R and R - [2003] FMCAfam 234

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

R & R

[2003] FMCAfam 234

FAMILY LAW – Property settlement – contribution – assessment of initial contribution – post separation contribution – section 75(2) factors.

Family Law Act 1975, ss.75(2); 79

Ferraro (1992) 16 Fam LR 1; (1993) FLC 92-335

McLay (1996) 20 Fam LR 239;FLC 92-667
Lee Steere (1985) 10 Fam LR 341; FLC 91-626
Farnell (1996) 20 Fam LR 513; FLC 92-681
Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844
Harris (1991) FLC 92-254
Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605; 9 Fam LR 449; FLC 91-507
Williams (1984) 9 Fam LR 789; FLC 91-541
Clauson (1995) 18 Fam LR 693; FLC 92-595

Applicant:

MMR

Respondent:

TER

File No:

PAM 2029 of 2002

Delivered on:

28 May 2003

Delivered at:

Parramatta

Hearing date:

28 May 2003

Judgment of:

Scarlett FM

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Mr Bullock
Ian Bullock Partners

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr Thistleton

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Beilby Wager Solicitors

ORDERS

Within three (3) months of the date of the making of these Orders the Applicant wife is to:
(a)Pay to the Respondent husband the sum of $114,628.00; and
(b)Do all things necessary to discharge the existing mortgage to St. George Bank Limited secured on the property known as
43 F Street, FD in the State of New South Wales being the land in folio identifier 2/2312406 and indemnify the husband in respect of all amounts to the said St. George Bank.
Simultaneously with compliance by the wife with Order 1 above the husband is to do all things and sign all documents and instruments necessary to transfer to the wife all of his right title and interests in the said property.
The wife is to pay all outgoings in respect of the said property and keep indemnified the husband in respect of such outgoings.
The husband is to pay all moneys owing by him to the Australian Taxation Office and to MasterCard in respect of his credit card liability and keep the wife indemnified in respect of such liabilities.
The husband is declared to be the absolute owner of the watercolour painting of a creek scene purchased in 1995 and the Kauri pine chest of drawers.
The wife is declared to be the absolute owner of the bookcase with glass doors purchased in 1996.
The Applicant and the Respondent are to do all acts and things and give all consents and execute all documents and instruments to give effect to these Orders.
In the event that either party refuses or neglects to execute any deed or instrument necessary to give effect to these Orders within ten (10) working days of being requested to do so, the Registrar of the Federal Magistrates Court is appointed pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 to execute such deed or instrument in the name of such party and do all acts and things necessary to give validity to the operation to the deed or instrument.
The Applicant and the Respondent are declared to have the sole right, title and interest in:
(a)All chattels, goods, furnishings, motor vehicles and other property in their respective possession; and
(b)All moneys, shares, debentures, insurances standing in their respective sole names at the date of the Orders.
The application is adjourned to Monday 1 September 2003 at 2.00pm for further submissions.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
PARRAMATTA

PAM 2029 of 2002

MMR

Applicant

And

TER

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Application

The application before the Court is an application by the wife for settlement of property matters between the parties. The complication in these proceedings relates to certain superannuation assets and at this stage the relevant information that is now required as a result of the change in legislation regarding some of the superannuation is not available or certainly was not available at the time of hearing, which was last Friday. I understand that this material is expected to become available within a matter of a few weeks.
Accordingly, it was proposed that I should proceed to hear the application in respect of the other assets which include real estate and other items of personalty and that the question of superannuation should be left for another day.
I proceeded to do that and I have heard evidence from both the applicant and the respondent and I have heard submissions from

