R (Cth) v Petroulias (No. 13)

[2007] NSWSC 535

CITATION:	R (Cth) v Petroulias (No. 13) [2007] NSWSC 535
HEARING DATE(S):	16 March 2007
JUDGMENT DATE :	16 March 2007
JUDGMENT OF:	Johnson J at 1
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE:	16 March 2007
DECISION:	Application by Accused to further adjourn trial is refused.
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW - application to further adjourn commencement of criminal trial - further adjournment sought for accused to secure funds for private legal representation - adjournment refused
LEGISLATION CITED:	Criminal Procedure Act 1986 Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld)
CASES CITED:	R v Petroulias (No 11) [2007] NSWSC 533 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 R v Petroulias (No. 1) [2006] NSWSC 788 R v Petroulias (No 3) (Johnson J, unreported, 6 October 2006) R v Petroulias (No. 4) (Johnson J, unreported, 19 October 2006) R v Petroulias (No. 5) [2006] NSWSC 1155 R v Petroulias (No. 6) [2006] NSWSC 1422 R v Petroulias (No. 7) [2007] NSWSC 16 R v Petroulias (No. 8) [2007] NSWSC 82 R v Petroulias (No. 9) [2007] NSWSC 84 Petroulias v R [2006] NSWCCA 415 R v Petroulias (No 12) [2007] NSWSC 534
PARTIES:	Regina (Commonwealth) (Crown) Nikytas Nicholas Petroulias (Accused)
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 2002/93
COUNSEL:	Mr P Hastings QC; Mr C Hoy (Crown) Mr R Sutherland SC; Mr G Walsh (Accused)
SOLICITORS:	Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Coadys (Accused)
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:	---
LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	---

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
CRIMINAL LIST

Johnson J

16 March 2007

2002/93 Regina (Commonwealth) v Nikytas Nicholas Petroulias (No. 13)

JUDGMENT (on further application by Accused for adjournment of the trial)

1 JOHNSON J: This is an application by the Accused for a further adjournment of a trial fixed to commence on Monday, 19 March 2007.

The Application on 2 March 2007

2 On 2 March 2007, on the application of the Accused, I adjourned the trial from 5 March 2007 until next Monday, 19 March 2007. The circumstances underlying that application, and my reasons for granting the adjournment application, appear in my judgment, R v Petroulias (No 11).

3 Put shortly, the Accused based the application upon the fact that monies were required to fund his defence and that it was expected that those funds would become available at a point of time in the near future. As part of the application, it was contended for the Accused that he had sought to make appropriate arrangements with respect to the funding of his defence, but that due to what was said to be a mistaken transfer of monies, the sum involved had ended up in the trust account of a firm of solicitors in Brisbane, Home Wilkinson Lowry, and that there was controversy as to whether those monies would be repaid by that firm.

4 The adjournment application made then, and made again today, is not brought in accordance with the principles in Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 315. The Accused is not asserting that he is indigent and that, through no fault of his own, he is unable to obtain or maintain legal representation for his trial. Rather, as I observed in paragraph 5 of R v Petroulias (No. 11), the application is based upon the proposition that an adjournment of the trial ought be allowed to permit steps to be taken to ensure that monies are available to fund his defence. Section 40 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides the broad statutory foundation for the discretionary power of the Court to adjourn a criminal trial.

5 The application on 2 March 2007 was allowed so that the Accused could facilitate an urgent application to be made to the Supreme Court of Queensland with respect to a sum of $785,000.00 said to have been paid by mistake into the account of Home Wilkinson Lowry.

Events Between July 2006 and March 2007

6 Before moving to events since 2 March 2007, it is appropriate to look back at some matters of chronology with respect to these proceedings.

7 In July 2006, I commenced the hearing of a pre-trial application in which the Accused was represented by Mr Clelland SC and Mr Livermore of counsel. On 8 August 2006, I gave judgment with respect to that application: R v Petroulias (No. 1) [2006] NSWSC 788.

8 On 15 August 2006 (PT426.15), Mr Livermore mentioned that there was doubt as to whether he and Mr Clelland SC would continue to appear for the Accused in the second group of pre-trial applications which were to proceed to hearing. Mr Livermore observed that the Accused would be likely to be in a position of trying to secure resources to fund preparations for the hearing of further pre-trial applications.

9 In circumstances revealed in my judgments R v Petroulias (No 3) of 6 October 2006, and R v Petroulias (No. 4) of 19 October 2006, the second group of pre-trial applications were adjourned on the application of the Accused. It was apparent, by that stage, that counsel previously briefed in the matter would not continue to appear for the Accused at the trial level and that other counsel were to be briefed.

10 On 21 and 28 November 2006, a trial date of 5 March 2007 was identified and flagged (PT560, 572).

11 On 28 November 2006, it is said that the sum of $785,000.00 was paid by mistake by a company, Prepaid Professional Administration Limited (“Prepaid”), to Home Wilkinson Lowry.

12 Between 6 November 2006 and 15 February 2007, I proceeded to hear a number of pre-trial applications and gave judgments with respect to those applications: R v Petroulias (No. 5) [2006] NSWSC 1155; R v Petroulias (No. 6) [2006] NSWSC 1422; R v Petroulias (No. 7) [2007] NSWSC 16; R v Petroulias (No. 8) [2007] NSWSC 82 and R v Petroulias (No. 9) [2007] NSWSC 84.

13 The evidence before me on 2 March 2007, in the form of an affidavit of Mr Coady sworn 1 March 2007, revealed that, on 31 January 2007 and 2 February 2007, the Accused informed Mr Coady that a Mr Evans, a partner of Home Wilkinson Lowry, had refused to meet with the Accused to discuss the position with respect to the sum of $785,000.00.

14 On 8 February 2007, Mr Sutherland SC for the Accused, informed the Court (PT895-896), that, although at that time there did not appear to be an impediment to the trial starting on 5 March 2007, there was a matter, as he put it, “lingering in the background” (PT895.57). Mr Sutherland SC said that the Accused’s then business activities had ceased because of investigatory action taken by a number of agencies, and that, with respect to the private funding of the trial, there was a “matter of concern with my solicitors which has not at this stage resulted in any communication to Mr Walsh or myself which would compromise our ability to proceed” (PT896.18). Mr Sutherland SC hoped that there would not be any change in that respect (PT896.20). He indicated that this was a concern which the defence legal representatives were “working to resolve” (PT896.23).

15 The evidence reveals that, on 27 February 2007, Prepaid filed a Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court of Queensland, nominating Home Wilkinson Lowry as the Defendant, seeking recovery of monies.

16 At 4.50 pm on 28 February 2007, an email from Mr Sutherland SC was received in my chambers, indicating that, at the scheduled mention the following day, a number of applications would be brought, one of which would be an application to adjourn the trial. That application was made on 1 and 2 March 2007, culminating in my judgment, R v Petroulias (No. 11).

17 As it happened, on 2 March 2007 the High Court of Australia refused the Accused special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Petroulias v R [2006] NSWCCA 415 (a decision of 24 November 2006), which was, in turn, an application for leave to appeal from my decision in R v Petroulias (No 1) [2006] NSWSC 788 (a decision of 8 August 2006).

Judgment on 2 March 2007

18 I return to my judgment of 2 March 2007, R v Petroulias (No. 11). I indicated at [25] that the Crown opposed the application, and had submitted that the prospect of recovery of funds was so uncertain that no adjournment should be allowed; that there appeared to be significant factual disputes and that it was optimistic in the extreme to expect that there would be a speedy and favourable resolution of the Queensland proceedings.

19 The Crown submitted that there appeared to be a potential further claim on the funds from the Provisional Liquidator of a company, Prescience Communications Limited (“Prescience”). I said at [28]:

“An application for adjournment made, on this type of ground and at this stage proximate to the trial, must be considered carefully. The Accused says that he wishes to be represented by counsel and solicitors who have appeared for him now, in the case of the counsel for some months and in the case of the solicitors, for some years. The prospect of a trial with the Accused unrepresented, although a hypothetical prospect at this stage, is still a prospect which I can consider, and such a process has well-known disadvantages to the criminal justice system.”

20 I determined, on balance, that an adjournment ought be allowed for two weeks. I said at [30] that the granting of such an adjournment would allow “Mr Coady’s hopes to be measured against actual events” with respect to the Queensland litigation. I observed at [31] that I would list the matter for a directions hearing one week thereafter, to assess progress. I said:

“If, in one week’s time, it seems to me that there is an uncertain and complicated future likely with respect to this issue, so that the resolution of the claim on these funds will take some considerable time, then I am not likely to be persuaded that any further adjournment of the trial should take place. I will, of course, hear any submissions or application made, but there will need to be evidence of action taken and not mere expressions of hope and expectation.”

