QX03/5 and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services
[2003] AATA 1254
•12 December 2003
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 1254
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2003/334
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re QX03/5 Applicant
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Dr EK Christie, Member Date12 December 2003
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The decision under review is set aside and in substitution therefor the Tribunal decides that the debt due to the Commonwealth be waived to the extent FTB/FA entitlements received by the applicant over the relevant period have been disbursed to the applicant's daughter. The Tribunal decision is subject to a direction that the applicant establish the amount of such disbursements to the satisfaction of the respondent. (Sgd) EK Christie
Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – benefits and entitlements - family tax benefit - entitlement - recovery of overpayments - waiver of debt - special circumstances - meaning of "day-to-day care"
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999, s 21 and s 22
A New Tax System (Family Assistance)(Administration) Act 1999 s 101
Re Callaghan and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1996) 45 ALD 435
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Field (1989) 25 FCR 425
Re QX03/2 and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 144REASONS FOR DECISION
12 December 2003 Dr EK Christie, Member 1. This is an application by the applicant to review a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“the SSAT”), made on 1 April 2003, that an amount of $3,555.59 paid to him as Family Tax Benefit over the period 1 January 2000 to 23 October 2003 (“the relevant period”) were overpayments of social security benefits and so a debt due to the Commonwealth which had to be repaid.
2. At the hearing the applicant represented himself. Ms H Wallis-Dunn, a Departmental Advocate, represented the respondent.
3. At the hearing the Tribunal had in evidence before it documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the “T” Documents, Exhibit 1) and the various documents tendered by the parties.
Issues To Be Decided
4. The only issues for the Tribunal to decide were:
(a)whether a debt was due to the Commonwealth in terms of the applicant being qualified for payments of family allowance (“FA”) and family tax benefit (“FTB”) for his daughter (Pamela) after she stopped living with him; and
(b)whether the debt could be waived, in part or in full, under the “special circumstances” provision of the legislation.
5. In response to a Tribunal question during the hearing, the applicant stated that he had an ongoing psychiatric condition which necessitated periods of hospitalisation at times. Accordingly, at the end of the hearing, the Tribunal exerted its inquisitorial powers and sought opinion evidence from the treating psychiatrist of the applicant as to the extent his psychiatric condition would affect his ability to make rational, logical or cogent decisions in relation to managing his daily affairs. The Tribunal received a report by Dr S Huntsman on 11 August 2003. Submissions in response to this expert opinion were invited and were received from the respondent on 1 September 2003.
Facts
6. At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that the following facts, listed by the respondent in its Statement of Facts and Contentions, were not in dispute – except for one qualification (see paragraph 7):
“1.[The applicant] was in receipt of FA and then FBT in respect of his daughter, Pamela from at least 9.8.1999 (T37).
2.On 18 October 2002, [the applicant] completed a form advising that Pamela had left his care at the end of 1999 (T14, p44).
3.Centrelink raised several debts in [the applicant’s] name:
(a)$1887.69 from 1.7.2000 to 30.6.2001, raised in March 2002, because of a change in [the applicant’s] family income (T12);
(b)$1363.95 from 1.7.2001 to 23.10.2002 because Pamela was not in his care in that period (T22) – this was recalculated to $1352.67 (T27); and
(c)$315.23 from 1.1.2000 to 30.6.2000 because Pamela was not in his care in that period (T36).
4.[The applicant] requested a review of the decision on 31.10.2002 (T23 & T24).
5.On 12.11.2002, the Original Decision Maker advised [the applicant] that she had affirmed the decision to raise a debt of FTB (T27).
6.The Authorised Review Officer reconsidered the issue and decided that the debts should have been raised from 1.1.2000 and so increased the debt by $315.23. She also reduced the $1363.95 debt to $1352.67 (T31, p75 – 78).
7.On 14.1.2003, the ARO advised [the applicant] of her decision (T33).
8.On 23.1.2003, [the applicant] appealed the SSAT (T34).