Mr Bullock for the applicant and Mr Thistleton for the respondent.
What the applicant wife seeks are orders that she pay to the husband a sum of $100,000 and do the necessary things to discharge the existing mortgage on the former matrimonial home at 43 F Street, FD and that the husband should transfer his interest in the former matrimonial home to her. The wife seeks that the husband should be responsible for a line of credit from St George Bank; that the husband should be responsible for moneys owing to the Australian Taxation Office and for a MasterCard Debt; and that otherwise the parties should retain the real and personal property, although of course with the exception of superannuation, that they currently hold.
The respondent husband seeks an order for the sale of the former matrimonial home at 43 F Street, FD and that after payment of expenses and costs on sale and the discharge of the mortgage and the repayment of certain debts that the balance be distributed in the ratio of 60 per cent to the applicant wife and 40 per cent to the respondent husband. Until the property is sold, the husband seeks that the wife should continue to pay the mortgage. The husband sought an order that he be declared the sole owner of an antique chest of drawers, although that application was varied to include not just the chest of drawers but a watercolour painting which was purchased in approximately 1995 showing the scene of a creek. Otherwise he seeks that the parties should retain the personal items that they currently hold.
The parties are 55 and 54 years of age. They commenced cohabitation at some stage in the first half or the middle of 1988. They were married on 27 August of that year. The wife hails from Ireland and had spent some time on a working holiday to Australia. There are two children of the marriage; H who was born on 19 February 1989 and M who was born on 28 December 1990.
The wife is employed in the nursing profession and indeed has qualifications in that profession which give her some seniority. She is a senior nurse educator. Apart from the time off to have children she has worked constantly in that profession and works in that profession today.
The husband worked as a commission salesman, he became a full time student and completed a Diploma of Education in an attempt to obtain employment as a teacher. He worked as a teacher. He has a science degree, he worked as a science teacher but found teaching a stressful profession, which indeed it can be, and was informed that he was not going to obtain the requisite certificate. He left the teaching profession, obtained part time work as a salesman and had periods when he was without employment and after discussions between the parties it transpired that the wife continued her employment in the nursing profession and the husband devoted a considerable amount of his time to the care of the children and acting as a homemaker.
There are disagreements between the parties as to the extent of the husband's contribution and indeed there are disagreements between the parties as to whether or not there was an agreement that the parties should fill those roles in the marriage or whether it was forced upon them by necessity. The wife, in evidence before me, commented somewhat wryly that her employment was more reliable and produced a more reliable income.
The parties separated in late July or mid-July 2000. The two children remained living with the wife in the former matrimonial home. The children are still at school, although there was some conjecture as to how long the elder child H would remain at school. He was a child who has experienced some difficulties in life and there was evidence tendered before me relating to such difficulties, that evidence being in the form of a discharge summary from R at H Road, C.
The upshot of the proceedings in respect of H is that it is believed by both parents that it is unlikely he will remain in school after the end of next year. It is unlikely that he will remain on to complete his Higher School Certificate but, that he will seek employment in the workforce, although there is some doubt expressed as to how readily he will be able to find employment. The wife commented, wryly again, in her evidence that it was difficult to ascertain at this stage exactly what this child's talents are. In any event, both children remain residing with the wife.
The matters that are in issue between the parties relate to the extent of the initial contribution by the respective parties; the weight that should be applied to contributions made during the marriage; the extent of contributions post separation; and whether, as there has been an initial imbalance in the contributions, whether that has eroded to any significant degree or what weight should be given to it now.
There is also an issue between the parties as to whether the discretionary factors under section 75(2) favour the wife or the husband. In dealing with applications to vary property interests Courts exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act must not make an order under the provisions of section 79 unless satisfied that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to make that order; sub-section (2) of section 79 makes that clear. Subsection (4) of section 79 sets out a number of matters the Court must take into account. They include the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the marriage, any property of the parties to the marriage; the contribution other than the financial contribution made directly or indirectly or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child; the contribution made by a party to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent; the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party of the marriage; the relevant matters referred to in section 75(2) and any other order made under the Family Law Act effecting a party or child of the marriage; any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989.
In dealing with applications under section 79 the Full Court of the Family Court has made it clear there are three steps to be followed by a Court, which includes the Federal Magistrates Court. First, the Court must identify the property of the parties and ascertain its net value. Second, the Court must examine and evaluate the contributions of the parties following the principles set out in sections 79(4)(a) to (c). And third, the Court must then consider the relevant factors set out in section 75(2). This may involve an adjustment in favour of one of the parties. Once that has been done a fourth step is for the Court to satisfy itself that the order that is proposed to be made is just and equitable.
The three step approach as it is called has been laid down by the Full Court of the Family Court in a number of cases, including Ferraro1 and McLay2, Le Steere3 and others.
1 (1992) 16 Fam LR 1; (1993) FLC 92-335
2 (1996) 20 Fam LR 239; FLC 92-667
3 (1985) 10 Fam LR 431; FLC 91-626
I turn first of all to the question of the matrimonial assets. The assets are the former matrimonial home at 43 F Street, FD. There is an agreed value of $560,000. There is a Ford Festiva motor car currently held by the wife of a value of $9000. The wife has a bank account with the St George Bank. There has been an amount read back into that asset representing money held on account of the wife's prospective legal costs so that the value for these proceedings I take to be $5500. There is also an account that the wife had with the Bank of Ireland. There was no immediate value as to the exchange rate between Australian dollars and Irish pounds but Mr Thistleton of counsel submitted that an overall value of some $3400 would be appropriate. The husband has a significantly smaller account with the National Australia Bank valued at approximately $450. This brings about a gross total of $578,350.
There are liabilities to be taken into account and there is some issue as to what some of those liabilities were. The uncontroversial liabilities include the mortgage to the St George Bank in the sum of $43,285;

