QUINN and REPATRIATION COMMISSION
[2011] AATA 557
•16 August 2011
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2011] AATA 557
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No 2010/1541
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re THELMA QUINN Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President D G Jarvis
Professor P Reilly AO, MemberDate16 August 2011
PlaceAdelaide
Decision The decision under review is affirmed.
D G Jarvis
... [Signed] ...
Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS' ENTITLEMENTS - Widow's claim - World War II veteran – veteran suffering from dementia - death of veteran following fall in aged care home - held that veteran engaged in eligible war service, not operational service - no material connecting smoking with war service - death of veteran not war-caused - decision under review affirmed.
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth), ss 119, 120(4) and 120B(3)(a)
Collins v Repatriation Commission (2009) 177 FCR 280
Fenner v Repatriation Commission (2005) 218 ALR 122
Gorton v Repatriation Commission (2001) 65 ALD 609
Kaluza v Repatriation Commission [2011] FCAFC 97
Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331
Repatriation Commission v Tuite (1993) 39 FCR 540
REASONS FOR DECISION
16 August 2011 Deputy President D G Jarvis Professor P Reilly AO, Member 1. The applicant is the widow of the late Herbert Quinn deceased, a veteran who served in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) from 1942 to 1946. The deceased died in 2009, aged 87 years.
2. Mrs Quinn claimed a pension in her capacity as the widow of the deceased, on the basis that his service caused or contributed to his death. In answer to a question as to why she believed that the deceased’s service caused or contributed to his death, Mrs Quinn referred to smoking and adenocarcinoma. A delegate of the Repatriation Commission decided that the deceased’s death was not related to service, but to Alzheimer’s disease, and that the available evidence did not indicate that lung cancer had played a part in his death. She accordingly decided that a war-widow’s pension was not payable.
3. Following a request for review, the Veterans’ Review Board (VRB) affirmed the delegate’s decision. Mrs Quinn then applied to this tribunal to review the Commission’s decision.
Issues before the Tribunal
4. The principal issues before the tribunal are:
(a) what was the cause of the deceased’s death; and
(b) whether the deceased’s death was war-caused.
Background
5. The following background facts are based on the documentary material before us, and on the evidence of Mrs Quinn’s daughter, Mrs Christine Mueller. The applicant, Mrs Quinn, is in a nursing home and was unable to give evidence. Except where otherwise indicated, the following facts are not in contention.
6. The deceased served in the RAAF from 16 September 1942 to 29 March 1946. He was 20 years of age at the time when he commenced service. A copy of his record of service shows that all his postings were to locations within Australia, and also lists the dates of his postings. There was, however, a suggestion, to which we will refer below, that he might also have served in Timor and Borneo.
7. The deceased died on 9 January 2009 while in the care of the Tanunda Lutheran Home. He had a fall at the home on 13 December 2008, and it was found that he had broken his hip. He had surgery at Calvary Hospital, and returned to the Tanunda Lutheran Home on 22 December 2008. His condition gradually deteriorated after that, and he began to refuse food and then also liquids. His death certificate (exhibit R1, T18, page 56) states that his death was due to Alzheimer’s disease, with a duration of five years, and a fractured hip, with a duration of one month.
8. The doctor who had been treating the deceased for the last 11 months of his life, Dr Bill Geyer, provided a report dated 18 September 2009, in which he said:
“I can confirm that he (Mr Quinn) had suffered from a duodenal ulcer, diabetes, ischaemic heart disease and lung cancer. Although the most immediate causes of death were Alzheimer’s disease and the fractured hip (which occurred 27 days prior to his death), his diabetes, ischaemic heart disease and lung cancer were current health problems at the time of his death and therefore contributed to it.” (exhibit R1, T19, page 57).
9. Further information regarding the deceased’s medical history is contained in a letter dated 20 February 2006 from Dr R J Nettle of Prospect. After listing a series of medical conditions from which the deceased had suffered, the letter concludes:
“Ischaemic heart disease 11/00
Probable Alzheimer’s dementia 5/03
Type 2 diabetes 12/99” (exhibit R1, T17, page 55).
The letter also records that his lung cancer occurred in 2001 and resulted in a right middle lobectomy in March 2001.