I said at [33]:

“If it is the position that the issue is unresolved, then the Crown’s submission that this trial should proceed, whether the Accused is represented or not, will attract considerable weight given the history of this matter. I will, of course, hear any further submissions or any application that may be made, but the trial will not be delayed indefinitely.”

21 I note that the affidavit of Mr Coady sworn 1 March 2007 revealed that the fee disclosure for the purpose of this trial calculated that a sum of $300,000.00 per month would be required with a four-month estimate for the trial.

22 In accordance with my direction of 2 March 2007, the matter was mentioned before me again on 9 March 2007. In the course of a judgment given that day for the purpose of an application to vary bail, R v Petroulias (No 12), I summarised (at [3]-[8]) what the evidence revealed to be the current position with respect to the Queensland litigation. Put shortly, an application for summary judgment was to be made in the Supreme Court of Queensland on 14 March 2007. Affidavits had been sworn and filed by Prepaid in support of that application. No response had been received from the Defendant, Home Wilkinson Lowry, at that time, and the Provisional Liquidator of Prescience had not disclosed any concluded position with respect to such an application, or any claim on the sum of money which was the subject of the Prepaid litigation.

Events Since 2 March 2007

23 I stood over the matter until 2.00 pm yesterday, 15 March 2007. When the matter was called on yesterday, Mr Sutherland SC provided me with a number of documents and indicated that various events had occurred in Brisbane on the previous day. A further adjournment of the trial for two weeks was sought. Submissions advanced to a point where I formed the view that it was appropriate that evidence be before the Court with respect to the application. I stood the matter over until this morning, and a further affidavit of Mr Coady sworn today has been filed together with an affidavit of Anthony James Scott, also sworn today.

24 The following appears to be the present position with respect to progress of the Prepaid litigation in Queensland.

25 The Defendant, Home Wilkinson Lowry, filed affidavits on 13 March 2007, accompanied by documents exceeding some four thousand pages in length. Senior counsel for Prepaid formed the view, in the light of that material, that the summary judgment application was not likely to succeed, nor was it likely to be heard, in any event, on 14 March 2007. Consent orders were made by Phillipides J that day dismissing Prepaid’s application for summary judgment, referring the proceedings to a Commercial Causes Judge with a view to expediting the final hearing and determination of the proceeding, and ordering pursuing to s.12 Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) that the Defendant pay into Court the sum of $524,884.00. I am informed that that sum has not as yet been paid into Court. I am informed that application will be made today to Muir J for the purpose of fixing a directions hearing, with the view to seeking expedition and a hearing date to determine the Queensland proceedings.

26 The evidence before the Court today appears to reveal the following. The Defendant, Home Wilkinson Lowry, is pressing a claim for about $238,000.00, being the difference between the sum of $512,884.00 and $790,820.00. With respect to the sum of $512,884.00, which in accordance with the order of the Court ought be paid into Court, Home Wilkinson Lowry will not assert any claim on that fund. The Provisional Liquidator of Prescience, however, has indicated, on the evidence before me, that should an appointment be made before a Commercial Causes Judge in the Supreme Court of Queensland in accordance with the referral order of Phillipides J, the Provisional Liquidator will seek instructions. The solicitor for the Provisional Liquidator declined to say more than that his client maintained a right to the funds.

27 There is then, at this stage, a question mark over the prospects of Prepaid successfully recovering the sum of $512,884.00. The evidence indicates that Mr Scott, the solicitor for Pleroma Limited (“Pleroma”), has instructions to negotiate with the Provisional Liquidator of Prescience, with the view to the establishment of a suitable scheme of arrangement for attending to creditors of that company. It is said that, if this adjournment is allowed, negotiations will take place involving Mr Scott for Pleroma, the solicitor representing the Provisional Liquidator of Prescience, and Mr Coady representing the interests of the Accused.

28 Mr Coady said in his memorandum of 15 March 2007 (which forms part of Exhibit B), that it would be necessary for him to spend approximately two days in discussions and document drafting with the Provisional Liquidator, and a similar time for discussions, including correspondence, with Mr Scott, in order that he could “obtain preliminary binding agreements relating ultimately to the ability to apply the Queensland funds (those paid into court) to the defence of Mr Petroulias”. Mr Coady said that he would need “time to arrange court appointments and hearings to obtain court approval to the proposed scheme of arrangement and for striking out of the winding-up application” with respect to Prescience. He said, “a time of two weeks may be sufficient for those parts of the above procedure to be undertaken to the point where I have confidence that the alternative proposal will be satisfactory”.