a line of credit with St George Bank in the sum of $15,234. Those amounts were uncontroversial. There were several other amounts which were referred to. There was a debt to M & A for $450 which I understand has now been paid. There is a debt of some $4000 to the husband's brother which I understand to be a post separation debt and one I therefore do not take into account. The two controversial debts are the husband's tax debt of $11,968 owed to the Australian Taxation Office and the husband's MasterCard account of $1904. Mr Bullock on behalf of the wife submitted these are amounts that the husband should bear the sole liability for, that he had the opportunity and the wherewithal to resolve those amounts but did not do so.
Mr Thistleton as I understand his submission submits that they are matters that should be taken into account as they were debts incurred during the marriage. The taxation debt arose from an unfortunate situation when the husband was working on a commission basis as a salesman that he would be paid commission in respect of the savings plan that was being sold but when people did not continue with the plan the then employer demanded a refund of the commission. The husband in his affidavit proposed the fact that as he was not then employed as a commission salesman he could not claim a credit back against tax and ended up with this tax liability which he said the wife would not allow to be paid out of joint funds.
The situation as I see it is that these two amounts were debts that were incurred during the marriage and I am of the view that I should include them. This would take the total of the liabilities that I should consider to $72,409. By deducting the liabilities of $72,409 from the gross total of $578,350 I arrive at a figure of $505,941. I find the net value of the matrimonial assets to be therefore $505,941.
The question of contributions by the parties pursuant to section 79(4) is a matter of some issue between the parties. I have set out the matters previously that the Court is required to take into account.
I have looked at the amounts which the parties’ say that they initially contributed. There is some issue taken by the wife as to the extent of the husband's contributions but in any event, it is clear that there was a significant imbalance of contribution early in the marriage on the side of the wife. The contributions that I find are the wife's savings of $23,000; the Ireland voluntary superannuation fund of $25,000; an Irish life policy of $10,000; an income tax refund again from Ireland of a value of $10,000; the sale of a motor vehicle in Ireland of some $10,000. In February 1991 the wife cashed in a second policy which brought in $19,171.39. The wife also sold some real estate in Ireland for some AU$37,000-odd of which $35,000 was paid off the mortgage on the then matrimonial home. The extent of the wife's contribution initially I find to be some $132,171.39.
The husband says that at the commencement of the marriage he had a Holden Torana motor vehicle worth $5000; furniture, furnishings and personal effects to the value of $2000; and about $30,000 in savings which had come from the sale of items of real estate including a hobby farm at M. The wife gave evidence she did not recall the husband having that amount of money. The husband said that he did. I am of the view that I should accept that the husband did have that amount of money or something like that. The fact that the wife does not recall it does not indicate that the money was not there and I note that the wife has been assiduous in documenting her amounts but the husband is unlikely to have made that up. I am of the view that the initial contribution by the husband should be seen in the sum of $37,000.
As I indicated earlier, that represents still a substantial imbalance between the initial contributions by the parties at the commencement of the marriage. The husband through his counsel submits that the initial contributions – and it is conceded there was this imbalance – 24 per cent to the husband, 76 per cent to the wife. Mr Bullock for the wife says that the contributions favoured her, initially 80 per cent to 20 per cent.
I am mindful that one need not in fact one is exhorted not to undertake a precise mathematical exercise but it would appear to me that the approximate ratio of the contributions between husband and wife on an initial basis falls squarely between the positions submitted to me on behalf of the parties. I am of the view that the wife's initial contribution would be seen at about 78 per cent and the husband's at approximately 22 per cent.
As to the contributions during the period of cohabitation, it is clear that apart from time off on maternity leave with the children the wife otherwise had a steady employment in the nursing profession resulting in a steady income. The wife had obtained, as I said, further qualifications and now has a position of some responsibility and indeed, in the course of her employment, has from time to time been required and been able to travel to conferences in other States and indeed in other parts of the world.
The husband's employment as I have earlier set out has been more of a sporadic nature. The career change into the teaching profession was sadly unsuccessful, a matter of some regret, and I take judicial notice of the fact that there is and there has been a shortage of science teachers, certainly in the State of New South Wales. I have no doubt it would have been highly desirable if the husband had been able to continue as a science teacher. Regrettably, that was not to be. The husband did devote a considerable amount of time to the care of the children when they were younger and attended to a variety of household tasks. There is no immediate agreement as to the amount of tasks that were done but I am certainly mindful of the views expressed by the High Court of Australia in their decision in Mallet which I think was reported in (1984) 156 CLR 605, that contribution as a homemaker should not be underestimated and the contribution by a homemaker of either sex is one which should be given appropriate weight.
It would seem to me that the contributions by the parties in the roles that they had during the period of cohabitation should be seen as approximately 50/50. The husband was working for some of the time in various forms of employment; he had a business venture called Good Lookin' Renovations, which has now ceased to be; he did spend time at home dealing with the children and looking after the household. I am satisfied that an approximate 50/50 split at that time for during that period of time would be appropriate.
The parties separated about the end of June or into July. The husband left the former matrimonial home, he is now indeed boarding with his brother in a two bedroom flat in the Eastern Suburbs of Sydney. The children remained and remain with the wife in the former matrimonial home. The wife says that no child support was paid except for one payment of $1300 which arrived out of the blue, so to speak, and without explanation on 23 December last year. I have no doubt that amount was welcomed when it was received but if one were to spread that out over the period of time when the parties were separate and the children were with the wife, it comes down to about $37 per month, which would indicate that the wife would have financially shouldered by far the lion's share of the costs of supporting the children from separation up to now.

