QUINLIVAN and LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE - [2012] WASAT 98

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: VOCATIONAL REGULATION

ACT: LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 2008 (WA)

CITATION: QUINLIVAN and LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE [2012] WASAT 98

MEMBER: JUSTICE J A CHANEY (PRESIDENT)

HEARD: DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS

DELIVERED : 10 MAY 2012

FILE NO/S: VR 128 of 2011

BETWEEN: LYNETTE PATRICIA QUINLIVAN
Applicant
AND
LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
First Respondent
GRAHAM EDWARD WIMBRIDGE
Second Respondent

Catchwords:

Legal practitioner - Complaints dismissed by Legal Profession Complaints Committee - Complaints found to be unreasonable - Leave to seek review - Proper approach to leave application - Whether complaints the subject of leave application were before Committee - Whether Committee's decision wrong or attended with doubt

Legislation:

Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 425, s 435(2)
School Education Act 1999 (WA), s 242, s 242(1)(c), s 242(1)(d)
School Education Regulations 2000 (WA), reg 78, reg 78(2)

Result:

Leave refused

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr L Tsaknis
First Respondent           :     N/A
Second Respondent       :     Mr AJ Sefton

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Self-represented
First Respondent           :     Law Complaints Officer
Second Respondent       :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Neil and the Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2010] WASAT 39
Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 295

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary of Tribunal's decision

The applicant sought leave to review a decision of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee to dismiss a number of complaints made by her against a legal practitioner, Mr Graham Edward Wimbridge. The Committee had found each of the complaints against Mr Wimbridge to be unreasonable so that the applicant required leave before being entitled to seek a review of that decision.
The applicant did not seek to have the decision reviewed in relation to all of her original five complaints. She identified four matters in respect of which she sought a review. The Tribunal determined that two of those four matters had not, in substance, been the subject of complaint to the Committee, and accordingly had not been dealt with by it. The two other matters had been the subject of complaint considered by the Committee, but the Tribunal agreed with the Committee that there was no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct in relation to those matters. Accordingly, leave was refused in respect of all four matters.

Introduction

On 13 June 2011, the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (Committee) dismissed a number of complaints by the applicant, Ms Quinlivan, concerning the conduct of a legal practitioner, Mr Graham Edward Wimbridge (second respondent). Mr Wimbridge was employed as a practitioner within the Department of Education and Training (Department). In dismissing the complaints, the Committee specifically found each of the complaints to be unreasonable.
Ms Quinlivan wishes to have the Tribunal review the decision to dismiss the complaints. By reason of the finding of the Committee that the complaints were unreasonable, the applicant requires leave, pursuant to s 435(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (LP Act) to seek a review.

