FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1025
Citation: Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1025 Parties: SHANE QUIGLEY v LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885) and RICHARD TENSER File number: NSD 1750 of 2013 Judge: EDMONDS J Date of judgment: 23 September 2014 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 r 15.04(b) Cases cited: Chen v Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 cited
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 Ch 204 cited
Vplus Holdings Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (2012) 91 ACSR 545 citedDate of hearing: 12 September 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 20 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr SA Wells Solicitor for the Applicant: Lazarus Legal Group Pty Ltd Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Bennett
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1750 of 2013
BETWEEN: SHANE QUIGLEY
ApplicantAND: LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885)
First RespondentRICHARD TENSER
Second RespondentJUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 SEPTEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Insofar as leave is required, the second respondent have leave to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and a Statement of Cross-Claim in the forms annexed “RT-14” to the affidavit of Richard Tenser sworn 11 August 2014.
2.Costs of the application be costs in the cause.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1750 of 2013
BETWEEN: SHANE QUIGLEY
ApplicantAND: LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885)
First RespondentRICHARD TENSER
Second RespondentJUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
23 SEPTEMBER 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an interlocutory application filed 12 August 2014 by the second respondent (“Mr Tenser”) for leave to file a notice of cross-claim and a statement of cross-claim (together “cross-claim”) against the applicant (“Mr Quigley”), in the forms annexed to the affidavit of Mr Tenser sworn 11 August 2014, filed 12 August 2014 and read on the hearing in support of the application.
On 1 August 2014, Mr Quigley, through his solicitors, had been provided with a copy of the proposed cross-claim. By letter dated 5 August 2014, Mr Quigley’s solicitors indicated that their client did not consent to the filing of this process.
On the hearing of the application I indicated that I did not think Mr Tenser required the leave of the Court to file his cross-claim. A respondent can file a cross-claim without the leave of the Court prior to filing his affidavit evidence in reply to the applicant’s affidavit evidence in the principal proceeding: r 15.04(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (“FCR”). The respondents’ affidavit evidence in the principal proceeding was only filed on 4 August 2014. The cross-claim was served on Mr Quigley on 1 August 2014. It was not…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1025
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the defendant had leave to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and a Statement of Cross-Claim. The court held that the defendant had a valid claim against the second respondent, as the second respondent's actions were the proximate cause of the termination of Quigley's membership. The court found that the defendant's cross-claim was relevant and necessary to the resolution of the case, and that it was in the interests of justice to allow the defendant to bring the cross-claim. The court also held that the defendant's cross-claim did not unduly delay or complicate the proceedings.
In conclusion, the court granted leave for the defendant to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and a Statement of Cross-Claim against the second respondent. The court held that the defendant's cross-claim was relevant and necessary to the resolution of the case, and that it was in the interests of justice to allow the defendant to bring the cross-claim. The court also held that the defendant's cross-claim did not unduly delay or complicate the proceedings. The costs of the application were to be costs in the cause.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Insofar as leave is required, the second respondent have leave to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and a Statement of Cross-Claim in the forms annexed “RT-14” to the affidavit of Richard Tenser sworn 11 August 2014.
2. Costs of the application be costs in the cause.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was initially brought before the Federal Circuit Court, where the plaintiff, Quigley, filed a statement of claim against the Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd. The defendants responded with a defence and a counterclaim against a third party for contribution. The second respondent sought leave to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and a Statement of Cross-Claim against a third party, which was the subject of the current application. This application was heard by the court, which considered the necessity of granting the leave to file the cross-claim and associated documents.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the second respondent should be granted leave to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and a Statement of Cross-Claim against a third party.
2. If leave is granted, what form the Notice of Cross-Claim and Statement of Cross-Claim should take, as specified in the affidavit of Richard Tenser sworn 11 August 2014.
Held
1. The court granted leave to the second respondent to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and a Statement of Cross-Claim against a third party.
2. The form of the Notice of Cross-Claim and Statement of Cross-Claim was specified to be as outlined in the affidavit of Richard Tenser sworn 11 August 2014.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the application for leave to file a Notice of Cross-Claim and Statement of Cross-Claim by the second respondent. The central issue was whether the second respondent should be permitted to bring a cross-claim against a third party. The court examined the relevant procedural rules and the merits of allowing such a claim. The decision was grounded in the principles of procedural fairness and the flexibility afforded by the Federal Court Rules 2011.
In assessing the application, the court highlighted the importance of ensuring that all parties have the opportunity to have their claims and defences fully ventilated in the proceedings. The court noted the second respondent’s affidavit and the proposed forms of the Notice of Cross-Claim and Statement of Cross-Claim. The affidavit detailed the basis for the cross-claim and demonstrated that the cross-claim related directly to the subject matter of the existing proceedings.
The court further considered the potential impact on the efficiency and fairness of the proceedings if the cross-claim was permitted. It was determined that allowing the cross-claim would not unduly prejudice the other parties or delay the resolution of the main proceedings. The court was satisfied that the proposed form of the cross-claim was appropriate and adhered to the requirements of procedural fairness.
In granting leave, the court referenced the principles established in relevant case law, which support the allowance of cross-claims where they are directly connected to the subject matter of the original proceedings and do not unduly prejudice other parties. The court noted that the second respondent's cross-claim met these criteria and that the proposed forms complied with the procedural requirements set out in the Federal Court Rules 2011.
The court also addressed the costs of the application, determining that they should be costs in the cause. This decision was based on the overall fairness and the necessity of the application for the proper administration of justice. The court concluded that the second respondent’s application should succeed, and it ordered that leave be granted in the specified form.