The situation is quite clear and the decision in Williams (1984)

9 Fam LR 789; FLC 91-541 is the authority that post separation contribution by a party to the care of the children is a matter to be taken into account under section 79(4) of the Act and it seems to me that there is an imbalance of contribution in favour of the wife.
There was a period of cohabitation of approximately 12 years. What weight now should the Court give to the initial contributions of the parties which was heavily weighted in favour of the wife? I have been referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Family Court in the matter of Pierce (1998) 24 Fam LR 377; FLC 92-844. That was a matter where there had been an imbalance in contribution between the parties that substantially favoured the husband. There was a period of cohabitation from 1986 through to 1996 and the two children of that marriage resided with the husband. The trial Judge was found to have erred in his assessment of the contribution of the parties in that he failed to attach sufficient weight to the greater initial contributions of the husband and also to his post separation contribution in caring for the children. The result that emerged was that the trial Judge's weighting of the contribution which his Honour placed 45 per cent in favour of the husband was found to be unreasonable and plainly unjust. The Full Court re-exercised the discretion in that case and reassessed the contributions as 70 per cent to the husband and 30 per cent to the wife and then made a further adjustment in respect of section 75(2) factors.
In this case, I have previously found that the initial contributions favoured the wife to the extent of 78 per cent to 22 per cent; I found that there was an approximately equal contribution during the 12 odd years of cohabitation and I have found a substantial imbalance in favour of the wife in respect of the post separation contribution relating to caring for the children over a period of approximately just under three years.
I am of the view that taking those matters into account and accepting the guidance of the Full Court of the Family Court in the decision in Pierce that I should now assess the contributions of the parties as favouring the wife to the extent of 70 per cent and therefore 30 per cent to the husband.
I now turn to the factors that are required to be considered under

section 75(2) of the Family Law Act. The wife is aged 55 years; she was born on 4 March 1948. The husband I gather, was born on