10. Notes from the Royal Adelaide Hospital (exhibit A7) indicate that the deceased was diagnosed with mild diabetes on 7 February 1987. A further hand-written entry, apparently made by Dr S Hawkins on 7 November 2001, records:
“Wife says he is dementing – forgetful. Gets up @ 9.30 pm disorientated & thinking it is morning.”
Dr Hawkins confirmed this complaint by his wife in a letter to Dr Nettle dated 12 November 2001, which is also included in the Royal Adelaide Hospital notes (exhibit A7).
11. Mrs Mueller, the daughter of Mrs Quinn and the deceased, gave evidence that she was born in 1953, and when she was growing up she observed the deceased smoking, and that he smoked heavily. She said that the deceased gave up smoking in 1983, and she was able to fix that date by reference to the date when her husband gave up smoking, which was the year before.
12. According to Mrs Mueller’s evidence, the deceased had walked with a shuffling motion, dragging his feet, for over three years. Before he went to the Tanunda Lutheran Home, he had been at another home, Mt Carmel, since 2006. Mrs Quinn had reached a point where she was unable to continue to look after the deceased at home, because he had started to wander off as a result of his dementia, and he reached a point where he was not capable of living independently. Mrs Mueller thought that the wandering off started in about 2005 to 2006. She said that the deceased had collapsed on one occasion when he was at Mt Carmel, apparently as a result of his diabetes and becoming dehydrated, and was taken by ambulance to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital.
13. Mrs Mueller also gave evidence that when the deceased was living at the Tanunda Lutheran Home, she used to take him for walks, and she thought that he was steady on his feet and did not have to be assisted. He had been given a walking frame at the Tanunda Home but did not use it. She said that the deceased had had a couple of falls at the Tanunda Home prior to the fall in December 2008; the Home had called her but told her that he was okay. She also said that after the deceased had been diagnosed with diabetes there was a gradual loss of weight and he looked very thin late in his life. She said he was always a fussy eater.
14. Mrs Mueller also gave evidence that whilst she accepted that the deceased was suffering from dementia, she had seen her grandmother die of Alzheimer’s disease, and she never thought that her father had died of Alzheimer’s disease, but rather that diabetes had caused his death. It appears that Mrs Mueller arranged for the doctor who provided the death certificate, Dr John Urlwin, to send a letter dated 8 June 2010 to the VRB to supplement the information on the death certificate. This letter records that the deceased’s medical notes confirmed that he suffered diabetes, past lung cancer and chronic obstructive airway disease, and that leading to his death he had become “poorly responsive and had been refusing food and fluids”. The letter concludes:
“I was of no doubt that his death was due to natural causes although as often is in these situations, the exact cause may be debatable. Mr Quinn’s daughter believes his death was related to diabetes and and lung disease. I could not argue against this proposition.[sic]” (exhibit A9)
Parties’ contentions
15. Counsel for the applicant, Mr Mattner, submitted that the deceased’s medical cause of death was vascular dementia, as opposed to Alzheimer’s disease, and that the deceased’s fall and its aftermath leading to his death was caused by vascular dementia and diabetes, that the vascular dementia had been caused by his diabetes, that his diabetes was caused by smoking, and his smoking was the result of his service with the RAAF. Dr Jane Hecker, a consultant physician who specialises in aged care and rehabilitation, gave evidence supporting the above diagnoses and their relationship with smoking.
16. The Commission disputed the contention made on behalf of Mrs Quinn that the deceased’s death was the result of vascular dementia or diabetes; it contended that his death was the result of Alzheimer-type dementia, and that having regard to the SoP concerning that disease, his death was not related to his service. The Commission’s advocate, Mr Crowe, relied on the evidence of Dr Simon Spedding, a sports physician and clinical epidemiologist, who has considerable experience, as a medical adviser to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, in assessing medical conditions suffered by veterans. Dr Spedding disputed Dr Hecker’s diagnoses, and considered that the cause of the deceased’s death was Alzheimer’s disease. Mr Crowe also contended that in any event, the material before us does not raise a connection between the deceased’s smoking and his service, and so the claim must fail even if we were satisfied that his death was due to vascular dementia and diabetes.
Legislative Scheme
17. Section 13(1) of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (VE Act) provides relevantly that where the death of a veteran was “war-caused”, the Commonwealth is liable to pay pension by way of compensation to the dependants of the veteran in accordance with the terms of the Act.
18. Section 8 provides relevantly that for the purposes of the VE Act, the death of a veteran shall be taken to have been “war-caused” if:
“(b)the death of the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran; or
...
(d)in the opinion of the Commission (which includes this tribunal when it reviews a decision of the Commission), the death of the veteran was due to ... a disease that would not have been contracted, but for his or her having rendered eligible war service or but for changes in the veterans’ environment consequent upon his or her having rendered eligible war service ...”.
19. Section 7(1)(c) of the VE Act provides relevantly that for the purposes of the Act:
“(c)a person who has rendered continuous full-time service (not being operational service) as a member of the Defence Force during World War 2, being service that commenced before 1 July 1947, shall be taken to have been rendering eligible war service while the person was so rendering continuous full-time service, ...”.
20. We referred above to s 120(4) which provides in effect that the Commission shall decide a matter arising under the Act to its reasonable satisfaction. This section is, however, qualified by s 120B. Section 120B(1) provides that that section applies relevantly to a claim made under Part II of the VE Act that relates to eligible war service (other than operational service) rendered by a veteran. Section 120B(3) provides relevantly that in applying s 120(4) to determine a claim, the Commission (which once again includes this tribunal when it reviews a decision of the Commission) is to be reasonably satisfied that the death of a person was war-caused only if:
“(a)the material before the Commission raises a connection between the … death of the person and some particular service rendered by the person; and
(b) there is in force:
(i)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(3) or (12); or
(ii) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(3);
that upholds the contention that the … death of the person is, on the balance of probabilities, connected with that service.”
21. Section 196B(3) provides relevantly in effect that if the Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA) (being a body established under s 196A) is of the view that on the sound medical-scientific evidence available it is more probable than not that a particular kind of death can be related to eligible service (other than operational service) rendered by veterans, the RMA must determine a SoP in respect of that kind of death setting out the factors that must exist, and which of those factors must be related to service rendered by a person, before it can be said that, on the balance of probabilities, a death of that kind is connected with the circumstances of that service. There is no statutory definition of the concept of a death being “connected with” service, but the reference in s 196B(3) to a “factor related to service” is expounded in s 196B(14). This provides relevantly in effect that a factor causing, or contributing to the death of a person is “related to service” rendered by a person if:
· it resulted from an occurrence that happened while the person was rendering that service;
· it arose out of or was attributable to that service;
· it was contributed to in a material degree by, or was aggravated by, that service; or
· in the case of a factor causing, or contributing, to the death of a person, it was due to an accident that would not have occurred, or to a disease that would not have been contracted, but for the rendering of that service by the person, or but for changes in his or her environment consequent upon having rendered that service.
Relevant Statements of Principles
22. The RMA has made SoPs in respect of Alzheimer’s disease, vascular dementia and diabetes. The applicant’s contention must be related to the terms of the relevant SoPs. Having regard to our above finding that the deceased was engaged in eligible war service but not operational service, the SoPs that are potentially relevant are as follows:
(a)Instrument No. 22 of 2006 concerning Vascular Dementia, as amended by Instruments No. 64 of 2006 and 62 of 2010;
(b)Instrument No. 90 of 2011, being the current SoP concerning Diabetes Mellitus;
(c)Instrument No. 12 of 2004 concerning Diabetes Mellitus, being the SoP in force when the Commission’s decision was made; and
(d) Instrument No. 23 of 2010 concerning Alzheimer-type Dementia.
23. Clause 6 of the SoP concerning vascular dementia sets out a number of factors that must exist before it can be said that on the balance of probabilities, that condition is connected with the circumstances of a person’s service. One of these factors, namely factor 6(b), includes having cerebrovascular disease before the clinical onset of vascular dementia. The expressions “cerebrovascular disease” and “death from vascular dementia” are defined as follows:
“‘cerebrovascular disease’ means any abnormality of the brain resulting from a pathologic process of the cerebral blood vessels or decreased blood flow to the brain, including cerebral ischaemia, intracerebral haemorrhage or cerebral infarction.
‘death from vascular dementia’ in relation to a person includes death from a terminal event or condition that was contributed to by the person’s vascular dementia.”
Dr Hecker relied in part on MRI imaging in 2003 in support of her opinion that the deceased was suffering from small vessel cerebrovascular disease, thus supporting the applicant’s contention that factor 6(b) of the SoP concerning vascular dementia was satisfied.
24. It is then necessary, in accordance with the applicant’s contention, to consider the relevant SoP concerning diabetes mellitus. For this purpose we must apply the SoP in force at the time of our decision if (as in this case) that SoP is more favourable to the applicant than an earlier SoP in force at the time of the Commission’s decision: Gorton v Repatriation Commission (2001) 65 ALD 609. Clause 6 of the current SoP, Instrument No. 90 of 2011, sets out the factors that must exist before it can be said that on the balance of probabilities death from diabetes mellitus is connected with the circumstances of a person’s relevant service. It was accepted that factor 6(b)(iii) was satisfied in this case, in that smoking had ceased (and that was in 1983 according to the evidence of Mrs Mueller, to which we will refer below) and that the clinical onset of Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus had occurred within 10 years of cessation (that is, by 1987). The expression “death from diabetes mellitus” is defined to include death from a terminal event or condition that was contributed to by the person’s diabetes mellitus.
25. The applicant’s claim cannot succeed if the cause of death was Alzheimer’s disease. It is common ground that in the present case, none of the factors existed that, according to the SoP concerning Alzheimer-type dementia, must exist before it can be said on the balance of probabilities that Alzheimer-type dementia is connected with the circumstances of a veteran’s service. Factor 6(a) of this SoP refers to the smoking of a minimum quantity of cigarettes, but where (as in this case) smoking has ceased, the clinical onset of Alzheimer-type dementia must occur within five years of cessation. The evidence before us does not uphold this factor, because the deceased ceased smoking in 1983, and the earliest reference to symptoms of dementia is the note made in November 2001 by Dr S Hawkins, to which we have referred above.
Consideration
26. In determining this matter we must proceed in the manner provided for in s 119 of the VE Act; we are not bound by the rules of evidence, and we must act according to substantial justice and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to legal form and technicalities. By virtue of s 119(1)(h), we must take into account any difficulties that for any reason lie in the way of ascertaining the existence of any fact, matter, cause or circumstance, including any reason attributable to the effects of the passage of time and the absence of or a deficiency in relevant official records. However, as was pointed out in Fenner v Repatriation Commission (2005) 218 ALR 122 at [27] - [28], these provisions do not provide an easy route to a favourable decision, or enable relevant statutory criteria to be disregarded.
Nature of deceased’s service
27. It is necessary to determine, at the outset, the nature of the deceased’s service, that is, whether the deceased’s service was operational service or war service. This question arose in this case because there was some reference made to possible service by the deceased in Timor and Borneo. The determination of this preliminary issue will determine the standard of proof applicable to Mrs Quinn’s claim, and also, when we come to determine the relationship between the death of the deceased and his service, which Statements of Principles (SoPs) are applicable. This preliminary issue is to be determined according to our reasonable satisfaction, and neither party has an onus of proof: ss 120(4) and (6) of the VE Act.
28. We have referred above to the information before us as to the deceased’s service record. That document appears on the face of it to be complete. Further, the record was presumably kept within Australia, and not in circumstances where the exigencies of defence operations might have led to omissions or inaccuracies.
29. We note that paragraph 8 of the applicant’s statement of facts, issues and contentions, which was lodged on 1 June 2011, asserts that the deceased undertook operational service between 6 and 12 November 1943 at a location “not yet confirmed”. However, the document also asserts that the deceased’s service from 16 September 1942 to 29 March 1946 constituted defence service. The only evidence that the deceased might have served outside Australia is contained in evidence given by the deceased’s grandson, Mr Roger Mueller. He said that as part of a school project, he had asked a series of set questions of the deceased regarding his experience in the war. A recording was made of the interview, and the deceased wrote out his answers to the questions (see exhibit R1, T13, pages 37-45). A transcript of the interview was tendered and is exhibit A11. This includes the following question and answer:
“14. What Countries did you visit?