9.[The applicant] provided the SSAT with submissions, receipts and a copy of a ruling from ATO in respect of his entitlement to a sole parent rebate for the year ended 30 June 1999 (T40).
10.On 1.4.2002, the SSAT advised [the applicant] that it had affirmed the decision under review (T41).”
7. With respect to qualifying the second of the above facts, the applicant stated that he had completed a form advising Centrelink that his daughter Pamela was residing in Newcastle and not at his home. Whilst the form did not use the word “care”, he did not state, or imply, that Pamela had left his care.
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
8. Sections 21 and 22 of A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (the “FA Act”) are relevant in the circumstances of the applicant’s application.
“21.(1) An individual is eligible for family tax benefit if:
(a) the individual has at least 1 FTB child.
Individual aged under 18
22.(2) The individual is an FTB child of the adult if:
(a) the individual is aged under 18; and
(b)the adult is legally responsible (whether alone or jointly with someone else) for the day-to-day care, welfare and development of the individual; and
(c)the individual is in the adult’s care; and
(d)the individual is an Australian resident, is a special category visa holder residing in Australia or is living with the adult.” (Tribunal emphasis)
9. For Pamela to be an FTB child of the applicant’s she must meet all four criteria [(a) to (d)] prescribed in subsection 22(2). Only paragraphs (b) and (c) are in dispute (see T2, folio 9).
10. Should the applicant not succeed in establishing Pamela as an FTB child, then the Tribunal must consider whether the debt due to the Commonwealth can be waived, in part of in full, under section 101 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (the “FAA Act”):
“101. The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a)the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i)making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii)failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the family assistance law; and
(b)there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c)it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.” [Emphasis added]
11. For this section of the Act to apply to the applicant’s factual situation, there must be “special circumstances” that led to the overpayment of social security entitlements. In addition, the applicant must not have “knowingly” made a false statement or false representation or failed to have complied with a provision of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act.
12. The meaning of the term “knowingly” has been considered by the Tribunal in Re Callaghan and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1996) 45 ALD 435 where Deputy President Forgie stated (at 445):
“There is nothing in s 1237AAD which suggests that the word ‘knowingly’ should be given any meaning other than that a person has actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge, that he or she is making a false statement or representation or that he or she is failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Act. That actual knowledge is to be ascertained by reference to the statements of the person as to his or her actual state of knowledge at the time and to events surrounding the false statement or the act of or omission.”
13. The Tribunal has had to consider the meaning and application of the expression “special circumstances” on many occasions. The decision of the Tribunal in Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 has been an oft-quoted benchmark as to the interpretation of “special circumstances”. In that case the Tribunal said (at 3):
“An expression such as ‘special circumstances’ is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special.”
14. In Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 (a case on “special circumstances” and section 1184 of the Act) at 545, Kiefel J, after referring to the Federal Court’s decision in Beadle, observed that “special circumstances”:
“…would require something to distinguish Mr Groth’s case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case…It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.”
Examination of the Evidence
15. The applicant said that his daughter Pamela was born in 1989 following a relationship he had commenced with a Filipino partner in May 1986. The relationship ended three years after his daughter was born. He had married another person in 1993.
16. The applicant now lives on the Gold Coast, whilst his ex-partner lives in Newcastle.
17. He said that in late 1998 his daughter decided that she wished to move from her mother’s home in Newcastle, because of undesirable circumstances, and to live with he and his wife.
18. On 8 June 1999, the Family Court made an order to the effect that Pamela live with the applicant and for him to have responsibility for decisions affecting her long-term care, welfare and development. The order further provided that Pamela have contact with her mother and that her parents to have responsibility for her day-to-day care when she was with that particular parent (T17, folio 54).
19. Pamela lived with her father until December 1999 when she went for holidays with her mother. She did not return – and has not returned to her father’s home. The applicant agreed with this arrangement because Pamela’s conduct at home had been causing dissension between him and his current partner.