28 August 1949, he is still 53. I think I mistakenly said 54 earlier.

I correct myself, he would still appear to be 53 years of age at this stage. The wife appears to be in good health.
The husband is currently suffering from Bell's palsy and has produced a certificate from Dr R F who I understand to be a general practitioner who indicates that he is currently recovering from Bell's palsy. Dr F says in his certificate that recent EMG and nerve conduction studies confirm axonal damage which his body may or may not repair. It was apparent when the husband gave evidence that he still suffers from Bell's palsy in that he showed symptoms of a slight drop in the features to the right side of the face and some slurring of his words. I make no claim to medical expertise at all except that Bell's palsy is a not uncommon condition in Australia and all of us in our experience of life have no doubt seen people who have suffered from that condition. Mostly they appear to recover from it but it is inconvenient and unpleasant whilst it occurs and can take some while for a person to recover from. The husband is recovering from it. He may well recover fully or there may well be some residual problem.
I look at the question of the income of the parties, their property and their financial resources and their physical and mental capacity for gainful employment.
The wife has and has had the greater capacity for gainful employment. As I said, she referred to her income as being more reliable and it would appear to me that at her age she has many productive years left in the nursing profession. It has been said in a number of decisions not least in the leading case of Clauson (1995) 18 Fam LR 693; FLC

92-595 that often the greatest asset that a party can take out of a marriage is an earning capacity. The comment is often applied to men but in this case it can be seen that the wife has taken any earning capacity with her and as I said, she should be in a position to work in the nursing profession for a number of years.
The husband's history of earning has been a chequered history. He has had periods of unemployment, periods of part time employment, an eventual unsuccessful foray into the teaching profession, a renovating business which has foundered, and worked from time to time as a commission salesman. That work appeared to pick up and indeed he spent a period of time recently in the State of Tasmania where he appeared to make a significant income, approximately $9000 over a period of about three months, although that work has come to an end.

I am of the view that the husband has a working capacity, an earning capacity. It may well be sporadic and it does not appear to be, certainly based on the evidence before me, as consistent and as rewarding as that held by the wife.
The wife has the care and control of the two children of the marriage; Hugh, who was born 19 February 1989 and M who was born on