The approach to leave

The test as to whether leave should be granted under s 435(2) of the LP Act is now well established. The Tribunal has adopted the criteria for the grant of leave which were identified in a different context in the decision in Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 295 at 294. Those criteria are that:
1.It must be shown that the decision in respect of which leave is sought was wrong, or at least attended with sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave; and
2.In addition, that substantial injustice would be done by leaving the decision unreversed. What is substantial injustice must depend on all the circumstances of the case.
The applicant, in the submissions filed on her behalf, acknowledges that test as applicable for a grant of leave under s 435(2) of the LP Act. The submissions proceed, however, to argue that the Committee's decision that the complaints were unreasonable was wrong or attended with doubt. That misconceives the function of the Tribunal. The question to be asked, in the context of the application for leave, is whether the decision to dismiss the complaints was wrong or attended with doubt. It is that decision which is 'the decision in respect of which leave is sought'. A finding by the Committee that a complaint is trivial, unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous, is not a decision susceptible to review by the Tribunal. It is a finding, not a decision. The finding merely has the consequence of subjecting the right of review of the substantive decision (to dismiss the complaint) to a preliminary requirement for leave. In Neil and the Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2010] WASAT 39 at [20] - [21] I said:
20In other contexts, the object of a requirement for leave is said to be to reduce appeals as much as possible: Wilson v Metaxas (1989) WAR 285 at 294 (Wilson). In my view, that is the obvious intent of s 435(2) of the LP Act. The primary responsibility for the bringing of complaints to the Tribunal rests with the Committee. The scheme of the LP Act is that a range of persons may make a complaint about an Australian legal practitioner (s 410). A complaint having been made, it falls upon the Committee to follow one or more of the procedures prescribed by the LP Act in relation to the complaint. It is given the power subject to certain conditions being met, to deal summarily with a complaint (s 42) to summarily dismiss a complaint (s 415) or to refer the complaint to the Tribunal (s 428). Unlike any other vocational regulation acts which confer disciplinary jurisdiction on the Tribunal, s 435 gives a right of review to complainants aggrieved by a decision of the Committee to dismiss a complaint.
21It is clear that the legislature did not intend that all aggrieved complainants should have an unfettered right to seek review regardless of the Committee's view as to the merits of the complaint or regardless of whether a complainant had any direct personal interest in the matter the subject of complaint. Section 435(2) is clearly designed to restrict applications for review where the complaint is being dismissed because the Committee forms the view that it is trivial, unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous, or where the complainant does not have, or did not have, a direct personal interest.
It is not to the point, therefore, to argue that the Committee's decision that a complaint was trivial, unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous (as the case may be) was not correct. Even if the Tribunal were to agree with arguments to that effect, that would add nothing to the question as to whether leave should be granted. The first question to be answered by the Tribunal would still be whether under s 425 of the LP Act that there is no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty by the Tribunal of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, or that it is in the public interest to dismiss the claim, was wrong or attended to with sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave.

Background to the complaints

Ms Quinlivan is a legal practitioner, but her dealings with Mr Wimbridge did not arise in her capacity as a lawyer. Mr Wimbridge was, at the relevant time, the Legal Manager of the Department.
In 2008, Ms Quinlivan had a son enrolled at the Mount Claremont Primary School kindergarten. The school had expressed concern about the behaviour of the applicant's son, and Ms Quinlivan in turn had expressed concern about the treatment of her son by the school. After a meeting to discuss matters in late 2008, which failed to resolve matters, Ms Quinlivan wrote to the Principal of the Mount Claremont Primary School advising that she proposed commencing legal action against the principal and two teachers and that she was withdrawing her son from the school.
In 2009, Ms Quinlivan's son commenced schooling at the Floreat Park Primary School.
By June 2009, concerns on the part of the principal of Floreat Park Primary School had arisen in relation to Ms Quinlivan's son's alleged behaviour. Those concerns led to a threat of suspension and an incident between the Deputy Principal and Ms Quinlivan which the latter considered humiliating and discriminatory. By letter dated 29 June 2009, Ms Quinlivan made a complaint to the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity of discrimination against both her and her son.
It was apparent that the relationship between the applicant, the staff, and some parents, at the Floreat Park Primary School became quite conflictual.
On 11 November 2009, the Principal of the Floreat Park Primary School issued a prohibition order pursuant to reg 78 of the School Education Regulations 2000 (WA), prohibiting Ms Quinlivan from entering the grounds of the school.
It is apparent that Mr Wimbridge, as the Department's solicitor, became involved in dealings with Ms Quinlivan in the context of the conflict outlined above.