A: Outside Australia - Timor and Borneo”.
30. The deceased also referred in the same interview, in his answer to question 4, to having witnessed four planes crash on a particular day, but this clearly related to his experience after he had been posted to Deniliquin in New South Wales to a service flying training school. The transcript of the interview contains no further reference to Timor or Borneo. Further, as Mr Crowe observed, even if the deceased did serve in Timor or Borneo, there is no evidence as to whether this occurred as part of operational service, or after hostilities had ceased.
31. We are satisfied on the evidence that the deceased was engaged in eligible war service, and that he was not engaged in operational service.
Cause of death, and relevance of Statements of Principles
32. In claims for pension arising from the death of a veteran, it is necessary to determine another preliminary question, namely, what was the medical cause of death: Collins v Repatriation Commission (2009) 177 FCR 280 at [41] and [42]. In the present matter, as we have said, conflicting opinions were provided by Drs Hecker and Spedding.
33. After the medical cause of death has been determined, it is necessary to determine whether the death was war-caused. In the majority of cases this involves considering the relevant SoP(s) (which are identified by the determination of the above preliminary issue of what was the medical cause of death), and deciding whether the SoP(s) uphold the contention that the death of the veteran was, on the balance of probabilities, connected with his or her service.
34. In the present matter, on Dr Hecker’s diagnosis of the cause of death, an issue would arise as to whether the deceased had cerebrovascular disease before the “clinical onset” of vascular dementia. In a recent case, namely Kaluza v Repatriation Commission [2011] FCAFC 97, a Full Court of the Federal Court confirmed earlier authorities to the effect that the date of clinical onset could be either the date when a person becomes aware of some feature or symptom at that time or when a finding is made on investigation which is indicative to a doctor of the disease being present. The Court explained at [63] that the purpose of the definition was to identify those symptoms (or features) which, if observed by a clinician, would warrant a conclusion that the patient suffered from the condition in question. It follows from the analogy referred to at [66] of the judgment that the onset of such symptoms might precede the date when the veteran first saw a doctor in relation to the symptoms.
35. Drs Hecker and Spedding gave concurrent evidence. This was very helpful, and clearly elucidated the grounds on which their opinions differed. Each doctor had plausible reasons for the respective conclusions reached, although they were both disadvantaged by the absence of clear evidence of relevant symptoms and clinical assessments during an appropriate period prior to the deceased’s fall. Little attention was paid to the question of the date of clinical onset of cerebrovascular disease, being a further issue that would arise if we were to accept Dr Hecker’s view that the cause of death was vascular dementia. However, we do not think it necessary to decide that further issue, or the contest between the parties as to diagnosis, for reasons to which we will now refer.
Was there a connection between death and war service?
36. Under s 120B(3)(a) of the VE Act, we are to be reasonably satisfied that the death of the deceased was war-caused only if the material before us raises a connection between his death and his war service. We consider that the reasonable satisfaction standard of proof provided for in s 120(4) applies to determinations or decisions in relation to the questions arising under s 120B(3)(b), that is (in this case) the question of whether the material before us raises a connection between the deceased’s smoking and his war service. The determination of the preliminary issue of what was the cause of death is distinct from the question of the relationship of the death to the service of the veteran. As appears from the discussion in Collins (supra) at [46] – [47], the purpose of determining the preliminary question of the medical cause of death is to enable the decision-maker to identify the relevant SoPs and apply them in the manner required by s 120B(3)(b). But the present matter need not be determined by reference to s 120B(3)(b), or the relevant SoPs, because the applicant is unable to satisfy the requirements of s 120B(3)(a); the material before us as to the deceased’s smoking, to which we will next refer, does not satisfy us that a connection has been raised between the deceased’s smoking and his war service. As a result, we are not reasonably satisfied that the deceased’s death was war-caused, and so it is not necessary for us to determine the preliminary issue of what was the medical cause of death.
Evidence of smoking
37. The deceased’s brother, Mr Vincent Quinn, provided a written statement to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (exhibit A10), which was witnessed by a Justice of the Peace and tendered by consent, to the effect that he had never known the deceased to smoke, and that their father was very strict and would not have allowed him or the deceased to smoke when they were younger. We were accordingly asked to infer that the deceased did not smoke before he joined the RAAF.
