FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1421
Citation: Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1421 Parties: SHANE QUIGLEY v LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885) and RICHARD TENSER File number: NSD 1750 of 2013 Judge: EDMONDS J Date of judgment: 17 December 2015 Catchwords: CONTRACT – whether more than one contract – terms of contract as to repayment of advance thereunder – whether advance presently repayable – terms on which second advance is repayable – whether advance presently repayable Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 82 Cases cited: Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 applied Dates of hearing: 21, 22, 25 May and 23 June 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Wells Solicitor for the Applicant: Lazarus Legal Group Pty Ltd Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Bennett Solicitor for the Respondents: Cordato Partners
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1750 of 2013
BETWEEN: SHANE QUIGLEY
Applicant/Cross-RespondentAND: LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885)
First RespondentRICHARD TENSER
Second Respondent/Cross-Claimant
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 DECEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The first respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $75,000 within 21 days of the date of these orders by tender of a bank cheque in that sum.
2.On tender of the sum referred to in Order 1, the applicant tender a signed registrable Transfer of all shares in the first respondent registered in the names of the applicant or any person associated with the applicant in favour of the second respondent or as the second respondent directs.
3.The first respondent pay 50% of the applicant’s costs of his claim as agreed or taxed; and the cross-claimant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of defending the cross-claim as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1750 of 2013
BETWEEN: SHANE QUIGLEY
Applicant/Cross-RespondentAND: LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885)
First RespondentRICHARD TENSER
Second Respondent/Cross-Claimant
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
17 DECEMBER 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND
For some time since early 2012, the first respondent (“Lunchalot”) has developed a website-based business that provides incentives to customers in the form of discounts at restaurants. The second respondent, Mr Tenser, and his wife (“Mrs Tenser”) have worked in the business on a full-time basis since it commenced. Mr Tenser is a director and shareholder of Lunchalot.
The applicant, Mr Quigley, has experience in marketing for various businesses by implementing search engine optimisation (“SEO”) services (for example, through Google) that raise the profile or ranking of a brand’s internet presence. He conducted this business through an entity known as Epiphany Solutions Pty Ltd (“Epiphany Solutions”) which was based in the United Kingdom…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1421
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the communications between the parties, particularly focusing on the 14 November 2012 agreement, which detailed the terms of the first advance. The court found that there was no evidence of a second agreement, only subsequent negotiations which were always "subject to contract". The court rejected Mr Tenser's claims that Mr Quigley breached the 14 November 2012 agreement in relation to the purchase of shares and the provision of services. The court concluded that Mr Quigley's claims for repayment of the advances had merit, as there was no evidence to support the existence of a second agreement.
The court ordered that Lunchalot must repay to Mr Quigley the sum of $75,000 within 21 days of the date of the orders, and on repayment, Mr Quigley must transfer all shares in Lunchalot to Mr Tenser. Additionally, Lunchalot was ordered to pay 50% of Mr Quigley's costs, and Mr Tenser was ordered to pay Mr Quigley's costs of defending the cross-claim. The court's decision was based on the lack of evidence for a second agreement and the finding that the claims for breach of the 14 November 2012 agreement were unsubstantiated.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $75,000 within 21 days of the date of these orders by tender of a bank cheque in that sum.
2. On tender of the sum referred to in Order 1, the applicant tender a signed registrable Transfer of all shares in the first respondent registered in the names of the applicant or any person associated with the applicant in favour of the second respondent or as the second respondent directs.
3. The first respondent pay 50% of the applicant’s costs of his claim as agreed or taxed; and the cross-claimant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of defending the cross-claim as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by outlining the substance of Mr Quigley’s claims against the respondents, which was the recovery of the amounts of $50,000 and $75,000 advanced to Lunchalot, and the substance of Mr Tenser’s claims against Mr Quigley, which was for damages for alleged breaches of contract. The court then examined the critical facts that were in dispute between the parties, focusing on the conversations between Mr Quigley and Mr Tenser. The court preferred and accepted the versions deposed to by Mr Quigley over those of Mr Tenser and Mrs Tenser, leading to a conclusion that Mr Quigley should succeed in his claims against Lunchalot and Mr Tenser, and that Mr Tenser’s cross-claim against Mr Quigley should be dismissed. The court then addressed the first issue of whether there was more than one contract between the parties, specifically a "second agreement" in addition to the 14 November 2012 agreement. The court found that there was no "second" agreement and that everything after the 14 November 2012 agreement was "subject to contract". The court moved on to the second issue of whether the advance of $50,000 was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement. The court held that it was not presently repayable. The third issue was whether the terms on which a second advance of $75,000 was repayable were clearly defined and enforceable. The court found that the terms were not clearly defined and therefore not enforceable. Finally, the court addressed the fourth issue of whether the advance of $75,000 was presently repayable under any agreed terms. The court held that it was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement. The court’s reasoning was based on the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement and the subsequent events that occurred. The court found that there was no "second" agreement between the parties and that the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement were clear. The court also found that the advance of $50,000 was not presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement, and that the terms on which a second advance of $75,000 was repayable were not clearly defined and therefore not enforceable. Finally, the court held that the advance of $75,000 was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where there is a dispute over the terms of a contract, the court will examine the written agreement and the subsequent events to determine the terms of the contract. The court will also examine the credibility of the parties’ versions of events and prefer the version that is more likely to be true. In this case, the court found that there was no "second" agreement between the parties and that the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement were clear. The court also found that the advance of $50,000 was not presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement, and that the terms on which a second advance of $75,000 was repayable were not clearly defined and therefore not enforceable. Finally, the court held that the advance of $75,000 was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement.