offender is not returned to Iran, the likelihood of repeat offending is extremely low, if it were to exist at all.

76. I take the offender’s Guilty plea into account for its utilitarian value and will provide a discount for that utilitarian value at the highest level of 25%.

77. The next consideration that I consider relevant to the sentencing of the offender is that contained in s 16A(2)(j) of the Crimes Act, namely specific deterrence. The Crown submits that there should be a significant component for specific deterrence, because of the offender’s demonstrated willingness to subvert Australian laws that exist to create and maintain international peace, security and order.

78. To some extent at least, such a submission double counts the objective culpability of the offence with the subjective need for specific deterrence. There can be no doubt that the offender has shown a willingness to contravene Australian law and to circumvent and/or subvert its operation.

79. Specific deterrence, however, is generally concerned with discouraging criminal behaviour in the specific individual charged and to be sentenced. As already explained, in the view of the Court, it is unlikely that AA will offend again, in this kind of offence or at all, and I do not consider that specific deterrence looms large in the fixing of an appropriate sentence.

80. General deterrence is in a different category. There are two aspects to the component of general deterrence as the Court considers it appropriate in this offence.

81. First, the importance of general deterrence on other people within Australia and outside it, in complying with sanctions of this kind, breach of which will render the sanctions ineffective, is a significant matter. In the absence of effective sanctions, world bodies, such as the United Nations, would be impotent to deter rogue nations from undertaking inappropriate and irresponsible activities.

82. Secondly, it is in this area, however, that the effect of the circumstance that AA was a citizen, and resident, of Iran, at the time the offences occurred, is appropriate to be considered. I do not double count the effect that circumstance has, by taking it into account in assessing culpability, on the one hand, and taking it into account, on the other hand, in the significance which general deterrence must play in the fixing of a sentence.

83. These offences are serious and the world community must realise that a breach of them will result in significant consequences. In my view, general deterrence is a factor in the determination of an appropriate sentence and, in some respects, general deterrence is difficult to assess separately from the seriousness of the offending.

84. The Court has the benefit of a Sentencing Assessment Report (Exhibit B on Sentence) compiled by Corrective Services, Ms Claire Shume. It is appropriate to deal with some of the aspects of that Report. The Report refers to the current residential arrangement for AA, in which she lives in the family residence with her husband and their four-year-old daughter. The husband has three adult sons from a previous relationship with whom AA has a close relationship.

85. The Report confirms that there are no prior criminal offences that have been committed by AA in Australia or elsewhere. It describes AA as cooperative, forthcoming and actively engaged in offence-related discussions. The Report refers to the expression of remorse and regret by AA at the commission of the offence.

86. AA is not a supporter of the Iranian government and expressed a desire to contribute to society in Australia and to engage, otherwise, in a law-abiding lifestyle. In the interview that gave rise to the Assessment Report, AA described her relationship with her former employer as dictatorial, which accords with the expectation of the Court given the nature of the society as described by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

87. Her father had died approximately six months before undertaking the employment with Hirbodan and HICo and AA was under financial stress at the time due to the recent death of her father and the fact that she was, as a consequence, the financial provider for her family in Iran.

88. AA expressed shame at the offence and that shame has prevented her from revealing the offence to her mother, who still lives in Iran. She is unable to return to Iran because of the proceedings that are before the Court. She claims psychological impact, to which matter I will return.

89. AA expressed a willingness to undertake community service and Ms Shume assessed AA as “a low risk of reoffending” according to the Static Assessment Criteria. Ms Shume assesses AA as suitable to undertake community service work and can provide the equivalent of up to 20 hours of work per month. In the absence of an Intensive Correction Order that includes electronic monitoring or home detention, supervision would be suspended in accordance with the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2014 (NSW).

90. An Affidavit sworn by Christopher Watson, the solicitor for AA, also attests to most of the foregoing underlying facts. The Affidavit refers to her very significant anxiety relating to the prospects of care for her child, who is now 4½. Mr Watson referred AA to Dr Mark Milic, Forensic Psychologist.