28 December 1990. As I mentioned earlier, H has had some difficulties which has resulted in his having depressive symptoms and has an occupational therapy involvement from 1992, a difficulty with social skills, a diagnosis of a mild major depression, secondary to school bullying and social skill deficits.
He has not had a happy career at school and does not appear to be applying himself enthusiastically to his studies and he is unlikely to make his way through to the higher school certificate. He has been assessed as not meeting the full criteria for Asperger's disorder. He has had a minor occurrence of depressive symptoms. It does not appear that it will be easy for him if he leaves school at the end of Year 10 to fall readily into well paid employment. The father expressed the view in evidence that he might be able to get a job as a trainee manager with KFC Chicken. That may perhaps be optimistic, certainly from reading through exhibit 1 and from hearing the mother's rather gloomy comments. It may well be that H on leaving school might find some difficulty in immediately obtaining employment which would require some assistance from his mother in his upkeep.
In any event, the child M will not be 18 for another five and a half years. The evidence would appear to me that she will go on to complete the higher school certificate, so for that length of time M is certainly going to require support from the mother. The likelihood of a significant degree of support from the father on the present history does not appear great.
Neither party is supporting anyone else at this stage. Neither party is in receipt of a pension or a superannuation benefit. The husband is now boarding with his brother in a two bedroom unit in the eastern suburbs. It is relatively cramped conditions and indeed the mother has commented on the father not having the children for overnight contact on very many occasions since the parties separated. The husband's indicated that if the children do stay overnight in the two bedroom flat, that it is very cramped and his brother, who is an older man, finds that very difficult and the husband does not have the resources at this stage for the children to spend a great amount of time with him for overnight contact.
It certainly appears on the evidence before me that the husband's standard of living has already dropped and is unlikely to improve significantly in the immediate future.
For the wife, it would appear that the only way in which she can maintain a standard of living that approximates what has occurred during the marriage is if she remains in the former matrimonial home. It is certainly before me that the wife wishes to remain in the former matrimonial home, and wishes to be given the opportunity to buy out the husband's interest.
Neither party appears to be cohabiting with anyone else. The husband apparently has a girlfriend but does not reside with her. As the marriage seems to be well and truly over there is no reason why either party should not have a girlfriend or a boyfriend but certainly on the evidence before me neither party is residing with any other person in any way that is of significance.
The matters in sections 75(2)(h), (j) and (k) do not appear to be relevant. Section 75(2)(n) does not appear to be relevant.
The question of child support is a matter that I must take into account. At this stage it appears to me that, looking at the evidence of one payment of $1300 of child support over just under three years and the husband's current working capacity, the likelihood of significant child support or regular child support payments in the immediate future over the next three to five years does not appear to be great. That is a matter that I will take into account on the behalf of the wife.
There appear to be no other circumstances I should consider. This is not a matter, and certainly section 75(2) matters are not matters where the Court makes a precise mathematical computation. It is very much a discretionary matter. It seems to me that the section 75(2) factors tend to favour the wife. There is certainly authority that where you have got a situation where one party has the care of the children and there are a number of years to go, that quite a significant adjustment is often made. If the children are considered by themselves and there is a considerable period of time to go, 15 to 20 or even 25 per cent may be seen as a suitable adjustment.
In this case, I am not of a view that section 75(2) factors should be given that degree of weight. I note that in Pierce the Full Court, having regard to the circumstances took the view that although there were two school aged children residing with the father that a 5 per cent adjustment was appropriate in the circumstances. I am of the belief that a greater adjustment than that is called for but there are certainly some factors which favour the husband. My overall assessment would be a 10 per cent weighting for section 75(2) factors.
That would bring a final calculation between the parties into consideration. Mr Thistleton of counsel referred me to an extremely interesting decision in the matter of Harris v Harris (1991) FLC 92-254. There was quote there from an English decision called Davey v Lee (1990):
The Court is required to make a holistic value judgment in the exercise of the discretionary power of a very general kind
I must look at the circumstances and look at whether the division that I propose to make or any adjustment I propose to make is just and equitable. Taking all of these considerations into account certainly the findings that I have made will see the wife end up with the bulk of the assets and the husband ending up with an amount of money. He is currently boarding with his brother. It may well be that with an amount of money he will be able to find better accommodation or more spacious accommodation. He may want to stay with his brother, he may like the company. I am satisfied however that it is just and equitable for me to make an order whereby the assets are divided as to the balance of 80 per cent to the wife and 20 per cent to the husband.
The net assets; I arrived at a figure of $505,941. The husband's share being 20 per cent comes to $101,188. The wife's share comes to $404,753. The wife's entitlement therefore will comprise the real estate at 43 F Street, FD valued at $560,000; the Ford Festiva motor vehicle valued at $9000; the Bank of Ireland account valued at $3400; the St George bank account with a notional value of $5500, coming to a total of $577,500.
As to the liabilities, the mortgage to St George on the house of $43,785 would come off that. I am of a belief that the line of credit moneys should also be the wife's responsibility, in the figure of $15,234, bringing a total liability of $58,519. That would mean a payment to the husband of $114,628.
The husband's entitlement will comprise the payment by the wife of $114,628; his account with the National Australia Bank in the sum of $450,000, making a gross total of $115,078 less the liabilities of the MasterCard of $1904 and the tax debt of $11,986, getting back to the figure that I have calculated of $101,188.
The orders therefore that I propose to make are those set out at the commencement of these Reasons.
It has come to my notice that I have not given my reasons for the order declaring the husband to be the absolute owner of the watercolour painting of a creek scene and the Kauri pine chest of drawers. My reasons for that are that the husband made a request for those items in his affidavit and the wife conceded; she had no objection to that. In her evidence she said she had no objection to his taking the paintings and the Kauri pine chest of drawers. She objected to his taking the bookcase with the glass doors. She said:
They are the two best pieces in the house and I would like to retain one of them. Ideally I would like the chest of drawers but he [meaning the husband] desperately wants it.
We will need an adjournment so that the superannuation issues can be dealt with and I think that is going to be some weeks off.
At this stage, we are adjourned until Monday, 1 September, 2:00pm for submissions.
Both parties’ costs are reserved.

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM

Associate: S. Polley

Date: 26 June 2003