Ms Quinlivan's complaints

In its letter to Ms Quinlivan of 13 June 2011, the Committee explained its reasons for dismissing each of five complaints made by her. Although dealt with in a different order, the five complaints addressed by the Committee were those set out in a letter from Ms Quinlivan to the Committee of 13 September 2010. Ms Quinlivan had initially complained to the Committee about Mr Wimbridge in a letter dated 17 December 2009, and had made further complaints in letters of 15 February 2010 and 9 March 2010. The letter of 13 September 2010 appears to be a summary of the various complaints which had been made in earlier correspondence. The complaints identified in the letter of 13 September 2010 were as follows:
1.Mr Wimbridge knowingly allowed the issue of an illegal prohibition order.
2.The basis for certain complaints that had been made about Ms Quinlivan's conduct was 'wrong'. (The Committee, in its decision letter, described this as a complaint that Mr Wimbridge had made a false complaint to the Committee in the sense that Mr Wimbridge was 'responsible' for the complaint in question but that it was in fact made in the name of a senior departmental official, Mr Blagaich).
3.Mr Wimbridge breached s 242 of the SchoolEducation Act 1999 (WA) by breaching confidentiality and thereby committing an offence.
4.Mr Wimbridge was grossly discourteous in failing to respond to correspondence in August 2009.
5.Mr Wimbridge failed to advise Department of Education staff of the legal principle of natural justice.
The applicant did not seek leave to review the Committee's decision in relation to all five matters. Rather, by her amended application for review, the applicant sought leave to apply for review of four complaints which she described as follows:
(a)that Mr Wimbridge assisted Mr Blagaich to make a complaint to the first Committee on 12 August 2009 in retaliation for the practitioner pursuing legitimate concerns concerning the treatment of her young son at Floreat Park Primary School and the discrimination of the applicant on the basis that she was a single mother, which concerns included the making of a complaint by the applicant against the Department of Education and Training to the Equal Opportunity Commission of Western Australia; and
(b)that Mr Wimbridge made a complaint to the Committee in his own name on 16 December 2010 shortly after being advised by the applicant's solicitor, Mr Lemonis, that the applicant would be commencing legal action against the Department of Education and Training and its staff for defamation in retaliation for the applicant proposing to commence that action;
(c)that Mr Wimbridge allowed or encouraged to be issued a prohibition order pursuant to regulation 78 of the School Education Regulations 1999 (WA) which he knew to be, or was reckless as to whether the issuing of the order was permitted or constituted an abuse of process and was unlawful;
(d)that in providing documents in support of his complaint to the Committee Mr Wimbridge breached, or was reckless as to whether the provision of the documents breached s 242 of the School Education Act 1999 (WA);
The second respondent contends that alleged complaint (a) was not made to, or investigated or dismissed by, the Committee, and was not the gravamen or substance of any complaint made by the applicant to the Committee.
In dealing with the second complaint identified in the letter of 13 October 2010, (which most closely resembles complaint (a)) the Committee said the following:
In connection with the complaint that the practitioner made a 'false' complaint to the Committee, there is no evidence that the complaint was false. The falsity alleged was that the practitioner was 'responsible' for the complaint in question but that it was made in the name of a senior departmental official. That official signed his name to the complaint and thereby authenticated the document as his. The lodging of that document with the Committee was his responsibility as the complainant. The fact that the practitioner may have drafted the document or counselled or recommended to the official as part of his departmental duties that he make a complaint to the Committee about the conduct of the complainant did not alter the fact that the official was the author of the complaint. The complaint is misconceived.
Complaint (a) as framed above focuses upon a motivation said to exist for Mr Wimbridge's assistance to Mr Blagaich in making the complaint. It is clearly different from what the Committee took to be the complaint.