91. Dr Milic also reports on a history consistent with that which has already been described. The Report describes her alienation and social exclusion, growing up in Iran, because AA is an atheist, despite her parents being Muslim. In and of itself, from other material before the Court, this may amount to an offence under Iranian law.

92. Nevertheless, relevant to the Psychological Report, AA had difficulty in Iran because of the restrictive religious codes imposed by the revolutionary regime, especially on women. As a result of the proceedings, which have been hanging over the head of AA for some period of time, she is “emotionally drained”, “frequently tearful”, “has trouble concentrating and sleeping, and has experienced nightmares”. She suffers headaches once a week or more, whereas previously, she may have had them monthly.

93. In particular, AA is extremely anxious in relation to the proceedings.

94. The Psychological Report notes that her responses to psychological questionnaire indicated that AA was severely distressed suffering from the following cluster of symptoms: ruminative, obsessive and intrusive thoughts, worries, restless sleep, difficulty concentrating, and problems with memory; low mood, loss of energy, trouble getting things done, loss of pleasure in activities, low self-esteem, feelings of worthlessness; and stress-related physical symptoms, including nausea, muscle soreness, bodily tension, feelings of heaviness, numbness and tingling.

95. The Psychologist, Dr Milic, takes the view that AA gave a psychologically plausible account of her history in that she struggled to adapt to life in Iran, due to the Revolution and the war with Iraq, and the feeling of alienation from the predominant culture on account of her atheism. She was not-entitled to pursue her own direction in terms of study, personal expansion and employment.

96. AA’s mental health “deteriorated after the sudden death of her father in 2007”, which, after a short break, required her to return to work because of money issues for the family. She accepted responsibility for the offences and “has paid a high price in terms of her mental health due to her legal matter”.

67. Dr Milic concluded that AA had:

“developed dysthymia, a depressive illness, and generalised anxiety disorder after she was charged. She has been too depressed to fully engage with her daughter, and she has lived in chronic fear of gaol. She has felt embarrassed by being publicly exposed. The ordeal she has experienced would act as a powerful deterrent to reoffending.”

98. Over and above the foregoing, AA filed a signed personal statement on which she relied in the sentencing proceedings (Exhibit 4 on Sentence). Much of the content, in relation to life in Iran, is the subject of independent evidence upon which the Court has already commented. AA refers to her father’s death, which was sudden, from a brain aneurysm in 2007 at the age of 58. She also refers to the circumstances under which she worked at Hirbodan/HICo.

99. She refers to the police raid on her home in 2013, which AA describes as traumatic and the feeling, after a few years, that no more would be heard of it. As a consequence of that conclusion, when AA fell pregnant in 2014, she and her husband decided not to terminate the pregnancy.

100. When her daughter was born, AA left work as a dental nurse to care for her daughter full-time. As earlier stated, AA is the primary carer of her 4½ year old daughter.

101. When her daughter was 16 months old, AA was charged with the offences now before the Court. Notwithstanding the submission on behalf of AA, I do not consider the delay significant because of the novelty of the charges, amongst other reasons.

102. She has a fear, if she returns to Iran, that the admissions she has made in her statement, for example, about her employer, will be regarded adversely in Iran and she will be subject to persecution as a consequence. Further, even if that not be the case, she is fundamentally opposed to her daughter returning to Iran. Her daughter is an Australian citizen.

103. AA is concerned as to the care for her daughter as there are, on the evidence of Mr Watson and AA and others, no other persons, in Australia, who can care for her young daughter on a full-time basis.

104. In my view, AA has cooperated with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of the offence now before the Court. It is true, as the Crown submits, that the evidence of her offences may be strong, but AA, apart from the plea of Guilty, cooperated with the prosecution in drawing up and agreeing to the facts which obviated the necessity to investigate the offence further and obviated the necessity to call significant evidence in the proceedings. As already stated the utilitarian value of the plea of Guilty is at the highest level, but some credit must be granted for some level of cooperation in the proceedings before the Court, pursuant to the terms of s 16A(2)(h) of the Crimes Act.

105. As already stated, specific deterrence is not an issue. I accept the opinion of Ms Shume and independently come to the view that the probability of any future offence, of this or any other kind, committed by AA is almost zero. Further, given the circumstances of this offending, which occurred in Iran, albeit in a way that occasioned the operation of Australian law, at a time when AA was wholly unaware that she would be coming to Australia, her conduct was lawful under Iranian law and she was an Iranian citizen, an Iranian resident and an employee of an Iranian company, linked, it seems, to the Iranian government, I do not consider that the circumstances of this case and this offender render AA a suitable vehicle for general deterrence. Nevertheless, general deterrence is a factor in the determination of an appropriate sentence.

106. I have already noted that AA is 48 years of age has little or no means, is suffering psychologically from the proceedings that have been hanging over her head for six years already and is otherwise of good character. Her prospects of rehabilitation are exemplary.

107. Bearing in mind the mandatory nature of the criteria in s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act, with one exception, I have dealt with all of the prescribed criteria that are relevant to an assessment of ZAN. I have already noted that I consider her expressions of contrition and remorse to be genuine.

108. The matter with which the Court has not yet dealt is that prescribed by s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act.

109. In dealing with the operation of s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act, the Court notes a difference of approach to the operation of this criterion. The difficulty for the Court is that, as earlier stated, the criteria in s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act are mandatory considerations.

110. The failure of a court or tribunal to take into account a relevant consideration in the making of a decision is one instance of an abuse of discretion and a court or tribunal is required to take into account all relevant considerations. Relevant, in that context, refers to those considerations that court or tribunal is bound to consider: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39, per Mason J; [1986] HCA 40.

111. If the Court of Criminal Appeal approach, by which approach the Court, as presently constituted, is bound, understates the effect of the mandatory consideration, and I apply that approach, then there is error. On the other hand, as the foregoing makes clear, in my position in the judicial hierarchy, I am bound by the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal and not those of another intermediate appellate body.

112. It seems to me that the two approaches to s 16A(2)(p) are reconcilable. Obviously, the criteria prescribed by s 16A(2) must be taken into account only where a particular criterion is relevant.

113. As a matter of practicality and fact, it is difficult to imagine a custodial sentence (and many other sentences) that would not have a probable effect on a person’s family or dependents. There may be persons who have no family or dependents, but otherwise it is an ordinary and unremarkable aspect for a custodial sentence, for example, to have an effect on a person’s family and dependents.

114. As a consequence, without placing a gloss on the prescribed criterion and the wording of the Act, either the probable effect is required to be out of the ordinary or, in relation to custodial sentences, at least, the prescribed criterion does no more than give effect to the policy underpinning the provisions of s 17A of the Crimes Act.

115. In other words, given that the term “exceptional” means, in this context, unusual or out of the ordinary, the relevance and significance of the criterion depends upon an assessment of an effect out of that which would ordinarily apply as a result of the imposition of a sentence.

116. In other words, I adopt the approach of the Court of Criminal Appeal, but make it clear, in doing so, that I do not put a gloss on the wording of the criterion in s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act. Rather, in the absence of circumstances that are unusual or out of the ordinary, such criterion would have no effect on the sentence to be imposed, but may impact the kind of sentence that the Court should consider.

117. As a matter of practicality, in the instant situation, it is unnecessary to resolve this tension finally. The circumstances associated with the possible incarceration of AA on a full-time basis are plainly exceptional. AA, as already noted, is the primary carer of her 4½ year old daughter. It is likely, given the charges against her husband and the evidence in relation to him, that her husband, who is not the primary carer but could care for the child in extreme circumstances, will be tried, convicted and sentenced to a custodial sentence.

