Qureshi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Qureshi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] FCA 155

Citation: Qureshi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] FCA 155
Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Qureshi [2009] FMCA 1111
Parties: ZIA QURESHI v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
File number: NSD 1244 of 2009
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 26 February 2010
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary dismissal of appeal pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 4, 25(1A), s 31A
Cases cited: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Qureshi [2009] FMCA 1111 affirmed
Qureshi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2009] NSWCA 421 related
Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1500 followed
Date of hearing: 26 February 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: CATCHWORDS
Number of paragraphs: 21
The Appellant did not appear
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr AR Zahra
Solicitor for the Respondent: Henry Davis York

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1244 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ZIA QURESHI
Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 FEBRUARY 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal. 

3.The hearing of the appeal fixed for 17 March 2010 be vacated. 

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

4.The solicitors for the respondent notify the appellant, by letter sent to him by no later than close of business on 26 February 2010, that his appeal has been dismissed with costs.

5.The exhibits to the affidavit of Christine Elizabeth Hilder sworn on 26 February 2010 be returned.  

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1244 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ZIA QURESHI
Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

26 FEBRUARY 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The appellant appeals from orders made by Raphael FM on 3 November 2009 (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Qureshi [2009] FMCA 1111). Raphael FM ordered that:

    1.A sequestration order be made against the estate of Zia Ul-Islam Qureshi.

    2.The applicant creditor’s costs (including any reserved costs) be taxed (in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006) and paid from the estate of the Respondent Debtor in accordance with the Act.

    3.Under the Bankruptcy Regulations a copy of the sequestration order be given to the Official Receiver in Sydney within 2 days.

  2. Ordinarily, an appeal from a Federal Magistrate in a non-migration matter must be heard by a Full Court. That requirement may be varied in appropriate circumstances by the Chief Justice giving…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 155
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Qureshi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia involved a dispute between the plaintiff, Mr. Qureshi, and the defendant, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Mr. Qureshi filed a claim against the bank, and the case was brought before the Federal Court of Australia for adjudication. The plaintiff alleged that the bank had engaged in improper conduct in relation to a financial transaction, resulting in damages and losses suffered by the plaintiff. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that it lacked merit and did not have a reasonable prospect of success.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff's claim had any reasonable prospect of success. The court had to assess the merits of the case and determine whether the plaintiff's allegations had a sufficient basis in fact and law to warrant a full trial. The court also had to consider the principles and factors that govern the exercise of its power under section 31A of the Federal Court Act to grant summary judgment in cases where one party has no reasonable prospect of success. The court needed to balance the need to efficiently manage its caseload and avoid unnecessary trials with the potential injustice of summarily dismissing a claim that might ultimately succeed.

In evaluating the plaintiff's claim, the court examined the pleadings and evidence provided by both parties. The court applied a flexible approach, taking into account the principles set out in relevant authorities, and considered whether the plaintiff's case had any genuine prospects of success. The court determined that the plaintiff's claim did not meet the threshold for having a reasonable prospect of success, as the evidence presented was insufficient to support the allegations. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute, and therefore, the claim should be dismissed. Based on this assessment, the court exercised its power under section 31A of the Federal Court Act and granted summary judgment in favour of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.