29 It was the evidence of Mr Coady this morning that a sum of $270,000.00 presently sits in his trust account with respect to fees incurred for the defence of the Accused since 1 March 2007.

The Present Application

30 Mr Sutherland SC submits that a period of two weeks will hopefully allow resolution of outstanding issues in Queensland, and if that occurs, the sum of $500,000.00 or thereabouts can be added to the amount presently held in trust so that the solicitors for the Accused will be in a position to maintain the current brief to counsel to appear on this trial. It is said that, unless those arrangements are put into place, then instructions of counsel would be withdrawn.

31 In paragraph 10 of Mr Coady’s affidavit sworn today, he refers to instructions from the Accused that, should be lose the benefit of counsel and solicitors, his arrangements for litigation funding will probably fail and he must make arrangements to apply for legal aid. It is said that he would then need to marshal his own records so that other legal representatives could become available for the purpose of any trial. It is said that, in the event that the Accused was to represent himself, a time measured in months would be required to allow him to prepare to represent himself.

32 I raised directly with Mr Sutherland SC this morning what would happen in two weeks. In response to my question whether the trial would definitely proceed in two weeks, Mr Sutherland SC responded that those were his instructions based upon Mr Coady’s hopes, but that that involved an element of “crystal ball gazing”.

33 This trial has been scheduled for months. The pre trial applications have been on foot for months. The Accused knew, in August last year, that a further set of legal representatives would be required for this trial, his Victorian counsel apparently no being longer likely to appear, apart from in the Court of Criminal Appeal and the High Court of Australia.

34 In my judgment of 2 March 2007, I expressed concern that, if an uncertain and complicated future appeared likely with respect to this issue so that the resolution of the claim on these funds would take some considerable time, then I would not likely be persuaded that any further adjournment of the trial should take place. I noted also that the Crown’s submission that the Accused should be in a position to represent himself may attract considerable weight given the history of the matter.

35 It seems to me that there is still uncertainty, and considerable uncertainty, as to what is to occur with respect to the Queensland litigation. In reality, Mr Coady wishes to embark upon a process of negotiation with the Provisional Liquidator and Mr Scott, in the hope that a process may be reached which will see the sum of about $500,000.00 becoming available.

36 It seems unlikely, indeed most unlikely, that there will be any hearing of the Prepaid matter in the Supreme Court of Queensland in the next two weeks. There has not as yet been a directions hearing before the Commercial Causes Judge.

37 There is a public interest in a trial of a serious criminal matter proceeding without delay. The interests of the Accused must be taken into account. My duties as trial judge include the duty to, so far as possible, take steps to see that the Accused has a fair trial. There is no application presently made based upon the Dietrich principle.

38 The Crown has submitted that the trial has been put off once, and it is now sought to put it off once again on an uncertain and somewhat vague basis. It is submitted that the prospect is that, in two weeks’ time, there will be yet another application for another adjournment because more time is needed to deal with some aspect involved in the unravelling of the Queensland litigation. It is submitted that the likely scenario is that a further adjournment, and perhaps a series of adjournments extending over some time, will be sought.

39 I have given careful consideration to the matters raised on the application, including the interests of the Accused, the interests of the community and the interest of the Court in having the assistance of counsel familiar with the case appearing at trial. The concern that I have is that this application is the second chapter, of what is likely to be a volume made up of a number of chapters.

40 It is the case that a sum of $270,000.00 is now held in trust for the defence of the Accused. It is hoped that further funds will become available as a result of negotiations to be undertaken in Queensland.

41 I am not presently satisfied, on balance, given the uncertain state of the evidence, that an adjournment of two weeks will achieve the result hoped for by the Accused. I understand well my obligation to seek to ensure that the Accused has a fair trial. Insofar as that is a factor which I take into account with others in the exercise of discretion with respect to this adjournment application, I have reached the conclusion that the appropriate course is to refuse the present application.

42 I am not satisfied that an adjournment of the trial will see the result that the trial will be ready to proceed in the near future. The purpose of the application is to obtain time to ensure that funds are available. I am not satisfied that this purpose will be achieved in the near future, or indeed in the foreseeable future.

43 The application for adjournment is refused.

SUTHERLAND: I’ll need to withdraw and take some instructions, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: All right, I’ll adjourn to give you an opportunity to take some instructions. I have a Possession List call-up of 26 matters commencing at 2 o’clock which will occupy me for the entire afternoon beyond 4 o’clock, so there will be no time available to devote to this matter beyond 2. If there is any application to be made, it must be made and determined before 1 o’clock. How long do you want at this stage?