118. On the evidence before the Court, there are no other persons in Australia who can care for the child. The stepsons, on the evidence, cannot.

119. The child is an Australian citizen. As a consequence, the imposition of a full-time custodial sentence on AA would probably result in the child being put into welfare or being required to be taken to Iran, where AA has family that may be able to care for the child. AA, understandably, opposes any course that would require the child to be taken to Iran.

120. The notion that the Court would encourage an Australian citizen of that tender age being taken to Iran and subject to the discrimination and other treatment of which the Court has heard that relates, generally, to women in that society, is not a course that, if there be an alternative, should be endorsed.

121. Further, the effect of that course on the offender is, itself, almost an extra-curial punishment, which, on the evidence before the Court, would exacerbate the depression and anxiety currently suffered by AA. The probable effect on AA’s daughter of a full-time custodial sentence for AA would be extraordinary and extremely punitive on the daughter as well as AA.

Barbaro

122. Before dealing with the effect of the foregoing on the sentence to be imposed and outlining that sentence, it is necessary to deal with one issue that arose during the course of the proceedings. On questioning from the Court of the Crown (and to a lesser extent Senior Counsel for the offender), an exchange occurred as to the appropriateness of an Intensive Correction Order. During the course of that exchange the Crown submitted that it would be inappropriate to impose a sentence that was 2 years or less.

123. To that submission counsel for the offender objected on the basis of the judgment of the High Court in Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2. While Senior Counsel for the offender made it clear that there could be no objection to a submission as to the appropriateness of a particular kind of sentence, once submissions were directed by the Crown to an appropriate duration of the sentence, it was inconsistent with the judgment of the High Court in Barbaro. In that submission, Senior Counsel for the offender was echoing the traditional view of the effect of Barbaro and the assistance that may be provided to courts on sentencing. In my view, that traditional understanding is incorrect.

124. In order to understand the effect of Barbaro on the submissions that may be made by counsel, a very brief understanding of the factual background to Barbaro is required. The issue arose because, in Victoria, for a period, there was a practice, seemingly confined to the County Court, in which a form of plea-bargaining arose during which there was agreement between the prosecutor and the accused/offender as to the “bounds of any sentence”.

125. As a consequence, it was submitted that a sentencing judge that departed from those bounds, delineated by the submission of the Crown at the upper limit and the submission of the accused/offender at the lower limit, would be, without an express question from the judicial officer raising the issue, denying the accused/offender (and possibly the Crown in the case of manifest inadequacy) procedural fairness.

126. In Barbaro, the sentencing occurred in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The sentencing judge precluded counsel from putting submissions on the bounds of any sentence or the bounds of any duration of sentence and the issue, ultimately before the High Court, was whether in precluding the Crown from putting its submission, the offender was denied procedural fairness.

127. The Reasons for Judgment of the High Court in Barbaro follows a line of authority which, with respect, is trite. It involves three propositions: first, the discretion, whether to prosecute and, if so, what charges to prefer, is solely a matter for the prosecuting authority; secondly, the discretion as to the plea to be entered to any charge that has been preferred is solely a matter for the accused/offender; and, lastly and, in this respect, most importantly, the discretion as to the appropriate sentence to impose is solely a matter for the sentencing judge. While I have described the proposition as trite, there is authority for the propositions, to the extent that any is necessary: see GAS v R (2004) 217 CLR 198; [2004] HCA 22 at [28]-[30]; Jimmy v R (2010) 77 NSWLR 540; [2010] NSWCCA 60, at [267]; Kutchera v R [2007] NSWCCA 121 at [32]-[33]; and Hunter Quarries Pty Limited v Morrison; Badior v Morrison (2017) 96 NSWLR 658; [2017] NSWCCA 326 at [61].

128. The foregoing principle is a fundamental aspect of the nature of criminal proceedings. To the extent that counsel put submissions, counsel can never be caught by surprise by the exercise of discretion of a court in imposing a sentence.