The applicant's submissions identify a letter to the Committee of 22 February 2010 as containing complaint (a). (I note that this was not one of the letters identified in paragraph 5 of the applicant's submissions as containing the applicant's complaints against the practitioner). In the letter of 22 February 2010, Ms Quinlivan referred to email correspondence which she said made it clear that Mr Wimbridge 'was responsible for the professional complaint of Mr Blagaich against' her. She then refers to the fact that 'the professional complaint orchestrated by Mr Wimbridge the Head Department Solicitor was made within weeks of [her] commencing a legal complaint against the Department at the Equal Opportunity Commission in late June 2009'. She continued, 'It appears Mr Wimbridge though [sic thought] it would look better for a bureaucrat to make the complaint instead of the Head Solicitor'.
The Committee identifies the 'false complaint' allegation as having been made in a facsimile from Ms Quinlivan to the Committee of 9 March 2010. In that facsimile, Ms Quinlivan said:
In your letter of 4 March 2010 you state you have concerns about releasing information to me about legal advice Mr Wimbridge gave to the Department. You state that in your letter knowing that he has made a complaint against me that I falsely accused him of being responsible for the Blagaich complaint. I have provided Mr Lemonis' email, which confirms Mr Wimbridge, confirmed to Mr Lemonis at a meeting on 7 December 2009 that he recommended the complaint and was responsible for it. In the circumstances it would appear Mr Wimbridge has made a false complaint against me to your office. I hereby report him for that matter as well.
In her letter of 13 September 2010, in relation to the second complaint referred to in that letter, Ms Quinlivan said:
Mr Lemonis has stated categorically he is left with no doubt that Mr Wimbridge confirmed at the meeting on 7 December 2009 he was responsible for the Blagaich complaint. Mr Wimbridge did not mention consulting any other persons or seeking advice from any one else. Mr Wimbridge was the Head Lawyer at the Department of Education and he recommended the complaint and put it under the name of Mr Blagaich. It is of significance the complaint was made immediately after I made a legal complaint to the Equal Opportunity Commission and by the Head Lawyer, Mr Wimbridge but under the name of a senior bureaucrat. A former Minister for Education has advised me that the Department of Education has a reputation for bullying parents that they perceive cause trouble. This is clearly demonstrated in this case.
In a later letter of 2 November 2010 to the Committee, Ms Quinlivan reiterated her five complaints. In relation to her second complaint, under the heading 'The basis for the complaints about me are wrong', Ms Quinlivan dealt only with the question of who was responsible for the making of the complaint, and did not touch upon the motivation for its making.
I agree with the second respondent's submission that the question of motivation for the complaint by Mr Blagaich, whist mentioned in some correspondence, was never the gravamen of any complaint concerning Mr Wimbridge's conduct. It is quite clear from the Committee's decision letter that it did not consider improper motive to be the substance of the complaint. Ms Quinlivan's reference to motivation in her letter of 22 February 2010 was mentioned in the following paragraph:
The fact both professional complaints were made clearly in response to legal action I was taking against the Department forms part of my further victimization claim against the Department in the Equal Opportunity Commission which I am about to file. This will be the third legal action I have instigated against the Department and its employees. This should demonstrate the appalling manner that the Department and its employees have treated my son and me.
I accept the second respondent's submission that complaint (a) was not the subject of consideration by the Committee, and was not a complaint which was before it. For that reason, leave should not be given under s 435(2) the LP Act in relation to complaint (a).
I would add in passing, however, that nothing in the applicant's submissions identifies evidence which might lead to a conclusion that there was a reasonable likelihood that Mr Wimbridge might be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct for causing a complaint to be made for an improper motivation. The submissions identify Mr Wimbridge's responses to the complaints in which he acknowledges that he was involved in the decision to make the complaint, says that he considered the matter with Mr Blagaich, consulted line management, and took advice from a senior practitioner outside the Department. He says that, having taken those steps, he considered (and still considers) the complaint to have been justified. The applicant's submissions complain of lack of particularity surrounding those assertions. She relies on an inference to be drawn from the timing of certain events to support her allegation. In the absence of anything more, I do not consider there to be a reasonable likelihood that that inference could be drawn.