As a result of the court's decision, the plaintiff's claim against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia was dismissed. The court found that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the claim, and therefore, the case was summarily disposed of without proceeding to a full trial. The court's decision underscores the importance of providing sufficient evidence to support a claim and the court's role in efficiently managing its caseload by dismissing unmeritorious claims where appropriate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This Court has ample power to deal summarily with unmeritorious claims, be they at first instance or on appeal. One source of power is s 31A of the Federal Court Act which is in the following terms: 31A Summary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5) This section does not apply to criminal proceedings.Proceeding, when used in s 31A, includes an appeal (see the definition of proceeding in s 4 of the Federal Court Act). In Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1500, I set out the principles which govern the exercise of the Court’s power pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court Act. At [43] and [44] I said: 43The critical words of s 31A(1), when applied to the present case, require me to be satisfied that the respondents have “… no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding …”. The following principles may be extracted from the authorities:(a)The moving party does not have to demonstrate that the defence is hopeless or unarguable;(b)The Court must consider the pleadings and the evidence with a “critical eye” in order to see whether the respondent party has evidence of sufficient quality and weight to be able to succeed at trial (Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 at [23] (p 382) (per Finkelstein J));(c)The respondent party is not obliged to present its whole case in order to defeat the summary judgment applicant but must at least present a sufficient outline of the evidence in order to enable the Court to come to a preliminary view about the merits for the purpose of considering the statutory test in s 31A(1)(b) (Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd 167 FCR 372 at [22] (p 382) (per Finkelstein J)); and (d)The test may require greater scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence in some cases than in others. In my judgment, the words of s 31A(1) compel a flexible approach. The real question in every case is not so much whether there is any issue that could arguably go to trial but rather whether there is any issue that should be permitted to go to trial. This seems to be the approach of Finkelstein J in Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd 167 FCR 372 and of Gordon J in the same case (as to which see [123]–[134] (pp 406–409)), although Rares J in that case at [73]–[74] (p 394) and in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720 esp at [45] (p 731) favoured a test which is much closer to the older test articulated in authorities decided under Rules of Court expressed in terms different from the language of s 31A(1)).44I agree with the helpful summary of the relevant principles given by Gilmour J in Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955 where, at [5] and [6] of his Honour’s Reasons, his Honour said:Section 31A of the Act5Section 31A lowers the bar for obtaining summary judgment: White Industries Australia Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298. The second reading speech of the Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005 which introduced s 31A stated that its purpose was to strengthen “the power of the courts to deal with unmeritorious matters by broadening the grounds on which federal courts can summarily dispose of unsustainable cases”: Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146 at [45]; Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60 at [124]. 6Success under s 31A does not require a demonstration that the case is hopeless or bound to fail. The following principles are of general application to an application under s 31A: (a)the Court must be very cautious not to do a party an injustice by summarily dismissing proceedings;(b)the Court ought not dismiss a claim based on a predictive assessment of prospects, where it is possible that if the claim went to trial, it may succeed; (c)in a case where evidence can give colour and content to allegations, and where questions of fact and degree are important, the Court should be more reluctant to dismiss a proceeding on the face of a pleading; (d)it is not Parliament's intention to require the Court to engage in lengthy and elaborate trials on an interlocutory basis for the purposes of determining whether or not a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success. It may be necessary for the opposing party to provide no more than an outline of evidence, sufficient to show that there is a genuine dispute, to prevent the summary application becoming a trial;(e)if there is a real issue of fact or law to be decided, and the rights of the parties depend upon it, it is obviously appropriate that the matter goes to trial. It cannot be said that where there is a real factual dispute and that factual dispute must be resolved to determine whether the claim succeeds that there is ‘no reasonable prospect of success’; (g)it ought not be used to shut out proceedings where, on a proposition of law, there may be room for doubt. On questions of law, an inquiry as to their merit should not be for the purpose of resolving them and also not simply to determine whether the argument is hopeless, but in order to decide if it is sufficiently strong to warrant a trial;(h)evidence of an ambivalent character will usually be sufficient to amount to reasonable prospects; (i)in determining if there are real issues of fact in issue so as to preclude summary judgment the courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favour of the non-moving party. See Genovese v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 923 at [5]; Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146 at [42]-[48]; Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574 at [13]; Bond v Barry (2007) 73 IPR 490 at [46]; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v ACN 000 247 601 Pty Ltd (in Liq) (formerly Stanley Thompson Valuers Pty Ltd) [2006] FCA 1416 at [30]; Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Jones (No 2) [2006] FCA 1401 at [21]; Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited [2008] FCAFC 60.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established