Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1421

Citation: Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1421
Parties: SHANE QUIGLEY v LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885) and RICHARD TENSER
File number: NSD 1750 of 2013
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 17 December 2015
Catchwords: CONTRACT – whether more than one contract – terms of contract as to repayment of advance thereunder – whether advance presently repayable – terms on which second advance is repayable – whether advance presently repayable
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 82
Cases cited: Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 applied
Dates of hearing: 21, 22, 25 May and 23 June 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Wells
Solicitor for the Applicant: Lazarus Legal Group Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Bennett
Solicitor for the Respondents: Cordato Partners

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1750 of 2013

BETWEEN:

SHANE QUIGLEY
Applicant/Cross-Respondent

AND:

LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885)
First Respondent

RICHARD TENSER
Second Respondent/Cross-Claimant

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $75,000 within 21 days of the date of these orders by tender of a bank cheque in that sum.

2.On tender of the sum referred to in Order 1, the applicant tender a signed registrable Transfer of all shares in the first respondent registered in the names of the applicant or any person associated with the applicant in favour of the second respondent or as the second respondent directs.

3.The first respondent pay 50% of the applicant’s costs of his claim as agreed or taxed; and the cross-claimant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of defending the cross-claim as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1750 of 2013

BETWEEN:

SHANE QUIGLEY
Applicant/Cross-Respondent

AND:

LUNCHALOT CLUB PTY LTD (ACN 154 977 885)
First Respondent

RICHARD TENSER
Second Respondent/Cross-Claimant

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

17 DECEMBER 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. For some time since early 2012, the first respondent (“Lunchalot”) has developed a website-based business that provides incentives to customers in the form of discounts at restaurants.  The second respondent, Mr Tenser, and his wife (“Mrs Tenser”) have worked in the business on a full-time basis since it commenced.  Mr Tenser is a director and shareholder of Lunchalot.

  2. The applicant, Mr Quigley, has experience in marketing for various businesses by implementing search engine optimisation (“SEO”) services (for example, through Google) that raise the profile or ranking of a brand’s internet presence.  He conducted this business through an entity known as Epiphany Solutions Pty Ltd (“Epiphany Solutions”) which was based in the United Kingdom…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1421
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Quigley v Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd involves a dispute between Mr Quigley and the respondents, Lunchalot Club Pty Ltd and Mr Tenser, concerning the repayment of two advances totalling $125,000 made by Mr Quigley to Lunchalot. The advances were made in the context of subsequent events following the provision of SEO services by Epiphany Solutions to Lunchalot. The primary issues before the court were the existence of a second agreement between the parties and the terms under which the advances were repayable. The court had to determine whether the advances were presently repayable, and if so, under what terms.

The court examined the communications between the parties, particularly focusing on the 14 November 2012 agreement, which detailed the terms of the first advance. The court found that there was no evidence of a second agreement, only subsequent negotiations which were always "subject to contract". The court rejected Mr Tenser's claims that Mr Quigley breached the 14 November 2012 agreement in relation to the purchase of shares and the provision of services. The court concluded that Mr Quigley's claims for repayment of the advances had merit, as there was no evidence to support the existence of a second agreement.

The court ordered that Lunchalot must repay to Mr Quigley the sum of $75,000 within 21 days of the date of the orders, and on repayment, Mr Quigley must transfer all shares in Lunchalot to Mr Tenser. Additionally, Lunchalot was ordered to pay 50% of Mr Quigley's costs, and Mr Tenser was ordered to pay Mr Quigley's costs of defending the cross-claim. The court's decision was based on the lack of evidence for a second agreement and the finding that the claims for breach of the 14 November 2012 agreement were unsubstantiated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $75,000 within 21 days of the date of these orders by tender of a bank cheque in that sum.

2. On tender of the sum referred to in Order 1, the applicant tender a signed registrable Transfer of all shares in the first respondent registered in the names of the applicant or any person associated with the applicant in favour of the second respondent or as the second respondent directs.

