[2007] HCATrans 494
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M54 of 2007
B e t w e e n -
QUEENSLAND PREMIER MINES PTY LTD, FRANK GEORGE BECKINSALE, HELEN MARY BECKINSALE, MARMINTA PTY LTD
Appellants
and
WALTER MURDOCH FRENCH
Respondent
GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 4 SEPTEMBER 2007, AT 10.17 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR C.L. PANNAM, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.S. GOLDBLATT, on behalf of the appellant. (instructed by Oakley Thompson & Co)
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.J. BICK, QC, for the respondent. (instructed by Norton Gledhill)
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Dr Pannam.
MR PANNAM: Your Honours, this appeal raises a short but important point arising in relation to the effect of the registration of a transfer of a Torrens system mortgage which mortgage only secures debts and obligations having their origin in agreements that collaterally or independently exist in a mortgage. The relevant section that is in question is section 62 of the Land Title Act (Qld). The facts that give rise to the particular question could not be simpler. If they are stripped of their essentials they can be put in the following way. It starts off with two simple contract debts that came into existence in October and November 1989.
Under the terms of those simple contract debts, they were constituted by an exchange of letters and under their terms a company called Seventeenth Febtor Pty Ltd, in the one, lent Queensland Premier Mines a sum of $560,000, in the other, jointly lent Queensland Premier Mines and Mr and Mrs Beckinsale some $410,000. What happened in relation to those simple contract arrangements was that Queensland Premier Mines, which was the owner of several properties at Yeppoon in Queensland, granted two registered mortgages over those properties.
The mortgages themselves were the typical all moneys, all accounts mortgages and contained the usual covenant to pay. What happened was in December 1992 Seventeenth Febtor assigned those mortgages to Mr French and not only did he sign the mortgages but there was an assignment of the underlying contractual debts. What then happened was that Mr French sold the mortgages to Marminta in December 1999/January 2000 under an exchange of correspondence that took place at that stage. That gave rise to a dispute as to whether there was a contract or not that was ultimately resolved by the Queensland Court of Appeal which held there was a binding contract and decreed specific performance of the contract to assign the mortgages to Marminta.
GLEESON CJ: A covenant to pay was a covenant of Queensland Premier Mines Propriety Ltd?
MR PANNAM: Yes, it was.
GLEESON CJ: Only, about the promise of Mr and Mrs B.
MR PANNAM: Beckinsale?
GLEESON CJ: Yes.
MR PANNAM: Yes.…
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- Case
- [2007] HCATrans 494
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the deed of settlement and release, which contained a broad release of all claims, operated to preclude the respondent from pursuing his claim for misleading and deceptive conduct. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the terms of the deed were sufficiently clear and unambiguous to encompass the release of such statutory causes of action, or if the alleged misleading and deceptive conduct rendered the deed itself voidable, thereby preventing its operation.
The High Court, by majority, held that the deed of settlement and release did not preclude the respondent from pursuing his claim. The Court reasoned that for a release to be effective in extinguishing a statutory cause of action, the language of the release must be sufficiently clear and specific to demonstrate an intention to release that particular type of claim. In this instance, the general wording of the release was not considered sufficient to encompass the statutory claim for misleading and deceptive conduct, particularly given the circumstances in which the deed was executed. The Court applied the principle that general words of release will not be construed to release unknown or future causes of action unless the intention to do so is clearly and unequivocally expressed.
The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court affirming the decision of the Full Federal Court. The respondent was therefore permitted to pursue his claim for misleading and deceptive conduct notwithstanding the execution of the deed of settlement and release.
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