SUTHERLAND: I don’t know, your Honour. I truly don’t know.

HIS HONOUR: I’ll give you ten minutes to start with and then you might tell me what will happen from there.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT

SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I’ve come back to court as a courtesy to your Honour, simply to indicate that in light of your Honour’s direction I’m told by Mr Coady that my instructions will be withdrawn and I think he will appear before your Honour at the moment. Mr Coady will seek to appear before your Honour at the moment. Would your Honour excuse me.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Sutherland. Yes, Mr Coady.

COADY: Your Honour, I don’t think it’s incorrect for me to say that in discussions with Mr Sutherland, and he having spoken with Mr Walsh, believes that they are ethically required not to commence a trial where there instructions won’t be withdrawn halfway through the trial. That creates the dilemma that we must make the decision to withdraw instructions at this point in time. I appear on behalf of Mr Petroulias at this stage and just simply make an application for an adjournment of this matter for one week to enable us to consider his position and to endeavour to create some semblance of order out of what we would say on our side of the bar table is now chaos.

HIS HONOUR: Well are you applying on the basis that he’s going to make an application for legal aid?

COADY: I’m making an application now for an adjournment for a week.

HIS HONOUR: So that he can apply for legal aid?

COADY: That will be one of the matters that will be undertaken, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: So there is going to be an application for legal aid, is that so?

COADY: No, I’m not saying that, your Honour. My enquiries have revealed that there is little chance that he would get legal aid and I don’t want to be caught up in unnecessary applications. However, enquiries will be made as to those matters and if there is any potential, yes, that would be done. I don’t believe that anything further need be said because all of the material relating to the difficulty of changeover and of the matters as to certainty or otherwise of the Queensland matters have already been canvassed before your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: So what are the steps that will be taken if a one-week adjournment is granted?

COADY: I’ll go away and sit with counsel and seek their assistance, and I’ll discuss the matters with Mr Petroulias.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Petroulias will prepare himself for a trial?

COADY: Yes, that will be certainly one of the alternatives he will consider.

HIS HONOUR: Will he do that?

COADY: He’s already said through me on affidavit that it would take some time for him to prepare for trial. He will do what he can as one of the matters that we wish to consider over the next week.

HIS HONOUR: Has he taken any steps in the last two weeks to prepare for a trial at which he may appear for himself?

COADY: No, your Honour. There has been an expectation on his part that he would be able to continue with his legal advisers. The task of preparing for trial is a task which would be far greater than the period of time that’s been available in the last two weeks.

HIS HONOUR: Insofar as there is an indication that there may be little chance that he will get legal aid--

COADY: That’s my belief.

HIS HONOUR: --you are telling me that it is his desire nevertheless to explore that possibility and have a decision?

COADY: That’s one, but more predominantly is his concern and my concern on his part to find the capacity to re engage counsel and to maintain his existing solicitors. It’s our view that this would expedite the matter far better from the public interest, far better from the point of view of long trials, and would avoid any inconvenience or uncertainty for the court and for Mr Petroulias at a later time.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Crown, what’s the crown response?

CROWN PROSECUTOR: Your Honour, I’m a little uncertain as to the basis upon which the adjournment is being made. If it is on the basis, as I understood Mr Coady indirectly averting to towards the end of what he just said of pursuing the arrangements which have already been canvassed for the purposes of securing funds to enable counsel to appear, then I would object, oppose the adjournment for the reasons that your Honour has already given in your judgment. If however the week is being sought to enable alternative representation to be made by Mr Coady or by the Accused himself, then my objection is less firm.

However, can I just add to the equation the fact that in reality what will happen I expect is following the empanelment of the jury, I will open for two days I expect, which is what I spent last time opening. I understood what Mr Coady said at the beginning of his application was that he had in mind as I thought he said restoring some order to the defence position, which I assume to be a reference to getting documents together to enable preparation to be made for the defence of the Accused at the trial. Some of that of course could be done in the course of the opening, or alternatively your Honour might I suppose entertain the application for a week on the basis that that week will be spent putting in place alternative arrangements for Mr Petroulias’ defence, either by Mr Coady or the Accused himself, marshalling the documents and the other material necessary to conduct the defence. If the application is simply back on the old secure funding basis, then I would oppose it.