20. The applicant referred to a Statutory Declaration prepared by Pamela’s grandfather (Exhibit 2) which confirmed the arrangement between the applicant, his ex-partner and her sister when Pamela refused to return to Queensland. Specifically, that Pamela could continue to stay with her mother for the time being without prejudice to the applicant’s position as sole custodian and guardian of Pamela.
21. The applicant said that not one single person had responsibility for the day-to-day care of Pamela. He had legal responsibility under the Family Court Order (T17) as well as financial responsibility in disbursing FTB payments he received, to meet Pamela’s needs. As examples of how he disbursed FTB entitlements to meet Pamela’s needs, the applicant referred to a range of payments he had made and which could be corroborated (T40, folio 95; T18, folio 56; T2, folio 8, paragraph 7). Furthermore, he stated that he had other sources of records to establish payments he had made to Pamela. However, he had not brought them to the hearing as he was unsure if they would be considered.
22. He said that the money he received from Centrelink was spent on Pamela’s behalf and that she received the full benefit of it. He further stated that the FTB entitlements were sent to him directly for his daughter – not to her mother, because his ex-partner could not manage finances and would “waste it” because of certain habits she had.
23. The applicant stated that his ex-partner had little to do with the day-to-day care of Pamela. He said that his ex-partner spent many months in the Philippines. In addition, she had kidney disease/renal dialysis needs which complicated the problem. He gave, as an example, Pamela’s frequent absences from school (Exhibit 3) as an indicator of how his ex-partner failed to display day-to-day care when Pamela lived with her.
24. The applicant said that the reason he did not inform Centrelink of the change of Pamela’s circumstances was because of the extreme complexity of the whole situation. As a consequence, he did not know how to effectively make such a communication. By agreement with Pamela’s mother he had made the best arrangements he could for Pamela’s welfare. He said that he believed, due to the complex inter-relationships between Centrelink, the Child Support Agency and the Australian Taxation Office, a simple notification to Centrelink almost certainly would have resulted in a giant misunderstanding that would have severely been to the detriment of Pamela’s welfare - as well as further exacerbating difficult financial circumstances.
25. The applicant acknowledged receiving at least one notification notice from Centrelink but “cannot remember reading [the notice]”.
26. In response to a Tribunal question concerning his medical state, the applicant responded that:
(a)he had to end his teaching career in 1982 because of depression. He receives a NSW Superannuation pension;
(b)he was treated for obsessive compulsive disorder; and
(c)he needed care in a psychiatric hospital for 6–8 weeks in May 2000.
Opinion Evidence of Dr Stephen Huntsman, Psychiatrist
27. Dr Huntsman expressed the following opinion in his report to the Tribunal:
“[The applicant] was admitted to The Palm Beach Currumbin Clinic under my care from the 29th April 1999 to 18th May 1999 with a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depressed mood. He was readmitted from 20th March 2000 until 20th April 2000 with his diagnosis revised to generalised anxiety disorder. He then attended the day patient program at The Palm Beach Currumbin Clinic [8 times from May to June 2000]…
I last interviewed him on the 29th June 2000. At the time he was relatively well and not needing formal follow up…
During my contact with him, [the applicant] was extremely disorganised as a result of his intense anxiety relating to what he believed was an unsatisfactory environment for his daughter, who was living with her mother. He also was experiencing marital difficulties during this time. I recall [the applicant] being preoccupied with these matters to an extreme degree, to the extent that questions were raised as to whether he was suffering from paranoid delusions. Although it was ultimately concluded that this was not the case, the degree to which he was consumed with the matter of his daughter’s welfare in particular would have reduced his ability to make rational, logical or cogent decisions in relation to managing his daily affairs. This would especially apply to family issues.
In my opinion [the applicant’s] degree of impairment was considerable during the time he was hospitalised, and this steadily improved during the course of his attendance at the day program. I obviously cannot comment on his subsequent course [from 29 June 2000].
