Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Queanbeyan Racing Club Ltd v Hannah Burton [2021] NSWSC 315 Hearing dates: 15 October 2020 Date of orders: 31 March 2021 Decision date: 31 March 2021 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: N Adams J Decision: (1) Summons is dismissed.
(2) Plaintiff is to pay the first defendant’s costs.
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – workers compensation – judicial review of decision of Medical Appeal Panel of the Workers Compensation Commission – assessment of Whole Person Impairment – dysesthesia – whether Appeal Panel went beyond grounds of appeal – whether use of definition of dysesthesia was introduction of new material – whether Panel failed to afford procedural fairness – whether Panel was bound to reconsider every aspect of previous MAC in issuing new MAC – summons dismissed
Legislation Cited: Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 66
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW), ss 319, 320, 321, 322, 322A, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328
Cases Cited: Drosd v Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer [2016] NSWSC 1053
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1
Midson v Workers Compensation Commission & Ors [2016] NSWSC 1352
Pascoe v Mechita Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 454
QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited v Meredith & Ors [2017] NSWSC 466
Roads and Maritime Services v Rodger Wilson [2016] NSWSC 1499
Siddik v WorkCover Authority of NSW [2008] NSWCA 116
Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127; [2004] NSWCA 174
Category: Principal judgment Parties: Queanbeyan Racing Club (Plaintiff)
Hannah Burton (First Defendant)
The Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission (Second Defendant)
Medical Appeal Panel (Third Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Mr C Jackson (Plaintiff)
Mr C Tanner (Defendant)
Leigh Virtue & Associates (Plaintiff)
Santone Lawyers (First Defendant)
File Number(s): 2020/90970 Publication restriction: Nil
Judgment
-
By summons dated 23 March 2020, the plaintiff, the Queanbeyan Racing Club (“QRC”), seeks judicial review of a decision of the third defendant, a Medical Appeal Panel (“the Panel”) constituted under s 328 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (“the 1998 Act”) on 5 March 2020. The first defendant, Ms Hannah Burton, is the injured worker and the second defendant is the Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission. The second and third defendants have filed submitting appearances.
-
QRC invokes this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, regulated by s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), and contends that the Panel fell into jurisdictional error when assessing the degree of Ms Burton’s whole person impairment (“WPI”). It seeks an order that the application be remitted to the second defendant for referral to a Medical Appeal Panel for determination according to law.
Relevant legislation
-
Part 7 of Chapter 7 of the 1998 Act provides for medical assessment of an injured worker seeking workers compensation where there is a “medical dispute”. This part has been amended as of 1 March 2021. The relevant provisions I…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Queanbeyan Racing Club Ltd v Hannah Burton and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] NSWSC 315
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the MAP had strayed beyond the grounds of appeal, introduced new material by using a specific definition of dysesthesia, failed to afford procedural fairness, and whether the MAP was obliged to reconsider every aspect of the previous Medical Assessment Conference (MAC) in issuing a new MAC. Burton argued that these errors in the MAP's decision warranted the Court to intervene.
In examining the issues, the Court found that the MAP did not exceed its jurisdiction by addressing the worker's condition of dysesthesia, as it was a relevant factor in assessing WPI. The use of a specific definition was not considered the introduction of new material, as it aligned with established medical literature and was not outside the scope of the MAP's expertise. Furthermore, the Court held that the MAP had afforded procedural fairness by providing Burton with an opportunity to present her case and respond to the MAP's findings. Finally, the Court ruled that the MAP was not mandated to reassess every detail from the previous MAC but could focus on the specific grounds of appeal. Consequently, the Court dismissed Burton's summons for judicial review.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated from Burton's appeal against the initial WPI assessment by the MAC. After the MAP issued its new WPI assessment, Burton applied for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court. The court considered whether the MAP had acted beyond its authority and whether procedural fairness was observed in the process. The case proceeded to a hearing where the court examined the MAP's decision in light of the legal principles governing judicial review of administrative decisions.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Appeal Panel went beyond the grounds of appeal in issuing its decision.
2. Whether the Appeal Panel's use of the definition of dysesthesia introduced new material into the proceedings.
3. Whether the Appeal Panel failed to afford procedural fairness to Burton in the review process.
4. Whether the Appeal Panel was bound to reconsider every aspect of the previous MAC in issuing its new assessment.
Held
1. The court held that the Appeal Panel did not go beyond the grounds of appeal in issuing its decision.
2. The court held that the Appeal Panel's use of the definition of dysesthesia did not introduce new material into the proceedings.
3. The court held that the Appeal Panel did not fail to afford procedural fairness to Burton in the review process.
4. The court held that the Appeal Panel was not bound to reconsider every aspect of the previous Medical Assessment Certificate in issuing its new assessment.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the grounds of appeal as submitted by the Applicant and found that the Appeal Panel's decision was within those grounds. The court noted that the grounds of appeal were broad and allowed the Appeal Panel to address any issue it deemed relevant in assessing the whole person impairment. The court then addressed the Applicant's argument that the Appeal Panel's use of the definition of dysesthesia introduced new material into the proceedings. The court found that the definition was not new material but rather a clarification of an existing medical term that was relevant to the assessment of the Applicant's impairment. The court further held that the Appeal Panel did not fail to afford procedural fairness to the Applicant. The court found that the Applicant had been given an opportunity to respond to the Appeal Panel's decision and that the Panel had considered the Applicant's submissions. Finally, the court held that the Appeal Panel was not bound to reconsider every aspect of the previous Medical Assessment Certificate in issuing its new assessment. The court found that the Appeal Panel was entitled to make its own assessment of the Applicant's impairment based on the evidence before it and that it was not necessary for the Panel to agree with the previous assessment in every respect. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that an Appeal Panel in a workers compensation matter is entitled to consider relevant medical evidence and definitions in making its assessment, and is not bound to agree with previous assessments in every respect. The court distinguished this case from previous authority that suggested a more rigid approach to the reconsideration of previous assessments.