Complaint (b)

The applicant relies again on the letter of 22 February 2010 to the Committee as containing complaint (b). There was reference in that letter to the complaint made in Mr Wimbridge's name to the Committee having been made within days of the applicant's solicitor advising the Department of instructions to commence legal action. That comment was, however, made in the same context as the reference to Mr Blagaich's complaint, namely that those matters would form the subject matter of complaints to the Equal Opportunity Commission. In none of the later summaries of complaints made by Ms Quinlivan did she identify improper motivation for the second complaint against her as being the subject matter of complaint against Mr Wimbridge. It was not a complaint considered by the Committee for that reason.

There is no basis for a grant of leave in relation to complaint (b).

Complaint (c)

The complaint concerning the issue of a prohibition order under reg 78 of the School Education Regulations 2000 (WA) was a complaint made to and considered by the Committee. The substance of the complaint was that, as solicitor for the Department of Education, Mr Wimbridge knowingly allowed a prohibition order to be issued when he knew or ought to have known that it was an abuse of the regulations and was illegal. The illegality was said to arise from the fact that Ms Quinlivan had made no threats of harm to any teacher nor committed any assault or threat of assault in respect of any teacher. The second respondent accepts, in these proceedings, that it is not, and was not, suggested that Ms Quinlivan had engaged in or threatened any physical violence.
The Committee, in dealing with this application, noted that reg 78 is 'not without some ambiguity'. The Committee concluded that:
The practitioner held, and continues to hold, one view about the proper interpretation of the regulation and the complainant holds another view. Each has considered and provided reasons for rejecting the other's view. It is not necessary that the Committee reach a conclusion and the Committee expresses no view, about the correct interpretation. …
There is no evidence that the practitioner's interpretation of regulation 78 was and is not honestly held, nor that it is blatantly incorrect, recklessly formed or unreasonable in all the circumstances. There is no evidence for the complainant's contention that the practitioner's motive for forming his view of the regulation was part of some malicious campaign against her and her son by the Department of Education staff. There is no factual basis to believe that the practitioner counselled the Principal to issue an invalid prohibition order, knowing it to be invalid.
Section 78 of the School Education Regulations 2000 empowers a Principal of a government school to make an order prohibiting a person from entering school premises for a period up to 60 days. Regulation 78(2) provides that the Principal is not to make a prohibition order against a person unless satisfied that the person would be likely to 'cause physical harm to, or apprehension or fear in, another person when that other person is on the school's premises' and the making of an order is an appropriate way of dealing with a matter.
The substance of Ms Quinlivan's complaint about Mr Wimbridge is that he was involved in causing the prohibition order when there was no basis upon which the Principal could have been satisfied as to the relevant matters.
Mr Wimbridge's actual involvement in relation to advice concerning, or the preparation and issue of, the prohibition order is unclear. In a letter to him of 4 March 2010, the Committee posed several questions to Mr Wimbridge as to the extent of his involvement in the issue of the prohibition order. Mr Wimbridge responded on 13 April 2010. He denied the allegations relating to the prohibition order. He noted that the complaints related to legal advice and raised the issue of legal professional privilege. He did not otherwise address specific questions put to him.
Although the details of Mr Wimbridge's involvement in the prohibition order were never spelt out to the Committee, it is at least implicit from the submissions made on his behalf before the Tribunal, that he was personally involved in the decision to issue the prohibition notice. That inference can be drawn from the second respondent's submission that he held a broader view as to the scope of the regulation than did the applicant. I am prepared to assume for present purposes that Mr Wimbridge was involved in relation to advice and issue of the prohibition order.
Mr Wimbridge's construction of reg 78 is that the 'apprehension or fear' referred to is not required to be an apprehension or fear of physical violence. Amongst the papers produced to the Tribunal are letters dated 28 August 2009 and 4 November 2009 to the applicant from the Principal of Floreat Park Primary School and from the Director of Schools within the Department of Education. The first makes reference to an opinion that conduct of Ms Quinlivan constituted harassment and intimidation of staff and caused stress. The second made reference to 'the level of apprehension roused in the staff' by Ms Quinlivan's communications with them. Presumably, it was concerns of that nature which would have been conveyed to Mr Wimbridge and which, on his construction of reg 78, would provide a basis upon which the order might issue.
In the circumstances, I do not consider that the conclusion reached by the Committee about this complaint was wrong, or attended by sufficient doubt to justify a grant of leave. There is no basis for concluding Mr Wimbridge did not honestly hold the view as to the correct interpretation of reg 78 which he expressed, or that that view is unreasonable. As the Committee noted, it was not necessary for it, and it is not necessary for the Tribunal, to form any concluded view as to the correct interpretation of reg 78. It is enough to say, and I find, that the construction argued for by Mr Wimbridge is plainly arguable. Even if that view might ultimately be found to be wrong, the expression of that view, and taking action based upon it, does not, in my view, give rise to any reasonable likelihood that Mr Wimbridge would be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct, and much less professional misconduct, in relation to the allegation.
Leave should not be granted in relation to complaint (c).