I would add that at no time did I observe [the applicant] to be in any way manipulative or exploitative…”
Contentions and Submissions of the Parties
28. Ms Wallis-Dunn, the Departmental Advocate, submitted that Pamela was not an FTB child as she was not in the applicant’s care. In addition, the applicant was not responsible for her day-to-day care, welfare and development.
29. The Departmental Advocate submitted that the applicant had not notified Centrelink that his daughter had left his care at the end of 1999 – notwithstanding that at least six notification notices had been sent to him from this time.
30. The Departmental Advocate contended that the applicant’s oral evidence indicated he was aware of the need to notify Centrelink. Because he had not notified Centrelink, in these circumstances, she contended that he had knowingly failed to comply with a provision of the legislation. It was her further contention that it was a “conscious decision” on the part of the applicant.
31. Ms Wallis-Dunn submitted that there were no special circumstances that justified waiver of the debt as there was nothing uncommon or unusual or exceptional in the applicant’s case. She further submitted that admission to a psychiatric clinic was not “particularly unusual, uncommon or exceptional”.
32. She then contended that the applicant’s psychiatric state did not represent a special circumstance when consideration was given to the dates of his hospitalisation and treatment because:
(a)during the period of his first hospitalisation (29 April 1999 to 18 May 1999), Pamela was still in his care; and
(b)the period of his second hospitalisation (20 March 2000 to 20 April 2000) was about three months after Pamela had left his care and about six weeks after she advised the applicant that she would not be returning to him.
33. It was the Departmental Advocate’s contention, based on:
(a)Dr Huntsman’s report that, as at 29 June 2000, the applicant was “coping relatively well and did not need formal follow-up”, and
(b)the applicant’s oral evidence,
that he “copes well” in that there were no facts to support waiver under the special circumstances provision.
34. The applicant submitted that the legislation requires an adult to be legally responsible for the FTB child’s care rather than to be physically responsible. He submitted that, in Pamela’s case, there was no one single person with whom she resided with continuously – the responsibility being shared between himself, Pamela’s mother, her uncle, her aunt as well as other unrelated people over the past ten years. He further submitted he was the single person most responsible, legally and financially, for Pamela’s care. Accordingly, it was his submission that he met the statutory criteria so that Pamela was an FTB child.
35. The applicant contended that the legal meaning of “care” would include matters such as communication by phone and e-mail, personal visits and financial care.
36. The applicant challenged the validity of the SSAT record of his evidence. Specifically, the following statement by the SSAT:
“He said that he deliberately didn’t tell Centrelink because it was not in Pamela’s best interests to have done so.” [T2, folio 8]
37. The applicant submitted that the SSAT record was incomplete and a misinterpretation of what he said and thereby represented a totally wrong inference as to his intent. He submitted that it was his intent to notify Centrelink about Pamela’s change in circumstances as soon as he had worked out how to do so effectively, because of the complexity of the situation. Because these issues were difficult to resolve, after some time he had put the matter in the “too hard basket” and forgot about it. Furthermore, he submitted that it was never his intention to receive social security benefits for which he was not entitled.
38. To illustrate his intent, in this regard, the applicant referred to his oral evidence which substantiated his submission that all FTB or FA payments received by him were used solely for the support and needs of Pamela.
39. The applicant concluded with the submission that any decision by the respondent to enforce repayments of FTB would result in his being unable to adequately financially assist Pamela and would create further detriment to an already difficult life she has had to endure.
Consideration of the Issues
40. The first issue for the Tribunal to consider is the credibility of the applicant as a witness. The Tribunal finds the applicant to be a witness of truth.
41. The next issue for the Tribunal to consider is the meaning of “day-to-day care” and “care” [subsections 22(2) (b) and (c) of the FA Act] as they relate to the facts of this application for review.
42. The statutory terms “day-to-day care” and “care” contained in subsection 22(2)(b) and (c) are not defined in the FA Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal has considered approaches to the construction of the meaning of analogous terms used by our Courts.
