Quarrell v White - [2004] TASSC 45

[2004] TASSC 45

CITATION: Quarrell v White [2004] TASSC 45

PARTIES:  QUARRELL, Dion William
  v
  WHITE, Sergeant Graham Ross

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 1/2004
DELIVERED ON:  20 May 2004
DELIVERED AT:  Launceston
HEARING DATE/S:  30 April, 4 May 2004
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford J

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Jurisdiction, practice and procedure – Judgment and punishment – Sentence – Factors to be taken into account – Factual basis for sentence – Sentence to be of and related to offence – Generally – Whether circumstances of aggravation attributable to offences other than those of which offender convicted.
R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383, distinguished.
R v Causby [1984] Tas R 54; Travers v Wakeham (1991) 54 A Crim R 205, referred to.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [820]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  E G J Hughes
             Respondent:  J P Ransom
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Director of Legal Aid
             Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment ID Number: [2004] TASSC 45
Number of paragraphs: 27

Serial No 45/2004
File No LCA 1/2004

DION WILLIAM QUARRELL v SERGEANT GRAHAM ROSS WHITE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CRAWFORD J
20 May 2004

The applicant seeks to review that part of a magistrate's order made on 22 December 2003 that sentenced him to imprisonment for four months, on grounds that it was manifestly excessive and that the learned magistrate erred by taking into account as an aggravating factor the injury caused to the victim of a shooting.

He pleaded guilty to and was convicted of seven offences on complaint 30343/03, namely:

Count 1 – On 2 November 2002 at Launceston he possessed two .22 calibre bullets when he was not the holder of a licence for a firearm that took that ammunition, contrary to the Firearms Act 1996, s105(3)(a).
Count 2 – On 2 November 2002 at Launceston he possessed a shortened .22 calibre rifle when he was not the holder of a firearm's licence in respect of it, contrary to the Firearms Act, s9(1).
Count 3 – On 2 November 2002 at Launceston he possessed that rifle when it was an unregistered firearm, contrary to the Firearms Act, s74(1).
Count 4 – On 2 November 2002 at Launceston he possessed that rifle when it had been shortened to a length less than 65 centimetres, contrary to the Firearms Act, s116(b).
Count 6 – On 2 November 2002 at Ben Lomond he handled the rifle when he was under the influence of alcohol, contrary to the Firearms Act, s120(1).
Count 8 – On 2 November 2002 at Launceston he possessed a controlled plant product, cannabis, contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 2001, s25.
Count 9 – On 2 November 2002 at Launceston he used a controlled plant product, cannabis, contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act, s25.

The learned magistrate's comments on passing sentence were brief:

"I take those factors into account and in relation to the complaint as a whole and having regard to your…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Quarrell v White

Details

AGLC: Quarrell v White [2004] TASSC 45
Case: [2004] TASSC 45
Decision Date: 20 May 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Quarrell v White involved a dispute regarding the sentencing of the respondent, Quarrell, by the Supreme Court of South Australia. Quarrell was convicted of several offences and sentenced to imprisonment by the lower court. The appeal centred on the appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the lower court. Quarrell argued that the sentence was excessive and did not adequately reflect the factual basis of the offence or the principles governing sentencing. The primary legal issue for the court was whether the lower court had appropriately considered the relevant factors in determining the sentence, particularly the circumstances of aggravation, and whether these circumstances were attributable to offences other than those of which Quarrell was convicted.

The court considered the principles of sentencing in criminal law, emphasising that a sentence must be of and related to the offence for which the offender is convicted. The court examined whether the lower court had correctly identified and applied the relevant factors in imposing the sentence. The court highlighted that while circumstances of aggravation may be considered, they must be directly related to the offence in question. In this case, the court found that the lower court had not adequately distinguished between the circumstances of aggravation attributable to the offences of which Quarrell was convicted and those relating to other offences. The court determined that the lower court's sentence did not sufficiently reflect the factual basis of the offence or the sentencing principles.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the lower court for resentencing. The court instructed the lower court to reconsider the sentence, ensuring that it appropriately reflected the factual basis of the offence and adhered to the principles of sentencing. The court emphasised that the sentence must be proportionate to the offence and take into account all relevant factors, ensuring that any circumstances of aggravation were directly related to the offence in question. The final orders of the court mandated a reassessment of the sentence, with a direction for the lower court to provide clear reasons for the revised sentence in light of the court's findings.

Orders