3. The first respondent pay 50% of the applicant’s costs of his claim as agreed or taxed; and the cross-claimant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of defending the cross-claim as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The substance of Mr Quigley’s claims against the respondents is the recovery of amounts, $50,000 and $75,000, which Mr Quigley advanced to Lunchalot in the period November 2012 to January 2013 in the context of events occurring after the commencement of the provision of SEO services by Epiphany Solutions to Lunchalot; and the substance of Mr Tenser’s claims against Mr Quigley are damages for alleged breaches of contract by Mr Quigley in the context of those same subsequent events. This is very much an over-simplification of the respective claims, but it will suffice for present purposes.THE FACTS While a large number of primary facts are not in dispute, there are a number of critical facts, which have their source in conversations between Mr Quigley and Mr Tenser on various occasions, on which the parties do not agree. With little or no hesitation, I prefer and accept the versions deposed to by Mr Quigley, or given by him in cross-examination, to the versions deposed to by Mr Tenser and Mrs Tenser, or given by them in cross-examination. Normally, that preference and acceptance would persuade me to conclude that Mr Quigley should succeed in the relief he seeks against Lunchalot and Mr Tenser and that Mr Tenser’s cross-claim against Mr Quigley should be dismissed. On the other hand, I hesitate to rush to that conclusion in the face of the wording the parties actually used in their written dialogue with each other. I shall deal firstly with the primary facts which do not appear to be in dispute. On 11 November 2012, Mr and Mrs Quigley attended Mr and Mrs Tenser’s home and stayed for dinner. The idea of Mr Quigley becoming personally involved in the business of Lunchalot and advancing the sum of $50,000 was raised through the course of the evening. Subsequently, on 14 November 2012 (following an exchange of emails between Mr Quigley and Mr Tenser over the period 12 and 13 November 2012), Mr Quigley entered into an agreement with Mr Tenser, which provided, inter alia: In consideration for an unsecured loan of $50,000 to the Company [Lunchalot] on terms outlined below, and the provision of your [Mr Quigley’s] ongoing services as outlined in the various correspondence between us, you will be issued with 200 shares in the Company which will represent 10% of the issued share capital of the Company. The timing of the advance of $50,000 was expressed in the 14 November 2012 agreement to be:–$10,000 payable on signing of these heads of agreement (“first payment”); and–$40,000 payable on signing of a Shareholders Agreement to be prepared and executed by November 30th 2012. On 21 November 2012, Mr Quigley consented to be a director of Lunchalot. On 22 November 2012, 200 shares were issued to Mr Quigley. At the time, Lunchalot had 2,000 ordinary shares on issue and Mr Quigley’s holding of 200 shares equated to 10%. (On 11 July 2013, Mrs Tenser filed an Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) form 484 whereby notice was given of a change in shareholdings. In particular, notice was given of the transfer of Mr Quigley’s 200 shares for $nil. Subsequently, additional shares were issued increasing the total number of shares to 2,000,000 and 188,595 shares [which equates to 9.4% of the total number of shares on issue] were transferred to Mr Quigley. These subsequent dealings with the shares, and the reasons for them, are explained in a letter dated 26 June 2014 from McCabes, the respondents’ former solicitors, but are not directly relevant to the issues in dispute. )

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the view I take, this claim has no foundation at all. In short, it is totally without merit. First, it claims damages for breach of the 14 November 2012 agreement in the sum of $135,093 and secondly damages for breach of a “second agreement” in the sum of $917,300. I have already found (see [39] above) that there is no “second” agreement; the only agreement that was ever reached by the parties was the 14 November 2012 agreement; everything after that date may have been a step along the way to a “second” agreement, but it was never reached. Everything that followed was “subject to contract”, in the sense of the third category of potential relationships coming out of Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353. And there is no evidence on which I am prepared to rely coming from Mr Tenser in support of Mr Quigley’s alleged breaches of the 14 November 2012 agreement, either in respect of the purchase of shares in Lunchalot or in the provision of services by Mr Quigley to Lunchalot.CONCLUSION Lunchalot must be ordered to repay to Mr Quigley the sum of $75,000 within twenty-one (21) days of the date hereof. On tender of such sum, Mr Quigley must tender a signed registrable transfer of all shares in Lunchalot registered in the names of Mr Quigley or any person associated with him in favour of Mr Tenser or as Mr Tenser directs. Lunchalot must pay 50% of Mr Quigley’s costs of his claim. Mr Tenser must pay Mr Quigley’s costs of defending Mr Tenser’s cross-claim.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by outlining the substance of Mr Quigley’s claims against the respondents, which was the recovery of the amounts of $50,000 and $75,000 advanced to Lunchalot, and the substance of Mr Tenser’s claims against Mr Quigley, which was for damages for alleged breaches of contract. The court then examined the critical facts that were in dispute between the parties, focusing on the conversations between Mr Quigley and Mr Tenser. The court preferred and accepted the versions deposed to by Mr Quigley over those of Mr Tenser and Mrs Tenser, leading to a conclusion that Mr Quigley should succeed in his claims against Lunchalot and Mr Tenser, and that Mr Tenser’s cross-claim against Mr Quigley should be dismissed. The court then addressed the first issue of whether there was more than one contract between the parties, specifically a "second agreement" in addition to the 14 November 2012 agreement. The court found that there was no "second" agreement and that everything after the 14 November 2012 agreement was "subject to contract". The court moved on to the second issue of whether the advance of $50,000 was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement. The court held that it was not presently repayable. The third issue was whether the terms on which a second advance of $75,000 was repayable were clearly defined and enforceable. The court found that the terms were not clearly defined and therefore not enforceable. Finally, the court addressed the fourth issue of whether the advance of $75,000 was presently repayable under any agreed terms. The court held that it was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement. The court’s reasoning was based on the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement and the subsequent events that occurred. The court found that there was no "second" agreement between the parties and that the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement were clear. The court also found that the advance of $50,000 was not presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement, and that the terms on which a second advance of $75,000 was repayable were not clearly defined and therefore not enforceable. Finally, the court held that the advance of $75,000 was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where there is a dispute over the terms of a contract, the court will examine the written agreement and the subsequent events to determine the terms of the contract. The court will also examine the credibility of the parties’ versions of events and prefer the version that is more likely to be true. In this case, the court found that there was no "second" agreement between the parties and that the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement were clear. The court also found that the advance of $50,000 was not presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement, and that the terms on which a second advance of $75,000 was repayable were not clearly defined and therefore not enforceable. Finally, the court held that the advance of $75,000 was presently repayable under the terms of the 14 November 2012 agreement.