129. The sentence imposed either discloses error or is manifestly in error (either manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate). As a consequence, a court is not denying any party procedural fairness in imposing a sentence that is outside the “bounds”, the ambit of which is defined by the opinion of the Crown as to an appropriate sentence and the opinion of the offender as to an appropriate sentence.

130. In my opinion, the Reasons for Judgment in Barbaro, make that clear. After discussing the factual basis and the ground of appeal, the High Court states:

“The prosecution’s statement of what are the bounds of the available range of sentences is a statement of opinion. Its expression advances no proposition of law or fact which a sentencing judge may properly take into account in finding the relevant facts, deciding the applicable principles of law or applying those principles to the facts to yield the sentence to be imposed. That being so, the prosecution is not required, and should not be permitted, to make such a statement of bounds to a sentencing judge.” (Barbaro at [7], per French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ.) (Emphasis added.)

131. That which is prohibited by the Reasons for Judgment in Barbaro is the submission of the bounds of a sentencing judge and any purported denial of procedural fairness associated with exceeding those bounds. The opinion of the prosecutor or counsel for an offender is not precluded from being submitted, but each party must understand that the discretion to fix and impose a sentence is a matter solely for the sentencing judge and will be overturned only on one of the well-known bases outlined in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40.

132. Conclusion

133. I turn then to the effect of the discussion on objective and subjective facts. I start with the proposition that the provisions of s 17A of the Crimes Act require the Court to treat a full-time custodial sentence as the last resort, to be imposed, in the case of a federal offence, only after considering all other available sentences and being satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

134. This offence is a serious one and requires that the offender be adequately punished for its commission. At the same time, AA is a first offender. She has no criminal history in Australia and, on the material before the Court, no criminal history in Iran or elsewhere. She is currently 48 years of age and, apart from these offences, is a person of good character, who has never before offended and never before suffered imprisonment. She is unlikely to offend in the future. Each of those factors is important in the determination of an appropriate sentence.

135. The purposes of sentencing are well known. They were summarised by the High Court in Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14. Those objectives are the protection of society; the deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend; retribution; and reform. They include the desirability of rehabilitation and, most appropriately, the need to ensure that appropriate punishment is meted out as a reflection of the condemnation of the conduct in question.

136. As already stated, there is a very low, if not non-existent, likelihood of repeat offending by AA. The prospects of rehabilitation are significant. Further, there is, on the material before the Court, no need to impose a full-time custodial sentence for the purposes of the protection of society, nor the deterrence of the offender. The Court then is left with the issue of general deterrence.

137. I have already expressed the view, albeit in slightly different terms, that the degree of non-exculpatory duress, subtle and express, on AA as she worked for an Iranian company in Iran, as a citizen and resident of Iran, domiciled in Iran, to adhere to the dictates of Iranian law and culture, is significant.

138. The legislature has made it clear that an appropriate sentence for this offence may be imprisonment up to a maximum of 10 years or a fine or both. A fine is an inappropriate sentence to be imposed on AA as she has little or no resources to meet any monetary imposition.

139. Her subjective factors are extraordinary, including, if it be subjective, the fact that these offences occurred while AA lived and worked in Iran as an Iranian citizen. At that time, there was no foreseeable possibility that she would ultimately become a permanent resident of Australia, as she now is.

140. The objective seriousness of the offence, for the reasons already given, is below the mid-range of seriousness, but certainly not in the lowest category. If AA were in Australia (or an overseas country other than Iran), then, it would seem the only appropriate sentence to impose to reflect the seriousness of the offence and general deterrence would be one of full-time imprisonment.

141. I apply a discount, as already stated, of 25% for the utilitarian value of the plea of Guilty. I allow some credit, although minor and not quantified, for the cooperation in the proceedings, but any credit is relatively insignificant.

142. Lastly, I refer in particular to the good character, otherwise, of the offender; that she is a first offender; that, if full-time imprisonment were imposed she would be spending her first and likely only period in gaol; and the effect of full-time custody on her daughter.

143. Is full-time custody the only appropriate sentence in all of the circumstances? As earlier stated, there is a need to ensure general deterrence and appropriate punishment. The circumstances of AA are quite exceptional.

144. Were I to impose a condition of full-time imprisonment, allowing for the objective seriousness of the offence and taking into account all of the subjective aspects, other than a discount for the plea of Guilty, I would fix a head sentence of between 2½ and 3 years’ imprisonment, and one that was probably closer to 2½ years’ imprisonment than 3 years.

145. As a consequence, an appropriate term of imprisonment would be 2 years and 8 months. I apply a 25% discount for the plea of Guilty at the first reasonable opportunity and the sentence that otherwise would have been imposed would now be a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment.

146. As a consequence of the foregoing, the possibility of an Intensive Correction Order arises. In all of the circumstances, it seems to me that an Intensive Correction Order is an appropriate sentence and, pursuant to the terms of s 17A of the Crimes Act, I should not impose a sentence of imprisonment in full-time custody. I accept that, notwithstanding definitions, there is a significant degree of leniency associated with the imposition of an Intensive Correction Order as distinct from full-time custody in a corrections centre.

147. Nevertheless, in all of the circumstances of this case, including the exceptional circumstances of the commission of the offence and the subjective circumstances otherwise applying, the Court will impose an Intensive Correction Order.

Sentence

148. AA, please rise.

1. You are convicted that, between about 19 March 2009 and about 1 April 2010, in Australia and elsewhere, you engaged in conduct that contravened a United Nations sanction enforcement law contrary to subs 27(1) of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) the particulars of which include:

1. The United Nations sanction enforcement law contravened was the making of unauthorised sanctioned supplies, contrary to reg 10 of the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions-Iran) Regulations 2008 (Cth);

1. The sanctioned supplies were the supplies, sales or transfers to HlCo Fze of export sanctioned goods, namely approximately 90 tonnes of export sanctioned nickel alloys, ordered by HICo Fze from Metalloy Pty Ltd pursuant to HICo purchase orders HlC/C.E/1078 and HIC/C.E/1079, as a direct or indirect result of which supplies, sales or transfers those goods were transferred to Bandar Abbas, Iran; and

2. This conduct of yours occurred partly in Australia pursuant to s 15.1(1)(a)(i) and s 16.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth).

2. The offender, AA is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years to commence on 24 December 2019 and expiring on 23 December 2021. The term of imprisonment is to be served by way of intensive correction in the community in accordance with the Crimes (Administration of Sentence) Act 1999 (NSW).

3. This Intensive Correction Order is subject to the following standard conditions:

1. The offender is not to commit any offence while subject to this Intensive Correction Order;

2. The offender must submit to supervision by a Community Corrections Officer.

3. The relevant agency for the purposes of supervision is Hornsby Community Corrections District Office.

4. This Intensive Correction Order is subject to the following additional conditions:

1. The offender is to report to Hornsby Community Corrections Office for the purpose of implementing the foregoing, on or before 6 January 2020.

2. The offender is to perform 18 hours of Community Service Work per month during the entirety of the duration of the Intensive Correction Order (being a total of 432 hours).

3. Subject to the receipt of an appropriate assessment, the offender is to be released to home detention for the period of the Intensive Correction Order.

4. The Court directs that Corrective Services assess the offender for home detention and provide the report within seven (7) days of its completion and by 3 February 2020.

5. The above conditions are entered by the Court whilst taking into account the offence notified under s 16BA, namely, that the offender gave false information to another person, reckless as to the risk that it will be given to a Commonwealth entity in connection with the administration of a United Nations sanction enforcement law.

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Amendments

09 December 2021 - Pseudonym revised.

Decision last updated: 09 December 2021