38. We understand that attempts were made on behalf of the applicant to have Mr Vincent Quinn give evidence by telephone, but he was unable to do so. Instead, the deceased’s sister-in-law, Mrs Pursche, gave evidence by telephone as to her contact with the deceased and Mrs Quinn. She appeared to do her best to recall relevant events, but her evidence was somewhat confused, and we are not satisfied that she knew the deceased before World War II started or that she could speak of the deceased’s smoking habits before he joined the RAAF. She said that she did not know him that much before he joined the Air Force, and lost contact with him after that, when for about 18 months prior to 1948, she and her sister, Mrs Quinn, became estranged as a result of a family difference. However, they made up their differences in 1948 and became very good friends again. She said that at that time, the deceased drank a little bit and smoked “but only very lightly, and not a great deal”.
39. As we have said above Mrs Mueller said that when she was growing up, her father smoked heavily. She said that she saw him smoking at home, and on occasions when she saw him at his work as a painter, he always had a cigarette in his mouth.
40. The transcript of the interview between the deceased and his grandson also includes the following question and answer:
“18. Salvation Army, Did they help?
A.The Salvation Army did a marvellous job for everybody up in Darwin supplying writing material etc. posting letters, giving away cigarettes. Also food parcels.”
This refers to the assistance that the Salvation Army gave “everybody up in Darwin”, and includes a reference to giving away cigarettes. However, this does not constitute evidence that the deceased himself accepted cigarettes or that he was smoking in Darwin.
41. It has been held that the history given by a veteran to a doctor can constitute material before the tribunal in the context of providing evidence as to the date of clinical onset of a disease in a claim relating to operational service: see Lees vRepatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331 at [25]. We accordingly invited the parties to review the available medical records relating to the deceased to see whether they contain any record of any history provided by the deceased to any doctor or other clinician, or to any other material, that would indicate a connection between the deceased’s smoking and his service. However, they did not draw our attention to any such record. After the conclusion of the hearing, we requested a copy of the deceased’s service medical records, including any report of the medical examination of the deceased at the time of his discharge from the RAAF. The Commission produced the deceased’s service records, and both parties had the opportunity to inspect them and advise us of any record in them indicating that the deceased was smoking during his service, but again we were not advised of any record to that effect.
42. In any event, the necessary connection would not be established by evidence of a temporal connection between service and smoking. The applicant must also establish that smoking had arisen out of or had been attributable to service, and it would not be sufficient to establish merely that service was the setting in which smoking occurred: see Repatriation Commission v Tuite (1993) 39 FCR 540. On the evidence before us, we are satisfied that the deceased was smoking by 1948 and that he continued to smoke until 1983. However, we are not satisfied that the material before us raises a connection between the deceased’s smoking and his service. Indeed, there appears to be no such evidence before us.
43. It is implicit in the applicant’s contentions that the deceased’s fall was caused or contributed to by his vascular dementia. We have considerable doubts about this aspect. There is no direct evidence as to what caused the deceased to fall, and the evidence as to the location in which he was found after he had fallen does not assist. We think that he was clearly at risk of falling for a number of reasons, having regard to his age and the various medical conditions from which he was suffering, and we would have considerable hesitation in inferring that, if he was suffering from vascular dementia or diabetes, these conditions contributed to his fall. However, it is not necessary for us to determine this issue, as we are not satisfied as to the requisite connection between the deceased’s smoking and his service.
44. For the sake of completeness, we add that even if (contrary to the finding we have made in paragraph 31 above) the deceased had been engaged in operational service, there is no material before us to raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the deceased’s death with his service, because of the absence of material connecting the deceased’s smoking to his service.
Decision
45. The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the 45 preceding paragraphs are a true copy
of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President
D G Jarvis and Professor P Reilly AO, Member... [Signed] ...
N. Misiajlo, AssociateDate/s of Hearing 19 and 20 July 2011
Date of Decision 16 August 2011
Counsel for the Applicant Mr J Mattner
Solicitor for the Applicant Hemsley, Gilbert & Mattner
Advocate for the Respondent Mr A Crowe
Solicitor for the Respondent Dept of Veterans’ Affairs Advocacy Section
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