43. In Department of Social Security v Lowe (1999) 92 FCR 26, the Full Federal Court cited the following decision in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Field (1989) 25 FCR 425 [Full Federal Court] with approval. In this case, the Court had to consider the definition of “dependent child” in section 3 of the Social Security Act 1947, which referred to “a child…in the custody, care and control of the person…”, but also provided that “a person shall not be taken to have the custody of a child unless the person, whether alone or jointly with another person, has the right to have, and to make decisions concerning, the daily care and control of the child”. The Court stated:
“It will be apparent that this provision was concerned with both the factual position in respect of custody, care and control, and also the legal right to exercise care and control. At issue was what was then known as a ‘supporting parent’s benefit’ (SPB). The situation was that the respondent, the father of a child Jacob, had access to the child under an order of the Family Court for four nights and five days in each period of two weeks when the child was attending school and during school holidays the time was divided equally between the parents, but the mother was awarded custody. The joint judgment of the Full Court recognizes (at 430) that a right to access may also involve ‘the right to have, and to make decisions concerning, [the child’s] care and control’.. However, the Court added, with reference to the recurring periods of four nights and five days that were in question:
But the intermittency of the access is such as to lead us to conclude that the respondent’s right cannot properly be characterised as the right to have the daily care and control of his child. [emphasis added]
The corollary of the Full Court’s view is that the general right of the custodial parent with respect to the care and control of the child continues during short periods of access, even where those periods are frequent. It is a very short step to conclude from this that the custodial parent’s right is actually exercised, during those periods of physical separation from the child, through the parent having access…”
44. The Tribunal makes the observation that notwithstanding the applicant’s stated devotion to his daughter (for example, by disbursing FTB/FA entitlements directly to her), his antipathy towards his ex-partner has created a situation – when Pamela refused to return to him in December 1999, to enter into an agreement with his ex-partner. The agreement was such that Pamela could stay with her on condition that it would not prejudice his position as sole custodian and guardian of Pamela (see Exhibit 2).
45. Applying the principles in Field’s case to the facts of this application, the Tribunal can make no other conclusion than to find that Pamela was not in his day-to-day care whilst living with her mother in Newcastle from December 1999.
46. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant was not entitled to receive social security entitlements after his daughter stopped living with him.
47. The next issue for the Tribunal to decide is whether the debt due to the Commonwealth, arising from overpayments of FTB/FA entitlements made to the applicant can be waived in part, or in full, under the “special circumstances” provisions of the FAA Act.
48. In considering this issue the Tribunal finds Dr Huntsman’s psychiatric opinion (see paragraph 27) to be extremely significant with regard to the outcome of this application. The applicant has a long history of depression which resulted in his having to end his teaching career in 1982 and to be placed on a NSW Superannuation pension. His depression state did not end at this time – but now is combined with other psychiatric conditions: “adjustment disorder with depressed mood” and “generalised anxiety disorder” and at times concerns whether he suffered “paranoid delusions”.. Dr Huntsman states that during the twelve months the applicant was his patient (April 1999 to April 2000) his concerns with the “unsatisfactory environment” for Pamela pre-occupied the applicant to an “extreme degree”. Moreover, Dr Huntsman’s opinion identified some of the triggers for the applicant’s psychiatric condition. Specifically, “the degree he was consumed with his daughter’s welfare, in particular, would have reduced his ability to make rational, logical or cogent decisions in relation to managing his daily affairs. This would especially apply to family issues”.. The Tribunal accepts this medical opinion and finds the applicant’s explanation in his response to Centrelink (paragraphs 7, 24, 37) plausible as it reflects an inability to make a rational, logical or cogent decision.
