R.R. and S.M. Powell Pty Ltd v Cafike Pty Ltd

Case

[1988] FCA 51

4 Feb 1988

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:JI IDGMENT N ~ . 51 y 5 6 - - . .... "4

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

)

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) T. Nos. G 2 and 3 of 1987
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: 
R . R . ANI2 S. M. POWELL PTI. LTD. Applicant
(Respondent)

and

CAFIXE PTY. LTD. Respondent
(Applicant)

NORTHROP J.

4 FEBRUARY 1988

HOBART

Ex TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

There are listed for hearing today before me two
actions, namely, T. No. G 2 of 1987 and T. No. G 3 of 1987.
In the first action the applicant is R.R. and S.M. Powell
Pty. Ltd. ("Powell"), and the respondent is Cafike Pty. Ltd.
("Cafike"i, trading as the Port Arthur Cider Company; that
action was commenced on 4 March 1987 and was based upon 5.52
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in relation to the use by
Cafike of the word "Grove" in relation to fruit juices. The

second action was commenced by Cafike and the respondent is Powell, and, in addition to claims based upon

s . 5 2

of the

Trade Practices Act, claims are made for damages for breaches

of contract as well as damages under other causes of action.

As a result of directions given, the matters have proceeded basically in T. No. G 3 of 1987 and In that action there has

been further pleadings by Cafike, a further defence by

Powell, a cross-claim by Powell, and a reply and defence to
cross-claim. The issues between the parties are very wlde

and cover very many causes of action coming within the

original as well as the accrued jurisdiction of the Federal
Court .
The matters have had an unfortunate history In that
although the actions were commenced in March of 1987, the
loint matter has proceeded rather slowly. Despite a number

of directions hearings, the parties had not always complied
gith dlrectlons glven. The last directions hearing was held

on 27 October 1987. At that hearing the Court was assured

that the matter would be ready for trial by 2 February 1988.
As a result, certain directions were made, including a
direction that any reports of experts be exchanged by 2 3
December 1987 and that a date be fixed for hearing, being a
date not before 2 February 1988, and also liberty to apply

was granted. It is apparent from material before the Court

that therg has not been compliance with earlier directions in

relation to the giving of particulars and the giving of

inspections and the giving, even, of discovery of documents

relevant to the trial of the action.
At this stage it is important that I say somethmg

about the general practice of the Federal Court which, in

this regard, is markedly different, as I understand it, from
t h e practice xhich has occurred in the p a s t m the %?reme
Court of Tasmania, although there may well be changes
occurring In that jurisdiction as well. In the Federal
Court, for practical purposes, any clam is made by way of

application and that is provided for in the Federal Court

Rules and the application directs the respondent to attend at
a directions hearing. In this regard there is a marked

difference between the Federal Court and Supreme Courts, not

only in Tasmania but also in other S ates.

Generally speaking, in 5upreme Courts the action is

commenced by xay uf writ vhich directs that the defendant, if

desirous of defending the claim, enter an appearance. If no appearance 1s entered there is a procedure whereby judgment can be obtained in appropriate cases but If an appearance is entered, the rules of the Supreme Cuurts contain procedures whereby the future conduct of the action depends very much

upon the activities of the legal practitluners of the
parties, namely, the procedures by way of pleadings and
matters o< that kind. The Supreme Court is available to deal
with any matter that the parties want to bring before it but
the Court itself normally does not take an active part in
those proceedings.
The Federal Court, however, is philosophically

different in nature. At the directions hearing the Court is

empowered by Order 10 to give directions as to the future
conduct of those proceedings. On one view, as a result of
directlons given, the Federal Court then takes an active part
in controlling the future conduct of those proceedings. In
this regard, it is very different from the State Supreme
Courts. I do not propose to go into detail as to what those
steps are, but, it is a new development In court management
in Australia and the Federal Court, even after some ten
years, is still developing thls concept.
One is aware that in Tasmania the amount of work in
the Federal Court is not so great as in other States and
possibly in the absence of a Judge of the Federal Court

*

actually residing in Tasmania or In Hobart, there has not been the guidance by the Court that has developed in other

States as to the procedures to be observed and the method of
control by the Court itself on the conduct of actions. The
whole purpose of this taking of control by the Court is an
aspect of vhat these days is commonly called case flow

management, a development which all courts are very conscious

of at the present time. But at the same time, in order to be

successful in its new ventures, the Federal Court depends
very much upon the co-operation of the legal profession.

Without that co-operation the Court can give directions, they

can be ignored and if that happens what follows?

.

L

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The Court is required to do justice according to

law between the parties. It must act impartially between

parties and must ensure that their claims are properly

presented and deternined. This is not a case whet-;? the =ins

of the legal profession should be visited upon their clients.

The Court has a greater duty to the litigants.