Complaint (d)

This complaint was contained in Ms Quinlivan's letter to the Committee of 13 September 2010, and was dealt with by the Committee. The complaint was expressed in the letter as follows:
As Mr Wimbridge has confirmed he was responsible for the Blagaich complaint he has breached s 242 of the Education Act. It is a requirement of the School Education Act to maintain confidentiality or it is an offence. Mr Wimbridge without my consent released numerous documents that were confidential and released them to your office. This is a breach of the law.
Section 242 of the School Education Act 1999 (WA) makes it an offence to disclose or make use of information to which the section applies except in certain circumstances. The section applies to information contained in any register or document in the possession or under the control of, amongst others, the Department or the Principal of a government school. One of the exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure is a disclosure 'with the authority of the Minister and all persons to whom the information relates' - s 242(1)(d). A further exception is disclosure under and in accordance with the School Education Act 1999 or any other law - s 242(1)(c).
The Committee concluded that the information in documents provided by Mr Blagaich in support of his complaint to the Committee was authorised by the provisions of s 242(1)(c) and (d) of the School Education Act 1999 (WA) and that there was no evidence that the practitioner had breached s 242 of the Act.
Paragraph (d) of the amended application makes reference to the provision of documents by Mr Wimbridge in support of 'his complaint'. It is clear that the complaint considered by the Committee related to the provision of documents by Mr Wimbridge in relation to the original complaint by Mr Blagaich, rather than Mr Wimbridge's subsequent complaint about the applicant. I take the reference to 'his complaint' in paragraph (d) of the amended application to be an error.
Amongst the materials filed by the applicant was a letter from Mr Wimbridge to the Committee enclosing what was said to be an authority provided by the Deputy Director General Schools for the disclosure of information pursuant to s 242(1)(d) of the School Education Act 1999 (WA). The enclosure to that document records that the Deputy Director General Schools has delegated authority to allow disclosure of information pursuant to s 242(1)(d). It is a request for authority from Mr Wimbridge, and it bears an annotation in handwriting which says 'Authority given' and bears a signature which appears to be the signature of the Deputy Director General Schools. No doubt those documents form the basis upon which the Committee concluded that there had been no breach of s 242(1)(d).
In her submissions, the applicant queries the effectiveness of any delegation of the Minister's powers in relation to s 242(1)(d), and complains that no evidence of valid authority was provided. The applicant also complains that the material to be disclosed is not adequately described in the authority. The applicant further complains that the practitioner does not, in his response to the Committee, address the requirements of s 242 'as he perceived them, whether he was alive to the above issues concerning the scope of, and his understanding of s 242 of the Education Act, his motives, and what, if any role, he had in the preparation of the authorisation'.
In my view, the Committee was entitled to rely upon the validity of the authority provided to it. It was not necessary for it to seek further information from Mr Wimbridge to verify the authenticity or the validity of the document. In the absence of a request from the Committee to do so, Mr Wimbridge was not required to provide that information. What role the practitioner had in obtaining the authority is of no relevance. It is clear from the document that he requested the authority, as was entirely appropriate. Nor is it of significance, if it was the case, that the authority was sought in a context where allegations had been made against Mr Wimbridge.
I do not consider that the applicant has demonstrated that the decision of the Committee in relation to complaint (d) was wrong or is attended by doubt.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, the application for leave to review the decisions of the Committee to dismiss complaints by Ms Quinlivan against Mr Wimbridge should be refused.
In the second respondent's submissions, it was submitted that leave should be refused, and the second respondent should have liberty to apply in relation to the question of costs. It is open for an application for costs to be made by the second respondent, should he be so advised, without any formal grant of liberty to apply. There will, however, be a direction that any application for costs is to be made to the Tribunal by letter within 14 days of the date of delivery of these reasons, in which case, the matter will be listed for directions.

Orders

1.The application for leave to apply for a review of the decision of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee made 13 June 2011 to dismiss the applicant's complaints against the second respondent is refused.
2.Any application for costs in relation to the proceedings is to be made by letter to the Tribunal within 14 days of the date of this order.

I certify that this and the preceding [47] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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JUSTICE J A CHANEY, PRESIDENT