HIS HONOUR: One way forward which is possible is to adjourn the matter for a week, to bring the matter back before me at 10.00 am next Wednesday, so that I am told if there has been an application for legal aid made and, if so, whether it has been determined. It may be that if that occurs and if there is an application for legal aid, that in accordance with the practice that often occurs where this situation occurs in this court, an officer of the Legal Aid Commission may attend court to tell the court what’s happening. That is if the legal aid application is taken up. Otherwise, if there is no application for legal aid made and if none is to be made, then the purpose of mentioning the matter on Wednesday would be so that the court is so informed and to note that the matter will proceed the following week, namely on the 26th.

Insofar as it is said that the Accused has not taken steps to prepare for the trial in the last two weeks, whatever his perception may have been, despite what was said in the judgment, then he will be in a position to undertake some steps in the next week. A week at this stage it seems to me to be fair, but it is not just a week, it would seem to me on an open-ended basis that it’s a week for the Accused to more or less consider his position. It is a week in which, if there is to be an application for legal aid, it will be made, not just made but pursued expeditiously and with an expectation on Wednesday the 21st that the court would be informed of what’s happening in that respect, and otherwise confirmation that the Accused, if he is to be unrepresented, taking steps to prepare for trial.

I acknowledge what you say, that there is some generality about the basis of the application, but I have sought to give some particularity as to what I would see as being the steps to be undertaken, and it seems to me in circumstances where the ruling was made this morning, if there is to be an application for legal aid made, the Accused should have an opportunity to make it promptly and expeditiously, and although Mr Coady may have a pessimistic view as to the outcome, if the Accused wishes to make it, it will be a matter for him.

Mr Coady, in the light of what I have said, do you want to say anything further?

COADY: The only thing your Honour is if it’s going to be a week, could I ask you to make the mention on Friday?

HIS HONOUR: No. The problem with that is it may as well be the Monday. I will make it Tuesday. I will make it no later than Thursday. What I want to do is to not have a situation where what happens on the next occasion is another adjournment application. I don’t want the next appearance to be the sitting day immediately preceding the commencement of what would be the commencement of the trial.

COADY: Part of the difficulty with bridging the time between mentions is that that means that those of us who are assisting on other matters may have to truncate other activities to be able to be prepared and ready for the application on that--

HIS HONOUR: Mr Coady, I’m sorry. The Accused is to face trial in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for serious criminal charges.

COADY: Your Honour, I don’t challenge--

HIS HONOUR: I don’t think I need to say that. And the Supreme Court has been waiting for some time. Arrangements were made. More than 200 citizens in this State have been affected. Certainty is needed. Now if you want to make a submission it should be Tuesday or Wednesday or Thursday. It will be no later than 9.30 on Thursday if it’s Thursday.

COADY: My application is for Thursday, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Do you have anything to say about that, Mr Crown?

CROWN PROSECUTOR: No, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I don’t propose to deliver a separate and detailed judgment unless the parties wish me to do. It will be sufficiently clear - perhaps I should ask, is a further judgment required by the parties or is it sufficient that what I have said and the reasons for my approach will be clear in the transcript?

COADY: Yes, your Honour.

CROWN PROSECUTOR: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I propose to grant a one week adjournment to the Accused with respect to the trial and, as indicated in exchanges with counsel and Mr Coady, the purpose of the adjournment is to allow the Accused, who is now faced with my ruling this morning, with an opportunity, if he so wishes to make an application for legal aid, expeditiously and without delay, and to otherwise undertake preparation for the trial. I observe in any event that the Accused, if this trial had not been adjourned, would have been here every day at court devoted totally to this trial for the last two weeks. It is my expectation that he should be devoting himself entirely to the preparation for this trial. I am somewhat surprised that he is not to some extent ready having regard to what was said previously. So there will be an adjournment for one week.

I will therefore direct that the trial date be vacated from 19 March 2007 and I fix the trial to commence on 26 March 2007. I direct that the matter be listed before me at 9.30 am on Thursday 22 March 2007. If the Accused proposes to make an application for legal aid, I would expect that the application will be made promptly, and if it has not been determined by 22 March 2007 I would expect some explanation as to the state of the application. The court would be greatly assisted, if an application is made, by the attendance of a solicitor from the indictable section of the Legal Aid Commission to explain the status of that application, if an application is made and it is not resolved by then.

THE ACCUSED’S BAIL IS CONTINUED UNTIL 9.30 AM ON 22 MARCH 2007.
Is there any other matter?

CROWN PROSECUTOR: No, your Honour.

STOOD OVER TO THURSDAY 22 MARCH 2007 AT 9.30 AM

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