In this regard, the Court was concerned when it

heard, a short ime ago, that he parties to these
proceedlngs each sought an adjournment of the hearing of

these two actions. The Court had been assured that the

matter would be ready for trial by 2 February 1988 and as

recently as until a few days ago lt appeared that the

solicitors for both parties took the view that the actions were not ready for trial. As a result of directions given by

me to the Acting District Registrar, the letter of 22 January
1988 was sent to the parties. The purpose of that was to

enable the Court to look into the matter fully to determine

whether the adjournment should be granted or not and it is

noted that there are affidavits filed in support of a motion
that an adjournment be granted. The affidavits were from the

solicitors for Cafike and Powell respectively and each set

out in s o y detail factual material to support the motion f r
the ad]ournment of the hearing. As part of its control of

the proceedings, the Court thought it desirable that the
litigants should be present in Court to hear what I propose
to say in relation to this matter. Hence the direction that
they be present today. One is always conscious of the fact,
although I am not suggesting that it occurred in this case,

.

.

that it is very easy for practitioners to blame the Court for

delays in the hearing of an action when those delays are not caused by the Court itself but by the legal practitioners. At the same time, it must Se realised that S G ~ S cases can Le

very complex and very difficult and it is unfalr on litigants

if they are forced to proceed wlth a hearing when thelr legal
representatives are not In a position to properly represent
them at that hearing. Such a course gives rise to a feeling
of injustice by the litigant, a feeling of unfalrness and a

feeling of the fact that the Court is acting unjustly. It 1s

in this regard, as I said before, that the Court relies very
much on the goodwill, the co-operation and the competence of
legal practitioners in ensuring the proper conduct of the
proceedings.
Having said that, I come to the facts of this case.
On the material before the Court there is a very strong
reason why an ad~ournment should be granted. It appears that
there has not been a proper compliance with directions
prevlously given in this matter, both in relation to
discovery and inspection and also particulars, and if the
matters were to proceed today it may well be that one or
other or, may be both of the parties would be at a
disadvantage. The matter however has been complicated by the
fact that there has been a change of sollcltors acting for
Cafike in both these matters. The change occurred on 29
January 1988 and notice was given to the Court on 3 February
1988 and about the same time, I do not need to decide whether
it was yesterday or today, notice was given to the solicitors

.

- 7 -

for Powell. The legal advisers for Cafike now say that they are ready to proceed with the hearing and are opposing any adjournment. Counsel also say that having regard to the

letter of 22 Jazuary 1358 xritten by the Acting Distr ls t

Registrar indicatlng that the Court directed that the parties

be ready to proceed with a hearing of the actions in the
event that adjournments were not granted, the fact that
Powell now is not ready to proceed should not be a relevant

factor to consider when determining whether to grant the

adjournment or not. There is some force in that submission
but, at the same time, it is important to act justly between

the parties and having regard to the earller conduct of the

then solicitors for Cafike, I cannot give the weight to the

current position which otherwise I would have given,
especially when certain particulars of one of the claims by
Cafike have still not been given; I refer primarily to

paragraph 5 of the amended statement of claim by Caflke, even

though those particulars may well depend upon documents

inspected as the result of discovery by Powell and some of

those documents may not have been fully discovered.

I am conscious also of the fact that the delay in

hearing claims of itself can give rise to injustice and one

can assume, in a case like this, that each party, and, in
particular, Cafike, in view of the fact that it says that I
is now ready to proceed, is suffering some injustice by

delay. But at the same time I have formed the opinion that it would be unjust to force Powell to proceed with the

hearing in circumstances where it ha5 not been given
particulars of all the claims made, where one aspect of the
claim, as submitted from the bar table on behalf of Cafike,
that an amount of somewhere between $40,000 and $50,000 is
cwing as a result of non-payment uf mcaeqrs cwir,g pursuant tc

the fruit juices that had been supplied by Cafike to Powell

in the early parts of 1987, remains unpaid although It
appears there is no specific clam for those amounts.
Possibly it may come under a claim for an account or may be a
claim for damages, but from what I have seen from the

pleadings and from submissions made thls mornlng, it seems

that the real issues between the parties have not yet been

sufficiently identified to enable Powell to present its case

adequately and that the only fair thing to do as between the

parties is to give further directions as to the interlocutory
steps to be taken for trial.

This gives rise, then, to a further aspect of the practice of this Court. Normally at a dlrections hearing the

date of a further directions hearing 1 s fixed. In most
States, except in urgent cases, a date 1s not fixed for the
hearlng of the action until a directlons hearlng is held at
which the parties can assure the Court that the matter is
ready for-trial. In those circumstances, the Court can fix a
date for hearing in the firm belief that the matter will
proceed for hearing at the date fixed. In the present case
that was not done. The matter certainly was not ready for

trial on 27 October 1987 but in order to try to expedite the

hearing of the matter, directions were given for a date to be
fixed even though all interlocutory matters had not then been

.

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fully complied with. What has happened illustrates the

undesirability of adopting that course, an experience which

has been had in other States, hence the current practice.

One aspect of the control by the Court and these

directions hearings is that it often forces litigants and
their legal advisers to face up to issues at a time before
the actual hearing commences. By doing this it has been

found in other States that any possible compromise to resolve the disputes between the litigants often occurs earlier than

would otherwise happen. This is omething xhich the

litigants and their legal advisers should keep in mind,
although the Court itself plays no part In the conclliation

aspect of the matter. The Court does not want to know of any

steps in such a course, lt merely draws that to the attention
of the parties.

In all the circumstances of the case I propose to

grant the adjournment sought Powell. by In these
circumstances, I desire to hear counsel on what directions
should be given to ensure that the matter will be ready for

trial at the next directions hearing.

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