49. The Tribunal does not accept the respondent’s proposition that the applicant’s psychiatric conditions can be restricted to discrete periods of time (hospitalisation/ consultation dates) only. Rather, the Tribunal finds that it is more probable than not that they apply over the duration of the “relevant period”.. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the respondent’s proposition is inconsistent with the evidence before the Tribunal, in particular:
(a) The applicant’s long history of psychiatric conditions;
(b) the change in his psychiatric state diagnosed over time;
(c)the triggers for these psychiatric conditions (concerns for his daughter’s welfare) as identified by Dr Huntsman being maintained over the “relevant period”; and
(d)the impacts of the triggers for his psychiatric conditions causing him to reduce his ability to make rational, logical or cogent decisions in relation to managing his daily affairs – especially family issues.
50. The Tribunal’s conclusion can be adduced from Dr Huntsman’s expert opinion, the applicant’s evidence, as well as judicial notice of the nature of these psychiatric conditions (see also DSM-IV). Moreover, whilst Dr Huntsman acknowledges “steady improvement” in the applicant’s condition, he could only describe him as “relatively well” rather than to provide a clear and unambiguous statement that there had been a complete and full recovery from the psychiatric state(s) that he has suffered over time.
51. The Tribunal further finds that Dr Huntsman’s observation that the applicant “was in no way manipulative or exploitative” to also be significant with regard to the outcome of this application. The Tribunal concludes that such an observation on his patient is additive to the Tribunal finding of the applicant as a witness of truth.
52. The Tribunal concludes that, applying the civil standard of proof, and based on its earlier findings (see paragraphs 48, 49, 50) the “special circumstances” provision of the FAA Act apply in the facts of this case because:
(a)applying the test in Callaghan’s case, the applicant could not be seen to have actual knowledge but rather constructive knowledge that he had failed to comply with a statutory provision: see medical opinion of Dr Huntsman at paragraphs 27, Tribunal findings at paragraphs 40, 48, 49(c) and the applicant’s belief in the nature of the agreement entered into with his ex-partner (paragraphs 20, 44); and
(b)applying the test in Beadle’s case, there are “uncommon” or “unusual” facts that justify the finding that “special circumstances” apply: see medical opinion of Dr Huntsman at paragraph 27 and Tribunal findings at paragraphs 40, 48, 51.
53. The Tribunal must next decide whether the debt due to the Commonwealth should be waived in part or in full. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of the applicant that he disbursed FTB/FA monies that he received throughout the relevant period directly to Pamela and which could be corroborated (for example, see paragraph 21). What is uncertain, on all the evidence and information before the Tribunal is an accurate estimate of the amount of the total monies disbursed in this manner. The first step is for the applicant to establish the amounts of FTB/FA benefits received over the relevant period which were disbursed to meet the needs of his daughter and for the respondent to be satisfied in this regard. Accordingly, the Tribunal will make its decision subject to a direction that the debt be waived to the extent that disbursements of FTB/FA benefits received by the applicant over the relevant period which were disbursed to Pamela be established to the satisfaction of the respondent. The waiver will apply to this amount.
54. For all of the above reasons, the decision under review is set aside and in substitution therefor the Tribunal decides that the debt due to the Commonwealth be waived under the special circumstances provision of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999.. The Tribunal decision is subject to a direction to the respondent that the amount of the debt to be waived is subject to the applicant establishing, to the satisfaction of the respondent, the amount of FTB/FA benefits, received over the relevant period, that were disbursed to meet the needs of his daughter.
55. The Tribunal makes the observation that concerns have been expressed by the Tribunal in relation to the issue of psychiatric conditions and the circumstances of overpayments made to social security recipients (for example, Re QX03/2 and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 144). Because of the beneficial nature of the legislation, the respondent may need to review its protocols for dealing with clients with known psychiatric conditions in order to avoid situations which might aggravate a pre-existing psychiatric condition or cause such a condition to recur.
I certify that the 55 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr EK Christie, Member
Signed: Sarah Oliver
AssociateDate of Hearing 21 July 2003
Date of Decision 12 December 2003
The Applicant appeared in Person
For the Respondent Ms H Wallis-Dunn, Departmental Advocate
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